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PREFACE
The purpose of this Report is to identify the best possible legal framework for carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) in New Zealand. The Report is of a study funded by the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment under research contract UOWX1204.
The aim of the research was to provide a comprehensive framework for the development of law and 
policy to govern CCS in New Zealand. The methodology involved an analysis of the existing law and 
policy as it applies to CCS, assessment of any barriers, and a comparison with law in selected other 
jurisdictions. That analysis was followed by discussion of different policy options and evaluation of 
the possibility of addressing CCS in the existing legal framework. Recommendations were made for 
law reform on each aspect of the subject. 
The Report is concerned with the legal framework for geological storage or sequestration of carbon 
dioxide (CO2). It does not address biosequestration, where CO2 is accumulated, temporarily or 
permanently, in forests or other vegetation. Nor is it concerned with the sequestration of CO2 in 
oceans, or with climate engineering. 
Our aim has been to evaluate the issues and policy choices in law reform for CCS, and to identify the 
nature of the law and regulation required. We have not sought to draft the legislation itself. Nor have 
we inquired whether CCS is needed, economic, or desirable. Questions of policy for the promotion 
of CCS lie outside this Report. Its concern is the law to regulate a CCS project, if one is proposed. The 
legal and regulatory settings must be such as to allow a project to be properly analysed in accordance 
with best international practice, and to allow for regulatory decisions to be implemented effectively. 
Thus we do not examine climate change policy, the price on the right to discharge greenhouse gases 
(the “price on carbon”), regulations that could compel companies to engage in CCS operations, or 
subsidies that could entice them to do so. It is likely that in New Zealand CCS will occupy specific 
niches rather than a more general or widespread position in the economy. Yet the premise of this 
research is that action on climate change requires all possible options to be available, and that no 
option should be unavailable for the mere reason that there is no legal framework for it. 
This Report has greatly benefited from input, suggestions and insights from its Advisory Committee: 
Sir Grant Hammond, President of the Law Commission; Margaret Wilson DCNZM; Brigid McArthur, 
Partner, Greenwood Roche Chisnall; George Hooper, Senior Consultant, Transfield Worley; and Chris 
Baker, Chief Executive Officer, Straterra. We acknowledge their valuable input and thank them for 
their time. We are equally thankful to members of the research team and others who could join 
the Advisory Committee and researchers for a two-day workshop during which a draft report was 
considered: Ian Havercroft, Senior Adviser of the Global CCS Institute, Nigel Bankes, Professor of Law 
at the University of Calgary, Robert Pritchard, Director of ResourcesLaw International in Sydney, and 
representatives from the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment and the Environmental 
Protection Authority. 
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We would also like to thank the following for their input and valued comments on the drafts of 
this Report: Michael Dworkin of Vermont Law School in his time at Waikato as a CEREL Visitor, 
Juliet Chevalier-Watts of Waikato University, James Hazeldine and Danielle Lind of Transfield Worley, 
Brad Field of GNS Science, Kennie Tsui from the Environmental Protection Agency, and Anne Aylwin 
and Kate Townsend from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. As well as having 
a role on the Advisory Committee, Margaret Wilson was always willing to share her knowledge and 
experience of policy and legislative processes. 
The sequence that we follow through the issues in this study is as follows, using the numbering of 
chapters in the Report.
Whether CCS injection activities can be managed under existing law.
The introductory matters required in the CCS Act.
Property rights.
A permitting regime.
Detailed regulation of CCS activities.
The relationship with other subsurface activities.
Transportation of CO2.
CCS in the marine environment.
Liability issues.
GHG accounting under the Emissions Trading Scheme.
Matters that require early attention.
Statements in this Report about the interpretation or application of legislation are the opinions and 
conclusions of the authors, and should not be regarded as legal advice. Any errors or omissions are 
those of the authors and not of the Advisory Committee or of any of the people who kindly agreed 
to review drafts. 
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The law is stated as at 13 September 2013, with one or two more recent developments noted. 
One of these is that the Marine Legislation Bill was split into two bills via supplementary order paper and 
enacted, on 22 October 2013, as the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental 
Effects) Amendment Act 2013 and the Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2013. Different provisions 
will come into force on different dates. The text of the legislation remains, in substance, largely the 
same as in the version of the Bill reported from Select Committee (on which this Report relies). 
Two late changes are, however, worthy of brief note: the Amendment Act introduces the concept of 
a non-notified discretionary activity status into the EEZ Act, and also shifts responsibility for 
emergency discharges in continental waters from the Maritime Transport Act to the EEZ Act. Our text 
however remains as it stood before the Bill became law; the changes do not alter the substance of the 
Report’s recommendations in relation to CCS.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a method of reducing emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) in order 
to reduce the effects of human activity on the global climate. At thermal power stations and industrial 
plants where large amounts of CO2 are generated, various capture technologies can separate CO2 from 
other gases that will be discharged to the atmosphere and compress it. It can then be transported by 
pipeline to a location where it can be injected deep underground (at least 800 metres) for permanent 
storage or sequestration. Several different types of geological formation can provide effective CCS 
storage, allowing CO2 to be injected in sufficient quantity and containing it permanently under 
impermeable cap rock formations. CCS brings together technologies that are well understood, and a 
number of large CCS operations have been operating in different countries for some time. Although CCS 
will be a new activity in New Zealand, there is a great deal of experience with it elsewhere.
Work in New Zealand has identified a number of possible sources of CO2 that would justify CCS 
operations. Some of them are coal and natural gas fired power stations, although New Zealand has 
less fossil-fuel electricity generation than many countries. Other sources are industrial activities such 
as gas processing, oil refining, cement making and steel making. Suitable geological formations for 
CCS injection and storage have also been identified. 
Law for carbon capture and storage 
This Report analyses existing law and regulation as it applies to CCS and makes recommendations for 
a legal regime that will make CCS possible in New Zealand, subject to proper regulatory constraints. 
Its purpose is a framework that will facilitate the evaluation of CCS projects and their implementation 
if approved. It does not consider policy settings or carbon prices that will bring CCS about or promote 
it; its focus is the regulation of CCS, not for CCS. Most of the focus of the Report is on the injection 
phase, and pipeline transportation along with it; relatively few legal issues arise in the capture 
phase of CCS. The Report considers the law concerning CCS projects onshore and offshore. Our 
recommendations are based on the rapidly-growing experience with CCS law and research on the 
subject internationally. Three valuable comparative reports contributed to the research and are found 
in the Appendices. 
The existing legal framework as it applies to CCS
Regulation of the injection and storage of CO2 under our existing legislation is problematic. The 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) does not enable CCS with any clarity, and indeed particular 
provisions may prevent CCS operations from proceeding. It is equally significant that the RMA 
does not facilitate the close ongoing regulatory supervision that CCS requires over very long time 
frames. Its procedures for the allocation of permits are unsuitable, especially in respect of the staged 
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regulation required for CCS, from exploration to injection and then post-injection. The RMA does not 
deal with long-term liability for CCS operations after closure. Similarly, the Crown Minerals Act 1991 
is not suitable for the regulation of CCS; even though it provides a staged application process for the 
different phases, and even though there is commonality between the geology and technology of CCS 
and oil and gas, its fundamental purpose is quite different. 
A close analysis of the RMA, the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental 
Effects) Act 2012 (EEZ Act), and the Crown Minerals Act 1991 produces the conclusion that none of 
those Acts is capable, either in its detail or its general architecture, of delivering the legal framework 
that is required for CCS. Thus, we conclude that new legislation should be enacted that specifically 
regulates the injection of CO2 for permanent sequestration, any subsequent leakage or migration, 
and exploration for storage formations. We propose that those matters will be removed from control 
under the RMA and EEZ Act, and will not require permits under them. Carbon dioxide storage under 
the proposed CCS Act will be more specific, and more capable of providing the kind of regulation 
that CCS requires. It can be drafted to be, and as a matter of principle it definitely should be, no 
less protective of the environment and human health than the RMA and EEZ Act. (We refer to the 
proposed Act as the “CCS Act”.) In regards to the transport phase, we conclude that the RMA and the 
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 provide a suitable framework, after amendment. 
A new CCS Act
The proposed CCS Act will provide a permitting regime for CCS activities in New Zealand both 
onshore and offshore, with regulation that is site-specific and performance-based. The purpose of 
the CCS Act will be to facilitate and to regulate the permanent geological sequestration of CO2, 
as part of efforts to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, in such a way as to protect the environment 
and human health and safety. It will also state ancillary principles to guide decision-makers exercising 
functions under the Act, including a duty to have regard to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Te Tiriti o Waitangi). 
Public participation for CCS should occur early and continue throughout the life of the project, 
with varying levels of engagement, however, there should only be one public hearing with 
submissions before a board of inquiry, at the point when an application for an injection permit is 
considered and determined. 
We consider the issues to be taken into account in determining which regulatory agency should 
administer the CCS law. It is unlikely that a new agency will be created to manage projects that, 
although large, will be infrequent. We do not recommend which agency should administer CCS. 
We refer simply to “the CCS agency,” “the regulator” or the “Minister,” without prejudging the matter. 
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Property rights
One of the fundamental legal issues for CCS is property rights. A CCS operator will need access to 
land, including the surface and subsurface, and will need to be protected against claims for trespass 
and nuisance for its use of the subsurface. 
For CCS pipelines and injection facilities, the law should allow a CCS operator to use existing 
RMA procedures as a network utility operator and requiring authority. That allows the operator to 
implement the RMA designation process in district plans. It also allows the operator access, under 
supervision, to rights of compulsory acquisition of land with compensation payable to the affected 
land owner. In regards to injection, this should be confined to companies that have been granted 
injection permits. The result is similar to what is done overseas, and to what is done in New Zealand for 
other pipelines and for oil and gas operations. The use of the subsurface for injection and permanent 
storage is somewhat different. A plume of injected CO2 may spread some kilometres, but without 
any perceptible effect on the enjoyment of the surface. Following the pattern of law reform in similar 
countries, we recommend that the rights and powers necessary to explore for storage formations and 
to inject CO2 and store it permanently be vested in the Crown. Compensation should be payable for 
actual loss or diminution of value to the land.
A permitting regime
The proposed CCS Act should provide for exploration permits and injection permits. This is common 
overseas. The permitting regime should be phased, transparent and flexible. It should provide suitable 
investment security, protection of existing uses, and control of the activity of permit holders. The initial 
phase is exploration. An application for an exploration permit must include details about the technical 
qualifications and financial resources of the applicant, its proposed work plan, and a public participation 
proposal detailing the level of public engagement proposed for the life of the project. The permit gives 
the holder the exclusive right to explore a specified area for CCS storage formations for a limited 
time and to undertake the work necessary to establish site characterisation, which is necessary for an 
application for an injection permit. Test injections may be carried out with approval. The exploration 
permit also gives a priority right to an injection permit. 
The second phase is the injection permit. An application for an injection permit is the occasion for 
the thorough scrutiny of a CCS injection project in order to decide whether it is in the public interest 
for it to be allowed to proceed. The applicant must provide a proposed site plan which includes a site 
characterisation, environmental impact assessment, work plan, monitoring plan, corrective measures 
plan, and site closure plan. The application will be determined by a board of inquiry, with submissions 
from the public and a public hearing. In order to obtain the injection permit, the applicant must meet 
a threshold test spelled out in the law; that the project will not present significant risk of leakage 
from permanent storage, significant risk to health and safety, or significant risk to the environment. 
If the project meets that test, the board of inquiry may grant the injection permit. It also approves 
the initial site plan. This approval may be withdrawn later by the Minister or regulatory agency if 
there appears any significant risk to human health, the environment, or other resources, or if there is 
non-compliance with the CCS Act. The Minister can subsequently re-approve the site plan when the 
situation is remedied. Conditions can be attached to the permit regarding the storage site, but the 
operational and technical details will be managed under the site plan. No term will be stated for an 
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injection permit. Instead, an injection permit will continue until the regulatory agency issues a site 
closure authorisation. A site closure authorisation will signify the end of liability for the CCS operator. 
It will be granted only when the injected CO2 is behaving as expected, a monitoring plan is provided 
and paid for in advance, and all decommissioning obligations are met.
Detailed regulation of CO2 injection activities
The detailed technical regulation of CO2 injection will be carried out through an approved site plan. 
If there is a significant problem with the operator’s performance or with the project generally, 
approval may be withdrawn, meaning that injection is prohibited. The use of the site plan in regulating 
operations, instead of imposing conditions on a permit, is to facilitate flexible regulation, to allow 
for technological advancement, and to deal with any unexpected behaviour in the injected CO2. 
The site plan will be reviewed regularly and when necessary, and will be varied as appropriate. 
In certain situations the Minister should be able to issue directions requiring the operator to do, 
or refrain from doing, any act; and the Minister may require the operator to carry out corrective 
measures to rectify an irregularity. 
The design aspects of injection wells are to be regulated under Health and Safety legislation. 
We recommend regulations be promulgated that will address CCS exploration and storage. 
An important part of the framework for regulating CCS is measurement, monitoring and verification. 
This work is necessary to ensure the integrity of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), because CCS 
is a removal activity which could receive credits under the Scheme. 
Relationship with other subsurface activities
Other subsurface resources and activities may be affected by CCS; oil and gas, coal, geothermal 
energy, saline aquifers, and potable groundwater are examples. Both harmful and beneficial effects 
are possible. CCS law will need to manage the relationships between these resources and their users. 
It will need to protect existing uses and facilitate new ones. The Minister or some other decision-maker 
will have power under the proposed CCS Act to evaluate the merits of competing proposals, and make 
decisions in the public interest, using either spatial separation, permit conditions, or control of specific 
activities. CCS proposals will need to identify existing uses and the effect on other resources as part of 
the environmental impact assessment submitted in the proposed site plan. To facilitate the resolution 
of conflict between competing uses, we recommend that a set of principles be included. Both the CCS 
Act and the Crown Minerals Act will need provisions to allow a decision-maker to take the principles into 
account when determining competing applications. 
Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) can work by injecting CO2 underground in order to stimulate petroleum 
flow, and can therefore involve CCS issues. EOR can be carried out with no intention of leaving CO2 
in storage, but it can also be carried out in a manner that leaves considerable amounts of the gas in 
permanent underground storage. In order to claim the benefits of CCS (and in particular removal 
credits under the ETS), an operator will have to meet the regulatory standards of the CCS Act. 
We propose that it be possible for an EOR operator to be a voluntary participant in the ETS in order to 
claim credits if it holds an injection permit under the CCS Act. 
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Transportation of CO2
Carbon dioxide is likely to be transported between the capture facility and the injection installation 
via pipeline. The design of CO2 pipelines is reasonably well understood, and is the subject of a parallel 
study. The existing legal framework does not provide clearly for CO2 pipelines, and clarity is required. 
Pipelines are currently regulated under the RMA and the Health and Safety in Employment Act, and 
both statutes need to be amended to deal with CCS. As we noted above, a CCS pipeline operator 
should be a network utility operator under the RMA, in order to enable it to obtain rights to land, 
and to enable it to use the designation process under the RMA. A National Environmental Standard 
on CO2 pipelines under the RMA is also recommended to facilitate a national approach, and to state 
objectives, policies, standards, and in particular decommissioning requirements. The Health and 
Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999 also need amendment to ensure that they apply 
to CO2 pipelines. Further amendments are needed to clarify that the Regulations apply to pipelines 
offshore. Industry governance, and in particular third party access to CO2 pipelines and other CCS 
infrastructure with monopoly characteristics, should be controlled when necessary by regulations 
made under the CCS Act.
The legal framework for CCS offshore
We propose that the legal framework for CCS offshore be generally similar to that proposed for CCS 
onshore. It is necessary, however, that the CCS Act complies with the provisions in the Convention 
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) 
and its 1996 Protocol. The key requirement of the Protocol is that the CO2 stream shall consist 
overwhelmingly of CO2. The framework we recommend removes the injection of CO2 into storage 
formations under the seabed from the ambit of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012 and the RMA, and requires regulation under the CCS Act. However 
the EEZ Act and the RMA should continue to apply to incidental aspects of CCS operations. Pipeline 
regulations under the HSEA will need to be amended to include CO2 pipelines offshore.
Liability
CCS operations overseas have not shown themselves to be likely to cause injury to persons or 
property, but general principles of law impose suitable levels of liability on a CCS operator during 
the operational period. The CCS framework we propose will remove the right of person to make a 
proprietary claim (eg for nuisance or trespass) against a CCS operator for subsurface operations that 
do not affect the surface. This is consistent with international trends. An operator will be required to 
provide financial assurance for its obligations under the CCS Act.
The key issue is long-term liability. Because of the time-frames involved with CCS projects, which 
can span many decades, a CCS operator may cease to exist or no longer have the financial capability 
to make good any claim for damages that may arise in the decades following site closure. We 
therefore recommend that the Crown assumes liability once a site closure authorisation is given 
by the regulatory agency. This liability will be for continued monitoring (paid for in advance by the 
operator), any remediation work, any actual losses, and remaining obligations under the ETS. Again 
this is consistent with international patterns of law reform. 
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CCS and the Emissions Trading Scheme
Under the New Zealand ETS, CCS is treated as a removal activity. Once the relevant provision is 
brought into force, a participant conducting CCS will be entitled to claim a credit for each tonne 
of CO2 that it removes from the atmosphere. However, this only includes emissions of CO2 from 
activities that are required to surrender units under the ETS. Because of the staged implementation of 
the ETS, this is a problem, and we propose that CCS be a removal activity whether or not the CO2 is 
from an activity that is required to surrender units. A robust measurement, monitoring and reporting 
regime will be necessary to ensure integrity of the ETS, and the Climate Change (Other Removal 
Activities) Regulations 2009 should be amended or complemented with regulations for CCS for this 
purpose and for any other necessary matter. 
The Climate Change Response Act 2002 lists CCS as a removal activity but makes no other provision 
for it. To enable the ETS to require a CCS operator to surrender units for any leakage, then Schedule 3 
of the Act should be amended to require a CCS operator to be a participant that must surrender units. 
Furthermore, to ensure that a CCS operator will surrender units for any leakage following the cessation 
of injection, the Climate Change Response Act should require a CCS operator to be a participant until 
a site closure authorisation is given and liability passes to the regulatory agency.
Matters requiring early attention
We note three matters which deserve early attention in policy processes, even if a new CCS Act is not 
enacted immediately. First, a public awareness programme for CCS is desirable, in order to ensure 
that members of the public are well informed. The programme can be implemented in the general 
context of activity on climate change and energy policy. Secondly, we note that in some countries 
“CCS Ready” policies encourage or require industry to prepare for CCS in the construction of new 
facilities such as power stations, by ensuring that CCS retrofits are technically possible. CCS Ready 
may have niche applications in New Zealand and may have a broader role if new climate change 
policies are required. Finally, enhanced oil recovery (EOR) stands out as being a candidate for early 
implementation of CCS, and appears to deserve policy action in order to promote CO2 storage that is 
incremental and not merely incidental to petroleum recovery. 
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
BECCS Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage
CCRA Climate Change Response Act 2002
CCS Carbon capture and storage
CCSR  Carbon capture and storage ready
CCRA Climate Change Response Act 2002
CMA Crown Minerals Act 1991
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CO2-EOR Enhanced oil recovery using carbon dioxide
EEZ Exclusive economic zone
EEZ Act Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012
EGR Enhanced gas recovery
EHR Enhanced hydrocarbon recovery
EOR Enhanced oil recovery
GHG Greenhouse gas
GCCSI Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute
HSEA Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992
HSNOA Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996
IEA International Energy Agency
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDC Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter (London Convention)
LDP 1996 Protocol to the LDC 
MLB Marine Legislation Bill 2013 (58-2)
MMV Measurement, monitoring and verification
MtCO2 Megatonne of carbon dioxide
MTA Maritime Transport Act 1994
NES National environmental standard (under the RMA)
NPS National policy statement (under the RMA)
OPGGSA Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth, Australia).
RMA Resource Management Act 1991
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WRI World Resources Institute
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION
1 The Role of Carbon Capture and Storage
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a method of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that 
affect the global climate. It is a key tool for climate change mitigation. In order to limit the rise in 
global mean temperature to 2.0°C, a reduction in global emissions of 50–80 per cent of 2000 levels 
will be needed by 2050.1 CCS is one option for meeting this target, by capturing quantities of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) from the burning of oil, natural gas and coal, and from industrial processes, compressing 
it, and injecting it into geological formations where it will stay permanently. It can be seen as a step 
or an intermediate step towards a low carbon society. 
CCS involves three phases. The first, as the name suggests, is capture, mostly in the process of 
burning fossil fuels. The major sources of CO2 for CCS in many countries are electricity generation, 
including gas, coal, geothermal and biomass. The processes for the capture of CO2 can operate either 
pre-combustion or post-combustion. Capture is the most expensive phase of CCS, and a great deal 
of research and development effort is going into bringing the costs down.2 The capture phase does not 
involve a great number of legal issues beyond what are ordinarily associated with the construction 
and operation of any large industrial plant. 
The second phase of CCS involves purifying and compressing the CO2 into a supercritical phase to 
transport it to a location where a suitable geological storage formation exists. Transport will generally 
be by pipeline, because for the large quantities concerned pipelines are more economical than road 
or rail or shipping. The construction and operation of CO2 pipelines are well understood, and the legal 
issues are reasonably clear. A thorough analysis has been carried out in a parallel New Zealand study.3 
The third and final phase of CCS is the injection of the CO2 into the geological storage formation 
where it will be permanently stored or, more accurately, put into geosequestration.4 The storage 
formation needs capacity to take quantities of CO2, injectivity, and containment by virtue of caprock 
formations that have enough depth, physical integrity and impermeability to hold the CO2 in place 
permanently. Several different types of formation can perform effectively; deep saline aquifers with 
no surface connection, depleted oil and gas fields, and deep coal measures. A storage formation must 
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report (2007).
2 See International Energy Agency, CO2 Capture and Storage: A Key Carbon Abatement Option (2008) chapter 3 for a good 
discussion on capture technologies.
3 Transfield Worley, Carbon Dioxide Transport and Pipelines - Engineering Requirements for Design, Construction and Operation, 
170212-RPT-X0001, (July 2013).
4 See S Haszeldine “Geological Factors in Framing Legislation to Enable and Regulate Storage of Carbon Dioxide Deep in the 
Ground” in I Havercroft, R Macrory, and R Stewart, Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011). See also World Resources Institute, CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Dioxide Capture, 
Transport, and Storage (2008).
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be at least 800 m below the surface of the earth in order to keep the CO2 in supercritical state, and it 
will usually be deeper, as far as 3,500 m below the surface. The quantities of CO2 that may be injected 
are very large; as a rule of thumb, CCS is considered viable when CO2 emissions are above 0.8 to 1.0 
million metric tonnes per year for a coal-fired power station, and 0.4 million metric tonnes per year 
for other applications.5 This is far larger than a deep well waste-water disposal operation, for example. 
The likely lateral spread of CO2 and associated pressure waves in subsurface storage formations is 
likely to be kilometres or tens of kilometres from an injection well, so that the subsurface of a great 
deal of land is involved.6 These characteristics of the storage or sequestration phase of CCS involve 
the greatest number of legal problems, and feature prominently in this Report.
CCS is not new. According to the Global CCS Institute there are 68 large integrated CCS projects 
world-wide that are active or in planning, 17 of which are in operation or under construction.7 Eleven 
of the 17 projects involve enhanced oil recovery, which injects substantial quantities of CO2. The first 
large CCS project, Sleipner, in Norway, began operation in 1996, but enhanced oil recovery operations 
have been carried out for decades. Thus the engineering and geological issues in CCS operations are 
reasonably well understood.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) calculates that CCS could contribute 12 per cent of the emissions 
reductions necessary for the transformation of the global energy system by 2035 in the 450 Scenario, 
which could limit the temperature increase to 2.0°C, compared to the New Policies Scenario.8 The IEA 
has repeatedly urged member countries to work together to ensure the broad introduction of CCS by 
2020, as a critically important part of the path to achieve low-carbon stabilisation goals.9 It sets goals 
of at least 30 CCS demonstration projects by 2020 storing over 50 MtCO2 per year, by 2030 CCS is 
routinely used in the power sector and industry, storing 2,000 MtCO2 per year, and 7,000 MtCO2 
per year by 2050. It proposes a vision of CCS growing by 2030 into an industry with large-scale 
deployment and continued R&D and economies of scale reducing costs significantly.10 The sectors 
in which CCS will appear (electricity generation, other fuels, or industrial processes) will vary widely 
from country to country depending on the cost of local abatement opportunities. 
5 Transfield Worley Ltd, CCS in New Zealand: Can Carbon Capture and Storage Deliver Value to New Zealand? Summary Report 
(2011) at 5; Global CCS Institute, The Global Status of CCS, (January 2013). 
6 For details, see Chapter 4, where the implications of this characteristic for property rights are discussed.
7 Global CCS Institute, Status of CCS Project Database, available <www.globalccsinstitute.com> as at 30 June 2013.
8 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012 (2012) at 241. (Note however that energy efficiency could contribute 
more than half.) The 450 Scenario is where energy policies are adopted that put the world on a pathway consistent with a 50% 
chance of limiting the global increase in average temperature to 2°C in the long term, and the New Policies Scenario is where 
existing policies are maintained and recently announced commitments and plans are implemented in a cautious manner: at 35.
9 International Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage (2013).
10 At 23 and 36. 
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This Report is concerned with the legal framework for geological storage or sequestration of CO2. 
It does not address biosequestration, where CO2 is accumulated, temporarily or permanently, in 
forests or other vegetation. Nor is it concerned with the sequestration of CO2 in oceans or with 
climate engineering. Indeed, the London Protocol prohibits dumping of CO2 into sea water, although 
it allows sequestration into the subsurface seabed under a permitting regime.11 
Questions of policy for the promotion of CCS also lie outside this Report. Its concern is the law to 
regulate a CCS project, if one is proposed. The legal and regulatory settings must be such as to allow 
a project to be properly analysed in accordance with best international practice, and to allow for 
regulatory decisions to be implemented effectively. It is regulation “of” CCS, not regulation “for” CCS. 
Thus we do not examine climate change policy, the price on the right to discharge GHGs (the “price 
on carbon”), regulations that could compel companies to engage in CCS operations, or subsidies 
that could entice them to do so. This Report takes no position on such matters. It is likely that in 
New Zealand CCS will occupy specific niches rather than a more general or widespread position in 
the economy. Yet the premise of this research is that action on climate change requires all possible 
options to be available, and that no option should be unavailable for the mere reason that there is no 
legal framework for it. 
The purpose of this Report is to ascertain the best legal and regulatory framework for CCS in 
New Zealand. Our purpose is to recommend changes in the law that will allow for the consideration 
of a proposal for a CCS project, and for its implementation if the interests of the public and the 
environment are adequately protected. 
2 The Likely Character of CCS Operations  
in New Zealand
Considerable work has been undertaken to investigate the viability of CCS in New Zealand. 
Investigations of the geological, technical and engineering aspects of CCS have been undertaken 
by GNS Science,12 Transfield Worley, and the NZCCS Partnership.13 New Zealand participates in 
the Cooperative Research Centre for Greenhouse Gas Technologies (CO2CRC), in the Global CCS 
Institute, and the CCS work of the International Energy Agency. 
There are a number of existing sources of emissions of CO2 that have been identified as suitable for CCS. 
The largest at the present is the Huntly coal-fired power station that emits around 5–7 Mt of CO2 per year, 
and the next largest is the Glenbrook steel mill that emits about 1.7 Mt of CO2 per year.
14 Other emitters 
with CCS potential are the Marsden Point oil refinery, Golden Bay cement mill, Motunui methanol 
11 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 
(as amended in 2006), Article 4. See Chapter 9 on marine issues.
12 For a list of publications see <www.gns.cri.nz/Home/Our-Science/Energy-Resources/Oil-and-Gas/Research/Outputs-and-Outcomes>.
13 See particularly Transfield Worley Ltd, CCS in New Zealand: Case Studies for Commercial Scale Plant: Final Report (2010); 
Transfield Worley Ltd, Summary Report (2011) above n 5.
14 B Field and R Funnel, Carbon Capture and Storage in New Zealand – Why, Where, and When? Full Abstract (The Energy Conference, 
NERI, Wellington, February 2013).
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plants, Stratford power station, and Kapuni gas treatment and ammonia-urea plants.15 Some sources, 
such as the refinery and the Kapuni plants, separate CO2 as part of their existing operations, so that 
the capture phase is in effect completed already. Future sources may include new industrial activities, 
gas processing associated with new gas field discoveries, and biomass energy. Some configurations of 
biofuel production with CCS that are receiving research attention in New Zealand can effect permanent 
net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere.
16
Significant storage potential appears to exist in many parts in New Zealand, such as Taranaki, Canterbury, 
Whanganui, Northland and East Coast.17 Only Taranaki has been characterised well enough to be 
reasonably clear in its suitability and capacity. Potential storage sites capable of securely storing CO2 have 
been found there, and one can speculate that Taranaki may one day host a pipeline hub and storage sites 
accommodating local emissions and CO2 transported from other regions by pipeline. Depleted oil and gas 
fields may be the best opportunities for New Zealand, but the finding, appraisal and development of a 
geological storage site is likely to be the technically critical path for any CCS project.18
In New Zealand fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) make a smaller contribution to electricity generation 
than in many countries, 28 per cent in 2012; and renewable electricity generation (geothermal, wind 
and hydro) is increasing its contribution.19 The consequences are that CCS associated with electricity 
generation is less foreseeable in New Zealand, and that industrial processes such as gas processing, 
oil refining, and steel, aluminium and fertiliser production are more likely sources of CO2 for CCS.
3 Characteristics of Carbon Dioxide and Carbon 
Capture and Storage
Before we discuss the character of CCS itself and the possible risks that might arise from it, it will help 
to understand the characteristics of carbon dioxide.
3.1 Physical properties of carbon dioxide
Carbon dioxide is a non-toxic, non-flammable, odourless, colourless gas that is naturally present in 
the atmosphere and is an essential part of the life-cycle of plant and animal life on earth.20 Humans 
and other animals produce it in respiration; it is produced in the fermentation of organic compounds, 
and in volcanic activity. The quantities of CO2 that cause concern from a climate change point of view 
are those produced by the combustion of coal, oil and natural gas. 
15 Transfield Worley, Summary Report (2011), above n 13, at 5.
16 International Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap, above n 9 p 36. Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) uses 
biomass that has removed atmospheric CO2 while it grew, burns or ferments it to produce fuels and in the process produces CO2
 
which can be sequestered geologically, so that the result is a net removal of CO2
 from the atmosphere. 
17 B Field, M Arnot et al, New Zealand Carbon Dioxide Storage Site Assessment: Phase 2 (Canberra: Cooperative Research Centre for 
Greenhouse Gas Technologies Publication RPT09-1579, 2009); B Field and R Funnel Carbon Capture and Storage in New Zealand 
– Why, Where, and When? Full Abstract (The Energy Conference, NERI, Wellington, February 2013).
18 Transfield Worley, Final Report, above n 13 at 37-39.
19 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Energy in New Zealand (2013) at 63.
20 See B Metz, O Davidson, H de Coninck, M Loos, L Meyer (eds), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on 
Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage, (Cambridge university Press, 2005) Annex 1: Properties of CO2 and Carbon-Based Fuels.
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The physical properties of CO2 vary with temperature and pressure. At ambient conditions CO2 is a 
gas, at low temperatures it is a solid (dry ice), if it is warmed with low pressure it is a vapour, and at 
intermediate temperatures it may be compressed into a liquid. When CO2 is at temperatures higher 
than 31.1°C and the pressure is above 73.9 bar it enters a supercritical phase where it is dense and has 
properties between those of a gas and a liquid. It is in this phase that CO2 will be transported, injected 
and placed in permanent storage.
Carbon dioxide in its gas phase is 1.5 times denser than air, so it can accumulate in a low-lying area if there 
is no wind. It is soluble in water, and when released from pressure and is expanding rapidly its temperature 
decreases and it can freeze materials that come into contact with it. It also forms carbonic acid when in 
aqueous solutions. But, at the normal atmospheric concentration of 0.037 per cent, CO2 is considered 
harmless. The workplace exposure standards in New Zealand are 0.5 per cent concentration,21 and at 
concentrations of up to 1.5 per cent for an hour or more there are no noticeable physical consequences.22 
When concentrations increase to 3 per cent or above, hearing loss, headache and visual disturbances occur 
and health may be significantly affected. At concentrations in the range of 7–10 per cent CO2 acts as an 
asphyxiant and can be fatal. At concentrations above 20 per cent death can result in 20–30 minutes.23
3.2 Risk of leakage and harm from carbon capture and storage
The IEA considers that the main risks of a leakage in CCS arise during injection and immediately after 
the closure of an injection site.24 It estimates that provided the geological reservoirs are appropriately 
selected and managed, the CO2 retained underground is very likely to exceed 99 per cent over 100 
years with a 90 per cent probability, and is likely to exceed 99 per cent over 1,000 years with a 66 per 
cent probability. Overall, it is believed that the risk of CO2 leakage from properly sited operations is 
very low,25 but that careful site selection is vital. This is relevant to the design of a legal framework.
The main risks arise at the injection wells, and can be caused by poor design or the aging of 
equipment. Another source of risk is old oil and gas wells in the vicinity; if they have not been plugged 
and abandoned properly, they may allow leakage to the surface or into other underground strata. 
Inadequate characterisation of cap rock, seismic activity, and migration via natural fractures or 
hydrologic flow also present risks.26 However, the risk of a leakage is not the same thing as risk to 
human health or the environment; in fact, the risk to public health from even a large leak of CO2 
to the surface is likely to be minimal.27 Finally, it is significant that the longer that the CO2 is stored 
underground the less likely it is to move; it becomes progressively more stable. This is significant for 
the design of legislation, in that the risk of an unexpected event will decline over time.28 
21 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Workplace Exposure Standards and Biological Exposure Indices: Effective 
from February 2013 (7th ed) (2013) at 40.
22 Metz et al, above n 20, at 391.
23 At 392.
24 International Energy Agency, CO2 Capture and Storage, above n 2, at 125. A thorough analysis of risk and risk management 
is European Commission, Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide Guidance 
Document 1 CO2 Storage Life Cycle Risk Management Framework (2011).
25 A Ingelson, A Kleffner, and N Nielson, “Long-term Liability for Carbon Capture and Storage in Depleted North American Oil and 
Gas Reservoirs – A Comparative Analysis” (2010) 31 Energy Law Journal 431, at 437.
26 International Energy Agency, CO2 Capture and Storage, above n 2, at 125.
27 M Granger Morgan and S McCoy, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the Legal and Regulatory Barriers (RFF Press, 
New York, 2012) at 41.
28 At 40.
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Because of the extensive use of CO2 in industry already – in chemical manufacturing, beverage 
carbonation, refrigeration, and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) – the hazards of using it and handling 
it are well known and routinely managed, so that health and safety regulations offer adequate 
protection for workers on CCS sites.29 Benson says:
The potential public health and environmental risks of CCS are believed to be well understood 
based on analogous experience from the oil and gas industry, [and] natural gas storage …  
For CCS, the highest probability risks are associated with leakage from the injection well itself, 
abandoned wells that provide short-circuits to the surface and inadequate characterization of 
the storage site – leading to smaller than expected storage capacity or leakage into shallower 
geologic formations. Potential consequences from failed storage projects include leakage from 
the storage formation, CO2 releases back into the atmosphere, groundwater and ecosystem 
damage. Avoiding these consequences will require careful site selection, environmental 
monitoring and effective regulatory oversight. Fortunately, for the highest probability risks, 
that is, damage to an injection well or leakage up an abandoned well, methods are available  
to avoid and remedy these problems. … [I]mplemented on a small scale, in a well characterized 
geologic setting, geologic storage poses no unique or poorly understood risks.30 
The types of harm that may arise from leakage of a failed storage site include toxicological effects and 
harm to the environment and climate.31 Toxicological effects will depend on the concentration and 
duration of exposure. The accumulation of the gas in a topographically sensitive area could be a concern, 
with the possibility of harm to persons and livestock, although the gas can normally be expected to 
dissipate, just as it does from a gas processing plant or a thermal power station. The effect on plant life 
at high concentrations can be detrimental, but at moderate concentrations it can actually be beneficial. 
Environmental effects include harm to groundwater, where acidification of water can result. But when the 
water rises to the surface and the CO2 is no longer under pressure the CO2 will return to its gaseous state, 
resulting in bubbles of CO2 in the water – essentially, soda water. Just as with a bottle of carbonated soft 
drink, once the CO2 equilibrates with the pressure of the atmosphere the CO2 will dissipate.
32 A further 
effect is that brine displacement and the mobilisation of metal compounds in subsurface formations 
may occur. This would be significant if the formations was in hydrological communication with accessible 
potable groundwater or the surface. When CO2 is injected at high pressure into underground formations 
in CCS operations, there is a risk that it will affect the availability of other underground resources such as 
oil and gas. Finally, climate harm will occur where CO2 leaks to the atmosphere; in that case the effort to 
reduce an emission of greenhouse gas will not have been successful. 
Fortunately, keeping track of CCS storage formations to ensure that damage does not occur to them 
should not be difficult in New Zealand, because there will be few CCS operations in the foreseeable 
future, and because there is a low density of oil and gas drilling compared to other countries. However 
CCS increases the importance of high-quality data about wells for oil and gas, geothermal and other 
purposes, including their location and the manner in which they are plugged and abandoned. 
29 S Benson, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in Underground Storage Formations (2004) Centre for Climate and Energy 
Solutions 10-50 Workshop Proceedings <www.c2es.org> at 9.
30 At 9. 
31 M de Figueiredo, D Reiner, H Herzog, K Oye, The Liability of Carbon Dioxide Storage (presented at the eighth International 
Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies, Trondheim, Norway, 2006). See also A Ingelson, A Kleffner, and 
N Nielson, “Long-term Liability for Carbon Capture and Storage in Depleted North American Oil and Gas Reservoirs – 
A Comparative Analysis” (2010) 31 Energy Law Journal 431. 
32 This is Henry’s Law: see W Moore, Physical Chemistry (Longman, London, 1972), T Engel and P Reid, Physical Chemistry 
(3rd ed) (Pearson, uSA, 2013).
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4 Developing a Legal Framework
There is a clear consensus internationally and in New Zealand that CCS requires a comprehensive 
regulatory framework, in order to provide structure and certainty for operators, investors, and the 
public, and to ensure the safety and permanence of CCS operations.33 Without it, CCS will be either 
difficult or impossible; the lack of an adequate legal regime is a roadblock to progress. 
The legal situation of CCS in New Zealand has been considered in two published articles and an 
unpublished report.34 This research has confirmed that there is no adequate framework for CCS 
at present, and indeed that it is probably not actually possible at all under the existing law. At a 
minimum the existing law does not send a message that New Zealand is receptive to applications for 
CCS projects. The existing research has identified most of the main issues, but it leaves many of them 
unexplored in any detail. It does not carry out the analysis necessary to recommend a path of law 
reform for CCS. This study builds on that research, examining first the application of the existing law 
to CCS, chiefly in Chapter 2, and then the different components of viable law for CCS. 
There is considerable research under way internationally on law and regulation to provide for CCS, 
and we have drawn on it extensively in this study.35 International authorities have contributed to 
the study with comparative analyses of CCS legal developments in Australia, Canada, and Norway 
and the European union. Those analyses are Appendices A, B, and C of this Report. We have referred 
directly to the legislation of those jurisdictions where CCS laws have emerged, particularly the 
Australian Commonwealth, Victoria, and Queensland; Alberta in Canada; and the European union 
Directive of 2009 on CCS.36 We have referred to American developments as well, for example the 
research project that produced a bill ready for enactment by Congress.37 Particular initiatives such 
as the Alberta Regulatory Framework Assessment are worthy of note.38 International organisations 
are working on the development of CCS legal frameworks, in particular the Global CCS Institute, the 
International Energy Agency and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.39 
The best aggregation of current thinking about international best practice for CCS legislation is 
the International Energy Agency’s Model Regulatory Framework of 201040 and we have relied on it 
extensively. It is founded on a wide research base and addresses most of the issues that we believe 
33 Granger Morgan and McCoy, above n 27 at 63; Transfield Worley, Final Report, above n 13 at 7. 
34 B Barton, “Carbon Capture and Storage Law for New Zealand: A Comparative Study” (2009) 13 NZJEL 1; and G Severinsen, 
“Towards an Effective Legal Framework for the Geo-Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide in New Zealand” (2010) 16:2 Canterbury 
Law Review 331; Baker and McKenzie, Strategic Analysis of the Global Status of Carbon Capture and Storage: Report 3: Country 
Studies: New Zealand (GCCSI, 2009).
35 N Hoffman, “The Emergence of Carbon Sequestration: An Introduction and Annotated Bibliography of Legal Aspects for CCS” 
(2011) 29 Pace Envtl L Rev 218.
36 A publication that provides a useful critique of legislation is CO2 Capture Project, Regulatory Challenges and Key Lessons 
Learned from Real World Development of CCS Projects: Final Report (2012). 
37 Granger Morgan and McCoy, above n 27. 
38 Alberta Energy, Carbon Capture & Storage: Summary Report of the Regulatory Framework Assessment (2013); see also 
H Krupa, “Legal Frameworks for CCS in Canada” in I Havercroft, R Macrory and R Stewart, Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging 
Legal and Regulatory Issues (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) at 53.
39 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report (above n 20) deserves mention: It discusses CCS comprehensively, 
including the legal and regulatory issues, risks, costs and the economic potential, gaps in knowledge, and the implications for 
emissions inventories and accounting. The 2006 IPCC Guidelines on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories have been revised to 
include accounting for CCS within the Kyoto Protocol framework.
40 International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010). 
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are relevant to New Zealand. However it is not highly detailed and in a number of situations our 
analysis is better served by having regard to a range of options in the literature and in the legislation 
of different countries. The Framework does not inquire into the integration of CCS law into the general 
fabric of national legal systems, an aspect which features prominently in this research. The IEA Model 
Regulatory Framework is therefore important but not exhaustive and not the sole point of reference. 
We can identify certain other items that we have particularly relied on in this study. 
• Bankes, N, Poschwatta, J and Shier, M, “The Legal Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage in 
Alberta” (2007) 45 Alta L Rev 585. The article examines the legal issues particular to injection and 
storage (property rights, regulation, and liability) in an Alberta context.
• Granger Morgan, M and McCoy, S and others, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the 
Legal and Regulatory Barriers (RFF Press, NY, 2012). This book gives an evaluation of the united 
States law, addressing pipelines, permitting, access arrangements, liability, GHG accounting, and 
concludes with a draft Bill for the united States Congress.
• Havercroft, I, Macrory, R and Stewart, R, Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory 
Issues (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011). A global view of CCS is provided in this publication, with 
perspectives from Canada, the united States, Europe, Australia, India and China. It identifies 
developments in the law of CCS, trends, barriers, and obstacles that need to be addressed.
• International Energy Agency, Legal Aspects of Storing CO2 : Update and Recommendations (2007). 
This publication identifies key legal issues, provides case studies, and makes useful conclusions. 
• International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010), 
noted above. 
• Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Geological 
Storage Australian Regulatory Guiding Principles (2005). These regulatory guidelines identify the 
different facets of a CCS project that require a nationally consistent approach: assessment and 
approvals process, access and property rights, transportation, monitoring and verification, liability 
and post-closure responsibilities, and financial issues. Advantages and disadvantages are discussed 
on options for implementation.
• World Resources Institute, CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Dioxide Capture, Transport, and 
Storage (2008). Guidelines are included for regulators, policy makers, and project developers and 
have a technical focus covering all phases of a CCS project.
• World Resources Institute, CCS and Community Engagement: Guidelines for Community Engagement 
in Carbon Dioxide Capture, transport, and Storage Projects (2010). This document identifies key 
principles and provides guidelines for regulators, local decision-makers, and project developers for 
effective community engagement, based on themes and lessons learned from case studies. 
(This list is by no means comprehensive. It is confined to items that consider the overall legal 
framework. A number of other publications address specific issues such as property rights, 
measurement, monitoring and verification (MMV), transport of CO2, and liability.)
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There is a reasonable consensus about the issues that CCS law reform must deal with. The IEA Model 
Regulatory Framework lists them as shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: Key issues relating to CCS regulatory frameworks identified by the IEA
Broad 
regulatory 
issues
1. Classifying CO2
2. Property rights
3. Competition with other users and preferential rights issue
4. Transboundary movement of CO2
5. International laws for the protection of the marine environment
6. Providing incentives for CCS as part of climate change mitigation strategies
Existing 
regulatory 
issues applied 
to CCS
7. Protecting human health
8. Composition of the CO2 stream
9. The role of environmental impact assessment
10. Third-party access to storage site and transportation infrastructure
11. Engaging the public in decision making
CCS-specific  
regulatory 
issues
12. CO2 capture
13. CO2 transportation
14. Scope of framework and prohibitions
15. Definitions and terminology applicable to CO2 storage regulations
16. Authorisation of storage site exploration activities
17. Regulating site selection and characterisation activities
18. Authorisation of storage activities
19. Project inspections
20. Monitoring, reporting and verification requirements
21. Corrective measures and remediation measures
22. Liability during the project period
23. Authorisation for storage site closure
24. Liability during the post-closure period
25. Financial contributions to post-closure stewardship
Emerging CCS 
regulatory 
issues
26. Sharing knowledge and experience through the demonstration phase
27. CCS ready
28. using CCS for biomass-based sources
29. understanding enhanced hydrocarbon recovery with CCS
Source: IEA, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010) at 17.
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A useful simplified listing of the CCS legal issues is:
1. Property issues
2. Regulatory issues or permitting system
3. Long-term liability
4. Carbon crediting and accounting.41 
The sequence that we follow through the issues in this study is as follows, using the numbering of 
chapters in the Report.
2. Whether CCS injection activities can be managed under existing law.
3. The introductory matters required in the CCS Act.
4. Property rights.
5. A permitting regime.
6. Detailed regulation of CCS activities.
7. The relationship with other subsurface activities.
8. Transportation of CO2.
9. CCS in the marine environment.
10. Liability issues.
11. GHG accounting under the ETS.
12. The different stages where regulatory change is necessary and matters that require 
early attention.
This study confines itself to legal and policy matters. It makes no judgement about scientific, 
engineering or technical matters. On the borderline between legal and technical matters, one notes 
that much effort has been made internationally for best practice guidelines and standards for the 
design and operation of CCS projects. Notable are the World Resources Institute Guidelines mentioned 
above, and the Det Norske Veritas Guidelines and recommended practices for managing risk and 
covering all phases of a CCS project. Indeed, the recommended practices from Det Norske Veritas 
have been the foundation for the European union’s Guidance Document to the implementation of the 
CCS Directive.42 The International Standards Organisation is also pursuing standards for all phases of 
CCS, and the Canadian Standards Association is also active, having promulgated a standard covering 
the storage phase of CCS. 
41 N Bankes, The Developing Regime for the Regulation of Carbon Capture and Storage Projects in Canada, Appendix B, 
at 14-345. 
42 The Guidance Document 1 is based on CO2QuALSTORE and adapted to meet the needs and terminology of the CCS 
Directive; Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide: Guidance Document 1 
– CO2 Storage Life Cycle Risk Management Framework (2011) at 35.
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5 International Law Considerations
Although CCS has received a lot of attention internationally, there are few international treaties 
or conventions that affect the actions of a state in making law for CCS, at least on land. The key 
international convention is the united Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(uNFCCC). Although the Convention does not specifically mention CCS, it does say that “‘[s]ink’ 
means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas … from the atmosphere”. 
This appears to include the sequestration of CO2 in geological formations. under the uNFCCC all 
parties commit themselves to promote and cooperate in the development of technologies and 
processes that control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic GHG emissions in the energy, transport, 
industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors. To do so, each party shall adopt national 
policies and take corresponding measures to mitigate climate change, limiting its emissions of GHGs 
and protecting and enhancing its GHG sinks and reservoirs.43 From this obligation one can infer that 
New Zealand has an obligation to promote and develop CCS as a means of reducing our GHG 
emissions, but if so it is only at a very general level. In the Kyoto Protocol to the uNFCCC, the Annex 
I parties of the developed world were encouraged to implement or elaborate policies and measures 
in accordance with its national circumstances such as research on, and promotion, development and 
increased use of CO2 sequestration technologies.
44 Again it is a very general obligation. More specific 
was the decision in 2011 under the Kyoto Protocol to allow CCS to be counted in emission reductions 
under the Clean Development Mechanism. That constituted a ratification of sorts of CCS, but its 
application is to projects in non-Annex I countries, so does not affect CCS in New Zealand. More 
relevant will be the treatment of CCS in the conventions or protocols that may be negotiated to 
succeed the Kyoto Protocol. It is highly unlikely that they will be adverse to CCS as a means of mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions, but they may make new requirements about how CCS is to be included 
in a state’s carbon accounting. That could affect the measurement, monitoring and verification (MMV) 
of CCS projects. 
At sea, the chief applicable law is the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention) and the London Dumping Protocol 
of 1996 which for New Zealand effectively supersedes the Convention.45 The Protocol prohibits the 
deliberate dumping at sea of many substances. Carbon dioxide was one such substance, but in 2006 
an amendment was made to allow CCS to proceed, provided that it is injection into sub-seabed 
geological formations and not the water column, provided that it is subject to a permitting regime, 
and provided that the CO2 stream must “consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide”.
43 united Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (signed 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994), Art 4. 
44 Kyoto Protocol to the united Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (signed 11 December 1997, entered into force 
16 February 2005) Art 2(1). 
45 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1046 uNTS 120 (signed 29 December 
1972, entered into force 30 August 1975); 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter 36 ILM 1 (signed 7 November 1996, entered into force 24 March 2006). The London Convention and 
Protocol are more fully discussed in Chapter 9.
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The international community is making substantial efforts to advance CCS in the field of international 
policy activity even if there is little activity in international law. The efforts focus on research and on 
informing policy makers about the potential of CCS to provide for the safe and effective permanent 
sequestration of CO2 in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Global CCS Institute and the 
IEA are the two main intergovernmental organisations. Industry organisations and research institutes 
are also active.46
Overall, it is only at sea (in the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and extended continental 
shelf) that international law imposes constraints on the making of new law in New Zealand on CCS. 
There are few international obligations affecting the design of CCS law in New Zealand.
46 For example, the CCS Association in London; the CO2 Capture Project combining members from the united States and the 
European union; the CCS Network established by the European Commission; and CO2CRC, a collaborative research centre of 
Australia and New Zealand.
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CHAPTER 2 
CCS AND EXISTING LAW
1 Introduction
This Chapter addresses a basic question of legislative design, the extent to which existing law 
can be used to provide an approvals process, or permit, for the storage phase of CCS and how the 
detailed regulation of activities can be provided for. Its primary subject matter is the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA), the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA), and the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (EEZ Act). It also addresses the Health and 
Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSEA) and other ancillary legislation that affects CCS. Its general 
conclusion is that neither the RMA, the EEZ Act nor the CMA provides a basis for law for CCS, whether 
amended or unamended; but that the HSEA should apply to CCS activities. 
The Climate Change Response Act 2002 is considered in Chapter 11. It does not need to be included 
in the analysis at this point because it does not have provisions that could be adapted to establish 
an approval and regulatory process for CCS. Its purpose is to meet New Zealand’s international 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and to establish the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme. 
2 Resource Management Act 1991
2.1 General characteristics of the RMA relevant to CCS policy 
The RMA is New Zealand’s main environmental law. With its predecessors in land use planning, water 
management and pollution control, it has roots that go back many decades in the New Zealand legal 
system. It applies to virtually any land-based or resources-based project in New Zealand or in the 
territorial sea, out 12 nautical miles from the shore. It is the subject of continuing political debate, and 
has been amended most years since 1991, but it also represents a shared body of assumptions about 
the law for the management of natural resources and the environment. It represents something of 
a benchmark against which proposals for other environmental and resources legislation will be judged. 
In the analysis below, we first consider the character of the RMA, and then the application of the 
RMA as it now stands to CCS. It is reasonably clear that under the present law CCS injection is a 
discharge of a contaminant into land and therefore subject to regulation under the RMA, but that 
provisions in the Act on climate change probably make it difficult to obtain consent. We then ask, 
even if these particular obstacles were removed, whether the RMA would provide a satisfactory 
regulatory framework for CCS, and we come to the conclusion that it would not; the way that permits 
are managed and the limited extent of regulation after a permit is granted are notable problems. 
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We then consider a range of options for using the RMA, concluding that the injection of CO2 should 
move out of the RMA while other aspects of CCS project stay under it. 
Many aspects of CCS are comparable with activities that are already managed under the RMA, and 
we recommend drawing on the accrued capability and experience where possible. For example, 
pipelines and oil and gas operations have for some time been managed (as to their environmental 
effects) under the Act. Other comparisons, such as deep well injection of waste, are less strong in 
that there is less RMA experience with them, and that the project scale, as we noted in Chapter 1, 
is enormously different. 
At the present two separate RMA law reform processes are under way. The Resource Management 
Amendment Act 2013 received assent on 3 September 2013. Some parts of it are already in effect 
and others will be brought into effect progressively. It deals with Auckland issues, faster processing 
of simpler consents, direct referral to the Environment Court, and new section 32 requirements. 
Secondly, the Minister has initiated a process of reform generally known as the RMA Phase Two 
reforms. (Phase One resulted in amendments in 2009.) The Minister released a discussion paper, 
drawing on a technical advisory group report and other technical discussion papers, and in August 
2013 announced an intention to proceed with legislation.1 
The RMA has certain characteristics that are relevant to the making of law for CCS.2 
Integration.  The RMA seeks integration in environmental and resource management. In the process 
of law reform that led to its enactment, one of the key concerns with the existing legislation was 
its diffuse and unconnected nature; there was a multitude of different laws dealing with urban land 
use, pollution, solid waste, noise, geothermal, mining, oil and gas, harbours, etc. An applicant would 
need to apply under multiple statutes. Decision makers under the different statutes had different 
mandates to pursue and different criteria to apply. A key policy objective for the RMA was therefore 
to produce uniformity of principle, consistent procedures, and above all integrated management. 
In relation to CCS, the characteristic of integration suggests that there should be caution in removing 
some resource management issue from the RMA. However, this has now been done several times 
where it has been thought necessary: hazardous substances and new organisms, and greenhouse 
gas emissions (to the extent they impact on climate change) are examples. (Crown minerals were 
originally to be part of the Act but were removed before the law reform process was completed.) 
1 Ministry for the Environment, Resource Management Summary of Reform Proposals 2013 (ME 1119, August 2013). 
2 See D Grinlinton, “Integrating Sustainability into Environmental Law and Policy in New Zealand” in K Bosselmann, D Grinlinton 
and P Taylor (eds), Environmental Law for a Sustainable Society (2nd ed) (Auckland: NZ Centre for Environmental Law, University of 
Auckland, 2013) at 21; K Palmer, “Resource Management Act 1991” in D Nolan (ed), Environmental and Resource Management Law 
(4th ed) (Wellington, LexisNexis, 2011) at 93.
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Similarly, EEZ environmental law reform has been carried out with a new Act outside the RMA, 
although the Act follows the pattern of the RMA in some respects. 
Consistency.  The RMA seeks to provide consistent management of all uses of natural and physical 
resources, and consistent treatment of projects whatever activity or industry they come from; a gold 
mine and an aggregate quarry, for example, should both be considered on the basis of their effects on 
the environment rather than the category of activity that they fall into. Projects sponsored by local 
government and central government should be treated the same as private projects. In the reform 
process there was an intention to ensure that government-sponsored projects did not get exempted 
or fast-tracked outside the main laws. It was intended that similar projects would be evaluated 
similarly on the basis of their effects on the environment, without undue regard to which industrial 
sector they came from. For CCS reform, this characteristic indicates the desirability of consistency of 
principle, and minimising the extent to which environmental regulation differs from one industry or 
one activity to another. 
Integrated public participation.  The RMA encourages public participation and seeks to initiate it at 
an early stage of a strategic initiative or a project application, but it seeks to channel participation 
through one set of procedures. The purpose again is to provide integration and to ensure that 
applicants and other participants do not face multiple hearings on different components of a project. 
For CCS reform, the point seems to be that it is desirable to provide for public participation, but to 
avoid a multiplicity of statutory procedures. 
Decentralisation. Decentralised decision-making is a characteristic of the RMA, based on the 
premise that local decision-makers are best placed to make the decisions that affect them most. 
Local bodies, some of them quite small, make decisions that in other countries would be made by 
a national or state-wide environmental protection agency. It was originally intended that central 
government would play a strong complementary role through national policy statements (NPS), 
national environmental standards (NES), and departmental advocacy. However the government’s 
role has not been an active one, even though some NPS and NES have appeared in recent years, and 
it has become more common for nationally significant projects to be “called in.” The administration 
of the law is dispersed. For CCS law reform, this characteristic poses a policy question, whether local 
bodies or central government should regulate CCS. 
Overlapping statutes and boundary issues.  The RMA is designed to focus on the environment, on 
the management of natural and physical resources. The general intention of its design is to keep 
it out of social planning and economic planning. While this distinction has not always been easy 
to implement, it helps explain why a major project will be regulated under more than one statute. 
General concerns such as buildings, health and safety, and local body infrastructure, for example, all 
have their own focus and own legislation that applies as well as the RMA. In addition, more specific 
legislation often controls aspects of particular activities or industries, such as oilfields and mines, 
airfields, and electricity transmission lines. It is therefore common for more than one Act to apply to 
a project. Complex projects have complex permitting requirements. 
Determining the legal effect of overlapping statutes is a significant part of statutory interpretation.3 
A court faced with such an issue will often determine that the legislature intended both Acts to 
3 J F Burrows and R I Carter, Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Wellington, LexisNexis, 2009).
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apply, sometimes because the legislation says so expressly, and other times because it is the natural 
meaning of the statutory framework as a whole. Only occasionally are statutes in direct conflict with 
each other. Law drafting seeks to minimise such occasions. Drafting seeks to state the boundaries of 
each regulatory regime, and sometimes includes mechanisms to deal with boundary issues.4 
For CCS law reform, we see that overlapping statutes and boundary issues are a normal state of affairs, 
whether general or standalone statutes are involved. The emphasis should therefore be on ensuring 
that the different statutes, considered together, provide a workable regulatory framework. There will 
be various options available in locating the boundaries between different statutory regimes, and they 
will all have their strengths and weaknesses. 
2.2 Application of the RMA to CCS as it stands 
The first set of questions to ask about CCS legal design in relation to the RMA is the extent to which 
CCS is controlled by the RMA as that Act stands at the present without amendment. Once that is 
clear it becomes possible to consider questions about the suitability of the RMA regime, with or 
without amendment. 
RMA permits required for CCS activity.  It seems clear that the injection of CO2 into a storage formation 
in land amounts to a discharge of a contaminant from industrial or trade premises into land within the 
meaning of section 15 of the RMA. It is therefore an unlawful action, subject to prosecution, unless 
authorised by a provision in a planning instrument or by a discharge permit.5 The definition of land 
in section 2 does not specifically say land extending downwards, but conventional legal uses of the 
word include the subsurface. Similarly a discharge of CO2 into a deep saline aquifer is a discharge of a 
contaminant into water within the meaning of section 15. There is no reason to think that discharges 
of CO2 are exempt from the Act because they are made unusually deep. The discharge of GHGs to the 
atmosphere from industrial or trade premises is a discharge of a contaminant within the meaning of 
the Act that requires a discharge permit.6 The consequence is that, under present regulatory settings, 
a carbon capture injection operation requires a resource consent from the regional council or unitary 
council. Council decisions on resource consents are usually governed by the provisions of the regional 
plan and regional policy statement, but we are not aware that any council has included provisions for 
CCS in its plan or regional policy statement (RPS). 
Leakage or migration of CO2 from the geological storage complex into which it has been injected in a 
CCS storage operation may constitute a separate discharge of a contaminant under section 15 of the 
RMA. The point is unclear. It could be that the discharge was the injection, and that the CO2 can only 
be discharged once, so that after the injection it is in the natural environment; alternatively, it can 
be argued that the discharge of the contaminant into a part of the environment authorised under a 
consent does not authorise a release of it from that part into another part. The terms of the consent 
would be important. If a leakage is a further discharge, then a further discharge consent is required, or 
else enforcement action including prosecution is possible.7 
4 See T Daya-Winterbottom “Resource Management Act Issues” Appendix D. The Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012 has a number of provisions to deal with cross-boundary projects. 
5 See Daya-Winterbottom, above n 4. 
6 Genesis Power Ltd v Greenpeace NZ Inc [2008] 1 NZLR 803 (CA) para 15. 
7 See Daya-Winterbottom, above n 4. 
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A CCS pipeline is likely to need approval under an RMA district plan in relation to the use of land, and 
under an RMA regional plan in relation to earthworks and the disturbance of watercourses. There is 
no general Pipelines Act. 
Other CCS activities are also subject to the RMA. Some of them may not need resource consents. For 
example, it is possible that a land use consent will not be necessary for CCS capture equipment at a 
power station or some other plant that is already dealt with under the district plan as an industrial or 
energy facility. In other cases resource consents are likely to be required for a CCS injection operation 
and associated pipelines. The more foreseeable of them are:
• Industrial facilities in a rural area;
• Incidental noise and light spill;
• Incidental discharges of gas or vapour;
• Incidental discharges of liquid waste;
• Incidental takings, diversions or damming of water. 
In addition, a project in the coastal marine area (inside the 12 nautical mile limit) will require coastal 
permits from the regional council, and a project in the exclusive economic zone (the EEZ) is likely to 
require a marine consent and marine dumping consent from the Environmental Protection Authority 
under the EEZ Act. Those matters are dealt with in Chapter 9. In every case, the actual needs of a 
project for resource consents depends on the detailed provisions of planning instruments under the 
RMA (rules in plans and national environmental standards), and the need for marine consents and 
marine dumping consents depends on regulations (when promulgated) under the EEZ Act. In practice 
the planning of a particular project requires a careful inventory of all such requirements.
RMA provisions on climate change and renewables.  The RMA appears to pose an unintended barrier 
to CCS in provisions concerning the discharge of GHGs. The general purpose of these provisions, 
inserted in 2004, is to prevent local authorities (mainly regional councils) from considering the effects 
on climate change of discharging GHGs to air when making rules and resource consent decisions. The 
background was the decision that the main national strategy for the mitigation of climate change 
would be a price on CO2 and other GHGs. That strategy is now implemented by the Emissions Trading 
Scheme, considered in Chapter 11. Section 104E is one of the main provisions:
When considering an application for a discharge permit or coastal permit to do something 
that would otherwise contravene section 15 or section 15B relating to the discharge into air of 
greenhouse gases, a consent authority must not have regard to the effects of such a discharge on 
climate change, except to the extent that the use and development of renewable energy enables 
a reduction in the discharge into air of greenhouse gases, either—
(a) in absolute terms; or 
(b) relative to the use and development of non-renewable energy.
Section 70A is similar to section 104E in instructing regional councils when making rules in regional 
plans not to have regard for the effects of the discharge of GHGs on climate change. The operation 
of these sections and the 2004 Amendment Act generally has been in dispute in the courts for some 
time, but some of the main features of the law have been clarified. It is not necessary to give a detailed 
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account of the decided cases, but we note the key points that indicate that the positive effects of CCS 
on climate change cannot be taken into account under the RMA.8
• The restriction in the 2004 Amendment concerns the effects of activities on climate change, and 
not the effects of climate change (i.e. adaptation).
• A purposive interpretation of the 2004 Amendment is required, using an overall scheme and 
purpose approach to the RMA as amended in 2004. 
• The clear legislative policy is that addressing the effects of activities on climate change lies outside 
the functions of councils under the RMA.
• The discretion under section 104 to grant resource consents is consequently restricted.
• The restriction applies to territorial authorities as well as regional councils, and applies to ancillary 
consents as well as consents for the actual discharge of contaminants to air. The carve-out for 
effects on climate change is a wide one. 
• Parliament was mindful of the positive effects of reductions in the discharge of GHGs, but chose 
to allow them to be considered only in relation to the use and development of renewable energy.
• Under a purposive interpretation, the consent that CCS would need under section 15 to discharge 
CO2 into a storage formation would be one relating to the discharge of a greenhouse gas into air 
(in the words of section 104E) so that its positive effects on climate change cannot be considered. 
Its only purpose, and positive effect, is the avoided discharge of a GHG to air, but that positive 
effect cannot be taken into account.
• A decision on a CCS discharge to storage would ordinarily require consideration of the effects 
of the alternative to storage, the discharge of GHGs to air; but on a purposive approach that 
consideration cannot be taken into account.
In summary, the current law is that neither positive nor negative effects of an activity on climate change 
may be taken into account; and the application need not be for a discharge for this to be so; it can be an 
application for some other aspect of a project. The overall consequence appears to be that the positive 
effect of CCS on climate change cannot be taken into account (it is not a renewable energy project), 
but its possible negative effects on the environment more broadly can be. This could make it practically 
impossible to get consent for a CCS project, and below we recommend an amendment to avoid that result. 
Sections 70B and 104F contemplate the making of a National Environmental Standard (NES) that 
could control the effects on climate change of the discharge into air of greenhouse gases. If such an 
NES is made, then regional plans may include rules to implement it (and which cannot conflict with 
it), and consent authorities would need to implement the standard in their decisions on resource 
consents. There are uncertainties about how such an NES is intended to work. An NES in effect states 
rules, such as a rule that states that some activity is a permitted or controlled activity or must meet 
certain standards to be classified as such. An NES does not state the policy considerations to be taken 
into account, once the need for a resource consent has been triggered, which affects the application 
8 The two main cases are Genesis Power Ltd v Greenpeace NZ Inc [2008] NZSC 112, [2009] 1 NZLR 730 (SC) and West Coast ENT Inc 
 v Buller Coal Ltd [2013] NZSC 87, 19 September 2013. In the latter decision, refer in particular to paras [130], [169], [171]-173], [176].
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of section 104F in particular. If an NES is accompanied by a National Policy Statement (NPS), the 
problem may be resolved. However it is not clear that an NPS or even an NES can entirely lift the 
prohibitions in sections 70A and 104E. The Act does not provide for an NPS to override the prohibition. 
Although an NES can override the prohibition, it is still not clear that an NES can be issued to favour 
CCS, when the allowed purpose is to control the effects of climate change on the discharge of GHGs 
to air. The closest it may be able to come is to require certain discharges to be abated by CCS. 
An additional RMA difficulty for CCS applications is the preference it states for renewable energy 
sources. Section 7(j) directs RMA decision-makers to have particular regard to the benefits to be 
derived from the use and development of renewable energy. The NPS on Renewable Electricity 
Generation made in 2011 encourages decision-makers in the same direction, and directs them to 
have regard to the government’s target, which is 90 per cent of electricity generation to come from 
renewable sources. The preference for renewables does not translate into a ban on thermal electricity 
generation, nor does it translate directly into opposition to CCS associated with fossil fuel generation, 
but CCS could be said to undermine the 90 per cent target by making fossil fuels more viable.9 
Some alleviation of these RMA difficulties for CCS could be obtained by making an NES as contemplated 
by sections 70B and 104F accompanied by an NPS. However the foregoing analysis shows that that 
option may not be enough. It leaves a number of obscurities of interpretation, in a field where there 
has been much dispute in the courts.10 The more prudent option, which we recommend, is to take 
those steps, making an NES and an NPS, but in addition to make amendments to the RMA itself to 
remove the barrier. In particular we recommend: 
• Add a matter to section 7 along the lines of renewable energy, so that decision-makers must have 
particular regard to the benefits to be derived from the use and development of CCS.
• Add a second exception to sections 70A and 104E to allow councils and consent authorities to have 
regard to the extent that the use and development of CCS enables a reduction in the discharge 
into air of greenhouse gases, either in absolute terms or relative to the use and development of 
non-renewable energy without CCS.
From a general law reform point of view, the occasion may serve also to clarify some of the difficulties 
that the 2004 amendments have created; but one may reasonably foresee complexity and controversy 
in that course of action. 
The overall conclusion to this part of the consideration of the application of the RMA to CCS is that 
the Act does apply, and that there are likely to be serious difficulties, probably not intended in the 
enactment or amendment of the Act, in obtaining approval of a CCS project under the Act. It is not 
possible to put the matter beyond doubt. But the likelihood of difficulty seems strong enough to 
require law reform action if CCS is to be possible. It may be that minor amendments along the lines 
suggested would be enough, but, whether they need to be major or minor, what seems clear is that 
amendments to make CCS possible seem to be essential. 
9 Admittedly, in the short term CCS in New Zealand is more likely to be associated with industrial or chemical processes than with 
electricity generation. 
10 It is not clear how an NES or an NPS will override the restrictions in ss 70A and 104E. One notes in particular that ss 70B and 
104F says that the regional council consent authority must make rules or a decision as “necessary to implement the standard”; 
this test of necessity may prove to be difficult to apply. 
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2.3 The RMA as a regulatory framework 
The second set of questions about the RMA in relation to CCS legal design goes beyond the difficulties 
described above, and the possibility of minor amendments to remove specific barriers to CCS, and 
considers more broadly whether the RMA would provide a satisfactory regulatory framework CCS. 
Before considering what we believe to be a series of difficulties, we should identify the advantages of 
using the RMA to regulate CCS. Integration and comprehensiveness in environmental management 
would be advanced. The value of generality in the law would be advanced. There would be no special 
Act for one industry. There would be less risk of special preference or advantage to one industry or 
kind of activity. There would be no boundary issues between the RMA and some new Act. There are 
precedents for the use of the general RMA framework with modifications, for example with respect 
to aquaculture.
The RMA is a long-established and well-understood framework of law and practice, and using it for 
CCS would have advantages. The value of building on existing regulation for CCS has often been 
recognised. The RMA has a carefully-considered purpose and principles and strategic planning 
procedures. The procedures for handling applications for project resource consents, including public 
participation, are carefully stated and well known. The management of resource consents including 
term, inspection, transfers, and surrenders are all well provided for. Other provisions deal with 
monitoring and enforcement. Requiring authority and designation procedures are well-fitted to the 
needs of pipelines. Project activity in lakes, rivers, and the territorial sea are accommodated. 
Nonetheless, there are several aspects of the RMA that are at odds with what is needed to regulate 
CCS properly, judging by the consensus of international thinking reflected in the IEA Model Regulatory 
Framework, the WRI Guidelines, and the CCS legislation enacted in Australia and Canada. We go 
through the issues one by one. The result is that we find a number of characteristics of the RMA that 
do not produce the kind of regulation that CCS requires. They imply that a stand-alone CCS Act would 
be more clear and facilitative than an RMA amendment.
Permit management.  Several aspects of the RMA present difficulties for the kind of permits that 
international experience and analysis show to be desirable for CCS. It is generally recognised that CCS 
rights need to be granted as authorisations, licences, or permits, in order to provide an orderly system 
of allocation of rights for different aspects of CCS, identifying the rights and obligations of a permit 
holder at each stage. Suitable provisions are needed for term, cancellation, transfer, and a number of 
administrative matters. The RMA deals with some of these matters in resource consents. There are 
several different kinds of resource consent, the main ones for our purpose being the discharge permit 
and the coastal permit. There is experience with the allocation of commercially valuable rights to 
resources in the form of RMA resource consents, such as water, geothermal fluid, and coastal space 
for aquaculture. However there are features of the Act that may prove difficult in the case of CCS. 
One particular difficulty for CCS is a key feature of the RMA’s application to the allocation of rights. 
Where there is competition between different companies for the use of a natural resource such as 
water, the consent authority is obliged to consider each complete application for a resource consent 
in turn on its merits. The result is that the resource is allocated among competing users on the basis 
of “first in first served.”11 It is certainly arguable that this is not the best method of allocation; if for 
11 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). 
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nothing else because it causes applicants to come forward with premature proposals so as not to get 
lost in the rush. Regional councils have been given an opportunity to modify “first in first served” by 
regional plan rules for the allocation of rights to water, geothermal energy, and assimilative capacity.12 
Other provisions have been made for tendering for coastal resources such as sand and for rules for 
allocating space in the common marine and coastal area.13 The use of the RMA for CCS would require 
some similar set of provisions. Otherwise the default “first in first served” will apply. 
More generally, the allocation of permits for CCS exploration activity and injection activity will 
require more active discretionary management that the “first in first served” rule or any other set 
formula is likely to provide. Choices may be needed between different parties, locations and types 
of project as part of a national effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Substantial discretion in 
deciding applications will be necessary in order to manage the relationship of CCS activities with oil 
and gas activities, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
A further difficulty with permits is that the RMA does not provide for a sequence of permits to be 
issued as happens under the Crown Minerals Act, giving a company that carries out exploration work 
a legal assurance (although not unqualified) that it will receive a mining permit if it is successful. 
While companies sometimes stage their developments under the RMA, the Act does not allow for 
the granting of a permit for CCS exploration and delineation on terms that give the permit holder 
a clear path to obtaining a development or injection consent in the event that its exploration work is 
successful. That is adverse to investment confidence. 
Permit term.  The maximum term that can be granted for a resource consent for the discharge of a 
contaminant is 35 years: section 123. Injection operations for CCS are likely to span longer periods than 
that. International examples also show that it is common to require a stabilisation period or “post-closure 
period” of 10 or 20 years after injection ends and before the operator is allowed to relinquish financial and 
operational responsibility. What an operator of a long-term discharge is required to do under the RMA is to 
apply for a new resource consent. The Act requires the consent authority to have regard to the value of the 
investment of the existing consent holder: section 104(2A). But the requirement virtually to start again in 
the application process and justify the project afresh puts an element of uncertainty into the investment 
climate. Extra compliance costs will also occur. The problem is greater if the consent authority grants 
a permit for a term less than 35 years; on occasion consent authorities try to keep consent holders on a 
“short leash” this way.14 The 35-year maximum term is therefore not suitable for CCS operations. 
Continuing regulation of activity.  CCS operations require continuing regulatory oversight and 
interaction over an extended period. The reasons for this are that they are long-term operations 
(especially when the post-closure phase is included); they are complex; and they are evolving 
(although numbers of commercial-scale storage operations are now under way internationally); 
and they are obliged to deal with geological and engineering uncertainties. They call for some form 
of adaptive management. International analysis and law-making is therefore clear in conferring on 
the responsible regulatory agency a major ongoing role, and substantial jurisdiction to impose new 
regulatory requirements from time to time through the life of the project. 
12 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 30(1)(fa) and 30(4). Further changes that will affect water allocation have been proposed: 
Ministry for the Environment, Freshwater Reform 2013 and Beyond (2013). 
13 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 151AA et seq, 165G.
14 Daya-Winterbottom, above n 4. 
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The structure of the RMA is focused on a more specific kind of regulation, particular to the appraisal 
of the effects on the environment of an individual project. Policies and plans do provide a broader 
perspective on the management and regulation of a resource such as a lake or a catchment, but the 
orientation is towards the resource or the environment rather than the project. When an application 
is made for a resource consent for a project, the likely effects of the project on the environment are 
considered, and are made the subject of conditions on the resource consent when issued in order 
to avoid, remedy, or mitigate those effects. The issue of a consent with such conditions is therefore 
a single event, rather an element of continuous regulatory control. 
Nonetheless, consent authorities have often sought flexibility, especially in dealing with the details 
of complex projects and in allowing for issues to be addressed as they arise over time, and they have 
often resorted to permit conditions for that purpose. Section 108 of the RMA uses broad language 
to allow a consent authority to impose conditions on the grant of a resource consent, but there 
are implicit in it a number of limitations that are relevant to the use of RMA consent conditions for 
a project as long and complex as CCS. The granting of a resource consent is an act that is final in 
disposing of the application; the application must be granted, refused, or granted subject to conditions. 
The conditions therefore cannot impart to the consent a quality in virtue of which it ceases to be 
final.15 A consent cannot be granted on condition that some aspect of the project may not proceed 
without the approval of the council. In effect that would be an attempt to retain the discretion for 
a future date. In the leading case in the field, concerning a consent for a shopping mall, conditions 
were held to be acceptable if they stated particular matters (such as colours and landscaping) to be 
completed to the satisfaction of a named professional who would use her skill and judgment as a 
certifier, but a condition that gave the professional a power to settle disputes generally was invalid for 
purporting to appoint an arbitrator or special tribunal.16 An RMA permit cannot be granted subject to 
a condition that a wildlife survey be conducted and that the consent authorities be satisfied that the 
site is not of special significance; that was a question that could not be delegated.17 A condition must 
be certain. It can leave the certifying of detail to a delegate, using that person’s skill and experience, 
but cannot delegate the making of substantive decisions.18
Management plans sometimes appeal to consent authorities as a way of providing some flexibility; 
the authority imposes a resource consent condition that a management plan be prepared, certified, 
and maintained to achieve outcomes that are stated in consent conditions. That can be done, but 
not on the basis that future amendments be approved by a consent authority or some delegate at 
a later time, except to the extent that the delegate can be regarded as a certifier.19 A management 
plan approved by the consent authority in deciding the resource consent conditions cannot be altered 
without a change to the consent, which requires formal processes under the Act.20 A condition that is 
15 These words seem entirely relevant to the RMA even though they were said in reference to its South Australia equivalent: 
City of Unley v Claude Neon Ltd (1983) 32 SASR 329 at 332. 
16 Turner v Allison [1971] NZLR 833 (CA). 
17 Director-General of Conservation v Marlborough District Council [2004] 3 NZLR 127. 
18 Royal Forest and Bird Protection Soc v Gisborne District Council, EnvC, W26/2009, 7 April 2009 para [88].
19 Wood v West Coast Regional Council [2000] NZRMA 193 (EnvC). Mount Field Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council [2012] 
NZEnvC 262 para [77]: a consent condition must set out clear outcomes, in respect of which a management plan as a process 
condition, dealing with how those outcomes would be met, could be certified by a council officer.
20 Walker v Manukau City Council, EnvC C213/99, 7 Dec 1999.
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flawed by uncertainty and delegation in attempting to allow future changes in a management plan or 
elsewhere will not be saved by having been volunteered by the applicant.21 
The RMA does not offer any other convenient tools to provide flexible long-term management of an 
activity. One option is an application by the resource consent holder for the change or cancellation 
of a condition, under section 127, but the application is subject to effectively all the requirements 
of an application for a discretionary activity resource consent. It is not a process for making minor 
adjustments. Another is a review of the conditions by the consent authority under section 128, but the 
consent authority can only initiate the review in certain defined circumstances, and again the process is 
similar to the consideration of a resource consent application. The power cannot generally be extended 
to terminate a consent except in particular circumstances. For a project under a designation, an outline 
plan allows some details to be provided at a later stage, but only up until the date of construction.22
Overall, one sees that the grant of a resource consent subject to conditions is an event that comes to 
final conclusion, subject only to monitoring of compliance and to formal review procedures. The RMA 
is not arranged in a manner that allows on-going responsive regulatory action over an extended period. 
RMA conditions do not appear to provide what is needed for the satisfactory regulation of a CCS operation. 
Consistent CCS provisions nationally.  The RMA, as noted above, provides for decentralised 
decision-making; CCS will be managed by district councils and regional councils, unless other 
arrangements are made. Those councils will regulate particular CCS projects by the consideration 
of applications for resource consents. However that activity will occur against the background of 
policies and rules that the councils have established at the strategic level. Each district council and 
regional council has the power to make its own policies and rules for CCS. While those rules and 
policies can be appealed to the Environment Court, each council has considerable latitude to on 
how to carry out the sustainable management of natural and physical resources in its area. Possible 
consequences for CCS are: 
• Rules for CCS up and down the country could be very different, creating investment uncertainty. 
A project crossing regional council boundaries could become particularly complex.
• There is a risk of unintended difficulty for CCS. In parts of Marlborough, for example, the injection 
of any substance into a borehole is made a prohibited activity,23 with the result that CCS injection 
is entirely ruled out. 
• The process of changing district and regional plans, for example to include CCS, is slow. Plan changes 
can easily take several years. 
• The institutional capacity of councils to regulate technically complex activities is variable. 
21 An “Augier condition” is one imposed on the basis of a representation or undertaking offered by the applicant, allowing 
a broader range of matters to be the subject of a condition: Mora v Te Kohanga Reo Trust [1996] NZRMA 566 (PT), Frasers 
Papamoa Ltd v Tauranga City Council [2010] 2 NZLR 202; but there is no reason to think that the requirements of certainty 
and non-delegation are excused for that reason. 
22 Resource Management Act 1991, s 176A.
23 Marlborough Sounds Resource Management Plan rule 26.1.11.4 and Wairau /Awatere Resource Management Plan rule 27.1.4.4.
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The RMA does include mechanisms to produce greater consistency. The central government can 
initiate procedures for the making of National Policy Statements (NPS) and National Environmental 
Standards (NES). An NPS can state objectives and policies for matters of national significance that 
are relevant to promoting the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. An NPS 
for CCS, for instance, could state an objective of facilitating CCS and state particular policies to bring 
this about. An NES can prohibit or allow an activity and, among other things, prescribe standards, 
methods or requirements for monitoring. However, NPSs and NESs are subject to limitations; they 
do not allow a re-writing of the RMA, and could not change the shortcomings identified above as to 
term, permit character, and continuing regulation. The matters to be taken into account under Part 
2 and sections 70A and 104E are unchanged except where change is specifically allowed. A second 
limitation of NPS and NES is that there is little experience in making them, and such experience as 
has accumulated shows that the procedures to make them are slow.24 Even with these constraints on 
them, we consider that an NPS and an NES have a role to play in the legal framework for CCS, and we 
go into the matter further at Part 2.6 below. 
The other mechanism to produce greater consistency and centralisation is the procedure of “call-in” of 
a project, a resource consent or a notice of requirement for a designation if it is a proposal of national 
significance.25 If the Minister for the Environment or an applicant initiates this procedure then the 
matter will be decided by a board of inquiry appointed for the purpose, or by the Environment 
Court without preceding hearings before a local authority. The Environmental Protection Authority 
administers call-ins. Once a call-in procedure comes to an end, resulting resource consents are 
administered by the local authority, such as in respect of monitoring. While call-ins have become 
more frequent, they are not intended to be common; they are for projects of national significance. 
Generally, NPS, NES, and call-in procedures allow a certain amount of centralisation of decision-
making. They should be put to use in relation to CCS, as we recommend below. But they do not alter 
the fact that the underlying framework of the RMA is one where the different district councils and 
regional councils have a substantial role. Policy statements and plans are made by those councils 
even if subject to modification by NPS and NES. Resource consents, once they are issued under a 
call-in, become the responsibility of the district and regional council for administration, monitoring, 
review, and enforcement. Furthermore, a call-in is at the discretion of the Minister, and there is no 
guarantee that ministerial decisions would provide a nationally consistent approach over time to the 
regulation of CCS. 
Long-term liability.  The liability provisions of the RMA, centred on section 314, are general in 
character. They impose strict liability on numerous parties, with limited statutory defences, and 
limited direction as to who should be primarily liable for any breach of conditions.26 The provisions 
do not allow for the transfer of liability to the Crown after a CCS post-closure period ends. Such a 
transfer is a common feature of the CCS regimes emerging internationally, mainly because of the 
24 Since 1991 only 5 NES have been made (air quality, drinking water, telecommunication facilities, electricity transmission, and 
contaminated soil evaluation) and 4 NPS (coastal, electricity transmission, renewable electricity, freshwater). Most of them 
have been made in the last 5 years. 
25 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 140-149ZE. Although it can only be a matter of conjecture, it is likely that a CCS project 
would meet the criteria under s 142 for national significance (inter alia, arouses widespread public concern or interest; involves 
technology, processes, or methods that are new to New Zealand; affects our international obligations; likely to affect more than 
one region or district), and it is quite possible that a Minister could consider it suitable to be called in. 
26 See Daya-Winterbottom, above n 4. 
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long time it might take for any irregularity in the behaviour of injected CO2 to become apparent. 
(A transfer is not an invariable feature; in some Australian states the law remains silent on the matter, 
as Chapter 5 notes; but it is a major focus of much law reform to deal with CCS.) The RMA does not 
provide for the detailed analysis that is required in such regimes to manage closure, stabilisation, 
and a transfer of liability, in the form of a closure authorisation or surrender of an injection permit, 
which provides a high level of assurance about the level of remaining risk. 
Discharges to water.  Uncertainty and a potential obstacle to CCS exist in the application of sections 
70 and 107 of the RMA to the discharge of supercritical CO2 underground. These sections protect 
waters from a discharge (or a dumping, in the coastal marine area) that is likely, among other things, 
to produce conspicuous suspended material or a conspicuous change in colour or visual clarity. 
A consent authority cannot grant a discharge permit or a coastal permit that would give rise to one 
of these effects, unless it is satisfied that (inter alia) exceptional circumstances justify the granting 
of the permit. In respect of a deep saline aquifer two kilometres below the surface of the earth it 
could be difficult to provide positive proof that these effects would not occur. (Indeed some mineral 
precipitates may well be put into suspension, and would be a satisfactory result in geosequestration.27) 
The test of exceptional circumstances is a high one; its interpretation is likely to be affected by the 
fact that the other two reasons for which a consent authority can allow these effects are that the 
discharge is of a temporary nature, and that the discharge is associated with necessary maintenance 
work. The consent authority’s decision must also be consistent with the purpose of the Act. Whether 
a change in colour in a deep saline aquifer takes place may not be important, but one sees clearly that 
the RMA was not enacted with such matters in mind. 
Result: the RMA as a framework.  In evaluating this second set of questions, we have found several 
key features of the RMA that would be difficult, if not impossible, to adapt for the regulation of 
CCS. How permits are issued and managed under the RMA is significantly different from what CCS 
requires. The permit terms for CCS, which include closure periods, are likely to exceed 35 years. 
Continuing regulatory activity and oversight will be vital for CCS, both technically and in the eyes of 
the public; CCS injection permits and the site plans under them must be subject to review, variation 
and directions in ways that are not possible under the RMA. Elaborate regulation of closure and 
formal transfers of long-term liability are not possible under an RMA resource consent. In addition, 
one must note a number of other necessary ingredients of CCS law that the RMA does not provide: 
the claims of land owners to the subsurface (see Chapter 4), the need to accommodate petroleum, 
coal, and other subsurface activities (see Chapter 7), anti-monopoly provisions such as third-party 
access (see Chapter 8). 
The result is that, even if minor specific amendments are made to the RMA in order to remove barriers 
to CCS, the RMA has a number of general features that are inconsistent with what is required for the 
proper regulation of CCS. They mean that many of the basic features of the RMA would have to be 
altered to provide a satisfactory legal regime for CCS. 
27 K Michael, M Arnot, P Cook, J Ennis-King, R Funnell, J Kaldi, D Kirste, L Paterson, “CO2 Storage in Saline Aquifers I: Current State 
of Scientific Knowledge” (2009) Energy Procedia 3197, doi:10.1016/j.egypro.2009.02.103.
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2.4 Options for using the RMA
The relationship between the RMA and any new legislation is one of the more significant questions 
of design of law for CCS. Having considered first the extent to which CCS is controlled by the RMA 
as it stands at the present, and then the extent to which the RMA with amendments would provide 
a satisfactory regulatory framework for CCS, we can move to a third stage of bringing together 
the foregoing analysis and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the different possibilities. 
We identify five options, some of which rather obviously disqualify themselves, but others of which 
need careful consideration. 
1. RMA without amendment
The first option is that CCS be regulated by the RMA without amending that Act. There could be 
vigorous use of NPS and NES procedures. Regulations could be made for CCS operators to be requiring 
authorities. The call-in powers could be used for all proposals for CCS operations. 
It seems reasonably clear that the RMA without amendment is not capable of acting as a legal 
framework for CCS. Not only would it provide an unsuitable framework for a CCS project, but there is 
a real possibility that the climate change and renewable energy sections will act as a specific barrier 
to CCS even if NPS and NES are made. This option is readily ruled out, but is put here for the purposes 
of context. 
2. RMA alone but with amendment 
The second option is that CCS be regulated by the RMA, but with substantial amendments to the 
Act in order to produce a viable regulatory framework. A new Part would be added to the RMA. There 
would be no separate CCS Act. NPS, NES regulations, and call-in measures would be used as well. 
In order to implement this option, the amendments to the RMA would be numerous. Many would be 
required to alter provisions made by the Act at present, for example as to term of permits, financial 
assurance, and monitoring. Many other amendments would be required to add provisions that have 
no equivalent at all in the Act at present, for example, separate permits for exploration and injection 
with a right to proceed from one to the other, a tendering system for permits and other means of 
allocation, alteration of subsurface rights of land owners, adjustment of relations with petroleum, 
coal, and other subsurface users, continuing regulation, long-term liability, injection permits that 
cannot be surrendered without approval, and third party access. 
If all these provisions were to form a new Part of the Act, it would be a very substantial one. The nearest 
analogy, as a Part directed at the needs of a specific activity and industry, is Part 7A on aquaculture. 
A new Part for CCS is likely to be larger. As well as being large, the Part would be very different from 
the rest of the Act; it would be a Part quite unlike any other Part. There would be a risk of distortion 
and reduced coherence in the RMA’s scheme, especially from the addition of material that has nothing 
to do with the management of natural and physical resources. Third party access is a good example of 
something that is necessary for CCS, but as a matter of commercial law is foreign to the RMA’s purpose, 
principles, and overall scheme. Indeed, it can be strongly argued that environmental legislation should 
not be used to regulate an industrial activity; the two are essentially different. Such use of environmental 
legislation is likely to be unwelcome in the industrial sectors likely to initiate CCS projects. Along with 
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this size, and this difference of a CCS Part in the RMA, is likely to come confusion; readers of the 
New Zealand statute book may be surprised to find the law for CCS in an environmental statute. 
The placing of proposed legislation in relation to existing law should assist the public understanding 
and acceptance of the proposed law and the law as a whole.28 
Boundary problems will not be eliminated by encompassing CCS regulation in the RMA. They will 
occur as questions about which Part of the RMA applies, instead of about which Act applies. 
Overall, even with a significant amendment that adds a new Part to it, the RMA presents a difficult 
legal framework for CCS. It is technically possible to use the RMA for this purpose, but the results are 
likely to overburden the RMA with a large amount of material that is entirely different in character, 
so that the result is likely to be complex and confusing. 
3. RMA plus a CCS Act for non-RMA-type matters 
The third possible relationship between the RMA and CCS is an amendment to the RMA in order to 
eliminate obstacles and to provide effective environmental management of CCS. In addition there 
would be a CCS Act that would deal with the commercial aspects of CCS such as third party access. 
The division between the two statutes would be modelled on that between the RMA and the Crown 
Minerals Act 1991 (CMA). Under that model, a petroleum operator needs permits under the CMA, 
for rights to Crown minerals, and to satisfy regulators about its capability, work programme, and 
payment of royalties. At the same time the operator must obtain resource consents under the RMA 
for the environmental aspects of its project. There is no difficulty with overlap because, at least in 
theory, the spheres in which the two statutes operate are reasonably distinct. 
The RMA-CMA model applied to CCS has its attractions, and there is no technical reason why it 
should not be followed. There is a strength in the model in that it is well understood. It also has the 
potential for all environmental regulation to occur under the main environmental legislation, the 
RMA. The enactment of a CCS Act would remove the need to burden the RMA with a great deal of 
unsuitable material. But there are also substantial weaknesses with the model. Above all, the RMA-CMA 
analogy is not perfect. The extraction of petroleum or minerals is less of an RMA concern than is the 
injection of CO2. The extraction of petroleum may or may not involve significant RMA concerns, but 
they are incidental to extraction, whereas the injection of a substance is immediately an RMA concern 
– it is prohibited under section 15 unless authorised – and is in itself controlled by the RMA. To put it 
the other way around, the injection of CO2, even if it is an RMA issue, is at the heart of a system of CCS 
regulation. The result is a higher risk of overlap between the RMA and a CCS Act. There is a risk of two 
regulatory agencies, two processes for application for permits, two sets of criteria, and two processes 
for administration, both of which have the injection of CO2 as their core concern. With overlap there 
is a risk of duplication and inconsistency. 
An effort could be made to avoid duplication and inconsistency with detailed provisions and 
mechanisms to reduce conflict between the two statutes, but there would remain the core problem 
that the CCS legislation was skirting around the injection of CO2. We are not aware that any such 
design has been adopted in CCS legislation internationally. 
28 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines: Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation (Wellington, 2001) at 145. 
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Another variation of this option would be a new CCS Act that leaves RMA jurisdiction over injection 
and other environmental matters substantially unimpaired, and addresses the remaining aspects of 
CCS management. The chief difficulty with such an arrangement would be an awkward spread of 
provisions between the two Acts – some provisions in the RMA, and the left-overs, as it were, in the 
new CCS Act. It would produce a poorly integrated framework for CCS. 
4. RMA plus a CCS Act for injection and non-RMA matters 
The fourth option is to move the injection of CO2 to a CCS Act, but for the RMA to continue to apply to 
other aspects of a CCS operation. Incidental discharges to air and water, water takes, coastal waters 
and earthworks would continue to be regulated by regional councils. Land use for CCS would continue 
to be regulated by district councils. Local input would therefore be provided, but in both cases the law 
would ensure co-ordination, and would ensure that incidental concerns do not determine the overall 
result of CCS applications. NPS and NES would be used for this purpose, as explained below in Part 2.6 
of this Chapter. Designation would also be used, as shown in Chapter 4. The procedure would be akin 
to an RMA call-in. The injection of CO2 would be regulated under legislation designed for that purpose, 
and designed to be no less onerous and no less protective than the RMA. RMA regulation of the injection 
would not be necessary. 
The key change to the RMA would be that the injection of CO2 and associated fluids would be made lawful 
notwithstanding the prohibitions in section 9 to 15C, if approved under CCS legislation. Supporting it would 
be a change so that the effects of injection could not be taken into account by a council in the making 
of a policy or plan, or by a consent authority in determining a resource consent for a related activity. 
The injection would only be approved under the CCS legislation if there were no significant risk of leakage 
and if no significant environmental or health risks exist.29 As well as the injection itself the CCS legislation 
would provide for the further management of the CO2, for example in corrective measures. 
A good delineation or definition of the boundary between the RMA and the proposed CCS Act would 
be important. For example, the CCS Act could say that an injection permit can only be granted if it is 
unlikely to have any adverse effect on potable ground water that is likely to be used in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. Boundary problems would also be reduced by statutory requirements for liaison, 
for example in requiring the CCS regulator to forward an application to a regional council and to have 
regard to its views on the matter. 
One of the strengths of this option is that it would provide a comprehensive and integrated 
framework for CCS, with suitable connections to existing law in the RMA. The proposed CCS law 
would deal fully with CCS activities. It would be reasonably clear that it was the “rule book” for 
CCS, with resultant benefits in clarity and accessibility. The rules for CCS would be in one place, all 
together rather than spread out in different Acts, and reasonably easy to find. The injection of CO2 
under the new CCS Act would be regulated under a system designed for the purpose, and capable 
of exerting stricter control over the activity than the RMA can provide.30 At the same time, the RMA 
29 See Chapter 3 for the full discussion of purpose and principles, and Chapter 5 for matters to be taken into account and the 
threshold test to apply to the decision to grant an injection permit.
30 Foreshadowing the analysis in Chapters, 3, 5, 6 and 10, one can identify stricter controls as the more specific rules for an 
elaborate analysis to support an application, a threshold test to be passed to obtain an injection permit, continuing regulation 
and variation of permit conditions by the regulator, continuing control of the site plan and related plans, liability stronger and 
more explicit, and restrictions on surrender of a permit.
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would continue to apply to those activities that are commonly the subject of RMA regulation at 
the present, including land use, water use, coastal occupation, and incidental discharges to air and 
water. There would be no duplication. 
A shortcoming of this option is that it would take a particular activity out of the RMA, reducing its 
integration and comprehensiveness. It could introduce an artificial boundary between different 
aspects of a project that would be better managed together. This shortcoming could be addressed by 
providing for a joint process under which all aspects of the proposal are heard together by a board of 
inquiry, but decided under different, yet tightly connected, regimes. 
5. CCS Act alone with no RMA controls 
The final option is that CCS would be removed altogether from the RMA. A CCS Act would be passed 
that would say that CCS activity is not subject to the RMA. 
This option would have strength in clarity and avoidance of duplication. It would allow CCS to be 
managed entirely under a purpose-built CCS legal framework. It would give a CCS operator an 
attractive “one stop shop” system of regulation. 
One weakness of this option is that it would need the new CCS Act to mirror or re-create RMA 
systems for the management of land use, incidental discharges, water use, pipelines, and so forth. 
It would result in considerable repetition and a great deal of overlap with the RMA. Boundary problems 
would not be avoided; indeed they would be more substantial than under some of the other options. 
In addition there would be a substantial and unnecessary alteration of general expectations about 
environmental and resources law; there is no precedent in New Zealand for a particular industry being 
made entirely an exception to the RMA. It is unlikely that the prospects of CCS would be advanced by 
pursuing such a route in law reform. 
2.5 Recommendations as to the RMA
Some form of interaction between the RMA and CCS legislation is inevitable. Deciding what is the best 
arrangement will necessarily involve a balancing of different considerations. This analysis shows that 
Option 1, “RMA without Amendment” will not work, and that Option 5, “CCS Act alone with no RMA 
Controls” is unprecedented and unnecessary. Option 2, “RMA Alone but with Amendment,” would 
be difficult; the advantages of keeping CCS in the RMA do not appear to outweigh the disadvantages. 
Options 3 and 4 are the only ones where the strengths seem to be greater than the weaknesses. Option 
3, “RMA Plus a CCS Act for Non-RMA-Type Matters,” presents significant complications, and in particular 
duplication of regulatory effort. It seems better to adopt a policy of “regulate once, and regulate well.” 
That leads us to conclude that Option 4, “RMA Plus a CCS Act for Injection and Non-RMA Matters,” 
is the right option. It appears to have fewer shortcomings, and is more likely to lead to a coherent 
comprehensible framework. Generally, we consider that the CCS legal framework should follow that of 
the RMA where it can, in order to take advantage of the substantial shared knowledge and expectations 
that have developed under the RMA. We therefore recommend that the injection and storage of CO2 be 
authorised under a new CCS Act, while the RMA continues to apply to other aspects of CCS operations. 
Our recommendations to this effect are summarised at the end of this Chapter. 
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2.6 National Policy Statement and National Environmental 
Standard for CCS
We saw earlier that a National Policy Statement (NPS) and a National Environmental Standard (NES) 
can produce greater consistency under the RMA nationally, and can provide policy and regulatory 
guidance and direction. On a specific matter, they can make and impose particular policy choices, 
so that decision makers no longer approach it only under the general policy framework of the Act. 
They must both be given effect by regional councils and district councils, and by a board of inquiry 
on a call-in. However they cannot do anything that would be tantamount to amending the Act, and 
must be made in the light of the Act’s purpose and principles. What can be put in an NPS or NPS, the 
process for making them, and their effect, is stated in sections 43 to 55. The New Zealand Coastal 
Policy Statement has slightly different provisions. 
An NPS for CCS would build on the new paragraph we recommend above in section 7, to ensure 
that regard will be had to the benefits to be derived from the use and development of CCS. (In that 
it will be similar to the NPS for Renewable Electricity Generation.) The NPS would follow statutory 
requirements for content. It would state the matter of national significance to which it applies as the 
benefits to be had from CCS, and the need to make CCS available as part of New Zealand’s effort to 
reduce the discharge of GHGs and to respond to climate change. Its objective would be to recognise 
the national significance of CCS by providing for exploration, injection and transportation. It would 
state policies directed at decision-makers, such as:
• Recognise and provide for the national significance of CCS, including its national and international 
benefits (which could be identified). 
• Recognise and provide for the effective development and operation of CCS.
• Recognise the relationship between policy on CCS and policy on renewable energy production, 
energy efficiency, and other aspects of climate change policy and energy policy. (The NPS would 
be an opportunity to explain these relationships.) 
• Consider (or have particular regard for) the scrutiny given to a CCS proposal and the ongoing 
management under the requirements of the proposed CCS Act.
• Consider the need to locate CCS operations where capture is possible, where storage is possible 
and where pipelines connecting them can reasonably be constructed. 
• Consider the constraints imposed on avoiding, remedying, or mitigating adverse effects of CCS 
activities by the technical and operational requirements of CCS.
• Enable reasonable operational, maintenance and minor upgrade requirements of an existing 
CCS operation.
• Require provisions in a policy statement or a plan to be based on identified standards or guidelines. 
• Manage activities to the extent reasonably possible, to avoid reverse sensitivity effects.
The Act allows an NPS to specify how and when it is to be incorporated in regional policy statements 
and regional and district plans, but we do not recommend that for CCS, because it would impose an 
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undue burden on local bodies. The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement could usefully be amended 
to facilitate CCS at sea, in the coastal marine area. It could make many of the policy points above, and 
could usefully ensure that coastal permits do not present a barrier to pipelines construction, which is 
an issue noted in Chapter 9. 
An NES for CCS could say that no CCS operation (including a CCS pipeline) shall be a prohibited or 
non-complying activity. That would mean that district plans and regional plans would have to make 
CCS operations permitted, controlled, restricted discretionary or discretionary. The scrutiny that we 
propose through a board of inquiry process is compatible with discretionary activity status and the 
more accommodating categories. An NES could also be used to impose rules on CCS activities such 
as for the monitoring and decommissioning of a CCS pipeline. 
Between them an NPS and an NES can also prescribe a certain amount of detail about the information 
that should accompany a CCS application, the way in which it should be processed, the criteria against 
which it is to be judged, and the conditions that are to be imposed. We have not examined other 
possibilities that an NPS or NES could address, such as whether they could require the call-in of CCS 
applications; that we think should be required by the Act itself. 
Finally, an option for the making of an NPS and NES should be noted. The conventional procedures 
prescribed by the RMA may be quite sufficient, but it is also possible for the new CCS Act to make an 
NPS or NES directly, or by declaring that certain of its provisions shall be deemed to be NPS or NES 
for the purposes of the RMA. If the desired policy direction is clear, this option will bring about the 
necessary changes without delay or uncertainty.31 
3 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012
Many of the limitations that occur under the RMA also occur under the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (EEZ Act). These include the effects of climate 
change provisions, duration of consent, transfer of consent, priority rules, entitlement to subsequent 
permits, on-going and flexible regulatory control, detailed monitoring, long term liability, financial 
assurance, relationships with other subsurface uses, and private property and access matters. The 
EEZ Act and the RMA also have similar purposes (sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources), however the Marine Legislation Bill proposes an additional purpose to the EEZ Act of 
protection against pollution, which may add uncertainty and complexity. A distinction between the 
EEZ Act and the RMA is that CCS injection would be classified as “dumping” rather than a “discharge”. 
The legal framework governing CCS in the territorial sea and the EEZ is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.32 
The above mentioned limitations lead to a conclusion similar to that we have reached above in relation 
to the RMA, for broadly similar reasons. The best option is to remove injection and storage from the 
31 The Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 s 9 is a precedent: s 55 of the RMA applies as though ss 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Act 
were a national policy statement. Also see the Waitakere Ranges Heritage Area Act 2008, ss 10 and 13, and the Waikato-Tainui 
Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 ss 11-17, where that Act’s vision and strategy are deemed to be part of the 
Waikato Regional Policy Statement, and are to be implemented in other planning documents. 
32 Further detail is provided in Appendix F.
Carbon Capture and Storage: Designing the Legal and Regulatory Framework for New Zealand44
EEZ Act regime and assess it according to the purpose of new, dedicated legislation on CCS which 
contains its own environmental protection provisions. This is consistent with the recommendations 
made in relation to injection on land and within the coastal marine area. The EEZ Act would continue 
to apply to the exploration phase, the transport phase, and the incidental aspects of a CCS storage 
operation, but injection and associated activities would be made lawful notwithstanding the 
restrictions under the Act if carried out pursuant to an injection permit under new CCS legislation. 
4 Crown Minerals Act 1991
The Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA) will come to mind in a discussion of the legal management 
of subsurface resources. It certainly is the main law for the management of subsurface resources 
at the present. As we did with the RMA, we ask whether the CMA in its present form governs CCS, 
and then whether it could usefully be amended so as to become the legislation for CCS, including 
different options. We find that the CMA is very different in its character from what is required for 
CCS legislation.
4.1 Whether the Act in its present form authorises CCS
In reading the CMA to ascertain its application, as is, to CCS, we start with its purpose section, then 
what it means by minerals, prospect, explore and mine, and finally what Crown-owned minerals it 
applies to. 
Purpose.  The purpose of the CMA is expressed in the new section 1A, added in 2013: 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to promote prospecting for, exploration for, and mining of Crown 
owned minerals for the benefit of New Zealand.
(2) To this end, this Act provides for—
(a) the efficient allocation of rights to prospect for, explore for, and mine Crown owned 
minerals; and
(b) the effective management and regulation of the exercise of those rights; and
(c) the carrying out, in accordance with good industry practice, of activities in respect of 
those rights; and
(d) a fair financial return to the Crown for its minerals.
There is nothing in this statement of purpose about CCS specifically, and nothing more general that 
applies, such as the use of underground formations. 
In order to ascertain precisely what activities the Act applies to, one works back from the offence 
provision, section 100; every person commits an offence against the Act who contravenes section 8. 
Section 8 says that no person may prospect or explore for, or mine, Crown owned minerals in land 
unless he or she holds one or another kind of permit granted under the Act or is otherwise exempt. 
One must therefore analyse three elements: (i) prospect, explore for, or mine; (ii) Crown-owned; and 
(iii) mineral. 
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Mineral.  What is a “mineral” can be disposed of without delay. The definition in section 2 of the Act is:
[M]ineral means a naturally occurring inorganic substance beneath or at the surface of the earth, 
whether or not under water; and includes all metallic minerals, non-metallic minerals, fuel 
minerals, precious stones, industrial rocks and building stones, and a prescribed substance within 
the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act 1945
The CO2 that results from carbon capture – the capturing of CO2 from burning fuels for electricity 
generation, or from industrial processes – cannot be described as naturally occurring without making 
the term meaningless. Nor can the term extend far enough to include geological structures that may 
be usable as CCS storage sites; the emphasis is on substances and not structures or in-situ character 
or capability. CO2 and CCS are therefore not controlled by the CMA.
Prospect, Explore for, Mine. One can then turn to the three verbs, prospect, explore for, and mine. 
“Prospecting” is defined in section 2: 
(a) means any activity undertaken for the purpose of identifying land likely to contain mineral 
deposits or occurrences; and 
(b) includes the following activities: 
(i) geological, geochemical and geophysical surveying:
(ii) aerial surveying: 
(iii) taking samples by hand or hand held methods:
(iv) taking small samples offshore by low-impact mechanical methods 
The core of the definition appears to be “mineral deposits or occurrences.” It is arguable that this could 
extend to mineral structures in the subsoil, which could be exploited by CCS operations. However one 
must be careful with the use one makes of more open language in a definition like this; one must read 
the statute as a whole. 
“Exploration” means: 
[A]ny activity undertaken for the purpose of identifying mineral deposits or occurrences and 
evaluating the feasibility of mining particular deposits or occurrences of 1 or more minerals; and 
includes any drilling, dredging, or excavations (whether surface or subsurface) that are reasonably 
necessary to determine the nature and size of a mineral deposit or occurrence; and to explore has 
a corresponding meaning
Whether this allows activities directed at establishing the existence of a formation capable of storing 
CO2 is by no means clear. Are such formations mineral deposits or occurrences? That strains the 
language somewhat. The evaluation of the feasibility of mining may be a limiting condition within the 
definition; if so, there is no room for CCS operations at all. 
“Mining” is defined to mean: 
(a) means to take, win, or extract, by whatever means,–
(i) a mineral existing in its natural state in land; or
(ii) a chemical substance from a mineral existing in its natural state in land; and
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(b) includes– 
(i) the injection of petroleum into an underground gas storage facility; and
(ii) the extraction of petroleum from an underground gas storage facility; but
(c) does not include prospecting or exploration for a mineral or chemical substance referred to 
in paragraph (a)
The verbs are take, win, and extract. There is nothing said about depositing, injecting, storing, disposing, 
or sequestering. It seems clear that CCS operations cannot be included within this definition. It is 
likely that this clear definition of “mining” must colour the interpretation of “explore” and “prospect.” 
The statute must be read as a whole, and in particular, one would expect a set of carefully-crafted 
definitions in the one section to be mutually reinforcing. This would prevent the more elastic readings 
of general words in the definitions of “explore” and “prospect,” and clarify that the Act as a whole only 
authorises mineral activity in the conventional sense. Where an unconventional meaning is intended 
for “mining”, as with storage, the conventional sense is expressly extended. This reading back, to 
construe ‘explore’ and ‘prospect’ in the light of ‘mining’ and ‘mine,’ is especially valid when section 32, 
in protecting the right of a permit holder to subsequent permits, shows that the Act is engaged in the 
management of rights at different stages in the one sequence of mineral activity. 
The prohibition in section 8 is against prospecting, exploration for, or mining Crown-owned minerals 
without a permit granted under the Act. The permits granted under the Act are stated in section 30. 
The holder of a prospecting permit has the right to ‘prospect,’ the holder of an exploration permit 
has the right to ‘explore,’ and holder of a mining permit the right to ‘mine.’33 So the rights that can 
be conferred on permit holders are confined by the definition of the three verbs.34 These are the only 
rights that the Minister can grant; he or she is bound by the legislation. It is unlikely that the Minister 
can exceed these statutory definitions by including more generous rights as permit conditions.35
Section 2 also defines ‘mining operations’ as operations in connection with mining, exploring, or 
prospecting for any Crown owned mineral, including a variety of connected activities. One of those, 
paragraph (b)(iv), is ‘the deposit or discharge of any mineral, material, debris, tailings, refuse, or 
wastewater produced from or consequent on the operations’. The last words of this definition rule 
out the inclusion of CO2 from a combustion source not associated with mineral activity. It should also 
be noted that this definition does not take the central place in the permitting regime; the permits are 
granted for prospecting, exploring, and mining as defined. 
33 In addition, the holder of an exploration permit may prospect, and the holder of a mining permit may prospect and explore. 
The permit may specify the mineral and impose other conditions. However these aspects of the grant of rights do not seem 
relevant to the present discussion. 
34 Greymouth Petroleum Holdings Ltd v Todd Taranaki Ltd, unreported, High Court Wellington CIV-2004-485-1651, Wild J, 25 July 
2006 observed para 55 that the Act manages petroleum exploration and mining by prohibiting those activities except pursuant 
to a permit for a defined area of land. The regulation is primarily of activities, except by permit. At para 77 it notes that ‘mining 
operations’ are defined in an inclusory way, but the point is not developed. 
35 Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Ltd v Chalk [1975] AC 520 (PC) is the case in point. Section 105(1)(l) authorises the making of regulations 
prescribing the duties of permit holders and the activities to be carried out under permit, but it cannot authorise regulations that 
in effect amend the definitions that Parliament has chosen to give in s 2. 
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Crown owned.  Petroleum is declared by section 10 to be Crown owned notwithstanding any Crown 
grant, certificate of title or other instrument of title. It is the mineral most likely to be associated with 
arguments about CCS. Section 2 defines it as follows:
[P]etroleum means—
(a) any naturally occurring hydrocarbon (other than coal) whether in a gaseous, liquid, or solid 
state; or
(b) any naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons (other than coal) whether in a gaseous, 
liquid, or solid state; or
(c) any naturally occurring mixture of 1 or more hydrocarbons (other than coal) whether in a 
gaseous, liquid, or solid state, and 1 or more of the following, namely hydrogen sulphide, 
nitrogen, helium, or carbon dioxide—
and, except in sections 10 and 11, includes any petroleum as so defined which has been mined 
or otherwise recovered from its natural condition, or which has been so mined or otherwise 
recovered but which has been returned to a natural reservoir for storage purposes 
Although a court would draw on expert evidence if this comes into dispute, there seems to be no 
room at all for an argument that CO2 is one of the hydrocarbons. Nor does there seem to be any room 
to argue that a substance like CO2 is naturally occurring if it is a product of combustion, the product 
of industrial processes, or the product of natural gas treatment and injected in a CCS operation. There 
is no authorising of CCS operations. 
Storage, which is referred to in the definition of petroleum, cannot be interpreted so as to include CCS 
in the sense of geosequestration. There are several reasons. What is returned to a natural reservoir must 
be petroleum, which could be a mixture, but cannot be CO2 alone, nor (if one looks at the purpose of 
the definition and the Act as a whole) predominantly CO2. Secondly, it must be a naturally occurring 
mixture. Thirdly, it must have been mined or otherwise recovered from its natural condition. Fourthly, 
the purpose must be storage, which is the action of keeping or accumulating a thing for future use. 
The purpose of CCS operations is the permanent sequestration or disposal of greenhouse gases. The 
possibility that the sequestration may not be perfect over geological time frames does not detract from 
that. Readiness for retrieval is the last thing that is intended. Carbon capture and ‘storage’ is therefore 
something of a misnomer.36 Finally, the words “except in sections 10 and 11” mean that stored petroleum 
is not vested in the Crown, which is logically necessary, but mean that any possible general effect of 
section 10 to empower the Crown to authorise CCS does not extend to storage. The reference to storage 
in the definition is tightly confined; it does not authorise CCS operations. 
36 Concise Oxford Dictionary (11th ed rev 2004): “Store v. 1 keep or accumulate for future use. Storage n. 1 the action of storing. 
2 space available for storing; Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed rev 2002): “storage ... 4 The action of storing or laying up a 
thing or things in reserve; the condition or fact of being stored. E19.” “store ... v. ... 4 Keep in store for future use; collect and keep 
in reserve; form a store, stock, or supply of; accumulate, hoard.”; N Bankes, J Poschwatta, and E M Shier, “The Legal Framework for 
Carbon Capture and Storage in Alberta” (2008) 45 Alberta Law Review 585, note that the terms ‘disposal’ and ‘sequestration’ are 
more suitable. However it is impractical to abandon the general usage of the term ‘carbon capture and storage.’
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The other Crown-owned minerals to which the CMA is confined37 are gold, silver and uranium, where 
ever situate; and minerals reserved to the Crown at the time of alienation of land to a private owner. 
None of those cases is likely to concern CCS, although they are considered further in Chapter 4 in 
relation to property rights. 
Former Legislation.  “Grandparented” rights exist under the Petroleum Act 1937, Mining Act 1971 
and Coal Mines Act 1979, and have some time to run. It is possible that old legislation affecting those 
particular licences may produce results that are different from the analysis presented here. However it is 
most unlikely that any differences, if they exist, would authorise the grant of new rights to CCS activity. 
Result.  The necessary conclusion is that permits for CCS operations cannot be issued under the 
CMA, and the holders of permits under the CMA cannot claim to hold the rights to carry out CCS 
operations in their permit areas. Since the definitions of ‘prospect,’ ‘explore’ and ‘mine’ do not include 
CCS operations, those operations are not prohibited by section 8 of the CMA, and are not an offence 
under section 100. This is an interesting and perhaps unexpected consequence, but it does not alter 
the fact that the CMA permitting regime does not include and does not authorise CCS operations. 
4.2 Should the CMA be extended to CCS?
If new law is to be written for CCS, could it be part of the CMA? This option needs careful consideration. 
It is an option that was adopted for the Australian Commonwealth legislation, but the petroleum law 
was given an inclusive name and purpose, the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2006, the object of which is (section 3) to provide an effective regulatory framework for (a) petroleum 
exploration and recovery and (b) the injection and storage of greenhouse gas substances, in offshore 
areas. This change of name and objective makes sure that the dual intentions of the legislation are 
readily understood. That option is also being taken in Western Australia with amendments that will 
cause the petroleum legislation to be renamed the Petroleum, Geothermal Energy, and Greenhouse 
Gas Storage Act 1967. In Canada, Alberta has made its CCS provisions under the Mines and Minerals 
Act and the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, but without making the new jurisdiction so obvious. 
However, the path of separate legislation was taken in Australia for the onshore CCS legislation 
of Queensland in the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009, and of Victoria in the Greenhouse Gas 
Geological Sequestration Act 2008. 
In all probability, a prerequisite for the option of enacting CCS legislation as an amendment of the 
CMA is that the administration of CCS must be carried out (or at least primarily carried out) by the 
same agency that administers the CMA, namely, New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals in the Ministry 
of Business, Innovation and Employment. It would be an unusual arrangement for one part of an 
Act to be administered in a different department from the rest of the Act. (On the other hand, it is 
common for several different or related Acts to be administered in the one department.) The policy 
question “which Act?” is therefore connected to the question “which agency?” which is considered in 
Chapter 3 below.
37 The Minister cannot issue exploration or mining permits for privately-owned minerals. Crown Minerals Act 1991 s 25(6), subject 
to an exception concerning the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. A prospecting permit can be issued for 
private minerals: s 30(1). 
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Several advantages can be identified for the option of using the CMA:
• Commonality of subject-matter, in dealing with the management of subsurface formations.
• Commonality in the administration of the permitting regime which is at the centre of the minerals 
regime and the CCS regime, with the possibility of same or aligned provisions for the management 
of bidding rounds, applications, granting, monitoring, and recording. 
• One statute within which to manage the relationship between CCS and petroleum activities, 
including overlapping interests and enhanced oil recovery (EOR).
• Same provisions for access to land. 
Equally, disadvantages in using the CMA for CCS can be identified:
• Different purpose. The purpose of the CMA (and ideally its title as well) would need to be changed, 
as in the OPGGSA. Alternatively a new part in the CMA for CCS would have to say that it applies 
notwithstanding the main purpose of the Act. 
• Different orientation. Apart from its formal expression of purpose, many provisions of the CMA 
reflect that it deals with mineral exploration and extraction. 
• Lack of environment, safety and GHG containment oriented provisions. While amendments to 
the CMA in 2013 introduce new provisions as to environmental and health and safety capability, 
the detailed regulation that will be necessary for CCS would be a new feature for the CMA. 
In particular, the matters to be established before an injection permit can be issued and can be 
ended have no parallel in the CMA. 
• Perception of CCS as an offshoot of petroleum and coal management. There is a risk that the new 
CCS industry may be seen to be influenced and controlled by the thinking and expectations arising 
out of the petroleum and coal industries.
The advantages and disadvantages of using petroleum legislation have been discussed by Australian 
practitioners who note that it provides a familiar framework for industry, and provides efficiency 
for the interaction between CCS investors and oil and gas companies.38 The disadvantage is that 
petroleum legislation is designed to regulate extraction of petroleum, and not the long-term disposal 
of CO2. Stand-alone CCS legislation is specifically designed to manage the long-term injection of 
CO2 and the associated risks. It includes specific requirements for liability and for monitoring and 
verification. Such provisions provide clarity and certainty for investors. 
The analysis thus far shows both advantages and disadvantages in using the Crown Minerals Act to 
regulate CCS. 
38 M Gibbs and P McCormack “No Consistent Approach to CCS Legislation” Blake Dawson Resources and Energy Law Update 
(October 2008).
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4.3 Options for using the CMA
Just as with the RMA, it seems useful to take the analysis further by marshalling the different options 
for the relationship between the Crown Minerals Act and new CCS legislation. However there seem 
to be fewer real options than in that case. 
1. CMA without Amendment
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the CMA in its present form does not apply to CCS. The 
Minister of Energy and Resources is not able to grant permits under the Crown Minerals Act in its 
present form for CCS operations. 
2. CMA Alone
It is equally clear is that the CMA would need very considerable amendment to apply to CCS. While there 
is commonality in dealing with the management of subsurface formations, and the administration of 
a permitting regime, the underlying objective that the CMA pursues is different from CCS and would 
need to be addressed. This would mean significant changes. The changes could be implemented by 
re-writing the provisions that deal with ownership of subsurface formations, minerals programmes, 
the issue and management of permits, permit conditions and work programmes, so that in each 
case they deal with CCS exploration and injection as much as with mineral extraction. Additional 
provisions would be required for the detailed regulation of CCS operations; the equivalent under the 
CMA for petroleum or other operations is not strongly enough developed to be adopted even if it was 
flexible enough to cover a very different kind of operation. 
The other way to make such significant changes is with a separate Part added to the CMA to provide a new 
regime for CCS. The question that it would pose is, if the CCS regime is so separate from the rest of the 
CMA, whether it is usefully placed in that Act at all. Readers of the statute book may not expect to find it 
there unless the Act is renamed – as the Crown Minerals and Carbon Capture and Storage Act, for example. 
Constituting CCS law as part of the CMA may make it easier to provide for the interaction of CCS 
operations with petroleum and other operations.39 Those interactions include protection of existing 
investments, protection of resources, enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and the rights of one kind of 
explorer to finds of the other kind of resource. However the nature of those provisions may be much 
the same whether they are located entirely within the CMA or whether they are distributed between 
the CMA and a new CCS Act. 
The RMA should also be considered at this point. RMA environmental regulation will be relevant to CCS 
legislation enacted in the CMA unless it is specifically excluded. The issues traversed in the previous 
section will be relevant in the much same way whether the CCS law is in the RMA or in its own Act. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the different options would be equally relevant. The one additional 
observation is about moving aspects of CCS out of the RMA, especially injection. It was noted above that 
there seems to be a strong case for moving injection out of the RMA and into a legislative framework 
that is more specific and effective for CCS, even if it has an environmental dimension to it. But the logic 
39 See Chapter 7.
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behind that choice seems to be reduced if injection and related environmental matters is moved into 
the Crown Minerals Act. The CMA does not engage in environmental regulation in any other respect,40 
and the CMA may not be a suitable location for a kind of regulation that is removed from the RMA. 
3. CCS Act Separate from the CMA
This option would not place the new law for CCS in the CMA, but in a separate CCS Act. There would 
necessarily be amendments to the CMA, particularly for the relationship between CCS activity and 
petroleum, coal and other subsurface activity. 
One strength of this option is that it would give CCS legislation more visibility than it would have as 
part of the CMA. Even a major re-write of the CMA to give suitable prominence to CCS, with a good 
deal of disruption attendant on the exercise, may fail to bring CCS clearly enough to the eye of the 
reader of the statute book, and may fail to dispel an assumption that CCS is subordinate to extractive 
uses of the subsurface. This option would also produce a single enactment where the reader will find 
most of the relevant provisions covering the activity. Another strength is that it would not presume 
that CCS will be regulated by New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals as the agency that administers 
the rest of the CMA. That possibility would remain open along with other possibilities.
Possible weaknesses of the option are that it would add a new Act of Parliament where it could 
have been avoided, and that it would make arrangements for co-ordination of subsurface uses more 
difficult. However neither of those seem to be substantial matters when considered closely. 
4. CMA Plus RMA Plus a CCS Act
One further option is for some CCS provisions to be located in the CMA, while others are located in a new 
CCS Act, and while reliance on the RMA continues as well. However there is an obvious risk, in spreading 
provisions out among three Acts, of failing to integrate and failing to enact law clearly. This option may 
have some value, however, as a reminder that the precise location of its elements is not important so 
long as the statutory scheme is clear. Modern statute drafting can include sections that direct the reader 
to relevant provisions in another Act, informing the reader without having legal force themselves. 
4.4 Recommendations as to the CMA
Just as with the RMA, an evaluation of the different options involves a balancing of various considerations. 
Option 1, “CMA without Amendment,” is plainly unworkable. Option 4, “CMA Plus RMA Plus a new CCS 
Act,” perhaps cannot be dismissed outright, but it presents the risk of a divided and opaque provision for 
CCS. Option 2, “CMA Alone,” is possible, but it seems to have few advantages. The similarities between 
CCS and mineral extraction are not high, and a new CCS Part to the CMA would need to have its own 
objectives and to operate separately in most respects. Option 3, “CCS Act Separate from the CMA,” 
has more strengths. 
We recommend that a new CCS Act be enacted separately from the CMA. Most of the questions 
about the relations between the two systems are addressed in Chapter 7.
40 There are new provisions in the CMA s 29A(2) on environmental capability of applicants, but they do not displace the RMA 
or the offshore environmental legislation. 
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5 Whether a New Act is Required to Provide  
an Approval Process
The above discussion has examined a number of different design options for CCS law in relation to the 
existing statutory framework under the RMA and the CMA. Some options rule themselves out quickly, 
while others have strengths and weaknesses that must be balanced.
One option that can be considered is to include CCS law in either the RMA or the CMA. (RMA Option 2 
and CMA Option 2.) Both appear to be technically viable, but neither seems to bring many benefits 
with it. In each case the CCS Part would be isolated from the rest of the Act, with fewer connections 
and collocation benefits than might at first appear. The option of using the RMA to manage injection, 
alongside a CCS-specific Act, (RMA Option 3) seems liable to create an uncertain and duplicative 
division of responsibilities. 
We conclude therefore that there is a good case to enact a stand-alone CCS statute. (In the discussion 
above, RMA Option 4 and CMA Option 3.) A separate CCS Act, establishing an approval process 
along with all the other main aspects of CCS activity, would provide a high degree of integration 
in the management of CCS projects. It would make sure that CCS law is reasonably visible and 
comprehensible.41 Connections to the RMA, the EEZ Act, and the CMA, and the delineation of 
boundaries between them, seem manageable, and certainly no less difficult than with any of the 
other options. Connections and boundaries can be clarified by provisions in the law that describe 
in a general way how different matters are regulated in the different Acts, without affecting the 
interpretation or application of the Acts directly.42 This is our recommendation, and in the following 
chapters of this Report we assume that this option is chosen.
6 Detailed Regulation of CCS under the  
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992
When the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSEA) was introduced, it repealed many 
industry-specific statutes concerning the safe use of equipment, such as the Petroleum Act 1937, 
Geothermal Energy Act 1966, and Mining Act 1971. The former legislation had been prescriptive in 
character, specifying in detail the codes to be followed, and, for example, the maximum pressure 
allowed in a pipeline and the thickness and specifications of the steel to be used. The HSEA introduced 
regulation that was different in character, and emphasises performance standards; the required 
standard of safety and elimination of hazards is identified, and the company is given considerable 
latitude in how to achieve those standards. Thus, the detailed regulation of design, operation, 
maintenance and decommissioning of analogous activities is through regulations under health and 
safety legislation, rather than by industry-specific statutes.
41 The option of new regulation that particularly addresses CCS is said to provide increased industry certainty, transparency and 
consistency, and reduced risk to the environment, health and safety: Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Geological Storage Australian Regulatory Guiding Principles (2005), at 45.
42 An example is s 20A of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, to be inserted by 
the 2013 Amendment Act. 
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In this section we consider whether the HSEA should apply to CCS operations. The question is different 
from the application of the RMA and Crown Minerals Act, which each have the potential to provide a 
general regulatory framework for CCS. The HSEA’s role is more confined, but no less important within 
its scope. We consider the different issues and conclude that the HSEA and particular regulations 
under it can apply to CCS with little amendment. 
6.1 General characteristics of the Health and Safety  
in Employment Act 1992
The HSEA is a statute of general application that affects all businesses and activities. It imposes 
general obligations on employers to ensure the safety of employees, and obligations to ensure that 
places of work do not present hazards to non-employees and people in the vicinity of the place of 
work.43 Employee participation, information disclosure, training, monitoring, inspection, accident 
investigation, and enforcement are all provided for. The government may issue a code of practice 
for a field of work that is not compulsory but is powerful persuasive authority in the event of an 
investigation or prosecution. In the ordinary course of events, the HSEA will apply to CCS operations. 
There is no reason to suggest that it should not. CCS capture facilities can be regulated effectively 
within the HSEA framework. CCS injection sites and pipelines can be regulated effectively within it 
with only minor modifications (refer to Chapters 6 & 8).
Health and safety regulation is receiving substantial policy attention because of the Pike River coal 
mine tragedy, and because of a more general recognition that New Zealand’s workplace safety record 
is worse than that of many other countries. The recommendations of the Royal Commission are being 
implemented.44 The Health and Safety (Pike River Implementation) Bill before Parliament focuses on 
mine safety and on the establishment a new Crown entity named WorkSafe New Zealand that will 
have responsibility for the HSEA. The Bill does not propose any change that is likely to affect CCS 
directly. A wide-ranging review has been carried out by an independent taskforce, and is likely to lead 
to more significant changes in the field.45 
The HSEA obliges the employer to ensure the safety of employees in the workplace, this includes 
employees working offshore aboard a ship or on an installation. As well as the general health and 
safety measures provided in the Act, the provisions particularly pertinent to our discussion include 
hazard identification and management, the powers of inspectors, and the power of the Minister to 
issue codes of practice. The HSEA gives inspectors the power to enter and inspect a work place at 
any time, and where necessary to issue an improvement notice or a prohibition notice. A prohibition 
notice may be issued to cease operations where the inspector believes there is a likelihood of serious 
harm to any person, until the inspector believes measures sufficient to eliminate the hazard have 
been taken.46 The Act also provides that, where an inspector believes there is a failure to comply with 
43 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, ss 6 and 16. The duties are restricted to taking ‘all practicable steps’ to ensure that 
there is no hazard. The duty to persons in the vicinity of the place (relevant to pipelines) is expressed in broad terms; the duties 
to persons in the work place who are not employees or invitees vary in character. 
44 Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy Volume 1+Overview (2012). 
45 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, Report (April 2013). 
46 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 41.
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a provision of any other enactment regarding health and safety, the inspector may notify the local 
authority concerned.47
The High Hazards Unit of the Department of Labour oversees the mining, petroleum and geothermal 
industries. If it continues to be a part of the institutional arrangements, as part of WorkSafe 
New Zealand, its role, for the sake of administrative convenience, should be expanded to cover all 
phases of a CCS project. 
6.2 Is the HSEA suitable for regulating CCS?
In New Zealand, there is a strong reliance on health and safety legislation for the detailed regulation 
of activities such as mining and oil and gas operations. The regulation of CCS under the HSEA would 
follow well-established practice. HSEA regulation is in a period of improvement, as shown by the new 
mining and petroleum regulations. If CCS is to be regulated under the HSEA, overlap of regulatory 
functions would be minimised. 
On the other hand, the HSEA is focused on personal safety in the workplace. A decision maker exercising 
powers under the HSEA cannot take into account considerations of the effects of climate change, the 
environment and other resources. To do so would be outside the scope of his or her powers and the 
decision would be void in law.48 If these considerations are to be taken into account (and indeed they 
should be at some point in the overall regulatory fabric) then must be addressed under the proposed 
CCS Act. The CCS Act that we propose will do this in two ways. First, before an injection permit is 
granted the board of inquiry must be satisfied the proposed project poses no significant risk to human 
health, the environment, or other resources (the threshold test; see Chapter 5 at 5.3). Second, if a 
situation arises where there is a significant risk the Minister may issue directions to the permit holder 
to either compel or prohibit a certain act. Because of this framework in the proposed CCS legislation, 
the environment and human health and safety and other resources can be safeguarded, meaning that 
health and safety legislation can be used to regulate CCS activities without leaving any gaps in the 
legislative framework. 
We believe that two further provisions in the proposed CCS legislation will be helpful in this respect. 
The first is a broad power to make regulations in order to give effect to the purpose of the Act. While 
being something of an open-ended “catch-all” provision, a general power to make regulations seems 
desirable in order to fill any gaps that may arise and to deal with specific issues, especially issues that 
concern health and safety. The second is powers for information-sharing between agencies, in order 
to ensure that important knowledge about CCS operations is passed to the agency that needs it, 
without any undue constraint. The example of recent amendments to the Crown Minerals Act 1991 
should be followed, allowing the CMA regulator, the HSE regulator, and others, to provide information 
to each other including information about activities under permits.49 
47 Section 61.
48 Such a decision would contravene the doctrine of ultra vires, the central principle of administrative law: H Wade and C Forsyth, 
Administrative Law (10th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 30.
49 Crown Minerals Act 1991 ss 90E and 90G; also ss 29A, 33A, 33B and 33D.
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6.3 Application of the HSEA to CCS
The HSEA will apply to all the capture, transport, and injection phases of a CCS project. It is likely 
that regulations under the Act will specifically regulate the construction, operation, maintenance, 
and certain other aspects of CO2 pipelines and injection operations. This situation is consistent with 
how the oil and gas industry is regulated. The application of the HSE (Pipeline) Regulations to the 
transport phase is discussed in detail in Chapter 8; the application of the HSE (Petroleum Exploration 
and Extraction) Regulations to the detailed regulation of injection and storage operations is discussed 
in Chapter 6. Difficulties in applying the Act at sea, and applying the Pipeline Regulations in particular, 
are discussed in Chapter 9.
6.4 Recommendations as to the HSEA
We recommend that the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 apply to CCS operations. 
Regulations under the HSEA are appropriate mechanisms for regulating the safety aspects of CCS 
operations. We recommend that regulations be made that will address CO2 storage exploration and 
injection, and that the HSE Pipeline Regulations be amended to include CO2 pipelines. (See Chapters 
6 and 8.) We recommend that the proposed CCS Act include a general power to make regulations 
to give effect to the purpose of the Act, especially for health and safety reasons, and powers for the 
inter-agency exchange of information. 
7 Ancillary Legislation Applicable  
to CCS Operations
There are a number of statutes that affect different phases of CCS, or any commercial activity for 
that matter, and that will apply because of their general application, not because of any unique 
characteristics that arise because of the nature of CCS. For example, legislation regarding conservation 
land, Māori land, foreign investment, and employment will all apply regardless of the activity. We do 
not discuss the legal questions that may arise under such legislation, but below we note two statutes 
that are directly applicable to CCS and may require policy attention to address gaps or barriers. 
7.1 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996
The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNOA) controls the use of hazardous 
substances by regulating identification, packaging, tracking, and emergency management. The Act 
defines hazardous substances, but also erects a complex system of classification of substances 
according to their character. Carbon dioxide is currently not classified as hazardous.50 Carbon 
dioxide in supercritical form is not separately classified, but we understand that it is not presently 
in commerce in New Zealand. If CO2 were to be classified as a hazardous substance, the result will 
be new administrative rules as to labelling, record-keeping and equipment, but with only minor 
50 Hazardous Substances (Dangerous Goods and Scheduled Toxic Substances) Transfer Notice 2004. See also Environmental 
Protection Authority’s Chemical Classification and Information Database. CO2 is identified as a non-flammable and non-toxic gas.
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implications for CCS operations.51 A further result would be that the Hazardous Substances (Disposal) 
Regulations 2001 would apply, stipulating methods of disposal that are incompatible with CCS.52 
We recommend that the classification of CO2 under HSNOA remain unchanged.
It is worth noting that general HSNOA requirements for the use and storage of chemicals will apply 
to CCS capture facilities, but there may be no need to change them for the specific case of CCS. 
7.2 Building Act 2004
The Building Act 2004 routinely applies to the construction of buildings, including most structures. 
Thus, a capture facility or injection facility will be required to comply with the provisions in the Act. 
A CCS operator can apply to be exempted from obtaining a building consent,53 although it may still 
have to comply with the Building Code. The Act currently excludes offshore installations used for 
petroleum mining, and we suggest this should be amended to include offshore installations used for 
CCS as well. We also recommend the Act be amended to include a CO2 pipeline operator as a network 
utility operator so that (as discussed in Chapter 8) a CO2 pipeline is not treated as a building. 
8 Recommendations
Recommendations as to the RMA 
1. The injection and storage of CO2 should be authorised under a new CCS Act, while the RMA 
continues to apply to other aspects of CCS operations.
2. The RMA will be amended so that the injection of CO2 for permanent sequestration will not be 
the discharge of a contaminant. Injection and any migration or leakage from a geological storage 
formation will be dealt with under the proposed CCS Act and not the RMA.
3. Incidental discharges from CCS injection activities and transport (for example occasional 
discharges of CO2 to the atmosphere, or stormwater runoff from industrial facilities) will remain 
regulated under the RMA, and continue to be discharges to land, air or water under that Act, 
regulated by the regional council. 
4. Section 7 will be amended to ensure that regard will be had to the benefits to be derived from the 
use and development of CCS.
51 For example the Hazardous Substances (Classes 6, 8, and 9 Controls) Regulations 2001 as to recording the date and time of 
applications would be unsuitable if they were to apply to CCS.
52 Hazardous Substances (Disposal) Regulations, regs 8, 9.
53 Building Act 2004, Schedule 1, cl 1(k).
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5. Sections 70A and 104E and related provisions will be amended to ensure that CCS is not 
unintentionally obstructed by the policy of removing from the RMA the consideration of the 
discharge into air of GHGs. A second exception can be added to sections 70A and 104E to allow 
councils and consent authorities to have regard to the extent that the use and development of 
CCS enables a reduction in the discharge into air of GHGs, either in absolute terms or relative to 
the use and development of non-renewable energy without CCS.
6. A National Policy Statement will be made under the RMA in order to provide nation-wide 
guidance and policy direction for CCS activities that remain subject to the RMA. Alternatively, 
provisions in the proposed CCS Act can be deemed to be an NPS. 
7. A National Environmental Standard should be considered to facilitate aspects of CCS operations, 
especially pipelines. 
8. The powers of the Minister for the Environment to call in a proposal of national significance under 
sections 140 to 150AA of the RMA will be amended to provide that, where a person makes an 
application for an injection permit under the proposed CCS Act, the Minister shall exercise his 
or her powers to call in all RMA aspects of the proposal to be heard and decided in the same 
process as that for the injection permit. A board of inquiry will be empowered to decide the RMA 
resource consents along with the injection permit. The public participatory processes under 
each Act should be aligned so that submissions are processed and heard only once in relation to 
a single CCS proposal. 
9. The RMA will be amended to extend the list of network utility operators in section 166 to 
a person who operates, or proposes to operate, a network for the purpose of carbon capture, 
the transmission of CO2 and geological storage of CO2. This will make a CCS company eligible 
to become a requiring authority with rights to designate and to acquire land and rights of way 
compulsorily, and will facilitate status as an accommodated activity under the Marine and 
Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. 
10. The drafting of CCS legislation should draw on the accrued capability and experience with the 
management of comparable activities under the RMA. 
Recommendations as to the CMA 
11. A new CCS Act should be enacted separately from the Crown Minerals Act 1991. 
Recommendation whether a new Act is required 
12. A stand-alone CCS statute should be enacted. 
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Recommendations as to health and safety 
13. The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 and regulations under it should apply to 
CCS operations. 
14. The proposed CCS Act should include a general power to make regulations to give effect to the 
purpose of the Act, especially for health and safety reasons, and powers for the inter-agency 
exchange of information. 
Recommendations as to ancillary legislation 
15. The classification of CO2 under the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 
(not classified as hazardous) remain unchanged.
16. The Building Act 2004 should be amended to include offshore installations used for CCS, and to 
include a CO2 pipeline operator as a network utility operator so that a CO2 pipeline is not treated 
as a building.
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CHAPTER 3  
A NEW CCS ACT
The need for a new statute for carbon capture and storage emerged from the analysis in Chapter 2. 
The conclusion we came to there was that the injection of CO2 and subsequent leakage or migration 
should be removed from control under the RMA and EEZ Act. Its control under the proposed CCS Act 
will be more specific, and more capable of providing the kind of regulation that CCS requires. The new 
Act should be no less protective of the environment and human health than the RMA and EEZ Act.
This Chapter addresses general preliminary questions concerning that legislation; its design, 
nomenclature, its purpose and principles, requirements for public participation, and what regulatory 
agency should administer it. The detailed requirements of the legislation are discussed in subsequent 
Chapters. But at first it seems desirable to provide a short general overview of the CCS legislation that 
we propose, and in particular its procedures
1 Overview of Regulation under a New Act 
The central feature of regulation under the new CCS Act will be the grant of permits for CCS exploration 
and for CCS injection. Chapter 5 explains the permitting regime, and Chapter 6 explains the detailed 
regulation of injection and storage under an injection permit and under the associated site plan which 
will be an important and flexible aspect of continuing regulation of CCS after the permit is issued. 
Site closure and the right to relinquish an injection permit will be carefully controlled, because it will 
amount to acceptance of the stability of the injected CO2 in permanent storage, with an associated 
transfer of liability to the public, as considered in Chapter 10. Below in this Chapter we consider 
options as to what agency should manage this permitting system. 
The procedure for obtaining an exploration permit will not be especially complex because exploration 
will not involve CO2 injection except possibly for small test injections. The application will require 
public engagement but not a formal hearing. It will be decided by the CCS regulatory agency. The 
company will apply separately to the regional council for any incidental activities such as earthworks 
or water takes; they will still be managed under the RMA. 
The procedure for obtaining an injection permit will be more complex, and in Chapter 5 we identify the 
material that an applicant will have to supply in order to explain its project, the site characteristics, 
environmental impact assessment, health and safety, and risk management. The application will be 
made to the CCS regulatory agency and will be heard either by it or by a board of inquiry. (We will refer 
to a board of inquiry generally without pre-judging that question.) One model of a board of inquiry is 
that under the “call in” procedures of the RMA, which is appointed by the Minister for the particular 
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matter, having regard to the nature of the application and suggestions from the local authority.1 
It has 3, 4 or 5 members, and is chaired by a current, former or retired Environment Court Judge, 
or by a retired High Court Judge. The board is serviced by the Environmental Protection Authority. 
The board makes a decision on the application, subject only to appeal on a point of law to the High 
Court. Another model is the EEZ Act, where it is the EPA itself which hears and decides an application 
for a marine consent, subject similarly to appeal to the High Court on a point of law only.2 
The board of inquiry will hold a public hearing into the application for the CCS injection permit. At the 
same time it will consider all applications for resource consents or marine consents under the RMA or EEZ 
Act for ancillary activities associated with the project. In particular it will consider an RMA designation 
for a CO2 pipeline if one is applied for as part of the project. Procedural simplicity and integration will 
result. Amendments of both those Acts will be required to bring this about. 
For CCS, we consider that a board of inquiry is suitable for several reasons apart from simplicity 
and integration. It provides a high quality of procedure and a high level of public participation. 
The appointment of a board for a particular application is a convenient arrangement for CCS where 
only few applications are likely but where the projects will be large. The constitution of a board can 
include members of local authorities, persons knowledgeable of tikanga Māori, and persons with 
relevant technical expertise. A board is well suited to making decisions on ancillary activities under 
the RMA and EEZ Act as well as injection under the CCS Act. 
A board of inquiry would make a decision on an application for an injection permit, and therefore on 
the initiation of any CCS project. However if a board is separate from the regulatory agency (as it is 
under the RMA) then its role will come to an end, and the ongoing regulatory powers under the CCS 
Act will be exercised by the CCS regulatory agency. The ongoing control of activities under the RMA 
and EEZ Act will be exercised by the local authorities concerned and (in the EEZ) by the EPA. 
2 The Case for a General CCS Law 
Two options to a general statute for CCS should be mentioned, even if only for the sake of form. 
One is a special Act; project-specific legislation. The chief example is the Barrow Island Act 2003 of 
Western Australia, ratifying a government agreement for a large natural gas project accompanied by 
CCS. A special Act is tailored to the particular project, and can allow CCS to proceed without having 
1 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 149J-149V.
2 The EPA can delegate a decision on a marine consent to a committee. It can delegate to a board of inquiry only on cross-boundary 
activities that are of national importance: Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, ss 16, 99.
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to develop a general framework. However special agreements and Acts do not produce consistency 
and legal certainty,3 and do not give a message to the industrial and investment community that a 
country and its legal system are ready to move on CCS. A special Act for CCS exploration would be 
unlikely. In contrast to Western Australia, there is no modern experience in New Zealand with special 
Acts for resource development projects. 
The second option is a simple Act, or amendment of an existing Act, that authorises the Governor 
General in Council to make regulations for CCS. It might only be one section. This may be attractive 
in allowing CCS regulatory requirements to be met in a progressive and timely way, as the need arises. 
However, just as with special Acts, it does not send any message that the country and its legal system 
is ready for CCS. In addition, some of what is required for a CCS legal framework should be in a statute 
made by Parliament and not in a regulation made by the government. Laws affecting the rights of 
land owners are a clear example. 
We are left with the preferred option of well-developed CCS legislation that will apply to a project, 
should one eventuate in New Zealand. An initial matter is the form that regulation should take. 
Options include self-regulation, co-regulation, or direct government regulation. The obvious 
difficulty with an Act that promotes extensive self-regulation is the lack of public confidence and the 
potential risk to the environment, public health and other resources, and reduced transparency and 
consistency. Self-regulation is common in codes of practice written by industry, but generally they 
receive statutory backing. Co-regulation combines elements of legislation with self-regulation and 
involves government and industry sharing responsibilities. The Australian Regulatory Guiding Principles 
offer a helpful analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the different types of regulation on 
each of the different regulatory issues for CCS.4 The general conclusion is that CCS lends itself to 
direct government regulation due to the increased certainty and clarity that it provides for industry, 
increased consistency and transparency, and the reduction in risk to the environment, health and 
safety. The emergence of CCS as an industry is uncertain, and especially in such circumstances self-
regulation and co-regulation are unlikely to reduce cost, complexity or timeliness. 
3 Title of Legislation for CCS
Carbon capture and storage, or CCS, is now the term that is in common use in technical, policy and 
legal circles around the world. It is a well established term. However it is plain that it is not very 
accurate. In Chapter 2 we saw that the intention is to dispose of CO2 permanently, and not merely to 
put it into a store for future use. A more accurate word is sequestration, or (to distinguish biological 
storage) geosequestration, but the word has a sesquipedalian unattractiveness. Further, the legislation 
does not really need to provide for the capture phase; its emphasis is storage and transport. 
“Carbon Dioxide Geological Sequestration” is accurate, but again it does not flow off the tongue 
easily. It excludes other GHGs, although that is not likely to be a serious problem; the next most 
3 M Gibbs and P McCormack, “No Consistent Approach to CCS Legislation” Blake Dawson Resources and Energy Law Update 
(October 2008) at 13.
4 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Geological Storage Australian Regulatory 
Guiding Principles (2005).
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common GHG is methane, and it would be put to use (it is the main component of natural gas) rather 
than put into storage. “Geological Sequestration Act” is precise, and provides a certain amount of 
latitude, but it does not make the connection with GHGs or climate change in the way that some 
Australian Acts do. “Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act” makes that connection, but it is 
a lengthy title. Internationally there is no consistent approach; examples from other jurisdictions are 
included in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: Examples of titles to legislation from other jurisdictions
Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act (Commonwealth, AU)
Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act (Vic)
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act (Queensland)
Carbon Capture and Storage Statutes Amendments Act (Alberta, CAN)
Directive on Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide (EU)
Act Regulating Carbon Sequestration (State of Montana, USA)
Carbon Dioxide Reduction Act (State of Kansas, USA)
We make no recommendation on the matter, and refer in this Report to the proposed statute simply 
as the Carbon Capture and Storage Act or CCS Act. 
4 Definitions for CCS
The International Energy Agency (IEA) Model Regulatory Framework5 is a good source for the definition 
of key terms in New Zealand law, because it represents a substantial gathering of international best 
practice for CCS regulation. Other sources such as the European Union Directive are also available.6 
Exactly what is “carbon capture and storage” comes up immediately in the statement of statutory 
purpose, considered below. A definition of storage could state plainly that storage, including in the 
purpose section, is the permanent containment of CO2 in geological formations. This goes further 
than the IEA Model Regulatory Framework, which defines storage in broad terms. These matters will 
need to be settled in the legislative drafting stage where the terminology of the legislation as a whole 
can be considered, and it seems premature to make recommendations on them at this point. 
The IEA states that a storage site is “a storage complex, overburden, the surface projection of the 
storage complex and injection facilities”.7 In contrast, the EU Directive says a storage site is “a defined 
volume area within a geological formation used for the geological storage of CO2 and associated 
5 International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010).
6 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114. 
7 International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework, above n 5, at 58.
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surface and injection facilities”; the storage complex is the “storage site and surrounding geological 
domain which can have an effect on overall storage integrity and security; that is, secondary 
containment formations”.8 This Report has generally adopted the definitions used by the IEA. The 
CCS literature is consistent with its terminology for the behaviour of injected CO2, and leakage refers 
to any CO2 that escapes to the surface; migration refers to movement of the CO2 plume subsurface. 
It should be noted that the IEA make a distinction between migration and unintended migration, the 
latter meaning movement of the CO2 outside the storage complex.
A phrase which does not appear in the IEA Model Regulatory Framework and appears to be unique to 
the Australian legislation is “serious situation”,9 the existence of which triggers ministerial powers 
to make directions to deal with the situation. Providing a definition of what constitutes a serious 
situation gives a clear statement of when the Minister may intervene and could be a desirable aspect 
to import from the Australian legislation.
A further definitional question is the point at which a pipeline that forms part of the injection facility 
becomes a pipeline for the transmission of CO2. This will be necessary because pipelines that form 
part of the injection facility should not be included under the regulations for transport of CO2. 
5 Statutory Purpose
It is now common for legislation to state its purpose expressly, and to state the principles which are to 
govern its application.10 These provisions serve a role in communicating the purpose and direction of 
legislation to the public. They also help in statutory interpretation, where the courts must ascertain 
the general intention of the legislature in order to give proper effect to specific provisions. Most of all, 
they guide discretionary decision-making. Where an Act grants broad discretionary powers to decide 
particular cases, a statement of purpose and principles gives direction to decision-makers about the 
general objectives to be pursued and particular matters to be taken into account in exercising their 
discretion. They confine and structure the discretion. For such purpose and principles to have real 
effect, the legislation must make it clear that particular decisions must be taken in accordance with 
them. The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) is a leading example of an Act that declares that 
particular decisions (such as decisions on plans or resource consents) must be made subject to the 
Act’s purpose and principles. 
Core of a CCS Act purpose.  The core of the purpose for the CCS Act should be to facilitate CCS or make 
it possible, and to regulate it. Just what is meant by CCS needs to be defined, as we have discussed 
in the preceding two sections of this Chapter. It must be permanent storage. It must be in geological 
formations. It must include, at least by reference, ancillary matters such as exploration, monitoring, 
and the transport of CO2. (Most of the law for pipeline transport will be in the RMA and the HSEA, 
8 Directive 2009/31/EC, above n 6, Article 3.
9 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 379; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s 363; 
Greenhouse Gas Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 6.
10 J Burrows and R Carter, Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) at 220; R G Hammond, 
“Embedding Policy Statements in Statutes: A Comparative Perspective on the Genesis of a New Public Law Jurisprudence” 
(1982) 5 Hastings Intnl & Comp L Rev 323.
Carbon Capture and Storage: Designing the Legal and Regulatory Framework for New Zealand64
but a few aspects such as industry regulation will be in the new CCS Act.) These points can be dealt 
with by the careful definition of terms in an interpretation section, and do not all need to be in the 
purpose section itself; but exactly how it is done is more a matter for detailed legislative drafting than 
for decision at this point. 
An important general policy question is the extent to which the purpose of the Act is to promote 
CCS. Different options from positive action to passive disengagement are signalled by different verbs; 
to ensure, to promote, to facilitate, to make possible, to render lawful. It is common for statutes to 
promote some direction or activity; both the RMA and the Crown Minerals Act 1991 do so. In Chapter 1 
we noted that this Report concentrates on the character of a legal framework under which CCS would 
be possible, but the broader policy debate about a new law should range more widely. For present 
purposes we will say “to facilitate.” 
A less policy-laden point is that the fundamental reason for CCS is to reduce CO2 emissions to the 
atmosphere in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or mitigate climate change, and that the 
statutory purpose should say so. An option is to go further and state connections with specific 
international targets, or specific government objectives with respect to climate change, but it is 
probably better to avoid such complexity, in favour of a general statement. The New Zealand Climate 
Change Response Act 2002 avoids detailed policy statements.11 
The purpose statement should not express any preference for CCS over renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, or other energy measures. Nor should it express any connection with any particular source 
of CO2. The legislation should not favour any particular technology, and should not lead unnecessarily 
to a CCS-versus-renewables debate or a debate about ending the undesirable use of fossil fuels. 
The legislation should identify CCS as one of a number of laws required to address climate change.12 
It is possible to include a direct reference to sustainable development or sustainable management in 
the statutory purpose. We do not see a great deal of benefit in doing so. There is scope for confusion 
in doing so. The Victoria Act declares that in its administration regard should be given to the principles 
of sustainable development, and then lists ten principles.13 It is not difficult to maintain that CCS 
is a form of sustainable development or management, however one characterises the concept. 
It is desirable to ensure that the proposed CCS Act can be administered in parallel with the RMA, 
so inconsistency of result should be avoided, but we do not consider that repetition or imitation of the 
RMA’s purpose and principles is necessary to administer the two Acts together in a satisfactory way. 
Examples.  A clear and well expressed purpose is stated in Queensland’s Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2009, section 3: 
Purposes of Act and their achievement
(1)  The main purpose of this Act is to help reduce the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on the 
environment.
11 The purpose statement in section 3 of the Climate Change Response Act 2002 refers to meeting international obligations and 
to reducing New Zealand’s net emissions below business-as-usual levels.
12 In contrast, Recital 4 of Directive 2009/31/EC makes some effort to explain the relationship between CCS and energy policy; 
CCS is to be a bridging technology and its use is not to detract from energy savings, renewables and other safe and sustainable 
low-carbon technologies. 
13 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 8.
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(2)  The main purpose is achieved principally by facilitating the process called greenhouse gas 
geological storage, also called greenhouse gas storage (GHG storage).
(3)  This Act facilitates GHG storage by
(a)  providing for the granting of authorities (called ‘GHG authorities’) to explore for or use 
underground geological formations or structures to store carbon dioxide, or carry out 
related activities; and
(b)  creating a regulatory system for the carrying out of activities relating to GHG authorities.
(4)  Other purposes of this Act are to ensure the following for the carrying out of the activities
(a)  minimisation of conflict with other land uses;
(b)  constructive consultation with people affected by the activities;
(c)  appropriate compensation for owners or occupiers adversely affected by the activities;
(d)  responsible land and resource management.
The equivalent provision in Victoria’s Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 section 1 
is as follows.
The purpose of this Act is to facilitate and regulate the injection of greenhouse gas substances into 
underground geological formations for the purpose of permanent storage of those gases, including 
to facilitate and regulate the exploration for suitable underground geological storage formations,  
as part of Victoria’s commitment to the reduction of atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions.
The Victoria Act goes on in section 7 to state that the objectives of the Act are to encourage and 
promote greenhouse gas sequestration operations by encouraging and facilitating greenhouse gas 
sequestration operations. In comparison with Queensland, there is a clearer intention to promote 
CCS. There is also a clearer inclusion of regulation, permanence, exploration, and CCS as part of a 
suite of laws to address climate change. 
The EU Directive gives another valuable example of a statement of purpose.14
1.  This Directive establishes a legal framework for the environmentally safe geological storage 
of carbon dioxide (CO2) to contribute to the fight against climate change.
2.  The purpose of environmentally safe geological storage of CO2 is permanent containment of 
CO2 in such a way as to prevent and, where this is not possible, eliminate as far as possible 
negative effects and any risk to the environment and human health.
The main statement is neutral rather than promoting, but the statement of the need to fight against 
climate change certainly takes a position. The element that does not appear in the Australian 
examples is the prevention or reduction of risk to the environment and human health. (“Eliminate as 
far as possible” is an awkward phrase.) 
Human health, environment, coverage.  The objective of avoiding significant effects on human health 
and safety and on the environment is an essential part of the scheme of the proposed CCS Act. It 
seems to be important and general enough to have a place in the statement of the Act’s purpose. 
(A possible alternative is to state it separately from the purpose, presumably in principles, and with 
words that do not allow it to be downplayed.) The matter can be stated in a simple way in terms of 
protection of the environment and human health and safety. It does not seem necessary to say that 
the protection is not absolute protection. There is no reason why the word should be read that way. 
(Certainly the legislation could put the point beyond doubt, in a definition or a clarifying subsection.) 
14 Directive 2009/31/EC, above n 6, Article 1.
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Alternatively, the matter can be phrased as one of the prevention or elimination as far as possible of 
risk, as in the EU Directive, or of avoiding and minimising risk, or of avoiding and minimising adverse 
effects. However there does not seem to be any special advantage in those formulations. 
How such protection should relate to facilitation of CCS is another question. It brings out the fact 
that CCS legislation is both facilitating activity within a particular industrial sector and providing 
environmental regulation that is no less strong in respect of the particular matters that it controls 
than would occur under the RMA and related Acts. The purpose of the RMA has prompted a great deal 
of debate about how such components are to be understood to fit together. Here we avoid using the 
word “while” which in the RMA’s purpose is much argued, and follow the EU Directive with the words 
“in such a way.” 
We readily acknowledge that a great number of different variations are possible in the drafting of 
the purpose of the CCS Act, and there may well exist effective alternatives to what we recommend. 
Although the task is challenging, we believe that it is important. In Chapter 5 we propose that the 
matters discussed here form part of key decisions such as the threshold test for the granting of an 
injection permit. However we also consider that it is important that an over-arching expression of 
statutory purpose guide the making of the many other decisions required under the Act, such as 
decisions on exploration, site plan approval, site closure, directions, and cancellation. 
Recommendation.  We recommend that the purpose of the Act be to facilitate and to regulate the 
permanent geological sequestration of CO2, as part of efforts to reduce the emission into the air of 
greenhouse gases, in such a way as to protect the environment and human health and safety.
6 Principles for CCS
A statement of principles is desirable in support of a statutory purpose in the proposed CCS Act. 
Principles can ensure that particular values are advanced without complicating a statement of overall 
purpose. Again, the RMA is an example, where sections 6, 7 and 8 state matters of national significance 
that decision makers shall recognise and provide for, and other matters that they shall have regard 
to or take into account. It is important that the relationship between the purpose and principles be 
carefully stated, and that the obligation to give effect to the principles is also clearly stated both 
generally and in relation to various specific decisions. 
The World Resources Institute identifies a useful set of principles to guide CCS development:
(i) Protection of human health and safety;
(ii) Protection of ecosystems;
(iii) Protection of underground sources of drinking water and other natural resources;
(iv) Ensuring market confidence in emission reductions through regulatory clarity and proper 
GHG accounting; and
(v) Facilitating cost-effective timely deployment.15
15 World Resources Institute, CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Capture, Transport, and Storage (2008) at 3.
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As we explained above, we take the view that the first two of these principles are sufficiently 
important to be included as part of the purpose of the Act. (We will not explore the difference between 
environment and ecosystems.) If that is done, then there is no need for these values to be restated 
as principles. Item (iii) on the list is perhaps two separate items, both of them deserving treatment 
separately from the environment or ecosystems generally. The first is well expressed in a focus on 
sources of drinking water rather than groundwater or potable groundwater more generally. It allows 
for consideration of the extent to which particular ground water resources are actually needed, taking 
into account (for example) the depth of the resource and the abundance of surface water. The second, 
other natural resources, divides down further into surface resources and subsurface resources. The 
former has only a moderate claim to be recognised separately. The latter is more important, where 
CCS injection operations and oil and gas or other mineral operations could affect each other. In 
Chapter 7 we propose that principles be stated to deal with such possible conflict. Those specific 
principles could usefully be accompanied by a principle that is generally stated.
The fourth item on the WRI list can be argued not to belong because in New Zealand GHG accounting 
is under the Climate Change Response Act 2002, but the counter-argument is that clarity and 
proper accounting will depend on the CCS regime providing clear measurement monitoring and 
verification data to enable the accurate assessment of liability under the emissions trading scheme. 
We recommend that it be adopted on the basis of a matter to which there should be particular regard. 
The fifth item, facilitating cost-effective timely deployment, can be advanced as ensuring that the 
administration of the proposed CCS Act facilitates and presents no obstacles to CCS. The importance 
of timely deployment has been urged by the IEA, among others, as we have noted. However goes 
beyond allowing CCS and into the promotion of CCS, so we make no recommendation it. 
From this, the principles that we believe should be stated in the new legislation are for the protection 
of underground sources of drinking water, the management of conflict with other subsurface 
resources, and the protection of market confidence in emissions reductions. Other principles relevant 
to the design of the legislation, rather than principles applying to decisions for CCS management, are 
discussed in Chapter 6 on the detailed regulation of injection and storage. They include flexibility, 
transparency, and requirements for public participation and the protection of existing uses. 
6.1 Treaty of Waitangi 
The Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand’s founding document and deserves explicit provision in CCS 
legislation. Treaty clauses are now common in legislation dealing with natural resources. Section 8 of 
the RMA is an illustration:
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it … shall 
take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi).
The Crown Minerals Act section 4 is very similar:
All persons exercising functions and powers under this Act shall have regard to the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi).
There is a strong case for the inclusion of a Treaty clause as a section in the CCS Act, and we so 
recommend, although it needs to be complemented with specific provisions to accommodate Māori 
dimensions of resource management. 
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6.2 Uncertainty, risk and precaution 
Much of the technology of CCS is well understood, and the risks that it presents are well understood 
and manageable. CCS deals with physical systems rather than biological systems or social systems 
which are often more complex. (Refer to Chapter 1.) However, there is always a level of technical 
uncertainty, especially in dealing with geological formations that may be hidden from view thousands 
of metres below the surface. The behaviour of a substance injected there can be modelled and predicted 
with some sophistication, but it may be affected by characteristics that are not readily discernible. 
In addition, public reactions to CCS, and public concerns with it, are likely to be different from those of 
people in the technical community who are well-informed about the issues and overseas experience 
with CCS and related operations. 
Public concern about CCS will be couched in terms of risk to people and to the environment. The CCS 
legal framework should assist decision makers with matters of risk and uncertainty, and one way to do so 
is to include statutory principles in the legislation. One candidate is what is known as the precautionary 
principle. Our examination of the issues leads to the conclusion that the precautionary principle provides 
some useful perspectives but is not in itself the solution for New Zealand CCS legislation. 
Precaution. The precautionary principle emerged in European law and is now found in international 
law and the domestic legislation of a number of countries.16 It gained recognition in the 1992 United 
Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which says:17
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.
This version of the principle conveys the core perception that decisions should be taken to prevent 
serious harm even where there is no definite proof that the harm will occur. The harm can be harm 
to the environment or to human health and safety. The principle takes a number of different forms. 
Strong versions emphasise that the burden of proof that an activity or a product is safe lies on the 
proponent. They may require that a margin of safety be built into all decisions, beyond what has 
actually been proved to be necessary. They may insist on caution without any balancing of costs and 
benefits. Weak versions are less restrictive and may not insist that preventive measures be taken in 
the face of uncertainty, only that they be available, or they may allow economic considerations to be 
taken into account.18 A precautionary “approach” is sometimes distinguished from the “principle,” and 
is generally thought to be less restrictive, certainly less restrictive than a strong version of the principle. 
An approach may have less immediate legal consequences than a principle of law, which may be 
understood to be very directive. Even though they provide valuable insights, neither the precautionary 
principle nor the approach has an exact meaning; there is a continuum of understandings.19
16 T O’Riordan and J Cameron, Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, London, 2001). 
17 United Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992), Principle 15. 
18 L Cameron, Environmental Risk Management in New Zealand – Is There Scope to Apply a More Generic Framework? 
(New Zealand Treasury Policy Perspectives Paper 06/06, 2006).
19 C Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) at 19. 
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Much of the conceptual confusion disappears if we keep in mind that all countries have elaborate 
regulatory systems to manage risk to human health and safety and the environment, and that if the 
precautionary principle has a role it is within such systems. The European Union has declared that 
all Union policy on the environment shall be based on the precautionary principle,20 and while the 
United States has not done the same, like many other countries, it has very elaborate systems in 
place to manage risk.21 We believe that the overall regulatory framework provides important context 
for consideration of the matter, both in New Zealand generally and in CCS legislation in particular. 
New Zealand has made no general declaration to adopt the precautionary principle. The RMA does not 
refer to it expressly, but Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council held that the precautionary 
approach was inherent in the RMA, and that to apply the principle separately would lead to double-
counting of the need for caution.22 Other Acts contain provisions that are more directly applications 
of the precautionary principle. The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 requires the 
precautionary “approach” to be followed:23
7 Precautionary approach
All persons exercising functions, powers, and duties under this Act, including but not limited to, 
functions, powers, and duties under sections 29, 32, 38, 45, and 48 of this Act, shall take into 
account the need for caution in managing adverse effects where there is scientific and technical 
uncertainty about those effects.
Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority held that little assistance was to be had from 
the somewhat uncertain international concept of the precautionary principle when Parliament had 
deliberately avoided it, so the section had to be construed in its own light.24 The Court held that 
the uncertainty had to be scientific and technical, not ethical or social. Managing adverse effects 
could include measures to contain the escape of an organism and was not confined to prohibiting the 
activity. The Fisheries Act 1996 includes “information principles” in section 10 which direct decision 
makers among other things to use the best possible information and to be cautious when information 
is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The Fisheries Act information principles have been adapted for 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012. 
Precaution in the Proposed CCS Act.  We have noted above that the conceptual difficulties of the 
precautionary principle and approach are fewer if we keep in mind the regulatory framework for the 
management of risk to human health and safety and to the environment.25 New Zealand legislation 
will be construed on its own terms, not in isolation from currents of thinking internationally, but with 
primary reference to the words used in the Act, especially where an underlying concept such as the 
precautionary principle is so inexact in its meaning. 
20 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 326/132, 26.10.2012, Article 191.
21 Sunstein, above n 19.
22 Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council [1999] NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at 134-135; also Environmental Defence Society 
v NZ King Salmon Co [2013] NZHC 1992, 8 Aug 2013, at [72]. Generally see A Gillespie, “Precautionary New Zealand” (2011) 24 
NZULR 364. 
23 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, s 7. In its present form the section is different only in the references 
to other sections. 
24 Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 NZLR 213 at 250-51 per McGechan J.
25 Cameron, above n 18.
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The CCS Act that we propose will require a CCS proponent to obtain a permit in order to explore for CCS 
storage formations or to inject and store CO2. Pipelines will be controlled under the RMA and the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act 1992. The applicant company will have to make out its case for a permit, 
submitting its plans and its assessment of risk to the scrutiny of a regulator and (in applying for an 
injection permit) to the scrutiny of the public. Subsequent regulation, including monitoring, inspections, 
directions, and the possibility of cancellation, will all be aimed at reducing risk. In Chapter 5, we propose 
that the CCS regulator shall not approve an injection permit unless it is satisfied that the CCS project 
applied for will not present significant risk of leakage from permanent storage, risk to health and safety, 
or risk to the environment. 
This proposal embodies much of what is contemplated by many versions of the precautionary 
principle; a burden of proof on the proponent of the activity to prove safety, and a standard of proof 
that requires caution. CCS development cannot proceed in the absence of firm evidence that it will 
do no harm. Firm evidence is not conclusive or absolute evidence, but the precautionary principle 
has never seriously been advanced on that basis. Thus, while it is an option, we do not see a case for 
including a section in the CCS Act like the one in the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 
1996 requiring the precautionary principle or approach to be applied. 
Information principles are another option, such as in the Fisheries Act 1996 or the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (EEZ Act). They embody some of the 
ideas associated with the precautionary principle in an effort to guide decision makers. Those in the 
EEZ Act are in section 61:
Information principles
(1)  When considering an application for a marine consent, the Environmental Protection 
Authority must—
(a)  make full use of its powers to request information from the applicant, obtain advice, and 
commission a review or a report; and
(b)  base decisions on the best available information; and
(c)  take into account any uncertainty or inadequacy in the information available.
(2)  If, in relation to making a decision under this Act, the information available is uncertain or 
inadequate, the EPA must favour caution and environmental protection.
(3)  If favouring caution and environmental protection means that an activity is likely to be 
refused, the EPA must first consider whether taking an adaptive management approach 
would allow the activity to be undertaken.
(4)  Subsection (3) does not limit section 63 or 64.
(5)  In this section, best available information means the best information that, in the particular 
circumstances, is available without unreasonable cost, effort, or time.
A statement of principles like this could help decision makers to address questions of uncertainty, 
risk, and imperfect information, and would complement more specific statutory criteria that govern 
particular decisions. However it can be argued that subsections (1) and (2) make requirements that 
should characterise all regulatory decision making. As for (3), we doubt that adaptive management 
is suitable for CCS projects, which need to be thoroughly analysed in advance and for which the only 
really available adaptation would be closure, a possibility which is provided for in any event. It should 
also be noticed that the EEZ Act context of this statement of principles is one where there is no 
hurdle or threshold to cross to acquire a marine consent. What we propose for the CCS Act is a clear 
threshold test imposing a distinct burden of proof. 
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Some of the experience with the equivalent section 10 of the Fisheries Act suggests a need for caution 
before inserting a like section in the proposed CCS Act. It has been held that section 10(a) reinforces 
the possibility that a decision can be set aside on the grounds of a mistake of fact, even if the Minister 
is seeking to act cautiously;26 and it has been applied to strike down a decision for using the wrong 
information even though it was taking a precautionary approach to environmental protection.27 
This is unsatisfactory if it makes it easier to launch judicial review proceedings for what is little more than 
a dispute about the facts. More positively, the section has been held to mean that fisheries management 
and protection decisions cannot be postponed even if the information available about a fish stock is 
poor; the Minister could not overlook information that could be gathered without unreasonable cost 
even though it would still be incomplete information.28 Equally positive is the decision that the section 
does not oblige the Minister to obtain the best possible information (in contrast with best available 
information), and the emphasis that to achieve the purposes of the Act the Minister may need to act 
on uncertain information.29 But the section has become used more for information management than 
for actual precaution.30 This makes it a less useful precedent for CCS. 
We therefore consider that a statement of information principles in the proposed CCS Act could allow 
undue re-litigation of questions of fact, without actually adding to the precaution for health and the 
environment that is provided by the Act as a whole. We observe that if a general direction about 
precaution is included, it should apply to all decisions made under the Act, and not only to decisions 
to grant an injection permit. (The Fisheries Act and the EEZ Act offer a contrast in this respect.) 
Decisions on site plans, directions, and cancellations, for example, should all be included. 
6.3 Recommendations as to principles
We recommend that the proposed CCS Act include an obligation for all decision makers under it to 
have particular regard to:
(i) the protection of underground sources of drinking water; 
(ii) the management of conflict between CCS and other uses of subsurface resources; and 
(iii) the protection of market confidence in emission reductions through regulatory clarity and proper 
GHG accounting.
We recommend that decision makers be obliged to have regard to, or to take into account, the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi). 
26 Northern Inshore Fisheries Co Ltd v Minister of Fisheries, HC Wellington CP235/01, 4 March 2002 at [50], [74]. 
27 Squid Fishery Management Co Ltd v Minister of Fisheries, CA39/04, 13 July 2004 at [75]-[80], [103]. The Minister was entitled 
to take a precautionary approach to the balancing of utilisation of a fishery with harm to sealions, but the decision could be 
attacked under section 10 for failing to use the best available evidence. 
28 Antons Trawling Co Ltd v Minister of Fisheries, HC Wellington CIV-2007-485-2199, 22 February 2008.
29 NZ Federation of Commercial Fishermen Inc v Minister of Fisheries, HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-2016, 23 February 2010 at 
[34]-[41].
30 C Iorns Magallanes “The Precautionary Principle in the New Zealand Fisheries Act: Challenges in the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal” (2005), Australasian Law Teachers Association, 2006, available <www.ssrn.com SSRN-id2079837>; D Modeste, “The 
Precautionary Principle and the Fisheries Act” [2011] NZLJ 179, who offers an interesting re-draft to provide for real precaution.
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We recommend that the relationship between these principles and the purpose of the Act be stated 
clearly to ensure that the principles support the purpose but are not capable of being read down or 
dismissed by giving undue priority to the purpose. 
7 Public Participation 
At this point it is desirable to give careful consideration to the public participation that should be 
provided for in CCS legislation. Public participation is a very general characteristic of environmental 
and natural resources law in any modern legal system.31 Where legislation requires a company to apply 
to a regulatory agency for permits for a project that affects the environment or natural resources, it is 
common for the legislation to require the agency to receive and take account of submissions from the 
public.32 The RMA follows this pattern by allowing substantial public participation. At the strategic 
level, individuals and companies can make submissions on proposals, and address decision makers at 
a formal hearing. They can appeal to the Environment Court on the merits and then to the High Court 
on a point of law. In resource consent application procedures for a particular project, there are similar 
rights. There are restrictions, such as where an application proceeds on a non-notified basis, or where 
a called-in application has one hearing rather than a local body hearing followed by appeal to the 
Environment Court. In comparison, the EEZ Act requires, as part of an application for a marine consent, 
an impact assessment to be completed that identifies those affected and describes the consultation 
undertaken and specifies those who have given consent. In other environmental legislation, such as 
the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, there is provision for public participation in 
many decisions. However other environmental legislation, such as the Climate Change Response Act 
2002, provides for relatively little. Under the Crown Minerals Act, there is limited public participation 
in the making of minerals programmes which operate at the strategic level, but very little (only 
consultation with Māori) at the level of the granting of exploration and mining permits. In many other 
fields of activity, such as health, education, safety, and local government, some decisions, but not all, 
are made through processes that provide specifically for public participation. 
Public participation is often contentious. It is often blamed for delays, complexity, and expense. 
However, it has a strong basis in human rights and political rights, and also in environmental law. 
The Rio Declaration of 1992 is an example. Another is the Aarhus Convention of 199833 (although 
New Zealand is not a party). Two broad rationales for public participation are generally understood.34 
One is that participation is an expression of democracy and citizenship, just as important as the right 
to vote or the right to a fair trial. Participation is a basic civil right. Public participation is connected 
to the concepts of corporate social responsibility and social licence to operate. The second rationale 
is that better results will generally be produced by an agency if its process has been open to genuine 
public participation. 
31 E Toomey, “Public Participation in Resource Management: the New Zealand Experience” (2012) 16 NZJEL 117.
32 D Zillman, A Lucas and G Pring, (eds), Human Rights in Natural Resources Development (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002). 
33 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, (adopted 25 June 1998 at Aarhus, Denmark), (1999) 38 ILM 517. 
34 B Barton, “Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resources Development” in Zilman, Lucas and 
Pring, above n 32, at 99.
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7.1 The range of forms of public participation 
Public participation extends across a broad range of possibilities.35 At the most complete end, 
participation may amount to a right to control or veto an activity. Other forms, more relevant in 
this context, are legally-protected rights to have notice, a right to take part, and a right to have 
the decision-maker take account of what you say. Less elaborate forms can still be important, in 
particular a right to be consulted before some action is taken, or a right to “notice and comment” 
before a regulation is made. One general model of public participation proposes three elements or 
pillars; access to environmental information, participation in the decision-making procedure, and 
access to justice.36 From a policy point of view, the whole range should be considered in deciding on 
what participation is suitable. 
This thinking about public participation generally has been applied to CCS. The World Resources 
Institute identifies three levels of community engagement. The first is that of informing the public 
and improving community understanding of the project; a one-way provision of information by 
the project developer, such as in hosting information evenings and open days. The second level 
is consultation, a two-way exchange allowing the community’s input to be incorporated into the 
decision before it is made. The third level is negotiation, where there is two-way communication and 
joint decision making on issues that affect the community.37 For the purposes of this Report, we shall 
refer to this first level as community or public engagement. The second level, more congruous with 
public participation under the RMA, we shall refer to as public consultation. 
International analysis points clearly to the need for CCS operations to obtain the social acceptance of 
their communities; their social licence to operate. The level of public engagement can have a significant 
impact on the success of the acceptance of the CCS project and its viability. Because of the time-frames 
involved in CCS, it is thought to be important to move away from the usual one-off comment periods 
and hearings towards a continual but varying level of public engagement. Forbes et al say:38
Especially for CCS, early engagement should be followed by continual public participation 
throughout the project life-cycle and extending into the final phase of long-term stewardship, 
although at appropriately varying levels of effort. 
The IEA also considers that consultation should be as early as possible, when there is still some 
flexibility in the project development process.39 The World Resources Institute believes that processes 
for multi-stakeholder engagement should be established as part of the regulatory framework.40 
The IEA agrees and says “[r]egulatory approaches should include methods for public engagement and 
promote public participation in the decision-making process” and that “[e]ffective dispute resolution 
mechanisms are also needed to ensure that conflicts of interest can be resolved.”41 In Australia, the 
35 S. R. Arnstein, ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (1969) 35 J. Amer. Inst. Planners 217.
36 J Ebbesson, ‘The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law’ (1997) 8 Ybk Int. Env. L. 51 at 53.
37 World Resources Institute, CCS and Community Engagement: Guidelines for Community Engagement in Carbon Dioxide 
Capture, Transport, and Storage Projects (November 2010) at 65.
38 S Forbes, F Almendra, M Ziegler, and R Greenspan Bell, “Regulatory Requirements for Public Engagement around Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage Demonstrations” in I Havercroft, R Macrory and R Stewart, Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal 
and Regulatory Issues (Hart, Oxford, 2011) at 268.
39 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 7, at 48.
40 World Resources International, CCS and Community Engagement above n 37, at 68.
41 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 7, at 48.
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Victoria legislation places the obligation on the holder of an authority (i.e. a CCS permit) to consult 
with the community and relevant municipal councils by sharing information and to give them an 
opportunity to express their views about the activities that may affect them.42 As part of an application 
for an authority, the applicant must submit a community consultation plan with general information 
about the types of activities the applicant intends to carry out, information about how any potential 
adverse impacts will be managed, and details of procedures to be followed to permit the activities. 
The plan must advise the community and municipal council that they may seek legal advice on the 
proposed activities, and must set out the contact details for the Department and the applicant. 
The consultation plan needs approval by the Minister and may only be submitted after the applicant 
has consulted with the community and municipal council in relation to the content of the proposed 
plan. A copy of the plan is to be provided to members of the community and each municipal council 
who may be affected by the activities proposed. There is no formal hearing. The Queensland legislation 
provides no public consultation in regards to granting a permit, but consultation is required with 
a land owner or occupier regarding access over the land on which activities are to be carried out.43 
7.2 Early and continuing engagement
One key characteristic of good public participation therefore appears to be early engagement by 
the proponent company with the community. An option is for the CCS legislation to require the 
proponent to produce a Public Participation Proposal as part of its exploration permit application 
process. The proposal would assess the local community context and identify the level of participation 
appropriate at each phase of the project, and say how this will be achieved. The proposal would 
identify how information will be exchanged about the project and its risks and benefits. The World 
Resources Institute’s guidelines for community engagement for CCS projects are a useful resource 
and can inform the content of such proposals.44 
Another desirable option is for the legislation to require the proponent / operator to maintain 
a continuing programme of public engagement that would run through the exploration phase and 
any following injection phase and site closure. The programme would include education, information 
sharing, and, for key steps, consultation. 
7.3 Nature of public participation in the form of consultation
Formal public consultation under the CCS legislation, such as in the consideration of an application 
for an injection permit, should include notification, submissions, a hearing, an obligation that 
decision-makers take into account submissions and what was said at the hearing, and a reasoned 
decision. The obvious models are the RMA, the CMA, and the EEZ Act. 
42 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 152-156.
43 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s 166.
44 World Resources Institute, CCS and Community Engagement above n 37.
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The CCS legislation should provide for this public consultation to be arranged by the central 
government. It is a part of the overall scheme for the management of CCS. The option of local and 
regional government (as under the RMA) is considered in Chapter 2, but is likely to present difficulties. 
CCS operations have some similarities with Crown minerals management, climate change policy 
and energy policy, all of which are dominated by central government rather than local government 
decision-making.
The CCS legislation should provide for this public participation on an injection permit to include 
consultation and hearings on all associated RMA resource consents and designation applications, and 
associated EEZ marine consents, such as for land use, air and water discharges, and water takes. The 
principle of integrated resource management should apply. This can be achieved through use of the 
“call-in” powers in the RMA. 
The main option for legal provisions for CCS hearings and decisions is to follow the models of the 
“call-in” provisions of the RMA and the hearings provisions of the EEZ Act. A panel of persons with 
suitable background and experience would be appointed for each application. The appointment of 
a panel for each separate application seems to be right given that there will be few CCS injection 
applications to be processed in the foreseeable future. An option is for the panel to be chaired by 
a sitting or retired Environment Court judge; such an arrangement ensures a high level of reassurance 
that the procedure will be fair and effective. Equally, panel members can be selected for technical 
capability so that there can be a high level of confidence in the decision-making. With such 
arrangements, the option exists for the right of appeal to be confined to an appeal to the High Court 
on a point of law only. Again that option would parallel the “call-in” provisions of the RMA and the 
hearings provisions of the EEZ Act.
7.4 Point of engagement for public consultation 
The main options for the timing of formal public consultation appear to be as follows. 
In an application for an exploration permit.  A strength of this option is that the public are formally 
engaged at the earliest practicable point. Another strength is that it provides certainty to a CCS 
proponent, which will not yet have sunk significant amounts of money into the project, but then 
knows that it faces no other hearings process. However a significant weakness is that at this early 
stage the applicant for exploration rights will have only the most general of information available to 
it about the geological formations that it might encounter. It will be in no position to state and justify 
the engineering design of an injection project that may not be built for years, if at all, somewhere in a 
large exploration permit area. It will be reluctant to pay for that work prematurely. Equally, affected 
parties will face difficulties in being called on to make submissions on an incomplete proposal; they 
would be chasing a mirage. The position of decision makers and their advisers will be equally difficult. 
It is possible for the legislation to state that the application process, including public participation, is 
to consider exploration only, and must not consider injection; but affected parties are likely to find 
that restriction unsatisfactory. It must also be asked whether exploration activity on its own poses 
environmental and health risks of a magnitude that a hearing is required. Much exploration work 
is likely to be transient and unintrusive. The most substantial and intrusive exploration activity is 
likely to be the drilling of an exploratory well; but that would probably use known oilfield techniques, 
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and pose environmental and safety risks that are reasonably manageable. The operator would have 
to comply with the RMA as to noise, pollution and water takes. In addition, an early-stage CCS 
public participation programme of education, information sharing and consultation would result in 
engagement with the public even if not in a formal hearing. 
In an application for an injection permit.  At this stage, an application will be informed by a 
considerable body of analytical work. The applicant will have carried out engineering design work and 
related environmental analysis. It will therefore have a specific injection project to take to the public, 
even final design work remains to be completed. It will therefore be able to explain and justify the 
project. Many of the expenses of preparing for public hearings will have been undertaken in any event 
as part of the design and environmental studies for the project. From the point of view of affected 
parties, they will be able to take part in an evaluation of specific effects of the project upon them, and 
to make submissions in response. 
In both an application for an exploration permit and an application for an injection permit.  This option 
recognises the differences between exploration and injection, and allows both applicants and the 
affected public to address the issues at each of the two main phases in the CCS development process. 
It provides the affected public some assurance at the exploration phase that it will have another 
opportunity to participate properly with respect to an injection project. However this option involves 
two sets of hearings processes, which will involve additional delay and expense. In addition this 
option raises the questions, considered under the first option above, whether a formal hearing process 
is really needed for CCS exploration. Ordinary RMA environmental management would control many 
of the exploration activities, and a further formal public participation process many not be necessary. 
Less formal CCS public engagement would however be desirable. 
Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of these three options, we are of the view that there should 
be formal public participation, in the form of a hearing, at the stage of the consideration of an 
application for an injection permit. The case for such formal public participation at the exploration 
stage is much less strong. 
In an application for site closure.  Another option, complementary to the above options, is that there 
be a formal process for public participation in the application for the closure of a CCS site and the 
concomitant transfer of liability to the responsible authority. This process has no direct analogy in the 
RMA or CMA, but it is an important step in the management of a CCS operation. A case can therefore 
be made for the public to have a say in this regulatory decision. It could be by way of a formal hearing, 
or it could be by way of a notice and comment procedure. At a minimum some form of community 
engagement is desirable.
7.5 Co-ordination with the RMA
Two issues concerning the RMA are relevant here. The first is that the RMA in effect provides a 
benchmark of expectations about public participation. Virtually any application for a major natural 
resources project in New Zealand involves substantial public participation under the RMA. Projects 
offshore involve similar participation under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012. Public participation under the RMA, and the EEZ Act, is not 
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unlimited, but it is the norm for a large natural resources project.45 Participation rights under the 
RMA reflect a social consensus that goes back long before 1991. At the same time those participation 
rights set an expectation. If CCS legislation departs from this expectation, it is likely that significant 
policy and political difficulties would be encountered. In our view, in the light of international thinking 
about the desirability of public participation in CCS regulation, there is a strong case for arranging 
CCS participation rights in the light of the RMA pattern. The RMA should not be followed exactly, 
but its pattern should adapted to the different situation, in a way that makes participation rights in 
relation to CCS just as good as those under the RMA. 
The second point about the RMA is that that the CCS legislation needs to be properly co-ordinated 
with RMA procedures as to public participation. The relationship between the two Acts was considered 
in detail in Chapter 2 of this Report. While different options were canvassed, it appeared that the best 
allocation of functions under the two Acts is for the RMA to continue to apply to all aspects of CCS 
activities, except for the injection of CO2, which would be regulated under the CCS Act. If this option 
is adopted, then all RMA applications for resource consents and designations should be brought 
together with the CCS application, in a procedure like a call-in, so that all aspects of the project are 
heard and decided at once. There will be a hearings process, but only one hearings process. 
7.6 Engagement with Māori
An important part of environmental decision making is the involvement of Māori as tangata 
whenua. Recognition of Māori interests in lands and resources, and especially ancestral lands, waahi 
tapu, kaitiakitanga, and Māori land, is an essential part of any engagement with Māori. So too are 
recognition of tikanga, and recognition of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.46 We consider that 
CCS legislation should have provisions to ensure such engagement. 
One point of reference in existing law is the RMA. Its procedural provisions require that Māori 
be consulted on certain plan-making matters, but not on applications for resource consents or 
designations,47 hearings shall recognise tikanga Māori, and when appointing board of inquiry members 
the Minister is to consider the need to appoint members with knowledge, skill, and experience 
relating to tikanga Māori. The RMA guides substantive decision making by requiring a decision maker 
to recognise and provide for the relationship of Māori with their ancestral lands, to have particular 
regard to kaitiakitanga, and to take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.48
45 The right of the public under the RMA to participate by making submissions, appearing at a hearing, and having a right to appeal 
are governed by the decision to notify an application for a resource consent: ss 77D, 95A-95F. Whether an application is to 
be notified or processed on a non-notified basis depends on several factors. The local authority as consent authority has the 
discretion to decide. But the matter may be governed by a rule in the district plan or regional plan or by a national environmental 
standard. If not, it must be notified if the activity will have or is likely to have adverse effects on the environment that are more 
than minor. It may be notified if special circumstances exist. In contrast, under the Crown Minerals Act 1991, an application 
for a permit does not require public participation; but a CMA permit does not exempt its holder from compliance with RMA 
obligations to obtain resource consents.
46 See Toki, Appendix E, for a full discussion. 
47 Under the RMA Māori are to be consulted on changes of regional policy statements, regional plans, and district plans: Schedule 
1, cl 3. But pursuant to section 36A neither the applicant for a resource consent nor the consent authority is obliged to consult 
any person. 
48 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 6(e), 7(a), and 8. 
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A different approach in existing law is that of the CMA. The obligation to have regard to the principles 
of the Treaty is very similar to that in the RMA, but from there, the methods of consultation that are 
required are stated differently. Consultation must occur at three levels. The first is the preparation of 
the minerals programme; second, the preparation of petroleum exploration permit block offers; and 
third, in respect of applications for petroleum permits not made in accordance with a block offer and 
applications for the extension of area of permits.49 These obligations for consultation remain following 
recent amendments to the CMA. The key difference between the RMA and CMA is consultation 
regarding consent applications. 
A third example in existing law is the EEZ Act, where there is no Treaty clause in the conventional 
sense, but a recording of provisions in the Act that recognise the Crown’s responsibility to give effect 
to the principles of the Treaty. These provisions include a Māori Advisory Committee to advise the 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), requiring the Minister to establish and use a process that 
gives iwi adequate time and opportunity to comment on the subject matter of proposed regulations, 
and requiring the EPA to notify iwi authorities, customary marine title groups, and protected 
customary rights groups directly of consent applications that may affect them.
We recommend that CCS legislation include provisions to recognise Māori interests. Choices can be 
made from the precedents given by the legislation discussed above, or entirely new arrangements 
can be made. Making use of the RMA model or its EEZ equivalent will make it easier to maintain a 
co-ordinated approach, although the two models are themselves quite different. 
Options to guide substantive decision-making include: 
(i) a Treaty clause, and 
(ii) obligations to have regard to ancestral lands, waahi tapu, kaitiakitanga, and Māori land.
Procedural options include:
(i) an obligation to consult before making particular decisions (eg to grant an exploration permit 
or injection permit) imposed on the applicant or the decision-maker
(ii) special advisory panels, composition of boards of inquiry etc.
(iii) recognition of tikanga Māori in proceedings. 
A final note should be made to recognise the fact that provisions of this kind in the CCS legislation 
do not prevent an iwi or hapu from making a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal that the CCS legislation 
or an action under it is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Such a claim can be 
lodged in any event under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. However the presence in the legislation of 
provisions making suitable recognition of Treaty interests would be a factor that would be taken into 
account in Waitangi Tribunal proceedings. 
49 These provisions were analysed recently in Greenpeace v Minister of Energy [2012] NZHC 1422.
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7.7 Conclusions as to Public Participation
Community engagement should be initiated at an early stage and continue throughout the life of 
the project, from the exploration phase and including site closure. At the stage of an application for 
an injection permit, participation should take the form of a formal public hearing. All applications for 
related RMA consents and designations should be brought together with the CCS application, so that 
they are all heard and decided at once. Special provision should be made for Māori participation.
8 A Regulatory Authority
A significant policy choice is the agency or department to be responsible for regulating CCS, which 
will likely include receiving permit applications, granting exploration permits and site closure 
authorisations (applications for injection permits will be decided by a board of inquiry50), inspecting 
storage sites, verifying data, and administering the CCS register. There are several dimensions to the 
matter, which we believe deserve close attention, even though we do not make a final recommendation 
on which entity should administer CCS law. 
Preliminary points.  A number of points bear on the matter, which are founded in the international 
experience and around which there is likely to be a reasonable consensus.
• It is desirable to maintain a distinction between the functions of 
(i) promotion, advocacy, education, and leadership on CCS and 
(ii) regulation and control of CCS.
 Otherwise confusion of roles may result. After the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the United States 
Bureau of the Interior separated the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (promotion and 
royalties) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. If permitting is an aspect of (ii), 
regulation and control, then it may be necessary to identify another agency to act as advocate for 
CCS. Without such a “champion” there may not be enough focus and effort in bringing CCS about. 
 It has been argued that the decision whether to accept a CCS site for long-term stewardship should 
also be kept separate from general regulation and control.51 However this adds complexity in a small 
country like New Zealand, and even as a matter of principle it may be better for the one agency to 
carry responsibility for all aspects of the activity. An alternative is to have the application for a site 
closure authorisation subjected to external audit or certification by an independent person. 
• CCS should be regulated by central government rather than by regional and district councils. 
The nature of the activity, the novelty of the activity, and the infrequency but magnitude of 
applications all suggest that an agency of the central government should be responsible. It should 
be noted, however, that this point does not preclude use of the Resource Management Act 1991; 
arrangements can be made for RMA decisions to be made centrally.
50 See Chapter 5 at 5.2.3.
51 M Granger Morgan and S McCoy and others, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the Legal and Regulatory Barriers 
(RFF Press, New York, 2012) at 128.
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• The low foreseeable frequency of applications for CCS projects militates against establishing a 
new agency. The task therefore becomes one of identifying and adapting a suitable candidate from 
among existing central government agencies. 
It is likely that there is a reasonable consensus on those points. If that is so, then the range of 
possibilities is narrowed down in a useful way. 
Minister or Agency.  The next issue is what kind of official should exercise powers of decision under 
the CCS legislation. Again, some different options present themselves. 
• A Minister of the Crown.  Legislation often gives a minister of the Crown the power to make 
decisions, whether at a general policy level or at a particular level affecting individuals. In some 
cases, the power is exercised by the minister in person, in others, it is exercised by departmental 
officials under express or implied delegation. In the natural resources field, the Crown Minerals Act 
confers the key powers of decision on the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act. 
The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act authorises the Minister for the Environment 
to call in certain applications for new organisms. The Minister is democratically accountable in 
Parliament for his or her decisions, and may also be subject to appeal on a point of law. A ministerial 
decision may be suitable where a number of different aspects of the public interest must be 
weighed, and where legitimately political considerations must be taken into account. Decisions 
by a Minister, or by two Ministers jointly, may be particularly suitable where the objectives of 
different legislation need to be reconciled. 
• An Agency or Authority.  Legislation often gives an agency or authority the power to make 
decisions. In natural resources, the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental 
Effects) Act 2012 confers the key powers of decision on the Environmental Protection Authority. 
The EPA has limited powers to delegate its powers to a committee or a board of inquiry. Under 
the HSNO Act, the EPA similarly decides applications. An agency or authority is likely to be 
accountable to the Minister, within the framework of its empowering Act and the Crown Entities 
Act 2004, but not for individual decisions. It may therefore act with a degree of independence 
from political considerations, and may also be subject to appeal on a point of law. 
• A Court or a Board of Inquiry.  Legislation sometimes gives a Court or a special-purpose board 
of inquiry the power to make decisions. In natural resources, the RMA confers powers on the 
Environment Court or a board of inquiry if the Minister for the Environment has exercised his 
or her powers to call a matter in. A Court or board of inquiry provides decision-making that is 
independent but not politically accountable. It is appointed pro hac vice to decide a particular 
application but cannot provide continuous management afterwards. That is not a suitable 
attribute for CCS regulation generally. However we have recommended that a board of inquiry of 
some form be used in an important but limited role, in deciding on an application for an injection 
permit. We have not made detailed recommendations about the constitution or procedure of 
such a board; a number of variations are possible. Different variations are also possible about the 
finality of a board’s report; it could be final (subject to appeal) as under the RMA; or it could be 
a recommendation to a Minister who has the final power of decision. 
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The two main options for CCS decisions therefore appear to be a Minister, or an agency or authority. 
However, either of them could appoint a board of inquiry for a particular hearing with power either to 
decide or to make a recommendation. It is also possible for a statute to allocate some decisions to a 
Minister and others to an agency or a departmental official.52 
Which Agency.  The final dimension is the choice among existing regulatory agencies or ministries to 
act as the lead agency for CCS. It appears that the options are as follows. 
• New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals (NZPM) is a unit of the Ministry of Business Innovation 
and Employment. It administers the Crown Minerals Act 1991. Most main decisions under the 
Act are made in the name of the Minister. The advantage is NZPM for CCS is that it has expertise 
in geological matters, subsurface formations, issuing permits and managing a permitting regime 
generally. Another advantage is that the co-ordination of CCS and petroleum activities would be 
administratively simplified. As noted earlier in this Chapter and in Chapter 7, overlapping interests 
and enhanced oil recovery are significant matters. However there may be disadvantages in 
perception in putting CCS under the rubric of fossil fuels. Also, key emitters of GHGs who become 
involved in CCS will probably be industrial process, not petroleum producers. The Ministry is a 
department of state identified in the schedules to the State Sector Act 1988, and the responsible 
minister is the Minister of Energy and Resources.
• The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) is established under the Environmental Protection 
Authority Act 2011 as a Crown entity. Factors in favour of utilising the EPA are that it administers 
call-ins under the RMA, and it administers the EEZ Act and the HSNO Act. As noted above the EPA 
itself makes key decisions under the EEZ Act and the HSNO Act. It also administers the Emissions 
Trading Scheme under the Climate Change Response Act 2002, and is therefore has a central place 
in the management of climate change measures. It has expertise in environmental management, 
the analysis of complex risks, and the NZ ETS. 
• The Ministry for the Environment is established under the Environment Act 1986 and its key function is 
to provide advice to the Minister. The Ministry is responsible for administering various environmental 
funds53 and could administer a long-term liability fund for CCS if one were established. But with a 
few isolated exceptions it is not involved in environmental administration or management. 
Whichever of these three agencies, or some other agency, is selected as the lead organisation for the 
regulation of CCS, several points are likely to be relevant. 
(i) CCS cuts across existing regulatory lines. By its nature it involves aspects of several different 
technologies and involves a new use of natural resources. It therefore has no obvious home 
among existing regulatory agencies. 
(ii) The agency that is selected to lead the administration of CCS legislation is likely to need to 
acquire new technical and regulatory capability, but in the foreseeable future the need will not 
be substantial. The private sector may be able to supply capability as and when needed. Specific 
arrangements for organisational capacity-building are not within the scope of this analysis.
52 Generally, see the Legislation Advisory Committee, Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines (May 2001, as amended) at 160.
53 Such as the Contaminated Sites Remediation Fund, the Community Environment Fund, the Environmental Legal Assistance 
Fund, the Fresh Start for Fresh Water Fund, and the Waste Levy and Waste Minimisation Fund.
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(iii) Shared regulatory responsibility and formal liaison arrangements are likely to be a feature of CCS 
regulation. There are numerous different forms that they can take: joint decision by two or more 
Ministers; appointment of board of inquiry members by different agencies; decision by one agency 
that requires approval by another to be given; the views of the other agency to be sought and 
provided for or taken into account; the other agency to be consulted, or to be notified. One can 
particularly see advantages in a central government agency being obliged to consult and confer 
with the regional council and territorial authority concerned with a CCS application. 
(iv) Informal liaison arrangements between agencies for information-sharing and the pooling of 
resources are also likely. 
Even though we make no recommendation from the various options about the agency that should 
administer CCS legislation, our appraisal identifies the key issues of legal policy that we consider to 
be relevant, without engaging in any analysis of institutional capacity. In the rest of this Report, we 
refer to the “regulatory agency,” “the CCS agency,” “the agency” and “the Minister,” without making 
any judgement at all about which agency or Minister that should be. 
9 Recommendations
1. We do not make a recommendation as to the title of the legislation. 
2. We recommend that the purpose of the Act be to facilitate and to regulate the permanent 
geological sequestration of CO2, as part of efforts to reduce the emission into the air of greenhouse 
gases, in such a way as to protect the environment and human health and safety. 
3. We recommend that the proposed CCS Act include an obligation for all decision makers under it 
to have particular regard to:
(i) the protection of underground sources of drinking water; 
(ii) the management of conflict between CCS and other uses of subsurface resources; and
(iii) the protection of market confidence in emission reductions through regulatory clarity and 
proper GHG accounting. 
4. We recommend that decision makers be obliged to have regard to, or to take into account, 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi). 
5. We recommend that the relationship between these principles and the purpose of the Act be 
stated clearly to ensure that the principles support the purpose but are not capable of being read 
down or dismissed by giving undue priority to the purpose. 
6. We recommend that public participation be initiated at an early stage of CCS development, and 
that it continues throughout the life of the project with varying levels of engagement. Nonetheless, 
there should only be one formal public hearing, which also covers RMA applications, as part of the 
permitting process for an application for an injection permit. Special provision should be made for 
Māori participation. 
7. We do not make any recommendation as to what agency should regulate CCS activities.
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CHAPTER 4  
PROPERTY RIGHTS ISSUES
1 Introduction
This Chapter addresses the questions that land ownership poses for carbon capture and storage 
operations at injection sites and on pipeline routes. It first considers the special land use characteristics 
of CCS. The ordinary proprietorship of land at the surface needs no special examination; the proprietor 
of the estate in fee simple, or his or her tenant, has a right to exclusive possession of the land, and he 
or she can defend it by an action for trespass or for nuisance, as described in Chapter 10 on Liability. 
However the rights of a land owner to the subsurface of land are less well understood, and we analyse 
them in detail. From there we turn to consider the need for law reform to facilitate CCS by restating 
subsurface ownership and by providing adequate powers of compulsory acquisition of rights to land 
if a company cannot reach negotiated agreements with land owners. 
Any CCS operation will need a land base. An operator will need to secure rights to make installations 
and carry out operations on land without disturbance. It wishes to operate without interfering with the 
rights of other people in land, and without being vulnerable to legal action for damages or for injunctions 
that could close it down. It requires secure legal title for its assets in a form that is satisfactory to lenders 
and possible purchasers. What legal form of rights to land are necessary will vary from one aspect of the 
operation to another. Where all that is required is short-term incidental access, such as for exploration, 
the access may be available by simple agreement – a licence. Longer-term operations may require a 
legal easement, if it is only for access or a buried pipeline, or they may require more complete control 
such as by acquiring the land itself in the form of the estate in fee simple.
2 Land Needs of CCS Projects
A CCS project will face particular challenges in assembling a land base because of the special character 
of CCS as a land use. 
Capture / Extraction.  Only some power stations or industrial operations will produce enough CO2 
to be candidates for CCS. Facilities for the capture or extraction of CO2 will need to be built into 
or next to the power station or factory concerned. If the CCS operator is a different company from 
the operator of the source gases, access and use of land will probably be one element of a complex 
agreement between the two companies. We do not consider whether measures will be taken to 
require emitter companies to enter into CCS arrangements. 
Pipelines.  Pipelines connecting CO2 capture sites and storage sites will have a limited range of 
options for their routes. Route selection will be influenced by physical geography and settlement 
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patterns. A route for any but the shortest pipeline will cross land held by a variety of owners, both 
public and private. Pipelines are dealt with generally in Chapter 8 of this Report, but the property 
rights questions are dealt with in this Chapter. 
Surface Installations and Operations at Injection Sites.  The location of CCS developments is 
constrained to sites where geological formations such as deep saline aquifers or depleted gas fields 
exist which, together with their associated cap rock structures, have the capacity to take and hold the 
CO2 indefinitely. The number of such formations known to be suitable is limited. Location is therefore 
constrained by subsurface geological features. CO2 injection requires a variety of surface facilities: 
wellsites for the drilling, maintenance and operation of wells; installations to receive and compress 
gas; and a network of pipes delivering gas to different wellheads. Existing or abandoned oil and gas 
wells in the vicinity may be re-entered in order to replace the plugging and carry out other works 
necessary to ensure a high-quality seal. A network of stations for measurement, monitoring and 
verification (MMV) will be deployed. MMV operations and periodic well inspection and maintenance 
will occur through the injection programme and for some time after it. The location and extent of the 
surface installations will be governed by the location and extent of the subsurface formations that 
are to be used for storage. 
Subsurface Installations and Operations at Injection Sites.  Carbon dioxide injection and storage, 
or geosequestration, naturally makes considerable use of the subsurface. It involves the drilling of 
wells. Wells are generally completed with the installation of casing, tubing, and plugs in preparation 
for injection. Directional drilling may be used to increase the penetration of geological storage 
formations, reaching targets two or three kilometres distant horizontally. Through such wells CO2 
will be injected into the storage formations in large quantities. 
Injected CO2 mixes with other fluids and spreads in the pore space of the storage formation. 
Formation fluid pressure increases and fluid flows are affected. The buoyancy of supercritical CO2 
causes it to rise to the top of the storage formation and spread laterally. Because of this and the large 
quantities that are injected, the subsurface area through which the CO2 spreads can be very large, 
with a radius perhaps of tens of kilometres.1 Simulations have shown that the areal extent of a plume 
of CO2 injected from a 1 GW coal-fired power plant over 30 years into a zone 100 m thick will be 
approximately 100 km2.2 These areas and distances are considerably greater than is usual for an oil 
1 C-F Tsang, J Birkholzer and J Rutqvist, “A Comparative Review of Hydrological Issues Involved in Geologic Storage of C02 and 
Injection Disposal of Liquid Waste” (2008) 54 Environmental Geology 1723-1737, doi 10.1007/s00254-007-0949-6; M Granger 
Morgan and S McCoy, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the Legal and Regulatory Barriers (RFF Press, New York, 2012) 
at 108.
2 J Rutqvist and C-F Tsang, “A Study of Caprock Hydromechanical Changes Associated with CO2-injection into a Brine Formation” 
(2002) 42 Environmental Geology 296-305. 
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or gas field, or for a liquid waste disposal project. The pressure footprint of a CO2 storage site will be 
much larger than the CO2 plume itself.
3 
Land Use Needs.  From those characteristics, several features of the land use needs of CCS projects 
stand out as likely to be relevant from a legal point of view. 
(i) The number of storage formations known to be suitable is limited, and location of injection 
facilities is therefore constrained.
(ii) Pipeline routes will be constrained by the location of CO2 sources, injection facilities, and 
intermediate physical and human geography. 
(iii) The footprint of a CCS injection project onshore is likely to include formations under the land of 
large numbers of land owners. Not all of the surface land above such a formation is likely to be 
affected substantially – indeed its use is likely to be unaffected except for a few well sites and 
monitoring sites. 
(iv) Once a particular formation is selected, there may be some latitude in the location of some 
surface injection facilities, but for others there may little latitude for the optimum location. 
3 Subsurface Installations and Operations  
at Injection Sites
3.1 Introduction
When a CCS project gets under way, at the injection site wells will be drilled and prepared for the 
injection of CO2 into the target formations. Once injection operations begin, the injection will introduce 
large quantities of supercritical CO2 into the pores in the rock in the storage formation. The pressure, 
composition and movement of fluids in the pore space of the target formation will be considerably 
affected. The CCS company will want to know that it can carry out these operations underground 
without illegally affecting the rights of others. That requires an analysis of the proprietary rights of 
others underground.4 
3.2 The general rule: rights of ownership of land  
extend downwards
The starting point is that rights deriving from the ownership or possession of an estate in land are 
presumed to be capable of exercise on all parts of the land, including upwards and downwards, 
indefinitely. The Latin phrase that expresses this rule is cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et 
3 B Field, S Bachu, M Bunch, M Funnell, S Holloway, R Richardson, Interaction of CO2 Storage with Subsurface Resources (2012) 
CO2CRC Report No RPT 12-3562 (IEAGHG Report 2013-08 April 2013) at 14. 
4 See B Barton, “The Common Law of Subsurface Activity: General Principle and Current Problems” in D Zillman and others (eds) 
Energy Underground (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014). 
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ad inferos; to whom the soil belongs, to that person it belongs all the way to the sky and the depths. 
As with all such generalisations, the real issues lie in the multiple exceptions, but this is the general 
rule. The main New Zealand text on land law puts it:
The general rule at common law is that the owner of the soil is presumed to be “the owner of 
everything up to the sky and down to the centre of the earth” according to the maxim cujus est 
solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos. Where a parcel of land was granted by the Crown or 
conveyed from one person to another, the grant or conveyance (unless some contrary indication 
was shown) passed everything which lay below the surface “down to the centre of the earth” and 
everything above it “up to the sky”.5 
In Australia in the High Court of Australia Windeyer J in Wade v NSW Rutile Mining Co6 refers to: 
[T]he elementary principle of the common law that a freeholder … is entitled to take from his 
land anything that is his. Except for those minerals which belong to the Crown, the soil and 
everything naturally contained therein is his. 
3.3 Underground trespass
A consequence of the general rule is that the person in possession of the surface can defend his or 
her possession of the subsurface. Interference with the landowner’s right to possession underground 
is trespass, just as on the surface. The work Laws of New Zealand states that “An intrusion into the 
subsoil is a trespass in just the same way as an intrusion on the surface.”7 Alderson B once said, “There 
is no distinction between trespasses underground and upon the surface.”8 Thus in Canadian cases 
Austin v Rescon Construction (1984) Ltd 9 and Epstein v Cressey Development Corp10 construction 
companies inserted anchor rods under the neighbouring property for temporary support; exemplary 
damages were awarded against them to deprive them of the profits of its trespass. It was no defence 
that permission to enter was unreasonably withheld. In New Zealand, Waugh v Attorney General 11 
dealt with a tunnel that the Navy had used for many years, connecting two of its yards in Devonport 
on either side of a ridge. It went under some private properties and streets. There was a period during 
which the tunnel was unauthorised, and the owners of one of the properties sued for damages. 
That the unauthorised tunnel under their land was a trespass went without argument; the only dispute 
was the measure of damages to be paid for the trespass. It was held that the measure was the Navy’s 
profit from using the tunnel rather than using a longer route through the streets, not merely the loss 
suffered by the landowners. 
5 GW Hinde, NR Campbell & P Twist, Principles of Real Property Law (Lexisnexis, Wellington, 2007) at 6.002. Footnotes omitted, 
the main references being to Corbett v Hill (1870) LR 9 Eq 671 at 673 and Wandsworth Board of Works v United Telephone Co Ltd 
(1884) 13 QBD 904 at 915 (CA). Generally, see Y Abramovitch “The Maxim ‘Cuius Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad Coelum’ as Applied 
to Aviation” (1962) 8 McGill LJ 247; and M Taggart, Private Property and Abuse of Rights in Victorian England (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002) at 120. Also see Laws of New Zealand, “Minerals and Mining” (2000), para 3, and Halsbury’s Laws of England 
(4th ed) vol 31, Mines and Minerals, para 19: “Prima facie ‘land’ or ‘lands’ includes everything on or under the surface.”
6 Wade v NSW Rutile Mining Co (1969) 121 CLR 177, 185.
7 Laws of New Zealand, “Tort” para 197, citing Bulli Coal Mining Co v Osborne [1899] AC 351 (NSW PC); Russo v Ridgway (1914) 33 
NZLR 1495. Also see J Howell, “ ‘Subterranean Land Law’: Rights below the Surface of Land” (2002) 53 NILQ 268.
8 Hunter v Gibbons (1856) 1 H&N 459, 465, 156 ER 1281, 1284.
9 Austin v Rescon Construction (1984) Ltd (1989) 57 DLR (4th) 591 (BC CA). 
10 Epstein v Cressey Development Corp (1992) 89 DLR (4th) 32 (BC CA). 
11 Waugh v Attorney General [2006] 2 NZLR 812. 
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3.4 Subsurface activity as trespass: Bocardo v Star Energy
Such cases deal with relatively conventional technology, and with trespass near the surface. There has 
been uncertainty about the application of the general principle of subsurface ownership at greater 
depths. The general principle is often put in terms of the maxim or brocard cuius est solum eius est 
usque ad coelum et ad inferos; to whom belongs the soil also belongs all the way to the sky and to 
the depths. However the maxim was ill-received in Commissioner for Railways v Valuer-General,12 the 
Privy Council said that its use is imprecise and mainly serviceable as dispensing with analysis. (But the 
case needs to be read carefully to see that the Privy Council was demolishing an argument that “land” 
must include all space from the centre of the earth upwards; an argument that there was a difference 
between a stratum and “real” land.) Partly in reliance on Commissioner for Railways, for a period it 
was argued that the wide application of the cuius est solum doctrine may not be accurate, and that 
resources at depth, such as below 200 metres, constitute a res nullius so that ownership will vest in 
the first person to reduce them into possession.13 
A case of directional drilling for oil allowed the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to clarify 
the vitality of the principle of cuius est solum, in Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd 
in 2010.14 Star Energy’s predecessor had drilled three oil wells under Bocardo’s land without seeking its 
permission. The closest that any of them came to the surface under its land was 800 feet. Bocardo’s 
case was simply that the wells with their casing and tubing were a trespass; title to the land extended 
downwards and included everything in it, subject to exceptions such as for minerals. (Bocardo could 
not sue for the petroleum.) The Court referred to the many cases where it was said that prima facie 
the owner of the surface is entitled to the surface itself and everything below it down to the centre 
of the earth.15 
The oil company argued that the surface owner should not be held to own any further down than necessary 
for the use and enjoyment of the surface.16 But the Court held that there was no English authority for 
such a limitation. There was some authority in favour from the United States, but also much authority 
against it, and that the debate remained alive in American law. The Court cited Smillie that “there 
appears to be no case in the Commonwealth where a plaintiff has failed on the basis that the area of 
subsoil invaded was so deep that the surface occupier’s possessory rights did not extend that far.”17 
The Court concluded that the maxim cuius est solum still has value in English law. The reasons for saying 
it has no place as to airspace are a good deal less compelling as to the subsurface. The approach in 
Chance v BP Chemicals Inc,18 that some kind of physical interference with the surface must be shown, 
would lead to much uncertainty. The law was that the owner of the surface is the owner of the strata 
beneath it, including the minerals that are to be found there, unless there has been an alienation of 
them by a conveyance, at common law or by statute to someone else. 
12 Commissioner for Railways v Valuer-General [1974] AC 325 (PC).
13 A J Bradbrook, “Ownership of Geothermal Resources” [1987] AMPLA Yearbook 353; A J Bradbrook, “The Relevance of the Cujus 
Est Solum Doctrine to the Surface Landowner’s Claim to Natural Resources Located Above and Beneath the Land” (1988) 11 
Adel L R 462. K Gray and S F Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th ed, Butterworths, London, 2009) at 18. 
14 Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd [2011] 1 AC 380 (SC(E)), [2010] UKSC 35.
15 In particular Rowbotham v Wilson (1860) 8 HLC 348, 11 ER 463. The other Judges agreed with Lord Hope on these points. 
16 This argued from Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479 which had held the same for airspace.
17 S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 426 (in Chapter 9, written by J Smillie).
18 Chance v BP Chemicals Inc 670 NE 2d 985 (Ohio 1996).
CHAPTER 4: PROPERTY RIGHTS ISSUES 89
Bocardo v Star Energy brought to an end the possibility that rights of the surface owner are limited 
to some maximum depth such as 200 metres. The rights of the surface owner are not restricted to 
those rights necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the surface. Strata and structures below 
the surface are not res nullius. The subsurface rights of a proprietor of land cannot be diminished by 
dismissing the cuius est solum principle as a whimsy, and by dwelling on the impossibility of owning 
land right to the centre of the earth. It is better to say that the ownership of the surface extends 
downwards indefinitely. The nature of the case, dealing with general principles of law, and its strong 
concordance with existing New Zealand law, make it likely that the precedent will be regarded as 
authoritative in New Zealand courts. 
3.5 Implications for CCS
Four points can be made to draw out the implications of the foregoing analysis on the law concerning 
carbon capture and storage. 
(i) Rights deriving from the ownership or possession of an estate in land are  presumed to be 
capable of exercise on all parts of the land, including the subsurface, indefinitely. The rule is well 
established. 
(ii) The rule is a presumption. It is the default position. It holds true until the contrary is established. 
A person other than the surface owner who claims proprietary rights in minerals or anything else 
below the surface must do so by some grant or conveyance or statutory vesting. The onus of 
proof lies on that person. 
(iii) The rule does not only apply to minerals. It applies to everything below the surface including 
subsurface structures suitable for CCS injection.
(iv) Under this general law, a land owner who is aggrieved with injection operations below his or 
her land is likely to be successful in an action for trespass or nuisance against the CCS operator. 
Even if there is no actual damage, nominal damages can be awarded, and an injunction or interim 
injunction can be granted.
4 Rights of Owners of Privately-Owned Minerals
The next ownership issue that affects CCS is the private ownership of minerals. There is a certain 
amount of private ownership of minerals in New Zealand, especially in areas of early European 
settlement, where they were not reserved to the Crown. (Petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium are, 
however, always Crown-owned.19) Those minerals can be separated in ownership from the rest of the 
land, if the owner sells the land excepting the minerals or sells the minerals to another person. What 
substances and what rights are held by a mineral owner, rather than the surface owner, will depend 
upon the interpretation of the original grant or instrument of severance, reading words as they were 
meant in the vernacular of the mining world, the commercial world, and landowners, at the time 
19 Section 10 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 declares that those minerals existing in their natural state in land, whether or not the 
land has been alienated by the Crown, are the property of the Crown. It continues similar declarations from earlier legislation. 
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of the grant.20 The onus of proof that a particular substance was, at the date of the document to be 
construed, or is, at the present day, regarded as a mineral is upon those raising the contention. This 
onus of proof is a reflection of the rule, or presumption, that the proprietor of the surface is proprietor 
of everything below; that is, the cuius est solum rule.
There is a natural tendency to assume that anything subterranean is in the hands of the owners of 
mineral rights, but a closer examination shows that this is not the case. Mineral rights are grants 
of minerals, as understood by the vernacular test; they are not grants of all strata, structures and 
phenomena below the surface. Where mineral rights are owned separately, they do not necessarily 
entail property rights to all things subterranean. A grant of the surface land is not the mere plane 
surface but really means a right to all the land except the mines.21 Thus even where mineral rights are 
owned separately, they do not necessarily entail rights to everything in the subsurface. 
CCS injects supercritical CO2 into pore space, the minute voids that exist between the solid grains 
of minerals that make up rock, filled with fluids such as water, oil or gas. The analysis of proprietary 
rights concerning carbon capture and storage has been couched, especially in American literature, 
as a debate whether the pore space is owned by the land owner or by the mineral owner.22 The 
claim of the mineral owner has generally been preferred, but in fact the authority for doing so is 
not particularly strong. The preference for the mineral owner has relied on a line of old English 
and Scottish cases (and one Canadian), in respect of spaces from which minerals have been 
removed.23 Recent literature on CCS picked these old cases up as the ‘English Rule’ to say that the 
mineral interest holder is the owner of rights in the mineral formation separate and apart from 
its rights to remove the minerals.24 Plainly that is not supported by the a reading of the old cases 
themselves. They all concerned grants of rights to mines of coal or other stratified deposits, and 
rights to the mine workings, not microscopic pore space. They all stayed close to the construction 
of the instruments in question without propounding any general rules, except to say that a grant of 
“mines” is more likely than “minerals” to mean a grant of the workings as spaces. More modern in 
its outlook was Mitchell v Mosley25 holding that conveyances of land included everything down to 
the centre of the earth, even including the vacant spaces from which coal may have been worked 
out by the coal lessees. What was conveyed was not merely of the surface rights but the whole 
substratum. Indeed it does not appear to be correct to say that the common law declares that 
20 North British Railway Co v Budhill Coal and Sandstone Co [1910] AC 116 (HL Scot).
21 Pountney v Clayton (1883) 11 QBD 820 at 833, 838-840. 
22 O. Anderson, ‘Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who Owns the Pore Space?’ (2009) 9 Wyoming L Rev 97.
23 The first of the cases was Bowser v Maclean (1860) 2 DeG&J 415, 45 ER 682, the last of them Little v Western Transfer and 
Storage Co [1922] 3 WWR 356 (Alta SC TD). The cases and their subsequent understanding are analyzed in more detail in 
B Barton, “The Common Law of Subsurface Activity: General Principle and Current Problems” in D Zillman and others, eds, 
Energy Underground (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014). 
24 T. A. Campbell, R. A. James and J Hutchings, ‘Carbon Capture and Storage Project Development: An Overview of Property 
Rights Acquisition, Permitting, and Operational Liability Issues’ (2007) 38 Texas Envtl L J 169 at 172; B. Metz, O. Davidson, 
H. de Coninck, M. Loos and L. Meyer, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special 
Report, 2005) 256; E. Wilson and M. de Figueiredo, ‘Geologic Carbon Dioxide Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface Property 
Law’ (2006) 36 ELR 10114at 10121; M. de Figueiredo, ‘Liability of Carbon Dioxide Storage’ (2007) PhD thesis, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 287; Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, Storage of Carbon Dioxide in Geologic Structures: 
A Legal and Regulatory Guide for States and Provinces (2007) 19. Other writers sensibly expressed scepticism of the idea of an 
“English Rule”: N. Bankes, J. Poschwatta and E. Shier, ‘The Legal Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage in Alberta’ (2008) 
45 Alta L Rev 585 at 604 and I. Duncan, S. Anderson, J.-P. Nicot, ‘Pore Space Ownership Issues for CO2 Sequestration in the US’ 
(2009) 1 Energy Procedia 4427.
25 Mitchell v Mosley [1914] 1 Ch 438 (CA). It was cited in Bocardo v Star Energy, along with Pountney v Clayton.
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a mineral owner has control of a mineral formation for purposes other than extracting minerals. 
“Pore space” is generally owned by the surface owner, not the mineral owner. 
The result is that, even in areas of private mineral ownership, the surface owner can claim rights to the 
subsurface that could obstruct CCS operations. Even if the private mineral owner prevails, it might be 
added, the CCS operator is still obliged to deal with a private proprietor; the only question is which one.
5 Crown Minerals
The rights of the owner of land to the subsurface, in relation to CCS storage operations, do not 
appear to be displaced by the vesting of minerals in favour of the Crown. There are two aspects to be 
considered; first the statutory declaration that certain minerals are the property of the Crown where 
ever situated, and secondly the exception or reservation to the Crown of minerals upon alienation of 
the land by the Crown. 
This discussion concerns only the proprietary claims that may be made by the Crown or its permittee 
against the surface owner. Other aspects of the role of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 are dealt with 
in Chapter 2, as to managing CCS under that Act, and in Chapter 7, as to the relationship of other 
subsurface resources. 
5.1 Substances declared to be the property of the Crown: 
petroleum
The first category is the minerals (petroleum, gold, silver and uranium) that section 10 of the CMA 
declares to be property of the Crown whether or not the land has been alienated by the Crown. 
The language clearly prevails over claims to minerals derived from the ownership of land, and applies 
on land in private ownership. It discharges the onus of proof, discussed above, that is borne by a person 
claiming rights contrary to the presumption of ownership by the proprietor of the surface. Of those 
minerals, only petroleum has any possible role in founding a Crown claim to rights under the existing 
law to CCS storage formations that displace those of a surface owner. The definition of petroleum 
(quoted in Chapter 2) cannot by any stretch of the imagination include CO2. In addition, the emphasis 
of the definition is on the petroleum itself, not on the formations containing it. Equally, the definition 
of “minerals” is of substances, not formations, structures, or character or capacity in situ. Natural gas 
storage, which is referred to in the definition of petroleum, cannot be interpreted so as to include carbon 
capture and storage in the sense of geosequestration. (See Chapter 2 on that matter as well.) The result 
is that the vesting of petroleum in the Crown cannot be argued to vest CO2 from CCS operations in the 
Crown, and cannot empower the Crown to authorise CCS operations in privately-owned lands. 
One might resort to the idea of necessarily-implied rights to argue that the declaration of Crown 
ownership of petroleum brings with it rights of control of structures or formations where petroleum 
exists, and therefore CCS formations, but the argument does not seem viable. There is certainly a 
long-established general principle that the grant of some right will include associated rights required 
to make the grant effectual.
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When anything is granted, all the means to attain it, and all the fruits and effects of it, are granted 
also; and shall pass inclusive, together with the thing, by the grant of the thing itself … By the 
grant of mines, is granted the power to dig them …26 
The reservation of a substance necessarily implies the existence of power to recover it and of the 
right of working.27 However such associated rights are limited; it seems inevitable that they must 
be necessary to the primary grant, and not merely convenient; and they must be for the same 
purpose, not some other purpose. Petroleum operations can proceed without sole control of an entire 
formation being vested in one company; and petroleum operations are by their very nature different 
from CCS operations. The case is quite different from the implication of rights to use the surface in a 
grant of mineral rights. 
The result is that the vesting of rights to petroleum in the Crown under section 10 of the Crown 
Minerals Act does not give the Crown or its permittee under the Act any property rights that displace 
the rights of the land owner in such a way that the Crown could allow CCS storage operations under 
the CMA. 
5.2 Minerals reserved to the Crown
The second category of Crown ownership of minerals in privately-owned lands arises from the 
exception of minerals upon alienation of land by the Crown. After land in New Zealand had been 
acquired by the Crown, and after customary Māori title had been extinguished in various ways, the 
land was often alienated – that is, granted, leased or sold – by the Crown to private persons. In the 
late nineteenth century Parliament began to say in the Land Act and other Acts that all grants of land 
under the Act were subject to a reservation of various minerals to the Crown. By the time of the Land 
Act 1948 all minerals were deemed reserved to the Crown from every sale, grant, lease, licence, or 
other disposition under the Act.28 This was the predecessor of the present provision, section 11 of the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991: 
(1)  Every alienation of land from the Crown made on or after the commencement of this 
Act (whether by way of sale, lease, or otherwise) shall be deemed to be made subject to a 
reservation in favour of the Crown of every mineral existing in its natural condition in the land.
(1A) Nothing in subsection (1) applies to pounamu to which section 3 of the Ngai Tahu (Pounamu 
Vesting) Act 1997 applies.
(2)  For the avoidance of doubt, every mineral reserved in favour of the Crown by any enactment shall 
continue to be reserved in favour of the Crown, notwithstanding the repeal of that enactment.
The definition of “mineral” in the CMA is a naturally occurring inorganic substance beneath or at the 
surface of the earth. (It is quoted in full in Chapter 2.)
Different language may have been used in earlier legislation, and section 11 is not retroactive. 
For any one parcel of land, one must therefore ascertain the terms of the particular Crown grant, 
the governing legislation at the time of the Crown grant, and the possible effect of the Land Transfer 
26 W Shepard, Sheppard’s Touchstone of Common Assurances, Fed vol. 1 (Luke Hansard & Sons, London, 1820) at 89. Also see 
Saunders’s Case (1599) 5 Rep 12a, 77 ER 66; and Pountney v Clayton (1883) 11 QBD 820 at 839. 
27 Borys v Canadian Pacific Railway [1953] AC 217 at 227, Lord Porter.
28 Land Act 1948, ss 2 (“minerals”) and 59. 
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Act.29 As a result, mineral title to private land is often unclear. Some general observations are possible 
nonetheless. There is nothing in section 11 of the 1991 Act, and highly unlikely to be anything in its 
predecessors, that suggests that in making a grant of land the Crown reserved to itself rights to carry 
out CCS operations. There is no reference to the ownership of the structures from which minerals are 
extracted; there is nothing about structures or formations. There is nothing about use of structures or 
substances for another purpose such as CCS disposal. At least in section 11, and in the Mining Act 1971 
Act, and in the Land Act 1948 (section 59), there is no exception of “mines.” (It will be recalled that 
a reservation or exception of mines was the basis in a few cases for a conclusion that the chambers 
left after working were vested in the mineral owner, and that this is the limited basis on which an 
argument of ownership of pore space for CCS storage could be made.) 
The conclusion on this point is that the exception or reservation of minerals to the Crown under 
section 11 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 and its predecessors does not give the Crown any property 
rights to substances, structures, formations, or pore space that displace the rights of the land owner 
in such a way that the Crown could allow CCS operations. This is the same position as for claims made 
by reason of the vesting of petroleum and other substances under section 10, discussed above. 
5.3 General conclusion
On the whole, therefore, one finds the rights of owners of private land to control the subsurface in 
respect of developments such as CCS injection operations are little affected by the presence of Crown 
minerals in the land, any more than they are affected by the private ownership of minerals. The general 
conclusion therefore stands, that under this general law rights deriving from the ownership or possession 
of land extend to all parts of the land, including the subsurface, so that a land owner aggrieved with CCS 
injection operations below his or her land has a strong legal basis on which to attack the operations as 
trespass or nuisance. When there are so many ways that cases can present themselves, and ways for the 
law to evolve, it is unwise to make an absolute prediction that all such actions will be successful; but it is 
entirely justifiable to say that in this situation the land owner has a strong case for his or her claim, and 
may well obtain damages or an injunction against the CCS operator. The counter-proposition, that there 
is no legal reason to apprehend such a claim, is not supportable. 
6 The Need to Modify Rights to Land for CCS 
What we have seen so far in this Chapter is that a CCS operation needs to build pipelines and surface 
facilities, and to use the subsurface of land for wells and for the injection and storage of CO2. The legal 
rights of land owners to the subsurface are in relevant respects similar to their rights to the surface. 
Substantial areas of land are involved. It may often be possible for the CCS operator to assemble land 
and property rights through negotiation and agreement with land owners. No law reform is required 
for that. What does require consideration is whether negotiation will be enough, or whether land 
rights should be modified for CCS, and whether a CCS operator should have a power of compulsory 
29 E C Adams, The Land Transfer Act 1952, (2nd ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1971) at 36; GW Hinde, NR Campbell & P Twist, 
Principles of Real Property Law (Lexisnexis, Wellington, 2007) para 6.008; Laws of New Zealand, Minerals and Mining, para 6; 
G Cain, “The Dormant Mineral Reservation” [1964] NZLJ 279 on transactions concerning private minerals.
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acquisition or override of the rights of land owners where necessary. This is a significant question for 
law reform and policy. 
Powers for the compulsory acquisition of rights to land, i.e. expropriation, are common in most legal 
systems. They are restricted, in recognition of the importance of property rights in society and in the 
legal system. There is a presumption that a statute is not to be interpreted as depriving persons of 
property without compensation unless that is clearly the intention of Parliament,30 and it is a recognised 
principle that the state should not appropriate private property for public purposes without just 
compensation.31 Powers of compulsory acquisition are granted sparingly and subject to constraints. 
They are granted primarily to public agencies, the Crown and local authorities. Only occasionally are 
they granted to private persons or companies, and then under close control. The purposes for which 
they may be exercised are invariably specified with some detail. An expropriating authority may be 
challenged if it takes land for purposes beyond those allowed. The procedure that must be followed for 
the taking of rights and the giving of compensation for them is carefully prescribed, ensuring notice to 
affected persons, opportunities to respond, and in some situations rights of appeal. 
The chief alternative to compulsory acquisition of particular lands is a statutory vesting of rights to 
some incident or attribute of land in the Crown. This could be done for the CCS storage capability of 
land. There are examples of such general vestings in New Zealand; the Petroleum Act 1937, vesting 
all oil and gas in the Crown; the Atomic Energy Act 1945 doing the same in relation to uranium and 
other substances; the Geothermal Energy Act 1953, and, in relation to water rights, the Water and 
Soil Conservation Act 1967.32 
Whether there should be a power of compulsory acquisition or a general vesting of CCS rights in the 
Crown for the public good perhaps depends on whether CCS has special characteristics as a land use. 
We noted several such characteristics at the beginning of this Chapter. They can be restated with 
some additional points. 
(i) The number of storage formations known to be suitable is limited, and location of injection 
facilities is therefore constrained.
(ii) Pipeline routes will be constrained by the location of CO2 sources, injection facilities, and 
intermediate physical and human geography. 
(iii) The subsurface footprint of a CCS injection project onshore, in the form of the CO2 plume in pore 
space, is likely to be extensive. 
(iv) Only some of the surface of that land will be affected by well sites and monitoring sites. 
(v) Once a particular formation is selected, there may be little latitude in the location of some 
surface facilities. 
30 Attorney-General v DeKeyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508 (HL) 542 per Lord Atkinson: “The recognized rule for the construction 
of statutes is that, unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a statute is not to be construed so as to take away the 
property of a subject without compensation.”
31 G Palmer, “Westco Lagan v A-G” [2001] NZLJ 163, p 168.
32 The vesting of uranium is now in the Crown Minerals Act 1991; the vesting of geothermal and water rights in the Crown is 
continued by s 354 Resource Management Act 1991.
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(vi) The large numbers of land owners is likely to be within the footprint of a CCS pipeline or a CCS 
injection site. 
(vii) Some of the land owners may be private land owners occupying their own land, but leases, 
common ownership and mortgagees push up the numbers of persons affected. Special classes of 
land like roads, reserves, and Māori land may all pose particular questions.
While some of these uses of land are common to any major project, others are special to CCS. It can be 
argued that CCS should be encouraged and should not be precluded because of its unusual character 
as a land use. The CO2 injection plume, dictated by geology, cannot be adjusted in order to avoid 
non-agreeing landowners; the plume will percolate through strata below the land of multiple land 
owners (quite possibly hundreds) who are likely to be entirely unaffected in their enjoyment of their 
land, but could veto the project. It would be unfortunate from a policy point of view if one such 
landowner could prevent a CCS project from proceeding, because there is a distinct public interest in 
facilitating CCS, in mitigating climate change.
CCS as a land use therefore seems to have attributes that are generally thought to provide a rationale 
and justification for compulsory acquisition or vesting in the public. Without compulsory acquisition 
a market failure exists that may enable a “holdout” land owner to thwart a development, especially 
where land attributes and contiguity are important.33 There are large transaction costs in dealing with 
multiple owners. There is often a risk of stalemate where for family or personal reasons an owner 
or co-owners of land cannot decide on any course of action. Land owners who are only involved 
because of the spread of a CO2 plume one or two kilometres below the land surface cannot claim 
that their investment intentions and plans for their use of the land have been thwarted, and they are 
protected by the elaborate scrutiny provided by the statutory permitting process for a CCS project. 
CCS shares some characteristics with ports, airports, roading and electricity transmission lines, for 
which legislation provides rights of access or rights of acquisition. 
The counter-argument is that there should be no interference with private property rights. It is 
certainly accepted that secure private property rights as a civil institution are an essential component 
of a liberal democracy. The courts and the legislature are slow to interfere with property rights.34 
It can be argued from that point of principle that the CCS industry should not be given preferential 
treatment or special assistance in the form of powers over other people’s private property. Private 
companies should not have the benefit of statutory powers; there should be a “level playing field;” 
and the state should not try to pick winners. However property rights are not absolute, and are 
often modified by statute and regulation in the public interest, subject to careful controls. This is 
particularly so where the interference with the owner’s rights and investment expectations is small 
or imperceptible.
The result is that there appears to be a clear case for the modification of land use rights in order to 
facilitate CCS operations, and to provide for compulsory access or acquisition. 
33 R Cooter and T Ulen, Law and Economics, (6th ed, Pearson, Boston, 2012) at 174. 
34 ‘Next to constitutional rights, property rights are the strongest interests recognised by our law.’ Hammond J in White v Chandler 
[2001] 1 NZLR 28 at [67].
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7 CCS Rights to the Surface of Land
At this point, we separate our consideration of the needs of a CCS project for rights to the surface of 
land from its needs for rights to the subsurface. In both cases it appears, as discussed above, that it 
is necessary to modify private property rights to some extent to enable CCS operations to proceed. 
However the two cases are different. Firstly, the surface needs of CCS are substantial but they do 
not have the district-wide character of a CO2 plume in a storage formation. Secondly, their effect 
on the use and enjoyment of the owner of the land are more substantial. A general statutory vesting 
of rights would be imprecise and unsuitable. We therefore consider methods that are procedurally 
more formal and more selective. Two different methods can be identified. We consider procedures for 
compulsory access carefully, although ultimately we do not favour them, preferring procedures for 
compulsory acquisition as a requiring authority. 
7.1 Compulsory access: Gas Act and Electricity Act
Some legislation gives powers to an agency or company to obtain compulsory access to land without 
taking any legal estate or interest in the land. One example is the Gas Act 1992, sections 23 to 36, 
which grants operators a general right of protection of natural gas fittings that were installed on 
private land before 1 January 1993, and a right of entry to inspect and maintain them. The Electricity 
Act 1992, sections 22 to 35, does the same for existing electrical works. Since then, however, utility 
operators have been obliged to obtain easements for their projects, with the possibility of the RMA 
“requiring authority” procedure for expropriation (discussed below) in the background. The general 
right of entry is perhaps suited to the specific situation where power and gas lines crossing private 
land had never needed formalising individually, and perhaps less suitable as a model for CCS surface 
installations. Another example is section 181 of the Local Government Act 2002, where a local 
authority is given power to construct works on or under private land for the purposes of water supply, 
trade waste disposal, land drainage, sewerage or stormwater. Notice must be given, and there is 
a right of appeal. Compensation is payable for any injurious affection, but no interest in land is taken. 
The chief drawback with the gas / electricity general right of compulsory access is that it is generic 
and unselective. It may be suitable where the particular fittings or works are plain to see, but less 
so for a future project. It would leave land owners unnecessarily uncertain about the effect of 
a project on their use and possession of the land. The water supply and sewerage option produces less 
uncertainty, but appears to be less sophisticated procedurally than seems desirable for the protection 
of land owners. 
7.2 Access arrangement: Crown Minerals Act 
Another relevant right of access without granting an interest in the land is the ‘access arrangement’ 
under the CMA. A mining company or a petroleum company requires an access arrangement in 
order to be able to use the surface of land for the purposes of mineral prospecting, exploration and 
extraction. It may be able to obtain one by agreement. If not, in the case of petroleum, the company 
can have the access arrangement determined by an arbitrator under section 53 and section 70. 
In the case of minerals other than petroleum, a company can obtain an access arrangement 
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(if agreement is not possible) only by securing an Order in Council, through a complex and difficult 
process under section 66, that it is in the public interest that an arbitrator proceed to determine an 
access agreement. Access to private land, especially for non-petroleum minerals, was a contested 
issue during the law reform and legislative process leading up to 1991. It comes close to providing 
landowners with a veto of non-petroleum activities on their lands beyond minimum impact 
activities. Separate provisions are made for minimum impact activities, Māori land, and Crown land.
The “access arrangement” procedure under the CMA is a possible option for CCS injection operations. 
If the purpose is to provide a viable alternative to obtaining the consent of the land owner, then 
it should follow the path for petroleum operations, where the arbitration can proceed without 
compliance with the requirements of section 66. A number of ancillary questions would need to 
be addressed in order to implement the option of an access arrangement, such as the definition of 
activities covered, and the right to carry out minimum impact activities. The option would provide an 
alignment of CCS with petroleum. It may be more suitable for short-term occupation of land than 
long-term occupation. It is not designed for pipelines. 
7.3 Compulsory acquisition of an estate or interest in land 
The formal acquisition of a land owner’s rights or part of them is provided for by the Public Works 
Act 1981.35 It is available primarily for government works and local authority works. The Act brings 
about the acquisition of all or part of the land in exchange for monetary compensation. The Crown or 
local authority acquires the estate in fee simple in the land, or an interest in it such as an easement. 
It therefore acquires registered title. Some other statutes, such as the Local Government Act 2002 
(section 189) specifically authorise the taking of property for works. 
The Public Works Act is suitable for permanent acquisition. However on its own it is only available 
for government works and local authority works, which would rule out CCS operators in the private 
sector. The main existing adaptation of the Act for use by private sector companies is in the Resource 
Management Act 1991.
7.4 Compulsory acquisition: requiring authority under the RMA 
The RMA provides a procedure to allow a company that is a network utility operator to use the Public 
Works Act powers of expropriation. This option requires close scrutiny because it seems very suitable 
for CCS purposes. The procedure reconciles the entirely public character of the power of expropriation, 
as an exercise of the sovereign power of the state, with the land use needs of private companies. 
Requiring Authority.  The key to eligibility to use the RMA and Public Works Act powers is becoming 
a “requiring authority.” To obtain that status, one must first be a “network utility operator”36 which is 
defined to be a person who undertakes or proposes to undertake various specified works, including gas 
transmission, electricity operations, telecommunication networks, water supply, drainage, sewerage, 
35 Generally, see K Palmer, “Compulsory Acquisition and Compensation” at 1297-1346 in T Bennion, D Brown, R Thomas and 
E Toomey, New Zealand Land Law (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009). Land Information New Zealand initiated a review of the 
Act in 2000. Its status is unknown. The Minister responsible recently announced that the Act would be amended: M Williamson, 
“Public Works Act acquisitions made fairer” (press release, 13 August 2013).
36 Resource Management Act 1991, s 166. (In addition a Minister of the Crown and a local authority has status a requiring authority.)
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roads, railway lines and airports. Under sections 166(i) and 360(1)(e) of the RMA other projects or 
works may be prescribed as network utility operations.37 
A network utility operator may apply under section 167 to be approved by the Minister for the 
Environment as a requiring authority. The Minister must be satisfied that the applicant is likely to 
carry out all the responsibilities, including financial responsibilities, of a requiring authority under 
the Act, and will give proper regard to the interests of those affected and to the interests of the 
environment: section 167(4). The Minister must also be satisfied that the approval as a requiring 
authority is appropriate for the purposes of carrying on the project. The Minister may revoke the 
approval, in which case all functions, powers and duties are transferred to the Minister. 
Designation.  Status as a requiring authority enables a company to do two things. The first is to 
give a notice of requirement to a territorial authority of its requirement for a “designation” for its 
work: section 168. The notice of requirement procedure includes provisions for notice, a hearing, 
and an appeal, similar to what is provided for an application for a resource consent.38 The territorial 
authority’s power on the notice of requirement is only to make recommendations, but it can appeal 
to the Environment Court. Through this process, the notice of requirement leads ultimately to a 
designation for the work, which ensures that the work can proceed as if a permitted activity under the 
district plan. The company can therefore avoid the possibility that the district plan would prevent the 
work. (However the company must still comply with rules in a regional plan and apply to the regional 
council for permits for, for example, soil disturbance, takes of water, discharges to air and water, and 
river crossings.) The designation also prevents any person from undertaking any activity that would 
prevent or hinder the designated work: section 178. 
Compulsory Acquisition.  The second thing that status as a requiring authority allows is the compulsory 
acquisition of land for the project or work. Often this will occur during or after the designation of 
land for the project under section 172, but section 186 does not require the designation to be under 
way or completed.39 There is a restriction in that the land must be “required” for the project. The 
Minister of Lands must give his or her agreement, and there are no restrictions expressed on what 
matters the Minister may take into account in deciding whether to give agreement: section 186(1). 
The requirement for the agreement of the Minister is controls the availability of this important state 
power by a private company. If the land is acquired, it is vested in the company rather than the Crown. 
The owner’s claim for compensation lies against the Minister, which again puts the state between 
the owner and the company. However the Minister may recover all the costs and expenses of the 
acquisition, including the compensation, from the company. 
Where the network utility operator requires land that is held by the Crown or by a local authority, 
section 186(4) of the RMA states that the land may be set apart for the operator’s project as provided 
by sections 50 and 52 of the Public Works Act. The consent of the relevant Minister or the local 
37 That power has been used, for a hydro project: Project Aqua Resource Management (Project Aqua Network Utility Operation) 
Regulations 2003, SR 2003/31. The Regulations described the project and the lands affected, and stated that for the purposes 
of section 166 of the RMA Project Aqua is a network utility operation. The project did not proceed. 
38 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 166-186. Generally, see D Kirkpatrick, “Land Use and Subdivision” chapter 4 in D Nolan (ed) 
Environmental and Resource Management Law (4th ed, Lexisnexis, Wellington, 2011) at para 4.18. 
39 Confirmed by Kett v Minister for Land Information, High Court, Auckland AP 404/151/00, Paterson J, 28 June 2001. 
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authority is required.40 The Minister may stop a road under section 116 of the Public Works Act, 
although the consent of the local authority is required for a road under its control. The Public Works 
Act 1981 applies to Māori land, although with special provisions, and the procedures in the RMA for 
a notice of requirement, designation, and compulsory acquisition apply to Māori land but special 
consideration is desirable.41 
In the territorial sea, the power to set apart land that is held by the Crown is extended by section 52 
of the Public Works Act to a setting aside of a part of the common marine and coastal area, with the 
consent of the Minister of Conservation or Transport. CCS pipelines, like other such operations, will 
require a coastal permit, as explained in Chapter 9.42 The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 
2011 provides a means of access for an accommodated activity across an area for which customary 
marine title has been recognised. However, there appears to be no way to obtain similar access across 
a marine area already occupied by a coastal permit such as for aquaculture, and in Chapter 9 we 
explore the options to deal with the matter. 
Subsoil.  Particularly to be noted in relation to CCS is that a designation can not only be for the project 
or work itself, but can also be, in respect of any land, water, subsoil or airspace where a restriction 
is reasonably necessary for the safe or efficient functioning or operation of the project or work.43 
The general effect of a designation is to prevent any person from doing anything in relation to land, 
without the consent of the requiring authority, that would prevent or hinder the work or project to 
which the designation relates.44 Also particularly relevant to CCS is that a compulsory acquisition 
need not be for the entire fee simple; it can be for an easement, and it can be for only part of the 
subsoil.45 
Advantages.  On the whole we see substantial advantages in using the requiring authority mechanism 
for CCS injection:
(i) It is an established and known part of the legal system.
(ii) Few changes are required. 
(iii) The eligibility of a person or company to become a “requiring authority” is controlled by the 
Minister for the Environment. Approval is conditional on the fitness of the applicant for the project 
and for having regard to the interests of those affected. Revocation of the status is a possibility 
for enforcement purposes. The consent of the Minister is also required for the particular taking. 
The Crown is further interposed in respect of compensation. The exercise of the statutory power of 
compulsory acquisition of private land by a company is therefore closely controlled. 
40 Also see section 29 of the Public Works Act 1981, where the power to acquire land includes the power to take land vested in a 
local authority. It is likely that the particular RMA provision for requiring authority applies to make consent necessary. We have 
not examined the application of the Public Works Act to the many particular categories of public lands for example those under 
the management of the Department of Conservation. 
41 Public Works Act 1981, ss 18(5), 23(2); McGuire v Hastings District Council [2002] 2 NZLR 577 (PC).
42 Chapter 9, Part 3, Legislation for the Territorial Sea, especially under the heading of coastal occupation. 
43 Resource Management Act 1991, s 168(2). 
44 Section 176. By reason of sections 9(4) and 338 it is a criminal offence to do such a thing. 
45 Public Works Act 1981, s 31. 
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(iv) A requiring authority can give a notice of requirement for a designation to address issues in 
district plans and ensure that no impediments occur in the application of the plan to the project. 
A notice of requirement for a designation can be called in for centralised decision-making. (We 
have considered those matters in more detail in Chapter 2.)
(v) The designation mechanism enables the procedures for the approval of compulsory acquisition 
to be integrated with the procedures for the approval of a CCS project generally. The mechanism 
can apply to an injection project, a pipeline project, or a project that involves both. The matter is 
considered further in Chapter 5. 
7.5 Recommendations
We recommend that the requiring authority system under the RMA leading to a Public Works Act 
process be made available for CCS pipeline and CCS injection operations, in order to provide certainty 
in relation to RMA approval and in order to provide a means to obtain rights to land where negotiation 
is unsuccessful. (We believe that CCS exploration operations will not need such powers, but it would 
be acceptable to include them if thought fit.) In particular we recommend as follows. 
(i) The definition of “network utility operator” in section 166 of the RMA should include a person 
who undertakes or proposes to undertake a CCS pipeline operation or a CCS injection operation. 
(ii) In relation to injection operations, eligibility should be confined to persons holding injection 
permits for CCS operations. (We do not believe that it is necessary to institute a CCS pipeline 
permit; see Chapter 8.)
(iii) A procedure should be introduced for the grant of an overlapping coastal permit for necessary 
infrastructure with a balancing of the interests of the two parties.
8 CCS Rights to the Subsurface of Land
We return to the consideration of the needs of a CCS project for rights to the subsurface of land. CCS 
injection is likely to have district-wide effect in a storage formation; the CO2 plume may spread for 
kilometres, and the pressure front may go further. However there should be no ordinarily discernable 
effect on the use and enjoyment of the surface of the land. We consider four options for addressing 
rights to the subsurface of land. 
8.1 Compulsory acquisition: requiring authority under the RMA
The first option is simply to extend the procedures recommended above for the surface, for use of 
the requiring authority procedure in the RMA. That could be done. It could be facilitated by the use of 
section 168(2) of the RMA to use a designation to impose restrictions in respect of the subsoil where it 
is reasonably necessary to do so for the safe or efficient operation of the project. However, this power 
may not give the requiring authority the right to use the subsoil as it wishes. The matter is certainly 
not free from doubt, and where there is uncertainty a court will lean against a power being construed 
to allow a taking of land without compensation. 
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Designation, of course, also leads to a formal power of expropriation under the Public Works Act. 
However, the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition is a formal and complex procedure that 
may be unsuited to a project that involves hundreds of properties but with little real surface effect. 
Fixing compensation could be difficult. 
8.2 Crown Minerals Act subsurface rights
The second option is a right of access modelled on the CMA. Such a right may be more suitable for 
the subsurface, where the effect of CCS operations will be general but of a lower or zero impact on 
a land owner. Where there is little real likelihood of discernible effect on the surface, and where any 
infringement of property rights seems slight, the need for full expropriation or even expropriation of 
an easement may be less. 
In this regard, one feature of section 57 of the CMA seems very relevant:
For the purposes of sections 53 and 54 [requiring access arrangements], prospecting, exploration, 
or mining carried out below the surface of any land shall not constitute prospecting, exploration, 
or mining on or in land if it –
(a) will not or is not likely to cause any damage to the surface of the land or any loss or damage 
to the owner or occupier of the land; or
(b) will not or is not likely to have any prejudicial effect in respect of the use and enjoyment of 
the land by the owner or occupier of the land; or
(c) will not or is not likely to have any prejudicial effect in respect of any possible future use of 
the surface of the land.
A provision of this kind could simplify relationships with landowners. Within the CMA regime, this 
provision means that the mineral operator does not need to obtain the consent of the owner for 
underground operations, and does nott need to rely on obtaining compulsory access through an 
access arrangement. However, as was the case with the extension of the RMA designation process 
for protective restrictions, this provision is not clear in overriding any claim of the property rights of 
the land owner. In addition, the test of “likelihood” to have an effect on the surface is unsatisfactory. 
So is the test of damage and loss or damage. 
8.3 Authorisation plus protection 
The third option is similar, in avoiding a full expropriation procedure and a taking of rights to land, 
while ensuring that the legislation provides what is necessary for CCS operations in relation to the 
claims of land owners. The first element would be an authorisation of the CCS works. That would 
protect the operator from any claim by a surface owner that the works are trespasses or nuisance; in 
effect, an immunity. It would state that the operator of CCS operations approved under an injection 
permit may carry out drilling and injection activities under any land without the consent of the 
owner of the land, unless the operations will have any significant effect on the enjoyment of the 
surface of the land. The second element is the protection of the CCS works from the interference of 
surface owners relying on property rights, to carry out their own drilling or anything else that might 
harm the CCS operation. The provision would simply prohibit interference with an authorised CCS 
operation, including interference with the cap-rock formations. That would prevent the exercise 
of proprietary rights inconsistently with the authorised CCS works. The third ingredient would be 
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compensation, for any person in possession of the surface or holding any interest in the surface, 
for damage to or loss of enjoyment of his or her property in respect to the surface only. (Separate 
provisions could be added for private mineral owners.) 
An approach of this kind would be suitable for use of the subsurface over wide areas at depth. It may 
have some attractiveness in policy terms, or political terms, if it avoids controversy about property 
rights, including Treaty rights. Precedents exist, to some extent at least, in section 57 of the Crown 
Minerals Act (the second option above), and in the mining legislation of some Australian states which 
allows their state mining Acts to apply to privately-owned minerals. On the other hand, it may not 
avoid controversy about property rights. In addition, it may not be clear enough in its intention, and 
that is a serious shortcoming in relation to property, where the courts will demand clarity in legislation 
that affects property rights. Any ambiguity or lacuna could cause provisions for authorisation plus 
protection to be ineffectual and allow a land owner a claim where none had been intended. 
8.4 General vesting of storage rights in the Crown
The fourth option is to secure public ownership of subsurface storage capability, with a general 
vesting of storage rights in the Crown by statute. Just as with the second and third options above, 
where there is little real likelihood of discernible effect on the surface, and where the infringement on 
property rights seems slight, an expropriation procedure for each parcel of land in the perimeter of 
the injection site may be unduly complex. We consider that it is more acceptable for a CCS company 
to have a general power to use the subsurface for injection operations. This option would be more 
direct in ensuring that the CCS storage capacity of land would be available for public purposes. A clear 
statement of ownership sometimes clarifies the situation. Clarity and transparency are obtained. 
It is important in addressing property rights to be clear, because any ambiguity may be construed in 
favour of the owner. 
Examples.  This option has emerged as the preferred path of law reform for CCS in a number of 
jurisdictions. The first example is Victoria, where section 14 of the Greenhouse Gas Geological 
Sequestration Act 2008 declares: 
(1) The Crown owns all underground geological storage formations below the surface of any 
land in Victoria. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to any land (other than Crown land) to the extent 
that the underground geological storage formation is within 15·24 metres of the surface of 
the land. 
(3) Subsection (1) applies despite any prior alienation of Crown land. 
(4) The Crown is not liable to pay any compensation in respect of a loss caused by the operation 
of this section. 
An underground geological storage formation is defined to include any seal or reservoir of an 
underground geological formation; and any associated geological attributes or features of an 
underground geological formation. The reference to formations within 15.24 metres of the surface 
is carried over from Victoria mining legislation, where the vesting of minerals in the Crown does not 
include anything within 50 feet of the surface. The assertion of Crown ownership of formations is 
backed up by a prohibition of exploration or development of such formations without an authorisation 
under the Act. However interference otherwise with a storage formation is not prohibited. It is not 
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made clear whether formations suitable for storage of materials other than CO2 are included, for 
example for natural gas storage or waste disposal. 
The Queensland Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009, section 27, is similar. 
(1) All GHG storage reservoirs in land in the State are and are taken always to have been the 
property of the State.
(2) To remove any doubt, it is declared that– 
(a) a person does not acquire any property in a GHG storage reservoir or petroleum in it 
only because the person creates or discovers the reservoir; and
(b) subsection (1) applies whether or not the land is freehold or other land.
(3) This section applies despite any other Act, grant, title, or other document in force from the 
commencement of this section. 
(4) In this section– 
 the State does not include any of the adjacent area under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Act 1982.
Grants of land by the State, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, are taken to be 
subject to a reservation of GHG storage reservoirs. A GHG storage reservoir is defined (Schedule 2, 
section 13(a)) as “the spatial extent of an underground geological storage formation that is suitable 
to store a GHG stream”. It is clear that the storage vested in the Crown is for greenhouse gases, not 
for natural gas storage or other purposes. 
In Western Australia it is proposed that the relevant statute be renamed the Petroleum, Geothermal 
Energy and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 1967,46 and that section 9 declare:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any Act, or in any grant, lease, or other 
instrument of title, whether made or issued before or after the commencement of this Act, all 
petroleum, geothermal energy resources, geothermal energy, potential GHG storage formations 
and potential GHG injection sites on or below the surface of all land within this State, whether 
alienated in fee simple or not so alienated from the Crown, are and shall be deemed always to 
have been the property of the Crown. 
As in Queensland this will be followed by a section deeming GHG storage formations to be reserved 
from Crown grants. A potential GHG injection site is defined as “a place that is a suitable place to make 
a well or wells to inject a greenhouse gas substance into a part of a geological formation” (section 5) 
and a potential GHG storage formation is defined (section 6AA(1)) as “a part of a geological formation 
that is suitable for the permanent storage of a greenhouse gas substance injected into that part.” 
In determining what is suitable, regard may be had to reasonably foreseeable technological developments. 
The Act will go on to classify eligible GHG storage formations and identified GHG storage formations. 
46 Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Legislation Amendment Bill 2013, second reading 8 August 2013. 
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In Alberta, Canada, the emphasis has been put on the ownership of pore space:47 
15.1(1)  It is hereby declared that
(a)  no grant from the Crown of any land in Alberta, or mines or minerals in any land in 
Alberta, has operated or will operate as a conveyance of the title to the pore space 
contained in, occupied by or formerly occupied by minerals or water below the surface 
of that land,
(b)  the pore space below the surface of all land in Alberta is vested in and is the property of 
the Crown in right of Alberta and remains the property of the Crown in right of Alberta 
whether or not
(i) this Act, or an agreement issued under this Act, grants rights in respect of the 
subsurface reservoir or in respect of minerals occupying the subsurface reservoir, or
(ii) minerals or water is produced, recovered or extracted from the subsurface reservoir, and
(c) the exception of pore space under this section is deemed to be an exception contained in 
the original grant from the Crown for the purposes of section 61(1) of the Land Titles Act.
(2) Subsection (1) does not operate to affect the title to land that, on the date on which this 
section comes into force, belongs to the Crown in right of Canada.
(3) The Minister may enter into agreements with respect to the use of pore space.
(4) It is deemed for all purposes, including for the purposes of the Expropriation Act, that no 
expropriation occurs as a result of the enactment of this section.
(5) No person has a right of action and no person shall commence or maintain proceedings
(a) to claim damages or compensation of any kind, including, without limitation, damages 
or compensation for injurious affection, from the Crown, or
(b) to obtain a declaration that the damages or compensation referred to in clause (a)  
is payable by the Crown, as a result of the enactment of this section.
Pore space is not defined in the Act, although the subsequent Carbon Sequestration Tenure Regulations 
defined it to mean “the pores contained in, occupied by or formerly occupied by minerals or water 
below the surface of land.”48 The Act gives mineral owners and permittees rights to work through 
pore space in winning access to their resources, subject to regulatory requirements. Alberta’s focus on 
ownership of pore space is a reflection of much CCS discussion in North America. 
The United States example is relevant but less immediate to New Zealand circumstances. In the 
United States, property is a state matter. Several states have passed legislation to say whether pore 
space is the property of the surface owner or the mineral owner, or part of the public domain.49 
The constitutional protection of property rights is an issue that could affect the permitting of CCS 
injection. It has been argued that CCS injection may not amount to a compensable taking, and that 
law reform should include, along with authorisation of regulators to issue pore space permits for CCS 
purposes, a federal declaration that the CO2 sequestration is a public use undertaken in the national 
interest, and a declaration of a presumption that it is not a taking.50 
47 Mines and Minerals Act RSA 1980 c.M-15 s15.1. 
48 Carbon Sequestration Tenure Regulation, Alta Reg 68/2011 s 1. 
49 M Granger Morgan and S McCoy, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the Legal and Regulatory Barriers (RFF Press, 
New York, 2012) at 96.
50 Granger Morgan and McCoy, at 120. 
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The United Kingdom is even less immediate to New Zealand circumstances in that the Energy Act 
2008 of the UK only authorises CCS in the territorial sea and the EEZ, where land owners are few and 
far between. The Act asserts the Crown’s rights to CCS at sea, and requires a developer to obtain a 
lease from the Crown Estate.
Targeted Thing or Activity.  The examples of vestings in the Crown have the merit of dealing directly 
with property claims. However they are less clear or less harmonious in stating their target, whether 
it is:
• underground geological storage formations (Victoria)
• GHG storage reservoirs (Queensland) 
• potential GHG storage formations and potential GHG injection sites (Western Australia)
• pore space (Alberta). 
It seems more desirable to state the target as accurately as possible, avoiding questions such as the 
effect of the vesting for non-CCS purposes. Storage formations seems more on point than pore space, 
and CCS storage formations even more so. (If the reference is to CCS storage formations, then the 
definition should be wide enough to include the related cap rock.) In all these cases, however, the 
emphasis is on formations or space. That may not be as precise as it could be. An unclear declaration 
of ownership may leave as much uncertainty as before, for example about the implications with 
respect to actual management and control.51 That is to be avoided. 
A declaration of ownership or of vesting of rights in the Crown may be more precise and effective 
than a general statement if it specifically identifies its target and the activities that it is intended to 
authorise. Thus, the declaration could be a vesting in the Crown of the CCS storage capacity of land, 
because after all that is what is needed. It casts the net widely for CCS, but it will not catch other 
uses of the subsurface. Taken further, this argument for precision suggests, in fact, that the true target 
should not be spaces, objects or capacity, but the activities that the Crown wants to carry out and 
authorise in land. The vesting in the Crown should therefore be a vesting of all rights and powers 
necessary to explore for CCS capacity, to develop CCS capacity, to inject CO2 and other greenhouse 
gases into the subsurface of land, and to sequester them there permanently; along with all necessarily 
incidental rights and powers. The difference is akin to that between a corporeal estate in a defined 
part of the land and an incorporeal right to use land in a certain way. This seems to have a higher 
probability of achieving the policy objectives and of avoiding unintended side effects. In spite of the 
apparent attractiveness of this route, we are not aware of any precedent; we do not know of any other 
jurisdiction developing CCS legislation has taken this route of vesting CCS rights in the in the public 
rather than storage formations or pore space. 
We recommend that the legislation vest in the Crown all rights and powers necessary to explore for 
CCS capacity, to develop CCS capacity, to inject CO2 and other greenhouse gases into the subsurface of 
land, and to sequester them there permanently; along with all necessarily incidental rights and powers.
51 For example, the declaration of ownership in the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 may have been less important than 
how one gets water rights and under what circumstances. The regional councils and not the Crown control water rights, and 
management rather than ownership is the focus of a co-management statute such as the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims 
(Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010.
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Prevention of Legal Action by Landowner against Injection.  One of the primary purposes in vesting 
rights in the Crown is to ensure that property rights claims are not an obstacle to the use of deep 
formations. It is important that the law reform clearly has that effect. Some of the legislation that 
has been enacted in other jurisdictions may not be entirely clear in having that effect. For example 
leakage or movement of CO2 or other fluids out of what is defined as the storage formation may take 
it out of what was vested in the Crown. Or, a vesting of pore space may not preclude a surface owner’s 
claim that solid rock under his or her property has been deformed because of the injection of CO2 
under high pressure into the pore space. 
We consider it important, if this option of vesting rights in the Crown is used, that it be clear and not 
merely arguable that the land owner has no proprietary claim in trespass, nuisance, or any related 
action, against authorised CCS operations. (An action in negligence however should remain available 
to the land owner.) 
One advantage of the proposal above to specify the activities rather than the spaces that are to be 
vested in the Crown is that there can be no argument that the activity is unauthorised. 
The corollary alterations of rights of action, it might be added, is the prevention of interference with 
the rights granted. Other jurisdictions have not put effort in their law reform into preventing land 
owners from interfering with CCS (except Alberta, in relation to mineral operators). It is probably 
sufficient to include unauthorised interference with CCS activity or CCS storage as an offence under 
the CCS Act. 
8.5 Compensation
The examples of statutory vestings of CCS storage formation rights in the Crown that we have 
considered rule out the payment of compensation. One can find a justification for this in the great 
depth at which injection will occur, the absence of any realistically-discernable effect on the use and 
enjoyment of the surface, and the absence of any effect on investment expectations. There seems to 
be very little rationale for compensation where the loss is comprehensible only in terms of abstract 
property rights without actual loss. 
However we recommend the policy option of compensation where actual loss or diminution of value 
can be shown. Such compensation is helpful in improving the public perception that property owners 
will be dealt with fairly if they suffer adverse effects. 
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8.6 Discussion and recommendations
It is possible to marshal the issues relevant to law reform in relation to subsurface property rights. 
First, the land owner’s rights extend vertically downwards, indefinitely, in a way that makes it 
likely that he or she can claim that CCS injection amounts to a trespass or nuisance. This is so even 
if the claim is made unreasonably, simply to be difficult, and even if there is no actual loss or effect 
at the surface. Secondly, a proposal to modify property rights is likely to attract attention from 
interest groups that are concerned with the erosion of property rights. A proposal will also attract 
attention from anyone concerned with the erosion of the guarantees of Māori property rights under 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi and the principles of the Treaty. A claim of a breach of the principles 
of the Treaty under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 is foreseeable. Thirdly, the numbers of landowners 
involved in a single CCS operation, perhaps hundreds of them, mean that onshore CCS will probably 
be impossible unless a modification of property rights does take place. Something must be done 
if onshore CCS is to be possible in New Zealand.
We have explored four options: 
(i) Compulsory acquisition using the requiring authority procedure under the RMA, along with 
restrictions to protect the project;
(ii) A right of access below the surface under section 57 of the Crown Minerals Act or a provision 
modelled on it;
(iii) An authority or immunity for a CCS operator from suit from a land owner for trespass or nuisance, 
accompanied by protection of the CCS operation from interference; and 
(iv) A vesting of CCS storage rights in the Crown. 
Neither (i) nor (ii) is intended to have a major role in the statutory scheme to which it belongs, and 
both appear to have limitations that would need to be removed in the process of adaptation to CCS. 
Option (iii) may not be explicit enough for an alteration of property rights (something that affects 
the first two as well) and aspects of it flow into (iv). Option (iv) is the most used in comparable 
jurisdictions internationally. Within it are several variations. The better variations would be targeted 
and would provide clarity – two attributes that are of great importance in the modification of property 
rights for policy purposes. 
Our preferred option and recommendation is a vesting in the Crown of all rights and powers necessary 
to explore for CCS capacity, to develop CCS capacity, to inject CO2 and other greenhouse gases into 
the subsurface of land, and to sequester them there permanently; along with all necessarily incidental 
rights and powers. It should be expressed in a way that makes it clear that the land owner has no right 
of action to vindicate property rights against the Crown or its permittee. Compensation should be 
payable for actual loss or diminution of value of the land. 
While making this recommendation we do not rule other options out of consideration. Other options 
have attractive points that warrant further analysis. Within option (iv) of a vesting in the Crown, other 
variations, which have found favour in Australia and Canada, also deserve further scrutiny. 
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9 Recommendations
1. The requiring authority system under the RMA leading to a Public Works Act process should be 
made available for CCS pipeline and CCS injection operations for the compulsory acquisition of 
surface rights to land.
2. The definition of “network utility operator” in section 166 of the RMA should include a person 
who undertakes or proposes to undertake a CCS pipeline operation or a CCS injection operation. 
3. In relation to injection operations, eligibility should be confined to persons holding injection 
permits for CCS operations. 
4. A procedure should be introduced for the grant of an overlapping coastal permit for necessary 
infrastructure with a balancing of the interests of the two parties.
5. The new CCS Act should vest in the Crown all rights and powers necessary to explore for CCS 
capacity, to develop CCS capacity, to inject CO2 and other greenhouse gases into the subsurface 
of land, and to sequester them there permanently; along with all necessarily incidental rights 
and powers.
6. The vesting of subsurface CCS rights by the Act should be expressed in a way that makes it clear 
that the land owner has no proprietary right of action against the Crown or its permittee for the 
effect of the Act. Compensation should be payable for actual loss or diminution of value of the 
land, but not otherwise.
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CHAPTER 5  
PERMITS
1 Introduction
At the centre of any law for carbon capture and storage must be a system for the granting of permits 
to engage in activities at the different stages of the CCS process. This Chapter considers the issues in 
establishing a permit system. It builds on the conclusions reached in Chapter 2 that the most suitable 
framework for legislation will be a stand-alone CCS Act. 
In brief, we recommend a system for the granting of a CCS exploration permit and a CCS injection 
permit. An exploration permit will provide rights to search for storage formations and to examine 
their characteristics. An injection permit will allow a company to drill injection wells and inject CO2 
into storage. It is therefore the key element of the legal framework for CCS. Injection permits will 
include measurement, monitoring and verification (MMV) and the post-injection phase which leads 
up to the closure authorisation. Detailed regulation of injection and related activities will occur under 
the site plan that is explained in Chapter 6. The exploration permit and injection permit provide 
the legal right to carry out CCS operations. An injection permit will be granted only if the applicant 
satisfies the regulatory agency as to the permanence of storage and the protection of human health 
and the environment. (We do not consider it necessary for the legislation to have a CCS pipeline 
permit.) Aspects of a project other than injection and storage will be regulated under the Resource 
Management Act 1991, but the RMA procedures and the CCS injection permit procedures will be 
brought together. 
The different CCS regulatory frameworks that have been recommended or enacted in different 
countries generally feature a system of permits. The nomenclature varies; in the IEA Carbon Capture 
and Storage Model Regulatory Framework, the term “authorisation” is used; in Victoria, “permit,” in 
Queensland, “permit” and “lease;” in Europe, “permit.” These frameworks are all useful points of 
reference for the design of the New Zealand permitting and regulatory regime. So too are the World 
Resources Institute CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Capture and Storage. For New Zealand, the 
term “permit” is suitable, because it is familiar from the Resource Management Act 1991 and the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991, and because it avoids confusion with leases in property law. 
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2 Purposes of a Permit System
The purposes that a system of permits fulfils can be identified. 
Regulation.  The issue of a permit is the result of a process that confirms that the necessary regulatory 
requirements have been complied with. The effects of a proposal on private interests and a variety 
of elements of the public interest are therefore considered and safeguarded. The legislation states 
that no person may carry out prescribed CCS activities unless he or she is the holder of a permit that 
authorises those activities. Status as the holder of a permit, however, imposes additional regulatory 
requirements. At the same time, other regulatory requirements apply without reference to permit 
status. The more detailed regulation of CCS is dealt with in Chapter 6 of this report. 
Allocation of public resources.  A formal system for the allocation of rights to CCS recognises the 
value of reservoir formations as a publicly-controlled resource. It makes rights to formations available 
on terms that maximise the benefit to the public, and that are transparent and competitive.
Identification of a commercial asset.  A permit is a public record of the rights of the permit holder, 
and others with interests in the project, such as equity or financial interests. The activities that the 
developer can proceed with are spelled out in legislation and in conditions attached to the permit. 
The right to carry out those activities will generally be exclusive in the permit area. The circumstances 
where the permit can be varied or cancelled are also spelled out. The grant of a permit therefore 
provides predictability that is conducive to investment decisions. 
Ancillary rights and duties.  Legislation can confer on the holder of a permit a variety of ancillary 
rights, such as rights of access to property. Additional duties can also be imposed, such as in relation 
to liability and third party access. In this sense the permits are the “backbone” to which other rights 
and duties are attached. 
3 Principles for a Permit System
It is also possible to identify factors or values that are relevant to the design of a permit system.
Transparency.  It is desirable that the system for the allocation and management of permits be 
transparent. The process, criteria, and relevant considerations should all be stated in the statute, 
subordinate legislation, or subsequent notices. A lack of clarity about such matters is a concern about 
CCS legislation in Alberta.1 It is also desirable that the information needs of CCS proponents and of 
affected stakeholders be considered. 
Flexibility.  The regulatory framework should be performance-based rather than process-based, and 
should include a prescribed process for periodic review and revision.2 Performance-based regulation 
does not prescribe specific methods that must be followed, but states the desired outcome that 
1 N Bankes, The Developing Regime for the Regulation of Carbon Capture and Storage Projects in Canada, Appendix B.
2 M Granger Morgan and S McCoy, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the Legal and Regulatory Barriers (RFF Press, 
New York, 2012) at 81.
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must be achieved. The reason for this is to ensure that regulation remains flexible to technological 
advancement and knowledge of the storage formation. The framework needs to be responsive to 
the uncertainties associated with CCS.3 It needs to be open to changes in technology. Thus, the plans 
and conditions under permits need to be flexible to adapt to situations as they arise. This means that 
there will be greater regulatory oversight of CCS than activities under the RMA or CMA, resulting in 
regulation that is in effect continuous. 
Investment certainty.  The permitting system should provide suitable security of investment; not 
absolute certainty, but proper clarity about rights and duties over an adequate length of time. 
Simplicity.  The permitting system should not be any more complex than necessary. It should not ask 
for information that is not necessary. It should integrate related procedures to minimise duplication 
and overlap. It should be designed in the likelihood that for the foreseeable future CCS permit 
applications will only occur occasionally. 
Phased approvals.  The approval process needs to allow for the different stages of CCS activity; 
firstly, exploration, and secondly, injection. At an early stage of exploration and while searching for 
CCS storage sites, a company is not carrying out the operations such as injection that require close 
scrutiny, and, equally, the company will not be able to provide much details about the site or the 
operations that might be carried out there. (We noted this characteristic in Chapter 3 in relation to 
public participation.) The option of one single kind of permit to encompass both stages is therefore 
attractive for its simplicity, but is unlikely to produce good results. Similarly important to producing 
good results is a reasonable level of assurance of priority of right to the holder of an exploration 
permit that it can obtain an injection permit. 
Protection of existing uses.  A further principle that should guide the development of a permitting process 
is that the grant of CCS rights must be carried out with regard to the interests of any existing uses of the 
subsurface. There should be no undue adverse effect on existing rights such as under the Crown Minerals 
Act. The need for management and co-ordination in this respect is addressed further in Chapter 7. 
4 Exploration Permit
4.1 General
The objective of the exploration phase is to establish the characteristics, extent, feasibility and 
suitability of a storage formation, and to ensure the exploration is conducted in a manner that 
protects the environment and human health.4 The importance of this first phase of the CCS storage 
process cannot be underestimated, because site selection and characterisation are important in 
producing an information base and reducing risk levels. Much work has already been done to assess 
geological formations and their suitability for storing CO2 in New Zealand. However it is at a general 
reconnaissance level and does not carry out the detailed analysis of a particular formation. 
3 N Bankes and J Poschwatta, Australian Legislation on Carbon Capture and Storage: A Canadian Perspective (ISEEE Research 
Paper, June 2008) at 73.
4 See Greenhouse Gas Geological Storage Act (Vic), s 21.
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Exploration can be defined as activities undertaken to locate and assess the suitability of prospective 
storage sites, and will involve technical assessment, geological data collection, and an environmental 
assessment.5 These assessments establish a baseline which forms a point of comparison for the 
information obtained from MMV during and after injection. 
The grant of exploration permits raises questions regarding the relationship of CCS storage formations 
with oil and gas and other subsurface resources, discussed in Chapter 7. One way to avoid difficulties 
between the two types of resources is not to issue CCS exploration permits where they would overlap 
with oil and gas permits, but it is more likely that better management tools will be found in the use of 
permit conditions and the approval of specific operations. Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) raises other 
questions about what can be done under a CCS exploration permit, and is also considered in Chapter 7. 
4.2 Other possible permits
One option is to provide for a prospecting permit for early-stage reconnaissance, before an exploration 
permit. The CMA allows for prospecting permits, but they are not much used. Another option, after an 
exploration permit, is a retention permit. Retention leases or licences are encountered in Australian 
CCS law for the period between finding a storage formation and being able to put it into operation. 
This reflects retention licences in Australian mining legislation which accommodate fluctuations 
in market conditions. In neither case does it appear that there is a strong case for these additional 
permits; prospecting can occur either without any permit, or, if more intensive, under an exploration 
permit. Retention permits will not be necessary if renewals of exploration permits are available on 
reasonable terms. 
4.3 Allocation 
Different options are available for the disposition by the Crown of rights to publicly-controlled 
storage formations in the form of exploration permits. The Crown could allocate rights in a number 
of different ways:
(a) discretionary decision on general criteria;
(b) priority in time of application (“first in first served”);
(c) tender or auction of blocks of land (ie cash bonus bidding);
(d) block offers to be evaluated on the basis of notified criteria (eg quality of the work programme). 
One option is for the legislation to state the method. Victoria, for example, requires the Minister to 
make an invitation to tender, specifying the chief factors to be taken into account but it also states that 
the respective merits of the work programs and the likelihood that they will be carried out are chief 
factors.6 However a statutory rule of tendering may be premature before there is some expectation 
that CCS operations can come forward and until some experience in handling applications for them 
5 International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010) at 57, 63, 66.
6 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 22(2) and 24(2). Australian approaches generally are evaluated by 
the comparative report by R Pritchard in Appendix A. 
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has built up. A better option, therefore, may be to leave the matter open, as does the CMA, and say in 
the statute that the Minister may notify the policies and procedures to be used, and that the Minister 
shall issue permits only in accordance with those policies and procedures. The instrument for this 
purpose under the CMA is the “minerals programme,” a form of delegated legislation. Such notices 
or delegated legislation can embody the results of a review of public interests in particular lands and 
particular strata, including environmental suitability, co-ordination with other subsurface users, and 
the release of acreage and deep rights that are not being pursued. 
4.4 Process for application 
The detailed requirements for making an application can be stated in delegated legislation. An applicant 
should be required to state the area that is sought, to submit information on its technical qualifications 
and financial resources.7 The applicant should submit its proposed work programme, including details 
of the work proposed for site characterisation, the methods to be used, and the expected time-frames. 
A work programme should provide information about other subsurface activities and the intended 
methods of avoiding effects on them. When determining what is required for an application for an 
exploration permit, a balance is needed between protecting the interests of stakeholders and ensuring 
that regulatory complexity will not hinder investment. 
The exploration phase offers a timely opportunity to engage the public through information sharing 
and education on the nature of CCS, and engaging with them about their perceptions of risk. In Chapter 
3 we suggest that one option is to include as part of an application for an exploration permit that the 
applicant submit a Public Participation Proposal outlining the type of engagement that is proposed 
throughout the life of the project. We recommend that, as well as a work programme, an applicant be 
required to submit a proposal that identifies those likely affected by the project and which details the 
community engagement already undertaken, as well as the proposed engagement that will continue for 
the life of the project. This will include the public engagement and involvement that will be undertaken 
in drafting the proposed site plan as part of an application for an injection permit. However we also 
recommend that at the exploration stage there be no public hearing. In Chapter 3 we explained that 
exploration operations are often short-lived, unintrustive, and preliminary in character. 
The participation of Māori is a particular aspect of procedure. While it can be argued that exploration 
is too early for useful participation, the option exists to follow the CMA and the Minerals Programmes 
made under it and require the agency to consult the iwi and hapu in the relevant area before a block 
offer is made or an exploration permit is granted. 
The application should be made to the CCS regulatory agency, with the relevant RMA consents 
(e.g. access across streams, earthworks, taking and using water, and disposal of drilling wastes) 
made to the regional council.
An application for an exploration permit could be made by an applicant solely on its own behalf, or as 
operator for a multi-party joint venture of some kind; or the application could be made by multiple 
parties. The CMA has provisions that deal with those possibilities. 
7 In Victoria, for example, an applicant must supply details of the relevant technical advice available to it: Greenhouse Gas 
Geological Sequestration Act 2008, s 23.
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4.5 Criteria for determining an application
The legislation should state the criteria that are to govern the decision to grant an exploration permit. 
The criteria should include an obligation to give effect to, or take into account, the purpose and 
principles of the Act. It should be necessary to give effect to the policies and procedures that were 
notified to govern the allocation of permits. In Victoria, the chief factors to be taken into account are 
the merits of the work programme, the likelihood that it will be carried out, and the factors notified 
in the tender process.8 
Since exploration is at an early stage, with an emphasis on data collection and analysis and few 
operations on the ground, it is desirable to leave the criteria relatively open. Stricter and more 
protective criteria are better at the injection stage. 
4.6 Rights and obligations
4.6.1 Exclusivity
An exploration permit will give its holder the exclusive right to explore the area specified for potential 
storage sites. 
Options are possible on different aspects:
(a) The legislation can state a maximum size for an exploration permit, but it may be better to leave 
the matter discretionary. 
(b) Permit rights can be limited to a particular stratum, identified by depth or by geological formation.9 
Such stratum limits can help protect the interests of other subsurface resource users. 
(c) Non-exclusive permits are possible but are likely to be complicated to administer and unattractive 
to operators. 
4.6.2 Priority for an injection permit
An exploration permit should confer on its holder the right, for part or all of the land it encompasses, 
to apply for an injection permit in priority to any other applicant. The right to proceed is important 
in providing investment certainty for the explorer company, so that no one else can take advantage 
of its efforts. 
One option is to confer not merely a priority right, but a substantive right to be granted an injection 
permit upon application, subject to compliance with the Act and the terms of the exploration permit. 
Section 32 of the Crown Minerals Act operates this way, as does the minerals legislation of many 
other countries. However the RMA does not operate so as to provide a right to a further permit. 
8 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 24. 
9 The Greenhouse Gas Geological Storage Act (Vic), s29 makes such a provision.
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4.6.3 Site characterisation
An exploration permit gives the holder the right to undertake activities to carry out a site 
characterisation, which is an essential component of an application for an injection permit. The site 
characterisation process is crucial. As the IEA Model Regulatory Framework10 points out, it underpins 
all other activities that follow and in particular the long-term security of the CO2 stored. While site 
characterisation work will be carried out under an exploration permit, its evaluation and approval is 
carried out in the process of deciding on an application for an injection permit. The IEA Model Regulatory 
Framework recommends that site characterisation requirements be stated in terms of performance 
characteristics to be achieved, rather than in requiring that particular techniques or processes be used. 
It also recommends that the details of the required steps and information be stated in regulations 
rather than the primary legislation, so that amendment to keep up with technical innovation and 
understanding of best practice as experience is gained with CCS projects internationally. Both 
recommendations are in accordance with New Zealand practice and expectations. 
According to the IEA, the technical requirements for the site characterisation process include 
data collection, performance assessment, sensitivity analysis, risk assessment, and a definition of 
appropriate modes of operation. The IEA Model Regulatory Framework can be followed on these 
matters.11 The IEA Model Text suggests that legislation state what the process must show (sufficient 
capacity, free of faults, fractures, wells etc. that are likely to lead to unintended migration) and 
also state the characteristics that make a storage site unsuitable (indications of a significant risk of 
unintended migration, leakage, environmental or health risks, or risk to other resources).12
Part of the site characterisation should include a risk assessment covering the matters suggested 
in the WRI Guidelines, which are included in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3: Recommended Guidelines for Risk Assessment
(a) For all storage projects, a risk assessment should be required, along with the development 
and implementation of a risk management and risk communication plan, should be required 
for all storage projects. At a minimum, risk assessments should examine the potential for 
leakage of injected or displaced fluids via wells, faults, fractures and seismic events, and 
the fluids’ potential impacts on the integrity of the confining zone and endangerment to 
human health and the environment.
(b) Risk assessments should address the potential for leakage during operations, as well as 
over the long term.
(c) Risk assessments should help identify priority locations and approaches for enhanced 
MMV activities.
10 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 5, at 70-74. 
11 At 71-74.
12 At 70.
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(d) Risk assessments should provide the basis for mitigation/remediation plans for response 
to unexpected events; such plans should be developed and submitted to the regulator in 
support of the proposed MMV plan. 
(e) Risk assessments should inform operational decisions, including setting an appropriate 
injection pressure that will not compromise the integrity of the confining zone. 
(f) Periodic updates to the risk assessment should be conducted throughout the project 
life cycle based on updated MMV data and revised models and simulations, as well as 
knowledge gained from ongoing research and operation of other storage sites. 
(g) Risk assessments should encompass the potential for leakage of injected or displaced fluids 
via wells, faults, fractures, and seismic events, with a focus on potential impacts on the 
integrity of the confining zone and endangerment to human health and the environment.
(h) Risk assessments should include site-specific information, such as the terrain, potential 
receptors, proximity of USDWs, faults, and the potential for unidentified borehole locations 
within the project footprint.
(i) Risk assessments should include non-spatial elements or non-geologic factors (such as 
population, land use, or critical habitat) that should be considered in evaluating a specific site.
World Resources Institute (2008) Storage Guideline 2.
It should be a condition of an exploration permit that exploration activities are conducted in the 
manner in the work programme. 
4.6.4 Test injection
At an advanced exploration phase, a CCS company may wish to drill a well, or use an existing 
well, to inject a small quantity of CO2 in order to evaluate the storage formation rock and other 
characteristics of the site. It is consistent with comparative legislation that test injections be 
allowed under an exploration permit, although some jurisdictions require approval before any 
substance is injected. This is our preferred approach. A good example is the Victorian legislation, 
which requires the holder of an exploration permit to prepare an injection testing plan that is to be 
approved before any injection occurs.13 The injection testing plan is to include information about 
where and how the testing will be conducted, the type and volume of substance to be injected, how 
any risks to public health or the environment will be prevented, a monitoring and verification plan, 
a risk management plan, and information about potential leakage and the migration path of the 
substance.14 Test injections may be important as a method of determining the characteristics of a 
formation, but need to be closely controlled. 
13 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 37, 39.
14 Section 38.
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4.7 Commonality in CCS exploration and petroleum exploration 
One option relevant here is whether the rights and obligations under a CCS exploration permit 
should include rights to explore for petroleum as well as storage formations. There is substantial 
commonality in the exploration work for the two kinds of target – although there are differences as 
well. Conversely, the holder of a petroleum exploration permit could be given the right to explore for 
CCS storage formations. The matter is complex, but within it one sees a significant policy objective, 
the encouragement of the search for CCS formations. At this exploration stage, differences between 
the two activities are fewer than at the later stage of injection / extraction. The matter is considered 
in more detail in Chapter 7. 
4.8 Term
The legislation should require that the regulator state the term of the exploration permit, subject 
to a maximum possible stated in the legislation.15 The term should be long enough to allow for the 
execution of the work programme that is stated in the application. Extensions may be allowed, with 
clear provisions to say who decides and on what grounds, to continue the work programme. Extensions 
should be available on a reasonably favourable basis where exploration has been successful but where 
injection cannot yet begin, for example where capture and pipeline arrangements are incomplete. 
However, term requirements should generally be guided by the principle of “use it or lose it” to 
prevent CCS rights from being tied up without being put to good use. 
4.9 Cancellation
An exploration permit should be subject to cancellation by the regulator for non-performance. 
Non-performance of different kinds is more amenable to action by cancellation at the exploration 
stage than at the injection stage. The options for both stages are dealt with together below. 
5 Injection Permit
A permit that authorises injection of CO2 to geological storage or sequestration is the key element 
of a legal framework for CCS. The next most important decision point is the decision to authorise the 
closure of a site. An injection permit will authorise activities from the well-drilling and construction 
phase until post-closure and the transfer of liability. 
An application for an injection permit should include information about the applicant and its technical 
and financial capabilities, the proposed site plan (or matters required in the regulations), the proposed 
public engagement, and proof of financial assurance. A board of inquiry should decide the application 
(including applications under the RMA and HSEA). The process should be a formal assessment of the 
entire project and include a public hearing. 
15 The Alberta evaluation permit has a term of five years, Victoria’s exploration permits are also for five years with a renewal of a further 
five years, and the Commonwealth of Australia’s GHG assessment permit is for six years, with a right of renewal for three years. The 
EU Directive says “[t]he duration of a permit shall not exceed the period necessary to carry out the exploration for which it is granted”.
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Just as with an exploration permit, an application for an injection permit will be made to the CCS 
regulatory agency, discussed in Chapter 3, and could be made by a sole applicant or by or for a group 
of co-venturer parties. 
5.1 Eligible applicant 
We envisage two phases in the consideration of applications for injection permits. The first phase 
identifies the eligible or preferred applicant. Provisions similar to those described for exploration 
permits, above, would operate, to say that the Minister may notify the policies and procedures to be 
used, and that the Minister shall issue permits only in accordance with those policies and procedures. 
It is likely however that the preferred applicant will simply be the holder of an exploration permit, 
exercising its priority right to an injection permit, as outlined above. 
5.2 Process for application 
The second phase will involve a detailed examination of the application. Its general purpose is to 
gain assurances over the short, medium and long term on the security and safety of the proposed 
storage operation.16 What character it should have is a significant policy issue in the design of the CCS 
legislation. It is closely connected to the choices that are made about the relationship between the 
CCS legislation and the RMA. In Chapter 2, the main option that emerged was that injection should be 
removed from the RMA, but that other RMA matters should be considered along with injection and 
other related CCS matters, and that the process overall should be no less protective than the RMA. 
If that option is to be adopted, then the process for the examination of an application for an injection 
permit will have some of the character of an RMA application for a resource consent. 
5.2.1 Proposed site plan
An integral part of an application for an injection permit is the applicant’s proposed site plan for 
the project. The site plan and its components provides a full analysis of all technical details of the 
project including site characterisation, environmental assessment, work plan, monitoring, corrective 
measures, and site closure. This material provides the basis for the key regulatory decision to 
approve or refuse a CCS project. The grant of the injection permit requires the approval of the site 
plan. The proposed site plan should be drafted following informal consultation with the community, 
as identified in the Public Participation Proposal which forms part of the exploration permit application. 
The details of the site plan are discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.2.2 Procedural integration:  Applications to be determined by a board of inquiry 
An application for an injection permit (and also an application for a pipeline permit, if one is provided for 
in the legislation, and is applied for) should be processed at the same time and in the same procedure 
as all associated RMA resource consent applications. A board of inquiry should be established with 
the relevant expertise, conducting one hearing for all such matters. 
16 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 5, at 77. 
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It will be necessary for the legislation to state that when an application for an injection permit is 
received, the Minister must appoint a board of inquiry to decide the matter. The legislation should 
state the procedure of the board of inquiry. The legislation should either state or guide the composition 
of the board; it is an opportunity to provide for Māori input and for input from the regional council 
in particular. That would ensure that Māori and regional council expertise and concerns are properly 
considered. There is a range of options available for this purpose; for example, the legislation could 
require representatives to be appointed to the board, or could require the advice of iwi and the regional 
council to be sought and particularly taken into account by the board.
An option is for the board of inquiry also to consider any plans or information required by the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act 1992, such as the safety case and the emergency response plan. The 
advantage of having these requirements approved at the same time is that an integrated assessment 
of design and construction details will be more efficient and more effective. The newness of CCS 
internationally and in New Zealand would suggest those benefits. However this would be a departure 
from existing arrangements for the regulation of health and safety of projects in New Zealand. 
5.3 Criteria for determining an application
The decision to grant an injection permit is central to the entire structure of CCS legislation. In the 
legislation that we propose, the grant of an injection permit authorises the applicant to proceed with 
a CCS project, and injection for geosequestration in particular. There would be other requirements to 
be fulfilled in respect of detail, but the approval of an injection permit entails approval of the site plan, 
site characterisation, and project plan. It entails, in the option that we recommend, the grant of the 
necessary environmental permits. 
Because of this centrality, the provisions stating the criteria for the approval of an application for an 
injection permit require particularly careful consideration. They bring together in legislative form the 
expectations of the community about the proper management of CCS operations. The public will 
expect the decision maker to approve a CCS project only if all relevant criteria are met. An injection 
permit is very different from an exploration permit in ways that affect the criteria that the CCS 
legislation should state. It is of first importance that the legislation give the decision maker clear 
guidance on what to look for and to require before approving a project. 
One option is to give the decision maker a broad, open discretion (“the Minister may grant or refuse to 
grant an application”), and make that discretion subject to a statutory purpose and subject to principles 
or matters to be taken into account, such as proposed in Chapter 3. The purpose, principles and matters 
would guide the decision maker about the questions that the community, through the legislator, regards 
as significant in authorising a CCS project. The decision maker is left with considerable discretion and 
flexibility in giving effect to that guidance, which may suit the exigencies of particular cases. 
The second option, which we prefer, is to retain the guidance provided by a statutory purpose and by 
principles and matters to be taken into account, as proposed in Chapter 3, but also to state a statutory 
test or threshold that must be passed before a CCS injection permit can be granted. A threshold test 
means that the applicant must provide evidence that its project will meet certain standards.17 
17 An open discretion is seen in a decision on a discretionary activity under the RMA, and a threshold in one on a non-complying 
activity: Resource Management Act 1991, ss 104B and 104D. 
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Several examples of a threshold test are seen in CCS laws. One of the clearest is the European Union 
Directive of 2009.18 
A geological formation shall only be selected as a storage site, if under the proposed conditions of 
use there is no significant risk of leakage, and if no significant environmental or health risks exist. 
Before it issues a storage permit, the competent authority of the Member State must be satisfied that 
all requirements of the Directive and other relevant Community law are met, and the above is the 
chief requirement, imposing a clear test that must be met as to leakage, the environment, and health. 
The IEA Model Regulatory Framework is very similar, even though it puts the threshold test into the 
site selection and characterisation activity process.19
3.  To be a suitable storage site, the site characterisation process must indicate that a proposed 
storage site:
(a)  has sufficient storage capacity for the intended quantity of CO2 to be stored;
(b)  has sufficient injectivity for the intended rate of CO2 injection; and
(c)  is free of faults, fractures, wells or other features that are likely to allow unintended migration.
4.  A proposed storage site is not suitable where the site characterisation process indicates that 
it poses significant:
(a)  risk of unintended migration;
(b)  risk of leakage;
(c)  environmental risks;
(d)  health risks; or
(e)  risk to other resources.
A similar pattern is seen in the state of Victoria.20 The Minister has a broad discretion to grant or refuse 
to grant an injection and monitoring licence, but he or she must be satisfied that the underground 
geological storage formation is likely to be geologically suitable for the injection and permanent storage 
of GHGs, and that the GHG is likely to be permanently contained. This addresses the permanence of 
storage that is dealt with as leakage in the two preceding examples. In addition, at the stage of approval 
of the injection and monitoring plan the Minister must not give approval unless he or she is satisfied 
that the formation is suitable for permanent storage, that the project will not present a significant risk 
of contaminating or sterilising other resources within the licence area; that the GHG will be contained; 
and that injection will not present a risk to public health or the environment.
We believe that these examples, especially the EU Directive and the IEA Model, are good precedents 
for New Zealand to follow. 
Other examples are less clear or show other priorities. For example, Alberta is concerned that there be 
no interference with the recovery or conservation of oil or gas or with an existing storage operation.21 
The Australian Commonwealth OPGGSA exhibits the same concern, in respect to a significant risk of 
a significant adverse impact on petroleum exploration or operations.22
18 EU Directive 2009/31/EC on Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Articles 4(4) and 8.
19 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 5, at 70. Although this is part of the site characterisation 
process in the IEA Model, it is separate from the authorisation of activities. 
20 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 83(1), 96.
21 See Bankes, Appendix B. Note however that environmental approvals are given separately. 
22 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), ss 362 and (as to determining the existence of a serious risk) 28.
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In shaping the legal test or threshold, one may note two different aspects.
(i) The substantive matters, that is, the matters that are subject to the test. Those that form the core are:
• Permanence of storage
• Health and safety
• Environment.
 In some jurisdictions, effects on other subsurface resources are the subject of a threshold test. 
The subject is addressed in detail in Chapter 7. The matter may lend itself to a balancing exercise 
rather than a threshold test. 
(ii) The standard of proof to be met, e.g. satisfied that there is no significant risk. A standard can be 
set in a basic way, e.g. that the project is unlikely to present a serious risk. On the other hand, the 
standard can be set high, e.g. satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there will be no identifiable 
risk whatsoever. Setting the standard that high would go well beyond what is found in other 
legislation, and would make it difficult to approve any project at all. We believe that a suitable 
standard is that the regulatory agency should be satisfied, and that the risks that it should 
concern itself with are significant risks. However other ways of expressing the standard could be 
acceptable and workable. 
While this threshold test is at the heart of the criteria to be applied to the decision to grant an injection 
permit, it would not be the only matter legally relevant to the decision. In particular, the decision 
would also be affected by:
• A statement of the purpose of the Act, as discussed in Chapter 3;
• General principles stated for the administration of the Act;
• Matters stated to be recognised and provided for, to be taken into account, or to which particular 
regard is to be had in the administration of the Act, and in particular those identified in Chapter 3; 
• Criteria concerning particular issues (e.g. effects on other subsurface resources) that are stated 
elsewhere as imposing a threshold test or consideration.
• Requirements for an injection permit that are less central than those noted above. For example, 
the financial and technical capability of the applicant, access to a stream of CO2 or GHGs,
23 
likelihood that storage operations will begin within five years of the grant,24 provision of financial 
assurance.25
• Compliance with formal requirements. For example, payment of fees, supply of information. 
23 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), ss 117 and 118; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 83(1). 
The requirement for commercial viability may need a generous interpretation until the price on GHGs is high enough to obviate 
government support. 
24 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld).
25 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 5, at 76.
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We therefore recommend that the CCS Act provide that a board of inquiry shall not approve an 
application for an injection permit unless it is satisfied that the CCS project applied for will not present 
significant risk of leakage from permanent storage, significant risk to health and safety, or significant 
risk to the environment. 
5.4 Rights and obligations 
An injection permit authorises the permitee to develop the storage site, to inject CO2 for storage, 
to leave the CO2 in storage permanently, and to undertake activities incidental thereto. It includes 
rights to carry out exploration activities. It includes activities such as building and operating local 
pipelines for the distribution of CO2 to wellheads in the injection site. The permit holder has ancillary 
rights such as rights to use Crown-controlled storage capacity, and rights to use or take private land 
(Chapter 4). The permittee accepts various obligations such as performance of the measurement, 
monitoring and verification (MMV) programme. 
5.4.1 Site plan 
The permit holder shall ensure that an approved site plan is in place, and is to undertake its operations 
in compliance with the site plan. Details of the technical operations of the project should be in the 
site plan, not the permit. The site plan can be varied through a process that is less comprehensive 
procedurally than the variation of a permit. Site plans are more fully considered in Chapter 6. 
5.4.2 Conditions 
Other rights and obligations can be stated as conditions on a permit. The CCS Act should contain 
a provision (similar to section 108 of the RMA) stating what conditions may and may not be imposed. 
Conditions of the permit should include the location and boundaries of the storage site, including the 
storage complex (the primary and secondary containment systems), having regard to the movement 
of the CO2 plume and the associated pressure front. Conditions should state the total quantities of 
CO2 to be stored, maximum annual and daily quantities to be injected, operating pressures, and the 
allowable operating limits for other components in the CO2 stream.
The decision maker should be authorised to impose conditions on review and updating the site plan 
and on any of its contents in order to provide site-specific regulation. 
Conditions for financial assurance are dealt with below. 
The permit should not state conditions relating to operational matters, methods of operation in 
particular. This is important to provide flexibility. Such matters should be addressed in the site plan, 
which can be varied and updated without affecting the permit itself.
Obligations will exist under other legislation, notably the Climate Change Response Act 2002, 
which will impose requirements for reporting and for the surrender of credits if leakage from 
storage should occur. 
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5.5 Term
There should be no maximum term stated in the legislation for an injection permit, or in the permit 
itself. The ordinary course of events should be that an injection permit stays in force until site closure 
is approved. Site closure is discussed below. Surrender or cancellation should be possible only in 
limited circumstances, also discussed below. From the point of view of the public interest, what is 
important is that the injection project be carried out properly, and that the site be closed properly, 
with no risk to the public or to the environment, at the expense of the operator. 
6 Pipeline Permit
It is possible in the CCS Act to declare that a company must apply for a pipeline permit in order to 
build and operate a CCS transmission pipeline. The Act would make it clear that the permit holder has 
authority for the pipeline, and has the ancillary powers necessary, in particular the right to enter on 
or to take land, or to use the marine and coastal area. The pipeline permit and the injection permit 
need not be held by the same company. One option therefore is that the legislation provide for a 
pipeline permit. An application for a pipeline permit could be made and considered alongside an 
application for an injection permit. The legislation could attach obligations such as third party access 
to the permit. (However, pipelines that are part of injection operations at a storage facility would be 
authorised by the injection permit.)
The alternative is for the CCS Act not to require pipeline permits, and to rely instead on existing 
legislation and procedures, especially the procedures that the operator can follow as a requiring 
authority under the RMA (see Chapter 4). Pipelines for other purposes are regulated under the RMA 
and the HSEA without the need for permitting arrangements and we see no reason why CO2 pipelines 
should be any different (see Chapter 8). The IEA Model Regulatory Framework observes that the 
main issue in reform in respect of pipelines is to analyse the application of existing regulations to 
CO2, so that modifications of existing laws is more likely than the introduction of a large tranche of 
specific new measures.26 This is the pattern that in Chapter 8 we consider suitable for New Zealand. 
Obligations concerning third party access can be imposed generally on any person who operates 
a CCS pipeline, without reference to holding a permit. Environmental and safety concerns can be 
dealt with in the course of the RMA procedures for a requiring authority to obtain a designation. 
Other health and safety requirements would be imposed directly under the HSEA without reference 
to holding a permit. The pipeline company need not be the company that is carrying out injection 
operations. On the whole we do not consider that it is necessary to institute a CCS pipeline permit. 
26 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 5, at 51-53. 
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7 Site Closure 
7.1 General
The most important decision under CCS legislation, after the grant of an injection permit, is the 
approval of the closure of an injection site. It is peculiar to CCS; ordinarily there is little public interest 
in a regulated activity once it comes to an end, but in the case of CCS the closure procedures are 
important to ensure that the project has been safely concluded, that the operator can be discharged 
from its obligations, and that long-term stewardship, monitoring duties and any residual liability can 
be assumed by the public. Closure is closely tied to liability (discussed in Chapter 10) and indeed the 
main point of the final closure authorisation is the transfer of obligations and liability to the public, 
rather than the actual cessation of operations, which may have happened years earlier. 
Closure procedures may be triggered in different circumstances:
(i) The conclusion of injection as planned;
(ii) Agreement between the permit holder and the regulator to close early;
(iii) Decision of the regulator, on default, or in the event of leakage, significant irregularity, or risk of 
significant irregularity. 
The third situation is dealt with under the heading of Cancellation of a Permit, below. It exposes the 
regulatory agency to the burden of completing closure, remediation, corrective measures and monitoring. 
7.2 Procedure for site closure
7.2.1 Notification of closure and start of closure period
The first step in site closure, if one follows most of the CCS models internationally, is that the permit 
holder notifies the agency that injection operations have come to an end. This could be at the end of the 
planned programme of injection, or it could be earlier at the request of the permit holder. This will also 
be a requirement under health and safety regulations. The closure period, as the IEA Model Regulatory 
Framework terms it, therefore begins with the notification of the end of injection operations, and ends 
when the closure authorisation is granted. During the closure period, the permit holder proceeds in 
accordance with the closure plan to decommission the site, to remove equipment, and to carry out full 
plugging and abandonment operations on all wells. It continues with monitoring and the reporting of 
results. It carries out any remediation or corrective measures that are required. It may be obliged to 
provide a financial contribution to the anticipated costs for the post-closure period.
Some jurisdictions require that the closure period have a minimum length, in order to provide time 
to show that the injected CO2 is permanently contained and is behaving as predicted. One view is that to 
shift liability when a set number of years have passed is too simple and would undermine the importance 
of ensuring that all operational tasks are fully completed.27 There is no technical or safety reason why 
27 R Campbell “Long-term Liability for Offshore Geosequestration” [2006] AMPLA Yearbook 515, at 521.
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a minimum period is needed; the greatest level of risk is during injection, and following closure the risk 
of future leakage is “as good as ruled out”.28 Such a minimum time may provide increased confidence, 
even if there is no technically obvious reason for it. The IEA Model indicates such a minimum period 
as an option, without recommending it.29 The EU Directive seems to take a hybrid approach and 
requires a minimum of 20 years unless all evidence indicates the CO2 is completely and permanently 
contained.30 An analysis of the application of the EU Directive raises some important questions that 
will need to be considered to provide certainty to a CCS operator, and which can be applied to any 
regulatory regime for transferring liability. Jonker asks what evidence must there be for liability to 
be transferred, and who will assess the evidence? What happens if the CCS operator and the entity 
to which liability is transferred do not agree?31 We do not attempt to answer the first question as it 
relates to scientific matters. However, where an operator and a regulatory agency do not agree the 
onus should be on the operator to show that the conditions for site closure authorisation are met. 
An option is third party verification. In comparison to the EU approach, the Australian OPGGSA 
provides for a site closure certificate to be issued on the cessation of operations but then requires a 
closure assurance period of at least 15 years after the site closure certificate is granted.32 We do not 
make a recommendation for a minimum duration for the closure period between the end of injection 
and the issue of a closure authorisation. The emphasis should be on the technical quality of the 
analysis of an application for a closure authorisation. But we accept that requiring a minimum period 
may provide a greater sense of reassurance to the public. 
7.2.2 Application for a closure authorisation
Closure authorisation is the termination of the injection permit, and the final sign-off for the permit 
holder company. The company provides the agency with the material that it requires in order to 
consider the criteria for a closure authorisation. It provides information about the operation and 
state of the storage site generally, decommissioning, well plugging and abandonment, and any 
other information required by regulations. It provides updated information about the storage itself, 
in a post-closure plan that includes evidence of CO2 plume stabilisation, forward modelling of CO2 
plume development, risk assessment, and a long-term monitoring plan, including costs to cover the 
monitoring requirements in the plan.33 
One issue is how long monitoring should continue for. For example, the EU Directive says that 
once responsibility has been transferred monitoring may be reduced to a level which allows for 
detection of leakages or irregularities and if any are detected monitoring shall be intensified as 
required.34 But what is this level? The Directive is silent as to what this should be, although it does 
say that the financial contribution for monitoring costs must cover at least 30 years. Considering 
28 T Jonker Permitting Process: Special Report on Getting a CCS Project Permitted (Maasvlakte CCS Project C.V., January 2013) at 56.
29 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 5, at 96. 
30 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Article 18. The IEA Model Regulatory 
Framework builds on the Directive in many respects. The Guidance Documents which accompany the Directive provide further 
detail on obligations and procedures. 
31 See Jonker, above n 28, at 57.
32 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 399.
33 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 5, at 95 and 99. Also see Greenhouse Gas Geological 
Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 170; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s 177.
34 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Article 18.
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the costs involved with on-going monitoring there should be a point at which, say, after 30 years 
of no leakage or unexpected migration, the competent authority is no longer required to undertake 
monitoring activities. 
Public participation in consideration of an application for a closure authorisation has some merit, even 
if only in a limited form such as public notice and an opportunity to comment or make submissions. 
More elaborate procedures such as a board of inquiry are possible, although do not seem necessary. 
Some public participation would be fitting in light of the significance of the closure process and could 
be as simple as involving the public in tree planting for site rehabilitation. 
7.2.3 Alternative procedures for closure 
The above approach, which we recommend, follows the IEA Model Regulatory Framework in providing 
for closure through a closure authorisation. An alternative is found in the OPGGSA of Australia, which 
uses an elaborate scheme requiring application for site closure within 30-90 days after cessation 
of injection, followed by issuance of a pre-certificate notice by the Minister, and then a site closing 
certificate once all conditions are met. The legislation requires the Minister’s decision to be made 
within 5 years. 
Another option (used in the Victorian legislation) is that site closure occurs where after injection 
ceases and closure responsibilities have been undertaken the permit is simply surrendered. 
The framework requires that on completion of injection activities all infrastructure is to be removed 
and the site rehabilitated, and the right to inject a substance is to be surrendered. It must be noted 
this is not a surrender of the permit yet, just the right to inject. The Minister must be notified and 
will amend the permit to remove the right to inject. It is not until the injected substance is behaving 
as expected and will continue to behave in a predictable manner and all risks are reduced to as low 
as practicable (and storage will not present a risk to public health or the environment) that the 
permit may be surrendered (additional criteria must also be met, such as details on the site and 
substance, assessments of potential leakage, and a risk management plan). The decision to consent 
to the surrender of an authority does not wholly rest with the Minister; binding recommendations 
can be made by the Ministers administering the Environment Protection Act 1970 and the Water Act 
1989 or recommendation may be sought from an independent panel or relevant public authority.35 
The approach is results-driven, rather than the legislation imposing a minimum time until the permit 
may be surrendered. One point to note, however, is that long-term liability is not addressed in the 
Victorian legislation. Although a long-term monitoring and verification plan must be submitted as 
part of the application to surrender a licence and costs to undertake the plan must be paid. However, 
there is no minimum time stated that monitoring shall continue for. Interestingly, the OPGGSA also 
does not have a specified time for monitoring, which contrasts with the EU CCS Directive that seems 
to envisage monitoring to continue for a period of at least 30 years.36 
Whichever procedure is adopted the substantive requirements remain the same; these requirements 
are stated below as the criteria for a site closure authorisation.
35 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 171, 172.
36 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide does not require monitoring for a period of at least 30 years 
but requires the financial contribution to cover post-transfer obligations to cover at least the anticipated cost of monitoring for 
a period of 30 years; Article 20.
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7.3 Criteria for a site closure authorisation
We consider that before it grants a closure authorisation the regulatory agency must be satisfied of 
the following matters: 
• There is no significant risk of future leakage or irregularity in the storage site; 
• The site has been decommissioned as required by the site closure plan and by the regulatory agency; 
• The CO2 is conforming with the behaviour anticipated in modelling, and the site is evolving to 
long-term stability;
• A long-term monitoring plan has been provided;
• Financial obligations have been fulfilled, eg that the costs of long-term monitoring have been 
paid for;37
• Overall, the operations must have resulted in safe and permanent storage of CO2.
7.4 Effect of a closure authorisation
The grant of the closure authorisation brings an injection permit and obligations under it to an 
end. It also effects the transfer of liability to the Crown, not only civil liability for loss or damage 
experienced by a third party, but also climate liability or carbon liability, in the event that a leakage 
should occur. These matters are dealt with in Chapters 10 and 11. 
8 General Permit Provisions
The effective functioning of a permitting system requires a number of ancillary provisions. These 
provisions are required for both exploration permits and injection permits, although sometimes in 
different form. The CMA and RMA often provide examples for CCS legislation. 
8.1 Notifiable events 
The legislation should state matters that the permit holder must notify to the responsible agency. 
Events that should be notified are the commencement of injection, significant changes to the rate of 
injection, and temporary and final cessation of injection. These events are also likely required to be 
notified to the Secretary of Labour under the HSEA. The agency is also to be notified of any significant 
irregularity in the storage site, including leakage and unexpected migration of fluid.38 In regards to 
notification requirements under an exploration permit, the permit holder should be required to report 
any success in identifying a viable CCS storage complex. What is required can be prescribed by regulation.
37 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 5, at 95.
38 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework above n 6 at 79; Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage 
of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Art 16. 
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8.2 Reporting 
Periodic reporting obligations will be required. The EU CCS Directive, for example, requires reporting by 
the operator at least once a year.39 Details of the quantities of CO2 injected, including the composition 
of the stream, the results of monitoring, proof of financial security, and other information necessary 
for ensuring compliance with the permit should be reported.40 The agency should have the power to 
provide copies of the report to other regulatory agencies, such as the Health and Safety Regulator or 
a regional council, and to the public.41 The operator will also be obliged to report to the Environmental 
Protection Authority in respect of removals and emissions for the New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Scheme, as discussed in Chapter 11.
8.3 Inspection
It is necessary that the regulator is given power to inspect exploration activities and storage sites 
to verify that storage projects are performing as intended, that the operator is complying with 
all statutory requirements, and to investigate any complaints. Even though the HSEA includes 
inspections its scope is limited to health and safety matters. The RMA provides that enforcement 
officers may make inspections to ensure compliance with that Act, and the CMA is similarly limited. 
Thus, provision should be made under the CCS Act to allow inspection of exploration and storage 
sites to ensure compliance with the CCS Act. 
The IEA says the objectives of inspection are to verify records, review monitoring results, examine 
surface facilities, and review any routine or unplanned shut-downs. It also says:42
[G]ood practice would suggest combinations of the following:
• At least annual reporting of operational activities and review by the relevant authority.  
This should be enforced via the storage authorisation process.
• At least annual or biannual routine inspections of operations.
• At least annual third-party verification, with oversight from the relevant authority.
• Non-routine inspections, in order to investigate any reports of leakage, unintended migration 
or other significant irregularity, complaints or other situations as necessary.
Inspections should continue through the closure period, although the frequency of inspections 
may be modified during this phase according to site-specific considerations and the level of 
confidence in storage site performance achieved by the relevant authority.
Clearly, the inspections during the closure period will be for the monitoring obligations, rather than 
the injection facilities, which would have been decommissioned. 
The findings from inspections should be reported to the operator, regional council, and the health and 
safety regulator, and a copy should be available on the CCS Information Database, as explained below 
in this Chapter at 8.10.43
39 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Art 14. 
40 These are the requirements as stated in Article 14.
41 The Crown Minerals Act 1991, ss 90 and 90E-90G are examples. 
42 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework, at 81.
43 See Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Article 15; International Energy 
Agency, Model Regulatory Framework at 80, 81.
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8.4 Variation 
The CCS law should provide for a permit to be varied in certain circumstances. Different situations 
could make a variation desirable. For example, the area covered by a permit and the strata identified 
(if any) should be changed if improvements in geological knowledge give a different picture of the 
storage formation, including the associated seal rocks, the likely plume of CO2 and the likely pressure 
front. Exploration permits will tend to last for shorter periods and are less likely to need variations, but 
the possible long terms of injection permits make a variation procedure necessary. Where a variation 
may result in a substantially changed permit or in different effects on other parties, the agency should 
require a procedure that resembles that for the initial application for a permit. Provisions should 
provide procedural fairness for the permit holder and for other affected parties, especially where 
cancellation is one of the possible outcomes. 
8.4.1 Variation on application by the permit holder 
It should be possible for a permit holder to apply for a change of the permit. Precedents are found in 
the RMA and the Crown Minerals Act.44 If the variation could substantially change the permit or the 
effect of operations on third parties, the agency should require a procedure that resembles that for 
the initial application for a permit. Otherwise a less elaborate process is likely to be sufficient. 
8.4.2 Variation initiated by the agency
It should also be possible for the agency to initiate a process for a variation of a permit, even though 
the permit holder does not seek it, if it is desirable to do so in order to safeguard some aspect of the 
public interest. Just as with the power to make directions, the power to require variations should be 
carefully circumscribed. 
The agency should be able to initiate a variation where it is desirable for the efficient administration of 
the Act, such as for adjustments of permit boundaries and the like and where there is new information 
about the storage site. 
8.5 Cancellation 
It is necessary that the regulator has power to cancel a permit, although cancellation should be 
seen as the last resort. It should be possible to close an operator down and cancel its permit for 
non-compliance with the CCS Act. It may also be necessary for the regulator to cancel a permit where 
new information shows that a geological formation is not suitable for CCS storage. Another case 
again is the failure of the permit holder to proceed with the project. (There are precedents for this 
under the RMA and CMA.) However the conditions for exercising the power of cancellation must 
be carefully specified, in order to maintain confidence of security of tenure for the permit holder.45 
There should also be careful consideration of the effects of a cancellation on an upstream party, 
such as a company that is producing CO2 and relying on access to the injection facility without having 
alternative facilities available. 
44 Resource Management Act 1991, s 127 (as to conditions only); Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 36. 
45 A good example of a cancellation provision is the Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 175. 
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Cancellation should not be looked to as an ordinary means of addressing non-compliance with the 
requirements of a permit. It will be an unattractive option for a regulator during the injection phase, 
when there is a significant public interest in ensuring that the permit holder proceeds with injection 
and closure operations without interruption. In most cases it will be more important to keep the 
permit holder in place and performing its operations properly, and other enforcement methods 
will be preferred. Directions made by the Minister or responsible authority and financial penalties 
will often provide better options for enforcement. Variation to the permit may be another better 
alternative than cancellation. But cancellation is a backstop where necessary, and the taking of 
adequate financial assurance allows the regulator to put it in play without immediately exposing the 
Crown to the financial burden of taking the project over. 
What is important is ensuring that closure obligations are fulfilled, and, where the agency carries 
out the work to fulfil those obligations itself, the cost will be recovered from the operator. It is also 
important to ensure that where required the monitoring obligations will continue.
8.6 Financial assurance 
Financial assurance is required to make sure that if an operator is unable or unwilling to carry out 
its obligations the expense does not fall on the public, especially in relation to corrective measures, 
proper closure of an injection project, rehabilitation, and ETS obligations. Financial assurance is 
similarly required of operators of many kinds of project under the RMA in accordance with good 
regulatory practice. Financial assurance is also important with respect to enforcement, the cost of 
remedial action, and liability. Without sound financial assurance, the regulator may struggle to obtain 
compliance from a company, especially a small one that has the choice of abandoning a project or 
going into liquidation.46 
For financial assurance in CCS law, the two main issues are the form of assurance, and the amount. 
Examples can be found in the EU CCS Directive47 and the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 of 
Queensland.48 The Victorian legislation is somewhat different and requires an authority holder to 
obtain insurance to cover expenses or liabilities in relation to the operation of an authority,49 a bond 
to be paid for rehabilitation work, and as a condition of an injection and monitoring licence annual 
instalments are to be paid of an estimated cost for long-term monitoring and verification.50 Further, 
royalties are to be paid in respect of the volume of greenhouse gas substance injected.51 The South 
Australian approach is different again and states that it is a mandatory condition of every licence that 
the licensee has adequate technical and financial resources to ensure compliance with environmental 
obligations.52 This is similar to our own Crown Minerals Act which requires an applicant to include 
a statement of its financial resources as part of the application process for a mining permit.53 The 
46 For a thorough analysis, see European Commission, Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of 
Carbon Dioxide Guidance Document 4 Article 19 Financial Security and Article 20 Financial Mechanism (2011).
47 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Article 19.
48 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s 270.
49 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 218.
50 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 112.
51 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 224. 
52 Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000, s 75.
53 Crown Minerals (Petroleum) Regulations 2007, reg 19.
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CMA also makes provision for the administration of bonds and deposits made in relation to mining 
under other Acts,54 although no bond or financial security is required under the CMA. Under the RMA, 
a bond may be required in order to ensure that conditions of a resource consent are complied with, 
as mentioned above. 
An ancillary issue is whether there should be ministerial discretion to require additional security or 
assurance. Another is whether the assurance is for the life of the operation, or only for the operation 
period. It is appropriate that the regulator require bonds and guarantees to be provided according to 
the characteristics and circumstances of each project.55
The European Commission’s Guidance Document on the implementation of the CCS Directive provides 
a useful overview and discussion of options for financial security.56 Options identified include setting 
aside funds, such as deposits, an irrevocable trust fund, or escrows. Other mechanisms include bank 
guarantees, letters of credit, bonds, or insurance. The Guidance Document is a useful resource for 
assessing the different options in respect of criteria such as certainty, liquidity, duration, flexibility, cost, 
and administrative complexity.57 Mechanisms that involve setting funds aside have a high cost and 
administrative burden compared with guarantees, letters of credit and bonds. Some instruments such 
as trust funds or industry-wide solutions are attractive in large jurisdictions such as in North America or 
Europe, but are likely to be unduly complex in New Zealand where for a long period there might only be 
one or two CCS operators. 
We recommend that there be sufficient power granted by the CCS Act to require financial assurance 
of a character and size that will protect the interests of the public and the capability of the regulatory 
agency in respect of enforcement. 
8.7 Enforcement
In order to manage a permit system the regulating agency requires a suite of enforcement measures to 
deal with different situations and different kinds of non-compliance. Inspections and directions have 
been dealt with elsewhere. Search and seizure and prosecution for interference and injecting without 
permission must also be provided for. Education, communication, and liaison will often be the most 
effective means of improving performance, but prosecution is a necessary option for the most serious 
cases of non-compliance. Enforcement measures under the RMA include enforcement orders and 
abatement notices; the equivalent here is directions and withdrawal of approval of the site plan. In 
the case of CCS, the threat of cancellation will not always be a desirable or an effective enforcement 
tool; at some point a recalcitrant operator may be willing to disregard enforcement efforts, forfeit 
the permit and leave the project. Financial assurance is therefore vital to make sure that the regulator 
can obtain proper performance from such an operator without performance immediately becoming a 
burden on the taxpayer. Cancellation was discussed above at 8.5. 
54 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 109.
55 See ResourcesLaw International, Appendix A. 
56 European Commission Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, Guidance 
Document 4, Article 19 Financial Security, and Article 20 Financial Mechanism.
57 At 26.
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8.8 Transfer
The legislation should provide that a permit, and the rights and obligations contained therein, may be 
transferred from one party to another, but that no permit, no interest in a permit, and no change in 
control of a company holding a permit shall occur or be effective without the consent of the agency. 
The main policy reason is that the particular company holding the permit has been chosen carefully 
with regard to its ability to carry out the injection and site closure successfully, without imposing risk 
or liability on the public. The model of sections 41-41D of the CMA is a suitable one. 
8.9 Nature of the Rights
It is desirable to include a provision that a CCS permit is neither real nor personal property, in the 
same manner as in the RMA section 122 and the CMA section 92. The provision should carry on to 
state, as in those Acts, how the permit may be dealt with as to personal property security, company 
liquidation, etc. The provision will limit the suggestion (which has arisen in some countries) that the 
permit confers a right to pollute. 
Some care should be taken to ensure that the rights and duties that are granted under the legislation 
and held under a permit are not merely those initially granted but as modified from time to time 
by any direction, variation, or alteration of the site plan. It is important to make it clear that the 
package or bundle of rights of a permit holder are inherently subject to change within the statutory 
framework. A permit holder should not be able to argue that its initial rights have some kind of 
preference over subsequent alterations, or that the exercise of powers to issue directions or to vary 
a permit are intrusions on its vested rights. Rather, it should be clear from the outset that CCS rights 
are adaptable. A long-term CCS project is sure to see significant changes in circumstances over time, 
and the legislative framework is designed so that the permit holder’s rights and duties will change 
in consequence where the regulator agency requires it. Clarity about change over time, and clarity 
in the relationship between the different parts of the regulatory fabric, will help avoid claims of 
expropriation or absence of fair and equitable treatment in dealing with investment. 
8.10 Register 
Register of permits.  A register should be maintained of the different CCS permits that have been 
granted (along with any closed storage sites), including maps, and any dealings. The register should 
also contain a summary site plan, and the reports that are required to be submitted as part of the 
reporting requirements mentioned in section 8.2 above. This information should be publicly available 
to ensure transparency and increase public confidence.
One additional option is that the existence of a storage operation should be drawn to the 
attention of persons dealing with lands in which they lie, by notation on certificates of title in 
the Land Transfer Act register, and/or in property information memorandums or land information 
memorandums. That may be thought unnecessary, however, where there is no likelihood of any 
effect on the surface. A more obviously desirable option is for such notations to be made only 
where CCS operations have surface facilities or require access for long-term monitoring.
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Public access to information.  Geological, geophysical and other technical information provided 
by permit holders should become publicly available, in a controlled manner, in order to contribute 
to a public information base about storage complexes. This is common in petroleum and mining 
legislation: See CMA sections 90-90D. It ensures additions to the shared basis of information about 
relevant subsurface resources. However, the collection of such information by seismic and drilling 
operations is expensive, and the data is often valuable commercially, especially in competitive 
situations. Data can help ascertain the value of land outside a permit boundary, and data obtained 
in the course of CCS exploration can be valuable for petroleum and other subsurface purposes. 
Rules for public disclosure must therefore be fair to the company collecting the data. Under the 
CMA, the general rule is that such information remains confidential for 5 years from the date that 
it was obtained, or upon the expiry of the permit and any subsequent permit if that is earlier.58 
In Alberta, this area of CCS law has been identified as one where improvement is needed.59
Thus, we recommend that the CCS Act establishes a register to contain the above information and to 
act as a portal to information for the public.
8.11  Dispute resolution and appeal
Regulatory decisions concerning permits should not generally be subject to a dispute resolution 
mechanism or right of appeal, but should be final. For the most part, they deal with administrative 
or executive matters that are properly the province of a government agency, and they should not be 
subject to renegotiation. They do not ordinarily lend themselves to judicial determination. Under the 
Crown Minerals Act, dispute resolution procedures and appeals only appear in specific situations. 
The same goes for mineral legislation and CCS legislation in other countries. One bears in mind, 
of course, that a decision that is taken unlawfully, unfairly, or unreasonably, in the sense of 
administrative law can be challenged in judicial review proceedings. 
However there are two situations where there are reasons for appeals or dispute resolution. The first is 
to maintain parity with the RMA in relation to the grant of an injection permit. Our recommendation 
for injection permits is that an application will be decided by a board of inquiry that is similar to a board 
of inquiry under the RMA call-in procedures, and which would also decide related RMA applications 
such as in respect of surface activities. The RMA provides an appeal from such a board of inquiry to 
the High Court on a question of law.60 If the scrutiny of an application for an injection permit under 
the CCS legislation is to be similar to the RMA, then there should be a similar appeal from the board 
of inquiry. Such an appeal seems to be suitable in any event as a procedural safeguard and a form of 
access to justice as public participation. It is not common in CCS legislation overseas, but in some of 
that legislation environmental scrutiny occurs separately. 
The second rationale for an appeal or dispute resolution system is the inevitable special closeness of 
the long-term relationship between a CCS operator and its regulatory agency, and the need to assure 
the operator that key decisions by the regulator that affect its existing investment can be scrutinised. 
If a decision by the agency could jeopardise a sunk investment of the permit holder, there is a case 
58 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 90(6). Different rules apply to certain prospecting permits: ss 90, 90C, 90D. 
59 N Bankes, Appendix B.
60 Resource Management Act 1991, s 149V. 
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for providing further consideration of what would otherwise be an entirely unilateral action. Relevant 
decisions would be those in the administration of an existing permit where the permit holder has 
made a significant investment; decisions to cancel a permit, to vary a permit, to vary a site plan, to 
make a direction, or to require more or different financial assurance. (Not included would be decisions 
about the initial grant of a permit and site plan; after all, the applicant can decline to accept the 
terms offered.) For these decisions, there could either be an appeal or some form of compulsory 
dispute resolution. Cancellation of a permit may be particularly suitable for an appeal on point of 
law.61 Without specifying detail, we recommend that there be limited appeal or dispute resolution 
rights in respect of key decisions in the administration of injection permits where the permit holder is 
likely to have made a significant investment.
These recommendations are consistent with CCS legislation elsewhere. In Victoria and the EU Directive, 
neither appeals nor relevant dispute resolution procedures are to be seen. They do not appear in the 
IEA Model Framework either, although that document tends not to concentrate on the more legal and 
jurisdiction-specific matters of this kind. In Queensland the CCS law provides for appeals to the Land 
Court by a person whose interests are affected by a decision listed in Schedule 1.62 That Schedule lists 
variations, modifications, and cancellations of the kind discussed above, so it is a useful precedent. 
In Alberta, decisions of the Alberta Energy Regulator are subject to a regulatory appeal and appeal to the 
Court of Appeal (with leave of the Court) on a question of jurisdiction or law. 
9 Recommendations 
1. We recommend a system for the granting of a CCS exploration permit and then a CCS injection 
permit. (We do not consider it necessary to have a CCS pipeline permit.) The permit system 
will facilitate the regulation of different aspects of the public interest, the allocation of public 
resources, the identification of a commercial interest, and various ancillary rights and duties. 
Exploration Permit
2. An exploration permit gives the holder the exclusive right to explore a specified area for 
storage formations for a limited time and to undertake the work necessary to complete a site 
characterisation, which is necessary for an application for an injection permit. Test injections may 
be carried out with approval. The exploration permit gives a priority right to an injection permit. 
3. An application for an exploration permit will include details about the technical qualifications 
and financial resources of the applicant, and its proposed work plan. It will include a public 
participation proposal detailing the level of public engagement proposed for the life of the 
project, including consultation with Māori. There will be no formal hearing. The Act will state the 
criteria for determining an application. 
61 Such an appeal is provided by the Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 39(5). Before the 2013 amendment it was a general right of 
appeal. Other examples exist in the CMA; a Minister’s proposal to change a work programme for a subsequent permit to which 
an applicant has a right is subject to arbitration (ss 44 and 99); and a Minister’s proposal to change a petroleum mining permit 
to maximize economic recovery is subject to determination by an independent expert: s 37 and 38. 
62 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), ss 395 et seq, Schedule 1. 
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Injection Permit
4. An injection permit will allow a company to drill injection wells, to inject CO2 for permanent 
storage, and to undertake activities incidental thereto. The holder of an exploration permit will 
have priority to apply. An application will provide a full analysis of the project in a site plan. 
5. An application for an injection permit will be considered by a board of inquiry modelled on RMA 
procedures, with a hearing that allows for public participation, including representation or other 
means of involving Māori and the regional council. The procedure will bring related RMA and EEZ Act 
resource consent applications together with the injection permit application to be heard together. 
6. A board of inquiry shall not approve an application for an injection permit unless it is satisfied that 
the CCS project applied for will not present significant risk of leakage from permanent storage, 
significant risk to health and safety, or significant risk to the environment. Approval of a permit 
will be subject to conditions, will include approval of the site plan, and will require measurement, 
monitoring and verification. 
7. The detailed regulation of CCS activities will be governed by an approved site plan, rather than 
by permit conditions. The site plan will include site characterisation, environmental impact 
assessment, work programme, monitoring plan, corrective measures plan, and site closure plan. 
The site plan will be approved by the board of inquiry initially but the permit holder can vary it 
subsequently with approval by the regulatory agency. The site plan will be subject to review. 
Approval may be withdrawn and reinstated on terms stated in the Act. An approved site plan 
must be in place in order to carry out injection activities.
8. The regulatory agency will have the power to make a direction to the permit holder where 
significant leakage, unexpected migration or other irregularity occurs, in order to protect the 
environment, human health, other resources, or third-party assets.
9. An injection permit will not be issued for any specific term, and will remain in effect until a closure 
authorisation is given, or (in limited circumstances) the permit is surrendered or cancelled. 
Site Closure
10. The regulatory agency shall not grant a closure authorisation unless it is satisfied that there 
is no significant risk of future leakage or irregularity in the storage site, that the site has been 
decommissioned as required by the site closure plan and by the regulatory agency, that the CO2 
is conforming with the behaviour anticipated in modelling, that the site is evolving to long-term 
stability, that a long-term monitoring plan has been provided, that financial obligations have 
been fulfilled, and overall that operations have resulted in safe and permanent storage of CO2.
11. We do not make a recommendation for a minimum duration for the closure period between the 
end of injection and the issue of a closure authorisation. 
12. A closure authorisation will signify the end of liability for the CCS operator. 
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General Permit Provisions
13. The permitting regime will contain ancillary provisions common in permitting systems, such as 
notifiable events, inspections, reporting, transfers, variations, cancellation, enforcement, and 
dispute resolution procedures. A register will be established for information on existing and previous 
permits, and to provide an information portal to the public.
14. The legislation will confer the power to require financial assurance of a character and size that 
will protect the interests of the public and the functioning of the regulatory agency in respect 
of enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 6  
DETAILED REGULATION OF INJECTION 
AND STORAGE ACTIVITIES
1 Introduction
To ensure effective and safe storage of CO2, a detailed regime of regulation is required to cover the 
injection phase of operations. Under the CCS legislation that we recommend, the basic permission to 
undertake these operations will be obtained by acquiring an injection permit. Chapter 5 deals with 
injection permits in depth, including the application process, rights and obligations, and closure. 
The focus of this Chapter is on the more detailed regulation of injection activities under an injection 
permit and under health and safety legislation. 
For the reasons that we explained in Chapter 5, the regulation of CCS projects must be flexible, 
site-specific and performance-based or outcome-focused. The legislation and the regulations 
under it should state the level of performance or the outcome that is required, and allow a project 
developer to select the technical methods, procedures and technology that will best meet that level 
of performance for the particular project, in light of the project’s particular characteristics. The CCS 
developer will be obliged to satisfy the regulatory agency that its proposed methods will meet the 
required standards of performance. The focus on outcomes rather than methods and technology is 
particularly suitable for CCS as an industry that is growing and changing in different parts of the 
world, that may adopt widely differing technologies, and that must adapt to business, engineering 
and geological circumstances that vary widely.1 
2 The Site Plan
Under the CCS legislation that we recommend, the key mechanism for this detailed regulation is the 
site plan that is approved by the board of inquiry upon the grant of an injection permit. The objective 
of the application and approval process is to demonstrate that the project will result in safe and 
permanent storage. The site plan can be varied subsequently, but it must be in place at all times, and 
it controls the activities that the operator may carry out. Where an operator fails to follow the site 
plan, maintain a site plan, or review it when required, the regulator can withdraw approval of the plan, 
meaning that injection operations are prohibited. Approval may be reinstated by the regulator once 
the operator’s obligations are fulfilled. The CCS legislation will need to state that injection activities 
are prohibited unless an approved site plan is in place. A summary of the site plan should be available 
on the CCS register, which was discussed in Chapter 5.
1 M Granger Morgan and S McCoy, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the Legal and Regulatory Barriers (RFF Press, 
New York, 2012) at 81.
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The site plan has been described as the most critical element of the regulatory scheme.2 It is separate 
from the permit in the way that it must be reviewed and varied where and when necessary. Where 
approval of the site plan is withdrawn, the permit remains intact, although the permit holder is not 
able to conduct injection activities until the plan is reinstated. 
2.1 Content of a site plan 
We recommend that the site plan contain the following components. 
(i) Site characterisation, including site model, baseline monitoring, risk assessment, and an 
assessment of the anticipated capacity;
(ii) Environmental impact assessment (EIA), including an assessment of the effects on other resources;
(iii)  Work programme, including locations of injection facilities, quantity of CO2 to be stored, injection 
rates, and actions to prevent leakage, unintended migration, or other irregularities;
(iv) Monitoring plan of the entire storage site, that covers the injection phase until liability is 
transferred. This is known as Measurement, Monitoring and Verification (MMV);
(v) Corrective measures plan, to deal with contingencies such as where the CO2 is not behaving as 
expected, and in case of well failure etc.
(vi) Site closure plan, covering decommissioning of facilities and rehabilitation of the site. 
Each of these components will be discussed separately below.
This recommendation is based on an analysis of the IEA Model Regulatory Framework, the EU Directive, 
and the Australian legislation. They can be referred to for a full discussion of the requirements of each 
of the components to be included in the detailed regulation. Emerging standards and guidelines are 
equally important. As mentioned elsewhere in this Report, important standards and guidelines are 
being written specifically for CCS. Leading examples are the standards from the Canadian Standards 
Association and the International Standards Organisation, and guidelines from the World Resources 
Institute, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and Det Norske Veritas. 
A degree of connection between the components of the site plan will be apparent. For example, 
risk assessments will inform the corrective measures plan and the measurement, monitoring and 
verification (MMV) plan. If monitoring under a MMV plan shows that a leak is occurring, that result 
will trigger the provisions in the corrective measures plan, and may trigger the activation of the 
closure plan. 
2 N Bankes and J Poschwatta, Australian Legislation on Carbon Capture and Storage: A Canadian Perspective (University of Calgary 
Institute for Sustainable Energy, Environment and Economy Research Paper, June 2008) at 13. A detailed consideration of the 
issues is European Commission, Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide Guidance 
Document 2 Characterisation of the Storage Complex, CO2 Stream Composition, Monitoring and Corrective Measures (2011). 
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2.2 Approval of a site plan 
An applicant for an injection permit will submit a proposed site plan as part of its application. Approval 
of the site plan is a central part of the decision to grant the injection permit. Once approved, it will 
govern activities from injection until stewardship is transferred to the agency.
The detail that is required for a site plan must be sufficient to enable regulatory oversight, but not 
so exact as to stifle the development of a project. What is required should be stated in regulations. 
The EU Directive has been criticised for requiring plans to be fully ready at the time that a company 
applies for a permit. It is said that a full design with all the necessary data should only be required 
once a final investment decision is made, but in order to make this decision a developer needs to have 
a storage permit.3 It has therefore been suggested that the level of detail required in an application 
be reduced, with an updated and more detailed plan to be furnished before injection begins. 
On the other hand, the regulator and the affected parties have a right to know, in some detail, what 
project they are being asked to consider. The applicant must put up a reasonably specific and detailed 
proposal, even though it is not the final construction plans. Granting an injection permit on the basis 
of a draft site plan or outline site plan is therefore undesirable. We consider the legislation should 
require an applicant to provide a complete site plan in order to obtain an injection permit.4
One option that should be mentioned is whether approval of the proposed site plan is given by the same 
decision maker as that deciding the application for an injection permit. An example is the Queensland 
legislation, which says that the Minister may not approve a proposed plan unless approval is first 
given to the plan by the Water Act Minister, insofar as the plan relates to potential groundwater 
issues. This is unique, and is not found in other legislation internationally. For New Zealand, given that 
our recommendation is that an application for an injection permit will be determined by a board of 
inquiry (which will be established with the relevant expertise, and will have representation or input 
from the regional council) there seems little reason to require different decision makers for permits 
and site plans. Further, the framework we recommend sets a threshold test, so that where there is 
a significant risk to other resources a permit can not be granted. (See the criteria for determining 
an application for an injection permit, Chapter 5.) 
2.3 Review and variation of a site plan
The operator shall review the site plan regularly and update it accordingly, with approval of the 
regulator, to take into account any changes to the MMV plan or work plan, or other components. 
The legislation should require review and any subsequent variation on a regular basis, such as every 
5 years, and when there is unexpected behaviour of the injected CO2, or where the operator considers 
it necessary. An application for variation of a site plan should be accompanied by an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) which will include an assessment of the risks associated with the proposed 
variation.5 Variations should not involve any public consultation or other participation unless the 
proposed variation significantly changes the nature of the project. 
3 T Jonker Permitting Process: Special Report on Getting a CCS Project Permitted, Maasvlakte CCS Project C.V. (GCCSI, January 2013) 
at 50.
4 See R Pritchard Carbon Capture and Storage – A Review of the Australian Legal and Regulatory Regime, Appendix A.
5 This requirement is included in the Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 54.
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2.4 Directions
The power for the regulatory agency to make directions is desirable to maintain public confidence 
in the management of CCS operations, and to give the agency full authority over operations in the 
public interest. For example, the agency should have the power to issue directions immediately in a 
time-critical situation. On the other hand, the power should not be couched in terms so wide that 
it allows unnecessary interference with the work of the operator. CCS operations will have gone 
through a process of careful evaluation leading up to the issue of a permit, and that evaluation is the 
primary safeguard that a project is well-conceived. Too broad a power could be unfair, inefficient, and 
adverse in its effect on confidence in the investment climate for CCS. The circumstances in which it 
can be exercised, and its consequences, should therefore be clearly stated. 
In the IEA Model Regulatory Framework and the EU Directive, the power to issue directions is phrased 
in terms of corrective measures. In the IEA Model Regulatory Framework, the responsible agency 
has the power to determine corrective measures and remediation measures that the operator must 
undertake in order to protect the environment, human health, other resources or third party assets.6 
Corrective measures are measures taken to address significant leakage, unintended migration, or 
other irregularity at a storage site. Remediation measures are to rectify any damage caused by such 
events. In the EU Directive, the agency has power at any time to require the operator to carry out 
the necessary corrective measures to respond to leakages and significant irregularities and measures 
related to the protection of human health.7 In both cases the agency can make its directions whether 
or not the particular measure was stated in the approved corrective measures plan, and can carry out 
the corrective measures itself if the operator does not do so, at the operator’s cost.8 In Queensland 
where a serious situation exists the Minister can make directions to stop or suspend injection, or 
take steps reasonably necessary to remedy the situation. A serious situation is defined as where 
the reservoir has leaked, or there is a significant risk of leakage, or where the GHG stream injected 
is not behaving as predicted.9 Victoria and the Commonwealth give very similar powers, with the 
direction being confined to reasonable steps as in Queensland except as to halting injection.10 
In comparison, broad powers are given to the Minister in the South Australian legislation, which says 
the minister may direct the licensee to carry out specified obligations under the Act or licence, or 
to cease specified activities that are contrary to the Act or licence. If the direction is not complied 
with in the time allowed, the Minister may take the required action (or arrange for it to be taken) 
and recover the cost, as a debt, from the licensee.11 However these powers apply generally and seem 
more of a compliance mechanism than a mechanism to ensure the safety or integrity of the CCS 
project. (Directions can also be given under most enactments in relation to special matters, such as 
6 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework at 89 and 93, Model text 6.8.2. 
7 EU Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Art 16. Significant irregularity, 
significant risk and leakage are all defined in art 3. Corrective measures is defined as “any measures taken to correct significant 
irregularities or to close leakages in order to prevent or stop the release of CO2 from the storage complex”. 
8 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework at 89 Model Text 6.8.2; EU Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological 
Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Art 16:4-5.
9 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), ss 363, 364.
10 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 182; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 
(Cth), s 380.
11 Petroleum and Geothermal Act (South Australia), s 88.
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protection of geological formations containing petroleum,12 maximising the volume of GHGs that can 
be stored,13 or accommodating a third party.14) 
We therefore recommend that the regulatory agency have power to make a direction to the permit 
holder, where significant leakage, unintended (or unexpected) migration or other irregularity occurs, 
in order to protect the environment, human health, other resources, or third-party assets. The direction 
can require or prohibit an act. Non-compliance is subject to enforcement measures and to a power 
in the agency to carry out (or have carried out) the necessary operations itself, at the expense of the 
permit holder and with recourse to the financial assurance. The permit stays on foot notwithstanding 
the making of directions. The direction should be reviewable. 
2.5 Withdrawal of approval of a site plan
The circumstances that may allow the Minister or regulatory agency to withdraw the approval of a site 
plan must be stated. They should include failure to review a plan as necessary, failure to comply with 
a direction, and activities carried out contrary to the site plan. The withdrawal of an approval will mean 
that injection and other operations are prohibited until the permit holder obtains reinstatement of the 
approval. The injection permit itself will remain in force. If operations continue despite the withdrawal 
of approval then cancellation of the permit would become possible. Procedures for the withdrawal of 
an approval should require due regard to be given to the consequences of the withdrawal on upstream 
parties relying on access to the injection facility for their CO2. 
2.6 Enforcement
As with the permitting regime, the primary enforcement measures will be penalties that are imposed 
under the Act. This will progress to the withdrawal of approval where necessary, and eventually 
cancellation of the permit. The primary objective will be to encourage the operator to fulfil its obligations.
3 Environmental Impact Assessment
A CCS operator must provide an assessment of the effects of its proposed operations on the 
environment. In CCS literature, and environmental literature generally, this is often referred to 
as an environmental impact assessment (EIA). In the RMA it is called an assessment of effects on 
the environment (AEE). The EIA will build on the information gained from the site characterisation 
process. The environment to be considered should be given a broad interpretation and include the 
effect on people and their communities, other resources, and amenity values. (The RMA definition 
may provide some guidance.) The EIA should include the actual and possible effects. It should require 
an assessment in such detail as corresponds with the scale and significance of the effects that the 
activity may have on the environment.15 An EIA for CCS purposes will focus on the environmental 
12 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), ss 376, 377. See Chapter 7. 
13 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 89.
14 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 114.
15 Resource Management Act 1991, s 88 and Schedule 4. 
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impact of injection operations. The subsurface elements of CCS may present new issues in regards to 
usual practice for environmental effects assessments. Best practice procedures are being developed 
for EIAs for CO2 storage sites.
16 An EIA for CCS operations should include a risk-based approach with 
assessments of worst-case scenarios and an analysis of the consequences of leakage and unintended 
migration on potential receptors.17 It should particularly consider groundwater and other subsurface 
resources, and the risk management processes that will be undertaken. Corrective measures and the 
detailed monitoring plan should remain as separate components of the site plan. The EIA will be an 
important part of the application for an injection permit. As noted above, a further EIA should be 
required with an application for a material variation of a site plan.
The environmental assessment needed under the RMA and under the CCS legislation can probably 
be one document or one set of documents, and the legislation should at least make that possible. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that we consider that injection and storage formation activities 
should be managed under the new CCS Act rather than under the RMA, but that the RMA would 
continue to apply to the other environmental effects of a CCS operation, such as incidental discharges 
to air or water or earthworks. Between the two Acts the environmental effects of all aspects of a CCS 
proposal will be considered. They will be considered in an integrated process. The requirements for 
the environmental assessment under the two Acts should be closely aligned. The main differences are 
likely to come from the fact that the requirements under the RMA are general while those under the 
CCS Act will be for one industry and will therefore be more specific.
4 Work Programme
As mentioned above, the work programme will include details of the locations of injection facilities, 
the quantity of CO2 to be stored, character of the CO2 stream, operational limits for injection, and 
actions to prevent leakage, unintended migration and other irregularities. It could include maps 
and geological cross-sections, the expected migratory pathway of the CO2, and other appropriate 
information about the site.18 It could also include an expected timeframe for work to be completed. 
5 Measurement, Monitoring and  
Verification Requirements
Measurement, monitoring, and verification (MMV) has been described as “the interface between the 
project and regulators, insurers, carbon markets, and the public”.19 It comprises a substantial part 
of a regulatory framework and is necessary to ensure the permanent storage of CO2, protection 
of adjacent resources, sustainability of the environment, community support and assurance, and 
16 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework at 44.
17 At 43.
18 These are the requirements for a site plan in the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s 142.
19 World Resources Institute, CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Dioxide Capture, Transport, and Storage (2008) at 64.
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stakeholder confidence. It is also essential for reporting requirements in regards to the emissions 
trading scheme. It is not desirable that the CCS legislation, or even subordinate legislation under 
it, prescribes the methods and procedures for monitoring.20 Geological formations are variable, 
so the MMV tools that are suitable at one project may not be right for another; flexibility is needed 
in methods, and it should be the performance or outcomes that are prescribed. This is particularly 
important for New Zealand with its complex geology. An MMV programme which is fitting for 
a region with large homogeneous geological units with little folding, faulting or recent tectonic activity 
may be quite unsuitable for New Zealand, and what is satisfactory in one part of New Zealand may be 
unsuitable in another part of the country. 
Monitoring will need to cover the entire storage site and the surrounding environment and will need 
to span from the injection phase through post-closure until liability is transferred to the agency. From 
this point, a separate long-term monitoring plan will need to be submitted to the regulatory agency 
as part of the site closure process with sufficient financial resources for the agency to undertake 
monitoring requirements. This is discussed in Chapter 5 on permits.
Just as with the other plans that are required as part of the detailed regulation of the site, the 
monitoring plan must also be reviewed and varied where necessary. This is to allow for technological 
advancement, altering monitoring frequencies, change with spatial locations, and to respond 
to leakage or migration or other irregularity.21 This will be triggered by the review requirements 
mentioned above at 2.3. The agency should also be able to request that a monitoring plan be updated 
where there are changes to the assessed risk or improvements in knowledge or technology.22 
5.1 Objectives of MMV
Much research has been conducted on the monitoring requirements for CCS and best practice 
guidelines have been formulated to assist regulators and operators alike.23 As part of the site plan, 
a monitoring plan is to be included, the components of which have been identified by the IEA 
as follows.24 
The monitoring plan must outline a monitoring programme and monitoring methods sufficient to:
(a) continue the baseline survey for the storage site until injection commences;
(b) monitor the injection facilities, the storage site (including the CO2 plume) and the surrounding 
environment;
(c) compare the ongoing monitoring results with the baseline survey for the storage site;
(d) compare the actual behaviour of the storage site with the anticipated behaviour of the storage 
site based on the results of the site characterisation process and monitoring results;
(e) detect and assess significant leakage, unintended migration or other irregularity in the storage site;
20 At 64.
21 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework at 86, 87.
22 At 83.
23 See World Resources Institute CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Capture, Transport, and Storage (2008); IPCC Guidelines for 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories (2006) Volume 2: Energy, Chapter 5: Carbon Dioxide Transport, Injection and Geological Storage at 
5.13-5.20.
24 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework at 83.
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(f) quantify, as required by the relevant authority, the volumes of CO2 associated with significant 
leakage or unintended migration;
(g) detect migration of CO2;
(h) detect significant adverse effects for the surrounding environment; and
(i) assess the effectiveness of any corrective measures taken.
These requirements for a monitoring plan appear to be suitable for New Zealand. Further guidance is 
provided by the World Resources Institute.25 
a. MMV requirements should not prescribe methods or tools; rather, they should focus on 
the key information an operator is required to collect for each injection well and the overall 
project, including injected volume, flow rate or injection pressure, composition of injectate, 
spatial distribution of the CO2 plume, reservoir pressure, well integrity, determination of any 
measurable leakage, and appropriate data (including formation fluid chemistry) from the 
monitoring zone, confining zone, and underground sources of drinking water (USDWs).
b. Operators have the flexibility to choose the specific monitoring techniques and protocols 
that will be deployed at each storage site, as long as the methods selected provide data at 
resolutions that will meet the stated monitoring requirements.
c. MMV plans, although submitted as part of the site permitting process, should be updated as 
needed throughout a project as significant new site-specific operational data become available.
d. The monitoring area should be based initially on knowledge of the regional and site geology, 
overall site-specific risk assessment, and subsurface flow simulations. This area should be 
modified as data obtained during operations warrant. It should include the project footprint 
(the CO2 plume, the extent of injected or displaced fluids, and any areas of significantly 
elevated pressure). Groundwater quality monitoring should be performed on a site-specific 
basis based on injection zone to USDW disposition.
e. MMV activities should continue after injection ceases as necessary to demonstrate  
non-endangerment, as described in the post-closure section (see Storage Guideline 7d).
These guidelines provide for a flexible, outcome-focussed MMV plan. The general purpose is to ensure 
that the behaviour of CO2 and other fluids is closely watched and clearly understood, and that any 
event of significant leakage is detected, measured and verified, in order to facilitate risk management 
and to ensure effective GHG accounting under the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme. The data 
produced under the MMV plan will be used for the calculation of removal credits (and credits to be 
surrendered in the event of leakage) under the NZETS: see Chapter 11. 
5.2 Reporting and verification
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the results of monitoring should be reported to the regulatory 
agency regularly. Reports should be made public on the CCS information database. Procedures for 
the verification or auditing of the monitoring activity are also important as part of the regulatory 
framework. The IEA considers that third party verification can provide assurances as to the quality, 
credibility, reliability, completeness, accuracy, and veracity of monitoring results, which are important 
to the integrity of the emissions trading scheme.26 Third party verification is certainly be desirable at 
key points such as when considering whether to approve a site closure, or when there is significant 
irregularity in the behaviour of fluids in the storage formation.
25 World Resources Institute CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Capture, Transport, and Storage (2008) at 70. 
26 International Energy Agency, Model Regulatory Framework at 88.
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5.3 Variation and review of the monitoring plan
Just as with the other plans that are required as part of the detailed regulation of the site, the monitoring 
plan must also be reviewed and varied where necessary. This is to allow for technological advancement, 
altering monitoring frequencies, change with spatial locations, and to respond to leakage or migration 
or other irregularity.27 The agency should also be able to request that a monitoring plan be updated 
where there are changes to the assessed risk or improvements in knowledge or technology.28 
6 Corrective Measures Plan
A corrective measures plan is necessary to identify the procedures that will be undertaken in the 
event that leakage or significant irregularities occur with the storage formation or the behaviour of 
the CO2. Whether this forms part of the AEE (as discussed above at 3) or is a separate requirement 
will be a policy choice. The advantage of having a separate plan outside of the AEE is the clarity that 
will be achieved, and that corrective measures for situations that do not pose actual or potential risks 
to the environment will be included, although these situations would be few, if there are any. There 
may be a possibility that corrective measures to protect third party assets may not be adequately 
addressed if left in an EIA. For these reasons, this is our preferred approach.
It will be necessary for the legal framework to identify who is responsible for performing the corrective 
measures and who will be financially liable. The common arrangement is that liability rests with the 
operator, however, the IEA identify that discretion is often conferred on the regulatory agency to 
determine when corrective measures are necessary and what they entail.29 For example, the EU CCS 
Directive states that in cases of leakage or significant irregularities the operator must notify the 
competent authority and take the necessary corrective measures. But the Directive further states 
that the competent authority may at any time require the operator to take the necessary corrective 
measures, and additional measures not laid out in the corrective measures plan, or the competent 
authority may take the corrective measures itself and recover the costs by drawing on the financial 
security posted by the operator.30
We recommend that in the event of leakage or significant irregularities it should be possible for the 
regulatory agency to require the operator to undertake corrective measures, or to be able to undertake 
those measures itself and recover the cost from the permit holder.31 
27 At 86, 87.
28 At 83.
29 At 89.
30 Directive 2009/31/EC, on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Article 16.
31 In the EU CCS Directive the competent authority can take corrective measures to deal with significant leakage etc and recover 
the costs by drawing on the financial security provided by the operator: Art 16. 
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7 Site Closure Plan
A site closure plan will specify how the operator intends to decommission and rehabilitate the site, 
including how the wells will be plugged and abandoned, what facilities will be removed, and how the 
land will be rehabilitated. It should state what international standards it relies on for the design and 
execution of that work. 
Site closure will also be addressed under the Health and Safety Act 1992. In Chapter 2 we concluded 
that CCS operations should be subject to the HSEA as are other industrial operations. The Health 
and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013 make particular 
rules for oil and gas operations, and in the next section of this Chapter we examine their adaptability 
to CCS. If they are adapted or extended, regulation 68 will apply to closure:
A well operator must ensure that a well is designed and constructed so that, as far as is reasonably 
practicable,—
(a) the well can be suspended or abandoned in a safe manner;
 and
(b) after its suspension or abandonment, there can be no unplanned escape of fluids from the 
well or from the reservoir to which it led.
In addition the operator must supply a notice of well operations with a detailed programme of 
abandonment, details of standards that have been applied, and the verification by an independent 
and competent person.32 This will not duplicate a CCS site closure plan if it is applied to CCS, because 
it is not supplied as part of the project design, it does not require approval, and it is focussed only on 
human health and safety. The two requirements will be complementary.
8 Health and Safety Regulation
The general applicability of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSEA) was considered in 
Chapter 2, and we concluded that the HSEA is suitable as part of the existing legal framework for the 
regulation of CCS safety, with appropriate amendment where necessary. The HSEA imposes a number 
of general duties on employers.33 We turn here to its role in the detailed regulation of safety matters 
pertaining to the injection and storage operations. Abandonment and closure were discussed above.
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013. 
The HSE (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013 supersede Regulations made in 
1999. They impose obligations on owners and operators of petroleum production and non-production 
installations, especially to take all practicable steps to ensure that the installation is safe. Except for 
32 Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013, reg 73 and Schedule 7.
33 The recent 2013 Workplace Exposure Standards and Biological Exposure Indices (2013) at 40 provide guidelines for employers 
to implement their general duties under the HSEA, although they do not represent “compliance” with the HSEA, They state 
a maximum exposure standard of 5,000 parts per million for CO2 over the course of 8 hours, or 30,000 parts per million for 
exposure over 15 minutes.
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smaller installations,34 a safety case must be prepared, which is detailed safety management system. 
In contrast to the former Regulations, the safety case must be approved by the Secretary and must 
be revised if the Secretary requires it. Well operations are subject to requirements for the assessment 
of conditions below ground, design and construction, well control, well examination schemes by an 
independent and competent person, and notification of specified well operations including drilling, 
suspension and abandonment. An emergency response plan must be prepared and maintained. Safety 
on offshore installations is addressed by a number of provisions. 
It is reasonably clear that these Regulations were not intended to cover CCS operations. Their overall 
purpose, even their title, is directed at petroleum, i.e. oil and natural gas. The workers concerned are called 
“petroleum workers.” A “well” means “a borehole drilled for the purpose of exploring for, appraising, or 
extracting petroleum” which excludes CO2 and CCS. It is true that a “production installation” is defined 
as a structure or vessel used for (among other things) the injection of gas into underground geological 
formations, and that “gas” is not defined and so could include CO2. But the argument is tenuous. The 
Regulations in their present form do not provide a satisfactory basis for controlling CCS. 
Adaptation for CCS.  The Regulations could be amended to include CO2 exploration and injection 
operations. The definitions and related provisions could be amended to include CCS installations, 
gases, wells, and workers. These amendments would not be unduly complex. The result would be 
regulations that could properly be entitled the Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum 
Exploration and Extraction and Carbon Dioxide Injection) Regulations. 
New provisions can be added to deal with the particular character of CO2. While CCS operations may 
involve the compression of fluids to higher pressures than encountered in most petroleum operations, 
CO2 presents no risk of fire or explosion, so that the protection of human health and safety should not 
need many new provisions.35 New provisions could relate HSE requirements to the standards emerging 
internationally for CCS activity (although the Regulations make little use of the petroleum industry 
equivalents). The Det Norske Veritas guidelines address risk management as well as site selection and 
monitoring.36 The International Standards Organisation also has a technical committee working on 
standards for CCS. The Canadian Standards Association has recently issued a standard on CCS.37 
Some requirements of the HSE Petroleum Regulations may appear at first sight to be duplicated 
by proposals we make for the new CCS legislation. One example is a power to inspect. Another 
is a power to require an emergency response plan. However the two regulatory frameworks have 
different purposes. An HSEA emergency plan, for example, is purely concerned with the personal 
safety of workers, while a CCS corrective measures plan is concerned with the integrity of CO2 storage 
generally, not only for human health and safety but also for the environment and the permanent 
sequestration of greenhouse gases. 
34 “Lower-tier production installations” are smaller onshore installations eg producing less than 820 barrels of oil per day. 
For them the operator must establish a major accident prevention policy instead of a safety case: Regs 3, 16-20. 
35 Benson believes that existing health and safety regulations provide adequate protection for workers on CCS sites, in the context 
of United States legal framework: S Benson, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in Underground Storage Formations (2004) 
Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions 10-50 Workshop Proceedings <www.c2es.org>, at 9. One may note that CCS drilling 
could hit oil or natural gas, which would present a fire and explosion hazard if it came to the surface.
36 See Det Norske Veritas CO2QUALSTORE, CO2WELLS, CO2PIPETRANS, and CO2RISKMAN <www.dnv.com>.
37 CSA Group “CSA Group and IPAC-CO2 Research Inc Announce World’s First Bi-national Standard For Geologic Storage of 
Carbon Dioxide” (news release, 15 November 2012).
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Options and Recommendation as to HSE (Petroleum) Regulations.  In Chapter 2 we noted the 
pervasiveness of the regulatory regime under the HSEA. It would be very strange for an industry like 
CCS to be exempted from the Act and dealt with under industry-specific CCS legislation, and we 
make no such recommendation. The two options appear to be to amend the Petroleum Regulations 
as considered above, or to make new ones specific to CCS. 
New HSE (CCS) Regulations would have the benefit of being tailored specifically for the needs and 
characteristics of CCS and of CO2. They would bring visibility to CCS; CCS would not be buried in an 
unexpected corner of the nation’s regulations. 
Amending the Petroleum Regulations to include CCS would have as its main advantage the avoidance 
of duplication. A close analysis of the HSE issues involved is likely to find a high degree of overlap 
between petroleum drilling and CCS drilling and related operations, in the work environment, in the 
equipment, and in the techniques employed. Against the background of an enormous range of diverse 
workplaces regulated for HSE purposes, petroleum and CCS workplaces are very similar to each 
other. Visibility for CCS can be achieved by other means, such as a guide that outlines the regulatory 
requirements and procedures for an industry.38 Our recommendation therefore is for amendment 
of the Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013 
to include CCS operations. 
9 Recommendations
1. The detailed regulation of CCS activities is governed by a site plan, approved by the board of 
inquiry upon the grant of an injection permit, and subject to review by the regulator. The permit 
holder may vary it subsequently with approval by the regulator. Injection activities may not occur 
without an approved site plan. The regulatory agency may withdraw the approval if there is a 
significant risk of leakage or risk to human health, the environment, or other resources, or if there 
is non-compliance with the CCS Act.
2. The site plan will contain the following components:
 (i) Site characterisation
 (ii) Environmental impact assessment
 (iii) Work programme
 (iv) Monitoring plan
 (v) Corrective measures plan
 (vi) Site closure plan.
38 Petroleum industry examples are Guide to Government Management of Petroleum from New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals, 
and the Taranaki Regional Council’s Guide to Regional Plans in Taranaki: for Oil and Gas Exploration Activities that explains the 
requirements under the RMA.
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3. The regulatory agency shall have power to make a direction to the permit holder, where significant 
leakage, unintended (or unexpected) migration or other irregularity occurs, in order to protect 
the environment, human health, other resources, or third-party assets. 
4. In the event of leakage or significant irregularities the regulatory agency may require the operator 
to undertake corrective measures or may undertake those measures itself and recover the cost 
from the permit holder. 
5. The Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013 
should be amended to include CCS operations.
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CHAPTER 7  
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER 
SUBSURFACE RESOURCES
Other subsurface resources may be affected by carbon capture and storage operations. Oil and gas, coal, 
formations suited to natural gas storage, saline aquifer minerals, geothermal energy, potable groundwater 
and wastewater disposal can all exist at similar depths and localities as formations suitable for CO2 storage. 
A recent New Zealand-led study shows that these interactions can be beneficial or undesirable, depending 
on the geology and the economic potential.1 The interactions may have occurred before CCS begins; oil and 
gas activity may have left wells that were not completed in a way that will properly contain CO2; hydraulic 
fracturing may have compromised the seal caprock essential for containment. Other interactions may 
occur after CCS begins, for example where the injection of CO2 migrates or increases pressure so as to affect 
the production of oil or gas or geothermal energy. In some formations, pressure effects can be felt many 
kilometres away. Beneficial interactions may occur where CO2 injection assists oil recovery in enhanced oil 
recovery (EOR). The study recommends that relevant resources, including useable pore space, are identified 
and mapped, even if there is little solid information. It identifies the need for CCS legislation to establish 
priority rules, to ensure that CCS proposals include an assessment of other subsurface resources, and to 
ensure that injection plans and site closure plans address other resources as well. 
These issues can be significant for CCS. Subsurface resources have a number of different values. The economic 
value of different resources changes as demand changes and as technology changes to enable new uses. 
For example, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have become more economic, and resources like 
coal bed methane have only recently attracted attention in New Zealand. EOR has not got under way 
in New Zealand to any significant degree. Geothermal resource development has grown rapidly in the 
central North Island, and groundwater, usually at much shallower depths than CCS storage formations, 
is increasingly an issue in parts of the country. The co-ordination of such uses raises a general policy issue 
about the management of New Zealand underground resources that goes well beyond this Report. 
The main issues that are addressed below, in respect of a legal framework for CCS, are protection 
of existing rights and priority rules generally, and methods to avoid and manage conflict between 
different subsurface resources and resource users. (At times the issue is the effect of CCS on a resource, 
whether or not it is under permit and in current use, while at other times the issue is the effect of CCS 
on a resource user company and its commercial interests.) In addition it is desirable to address two 
other matters, the use of CO2 in EOR, and the shared use of facilities. A general theme that emerges 
is the need for a suitable balance to be found between an emerging CCS industry and the established 
petroleum industry. In finding that balance, it seems desirable from a policy point of view that CCS 
be able to develop on its own path as a climate change imperative, rather than as an offshoot of the 
petroleum sector, while recognising and harnessing the considerable shared interests that the two 
industries will have in geological, engineering, technical, and indeed commercial matters. 
1 Field, B, Bachu, S, Bunch, M, Funnell, R, Holloway, S, and Richardson, R, Interaction of CO2 Storage with Subsurface Resources 
(CO2CRC Report RPT12-3562, November 2012, IEAGHG Report 2013-08, April 2013).
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1 Protection of Existing Rights
One of the most important factors to be taken into account in dealing with different interests in the 
subsurface is the desirability of the security of tenure of existing resource rights. There is a general 
national interest in maintaining a reputation for a stable investment climate. While regulatory 
flexibility and sovereign rights necessarily pose the possibility of change, it is desirable to minimise 
alterations of existing rights such as permits under the Crown Minerals Act (CMA). It is all the more 
important to avoid changes that are unpredictable and that come at a late stage in the development 
of a project. In the balancing of the interests of subsurface users, it is therefore desirable to ensure 
that CCS law give a reasonable degree of protection to the interests of existing rights.
• Weight should be given to the interests of the holder of a permit that was in existence before the 
new CCS legislation comes into force. 
• Weight should also be given to the interests of the holder of a permit who has made a substantial 
investment to develop its permit. 
Where the permit is a petroleum mining permit under the CMA, its origin and existence should be 
dated back to the issue of any preceding prospecting permit or exploration permit for that acreage. 
The protection of existing rights can be given effect in different ways. An absolute protection would 
be given by preventing the issue of a CCS permit for land covered by a relevant CMA permit; or it 
could be a right of veto; or it could be a preference in regulatory decisions about the management of 
operations under each permit. The choices are significant and are discussed further below. 
Reform in Australia was especially marked by efforts to accommodate the existing interests of the 
petroleum industry and the interests of the future CCS industry. The result in the Offshore Petroleum 
and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 was an intricate set of provisions to balance the different 
interests.2 These provisions gave special priority to “pre-commencement” petroleum titles, that is, 
permits where the permit or its predecessor had come into existence before the new CCS law came 
into effect. In limited circumstances this amounted to a power to veto CCS operations. In others, the 
Minister holds a power to order a CCS operator to make changes if its operations pose a serious risk of 
a serious adverse impact on petroleum operations.3 The petroleum title holder has preferential rights 
2 M Gibbs, “Greenhouse Gas Storage in Offshore Waters: Balancing Competing Interests” (2009) 28 Australian Resources and 
Energy Law Journal 52 provides a careful analysis. Also see S Barrymore and A Mathison, “Offshore Petroleum Amendment 
(Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008 (Cth)” (2008) 27 ARELJ 348; J Fahey and L McMurtrie, “Carbon Capture and Storage Bill 
before Senate” Mallesons Stephen Jaques Newsletter, October 2008.
3 This formulation, sometimes called a SRSAI, is used a number of times in the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Act 2006 (Cth). 
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to CCS titles in certain circumstances. Among the states, Queensland conferred significant discretion 
on the Minister in determining grants.4 South Australia requires GHG grant applications to pass a 
compatibility test, but Victoria has not restricted the grant of permits so as to prevent overlaps. 
2 Priority Rules Generally
Where there is no issue of existing rights before new CCS legislation comes into force, the question 
of accommodating the different interests is a broader one, on a more level playing field. Three main 
options for a priority rule can be identified.5
Preferred Industry.  It is possible to give one industry a consistent priority over the other. For example, 
CCS permits could only be granted where there is no petroleum activity, and CCS operations could 
be approved only where there is no likely effect on petroleum activity. (Or, CCS could proceed if the 
petroleum permit holder agrees.) Alberta has followed this path. The regulator may not approve a CO2 
injection scheme unless it is satisfied that injection will not interfere with the recovery or conservation 
of oil and gas, and will not interfere with an existing oil or gas storage facility.6 A similar priority is 
stated in the province’s Mines and Minerals Act. However this option requires an a priori judgement 
to be made about which industry is to be preferred. It may not be easy to make defensible judgement 
of that kind that will be valid for all circumstances, and for all industries – it is not only petroleum 
that would need to be considered. A poor signal would be sent for investment in the industry getting 
lower priority. There would be much greater uncertainty in that industry about the possibility of the 
exercise of priority rights against it. If petroleum is granted preference in a manner that prevents CCS 
permit applications from being made for land that is subject to a petroleum permit, then substantial 
areas of suitable geology would be closed off to CCS investigation, because petroleum exploration 
permits cover large areas of New Zealand and its EEZ. Areas under block offer would presumably be 
closed off in the same way. 
Priority by Time.  A different rule is priority by time, such as priority by time of making an application for 
a permit for an area – first in, first served. While this does not make a general expression of preference 
for one industry or the other, it would operate for some time to give priority to existing permits 
in the petroleum sector. While priority by time gives clear results in individual cases, as it does in 
relation to land title registration and in relation to water resources, its results from the perspective of 
national policy would be haphazard, almost random. In addition, a first-in-first-served rule increases 
the pressure on companies to apply before competitors do, earlier than would otherwise be logical. 
Discretionary Priority.  The third option is for applications to be decided on an individual basis, 
having regard to overlap and interaction issues, but without regard to any general rule of priority. 
A decision would be made under a criterion of the public interest, the merits of the different 
4 S Singleton and R Gawrych, “Overlapping Land Interest Issues for GHG Grants and Activities” [2009] AMPLA Yearbook 283. 
The paper includes a useful tabular analysis of the OPGGSA and three State Acts. 
5 This section particularly draws on the Report by Pritchard, Appendix A.
6 Oil and Gas Conservation Act RSA 2000 c. O-6, s 39(1.1). The Carbon Sequestration Tenure Regulation requires an analysis 
of the likelihood that the operations will interfere with mineral recovery with an application for a CCS evaluation permit and 
again in more detail with an application for a CCS sequestration lease: Alta Reg 68/2011 ss 7(1) and 15(b). See N Bankes, 
The Developing Regime for the Regulation of Carbon Capture and Storage Projects in Canada Appendix B.
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applications, the most valuable use of subsurface resources generally, or some such general rubric. 
It would be necessary to ensure that the decision is not be governed by the purpose of one Act 
if its intention is to manage conflicts between activities under two different Acts. Although a public 
interest test is open to criticism for vagueness and vulnerability to capture for particular purposes, 
it is open to the legislature to be more specific, and below we identify principles that could provide 
real guidance to the decision maker. 
In Australia, the OPGGSA follows this approach in providing a level playing field in respect of 
‘post-commencement’ petroleum titles. Where there is overlap, CCS operators are restricted in 
a number of ways, but petroleum operators may be restricted in respect of their own activity. 
There is no automatic priority for either industry. The Minister is often directed to employ a ‘public 
interest’ test. The public interest test is also important in Queensland, South Australia and Victoria.7 
In New Zealand, a ‘public interest’ test is used in section 66 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 for the very 
similar balancing of the interests of a mineral operator and a land owner. 
A procedure for notification of potentially affected subsurface resource users, and comment by them, 
could precede the exercise of this discretionary power. The procedures in some of the Australian 
legislation are more complex than is perhaps desirable as a precedent. An alternative is to allow 
other resource users simply to use the general mechanisms for public participation, but that may be 
insufficient especially if there is limited public participation in the consideration of an application for 
an exploration permit. 
This option of discretionary priority, to be decided on the basis of what is in the public interest, appears 
to be the best option, and is our recommendation. 
3 Methods to Avoid and Manage Conflicts 
A range of methods can be identified to avoid and manage interference between CCS and other 
subsurface resource interests. They could be implemented under the different rules for priority, 
above. They would take effect at different stages of a permitting and development continuum. 
Exactly who would exercise such powers is an issue in itself, depending of course in part on what 
agency has overall responsibility for CCS, but depending also on how any inter-agency questions about 
responsibility for different resources is addressed. For the moment we will refer to the “Minister.” 
A procedure for a decision by two ministers jointly could be very effective. 
3.1 Spatial separation
In deciding whether to grant a permit (or to make a block offer) the Minister avoids overlap in order 
to avoid adverse effects on another subsurface resource. In particular, a policy of spatial separation 
can keep petroleum and CCS operations out of each other’s way. In making the key decision about 
opening acreage open for bidding, both CCS and petroleum would need to be considered. The Minister 
takes into account the different subsurface resources and the likelihood that they will be used. 
7 In some cases “public interest” is given an expanded meaning: Singleton and Garwych, above n 4 at 316. 
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This option would operate effectively in preventing interference between different subsurface 
operations. However it would amount to a division or carving up of land into areas allocated to the 
different industries. It is a relatively crude measure, and it is one that will be difficult to employ 
without very good information about subsurface resources. At early stages of exploration programs, 
such information is scarce. Spatial separation vertically, by geological formation, may also be possible, 
but again, without enough information, the risk of an erroneous long-term allocation to different 
purposes may be high. Permits and block offers in petroleum can be large, and if they exclude CCS 
altogether then the effects on CCS could be considerable. In the 2013 block offer process, five onshore 
blocks covering a total of 1,562.7 km2 were offered, and three offshore release areas covering a total 
of 189,000 km2. 
Just as with an a priori preference for one industry or the other, spatial separation presents a risk that 
opportunities in one industry will be unintentionally foregone in return for a lesser opportunity in the 
other industry. Spatial situation is not the preferred solution in Australian legislation.8 
3.2 Permit applications and permit conditions
A second method of addressing conflict is in the permitting process. A CCS applicant can be required 
to provide an analysis of possible interference with other subsurface resources. That possibility would 
then be a relevant consideration for the decision maker to take into account, firstly, in deciding 
whether to grant the permit, and secondly, in deciding what conditions to impose in order to avoid or 
mitigate the risk of adverse effects on another subsurface resource.
Power to deal with different subsurface resource interests through decisions on individual permits 
and on permit conditions is likely to be an effective management tool. It is likely to be more flexible 
over time as knowledge of resources increases, and to be more targeted to specific concerns than 
would be a blanket ban on one industry operating in an area. It accommodates and addresses the 
need for a system of overlapping permits. 
3.3 Control of specific activities
A third method is the approval of site plans, work programmes, and particular activities, and the giving 
of directions. For example, a difficulty for another resource user could be avoided by a well design 
that isolates a particular zone. In addition, corrective measures should be put in place, and insisted 
on, where desirable to protect other resources and other resource users. The Australian OPGGSA 
identifies a number of activities such as drilling a well and injection (even for appraisal purposes) 
as “key GHG operations” which require particular approval. Again, this appears to be an effective 
management tool for dealing with conflict possibilities. 
From the point of view of oil and gas affecting CCS, one issue is that the CCS potential of subsurface 
formations puts a different emphasis on the quality of oil and gas well completions, in order to 
maintain the sealing capacity of the cap rock formations that are necessary to keep CO2 in permanent 
storage. Well completions in areas with CCS potential may need to be completed with additional 
durability, resistance to corrosion and resistance to pressure. Additional expense may be the result. 
8 Singleton and Gawrych, above n 4, at 285. 
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4 Powers to Avoid and Resolve Subsurface 
Resource Conflicts
Different approaches can be taken to the drafting of legislation to deal with subsurface resource 
conflicts. One is to follow the Australian offshore legislation, the OPGGSA, and set detailed rules and 
tests to apply for a number of different situations. This pattern seems to be necessary to deal with 
the complexities of State-Commonwealth relations, but there is a risk that a framework to deal with 
every contingency may not in fact accurately reflect the few cases that actually arise. CCS is in its 
early stages, and few applications are likely in the foreseeable future. Moreover, subsurface resource 
use in New Zealand is not yet intensive. 
A more suitable approach, which we recommend, is to vest discretionary powers of a brief and 
reasonably general kind in the Minister or Ministers to evaluate the merits of the competing proposals, 
and to make decisions in the public interest in order to avoid and resolve subsurface resource conflicts. 
The powers would particularly relate to the three methods noted above:
(i) spatial separation (although it is unlikely to be the preferred option);
(ii) permit applications and permit conditions; and
(iii) control of specific activities.
General discretionary powers along these lines should allow for flexibility as projects emerge, 
as information improves, and as the relative significance of CCS and petroleum operations evolves. 
They would allow for the possibility of commercial agreements to be explored and endorsed as 
acceptable compromise solutions.9 
5 Equivalent Powers in Other Legislation
Similar powers should exist in one form or another in both the CCS legislation and the other relevant 
subsurface resources legislation. Otherwise the accommodations and adjustments necessary in the 
overall public interest would all come from the one industry. We have already noted the special 
premium that CCS potential puts on the quality of the completion of oil and gas wells in order to 
prevent leakage from old wells and to maintain the sealing capacity of cap rock formations. This 
is significant because depleted oil and gas reservoirs offer some of the most likely CCS storage 
possibilities in New Zealand. The plugging and abandonment of oil and gas wells after use is only 
regulated with notice requirements.10 Certain oil and gas or coal activities can be important for 
CCS; both hydraulic fracturing and coal seam gasification have the capability to cause damage to 
formations that could reduce CCS possibilities. Such techniques present special needs for provisions 
to avoid present and future subsurface resource conflicts.
9 See ResourcesLaw International, Appendix A.
10 Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013, regs 73, 74 and Sched 7 
(notice of operations in advance); Crown Minerals (Petroleum) Regulations 2007 reg 47 (well abandonment report to be 
supplied afterwards).
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There is no power under the CMA at present to require other subsurface resource uses to be 
accommodated. The Minister has a general power to issue permits, and on such conditions as he or 
she thinks fit (section 25) but the protection of CCS is unlikely to be a valid reason for its exercise, 
especially in the light of the new statutory purpose in section 1A, that the purpose of the Act is 
“to promote prospecting for, exploration for, and mining of Crown owned minerals for the benefit of 
New Zealand.” That probably prevents the Minister from taking CCS matters into account in making 
decisions such as when making a block offer or issuing a permit.
We recommend that the powers to avoid and resolve conflicts will apply to both CCS and CMA 
activities and are the subject of provisions in both Acts. An amendment to the CMA will ensure that 
the Minister and other decision-makers may, and are required to, take into account CCS matters 
in making decisions under the CMA on permits, permit conditions and regulations. The amendment 
should ensure that the purpose of the CMA stated in section 1A does not prevent decision-makers 
from taking CCS considerations into account in the administration of the Act. 
While such new powers may appear to add a complication to petroleum activity, they appear in 
the Australian OPGGSA and state legislation, and seem to be a necessary part of finding a place for 
CCS as a new subsurface activity. It is difficult to see a rational basis for a policy of imposing all the 
conditions and constraints necessary to prevent conflict on CCS. The simple fact that CCS is new 
cannot be a reason. 
6 Co-ordination Agreements  
and Dispute Resolution 
Another desirable option is procedures to encourage consensual adjustment of interests, with formal 
dispute resolution if necessary. A procedure can be established for the ratification of co-ordination 
agreements made between a CCS operator and another subsurface resource user.11 
Another procedure that appears desirable is that the Minister (or other decision-maker) have power 
to resolve disputes between CCS permittees and other specified permittees such as CMA permittees, 
subject to an appeal on point of law to the High Court. This option may be preferable to leaving such 
matters to the parties to take to the courts. If they go to the courts, they may well find that there are 
no clear legal rules to determine the dispute. It is quite possible that lacunae exist where it is unclear 
whether the holder of a permit under one Act has a right of action against a permittee under another 
Act, especially where neither negligence nor intent to cause harm are established. The prospect of 
disputes without any reasonably clear means of resolving them would probably have an adverse 
effect on operations and on the investment climate in the different industries. 
11 For example, Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s 186. 
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7 Principles
It is likely that a common set of principles or matters to be taken into account would help to inform 
the exercise of the above discretions. They would provide guidance but would also provide reassurance 
to the different parties involved. Possible principles or matters are as follows. 
(i) Activity in both CCS and other subsurface resource uses is to be facilitated.
(ii) Unreasonable interference with potentially useful subsurface resources should be avoided. 
(iii) Consultation and agreement among operators is to be encouraged.
(iv) No operator should have a veto over the activities of another operator or permit holder. 
(v) The Minister (or other decision maker) is to make decisions in the public interest. The public 
interest can be left as a broad criterion to be applied in particular cases, or the legislation can 
make an effort to explain, define, and confine it.12
(vi) Due regard should be had to the importance of investment certainty. Rights under permits 
granted before new CCS legislation comes into effect should be altered only where necessary in 
the public interest. Rights under permits where significant investments have been made in project 
development should be altered only where necessary in the public interest. 
We recommend that these matters and principles be taken into account in the making of decisions on 
permits and conditions under the CMA and the CCS Act. 
8 CCS Explorers Discovering Petroleum, 
Petroleum Explorers Discovering  
Storage Formations 
At this point we turn to an issue that is only broadly related, but which needs attention. It can be framed by 
asking, what happens if a programme to delineate CCS storage formations under a CCS exploration permit 
finds oil or gas? And what happens if an oil and gas exploration programme under a petroleum exploration 
permit finds that a formation is ideal for CO2 storage?
13 There is a substantial commonality in the kinds of 
geology likely to be targeted by each activity. There is substantial commonality in the exploration work 
that is carried out for the two kinds of target, even if operations in the production / injection stage are 
very different. (There are exploration differences as well; for example, CCS needs more information about 
cap-rock seal formations and the closure of storage than does petroleum exploration.) From the general 
policy perspective of encouraging CCS, it would appear to be desirable to give a CCS operator a pathway to 
benefit from any petroleum discovery that it makes. It would appear equally desirable to give a petroleum 
operator some incentive to include CCS-relevant data collection in its geophysical and drilling programme. 
12 Singleton and Gawrych, above n 4, at 289. 
13 Similar questions can be asked about coal resources, and possibly about geothermal energy, but for the sake of simplicity the 
discussion will focus on petroleum. 
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There are likely to be complications in bringing the two different kinds of activity together. It is not 
desirable to allow “back door” access to petroleum production or to CCS injection if the requirements for 
that activity have not been met.14 A more specific problem will arise if CCS and CMA permits can overlap, 
so that the two permit holders are in competition, for example both seeking the right to put the petroleum 
into production.15 Overseas legislation does not come up with any clear path through these complications. 
Three options seem to present themselves.
(i) It should be lawful for an operator in either CCS or petroleum to gather and use information 
about the other resource. This minimum option seems viable.
(ii) A pathway is provided in both the CCS Act and the CMA for the holder of an exploration permit to 
apply for a permit for development under the other. The holder of a CCS exploration permit who 
finds petroleum could have a streamlined process to apply for a petroleum mining permit under the 
CMA. The holder of a CMA petroleum exploration permit who finds a good CCS storage possibility 
has a similar process to apply for an injection permit under the CCS law. Some kind of conversion 
programme may be required to ensure that requirements are properly met. This option is therefore 
somewhat more complex. 
(iii) Reciprocal rights are held by CCS and CMA exploration permits. Both have rights to explore for 
both possible uses of the subsurface. In Australia the holder of a petroleum exploration permit 
is authorised to explore for geological storage formations.16 However priorities and compliance 
with the two different statutes could become complex. 
The issues are complex and we do not make a specific recommendation except to observe that 
possibilities of encouraging both CCS and petroleum discovery should be pursued in the design of the 
legislation. 
9 Shared Facilities 
The use of shared facilities is another issue in relations between different subsurface resource users. 
For example, a petroleum operator could be asked to accommodate CCS operations on an offshore 
production platform. It is rare for New Zealand law to require operators in any industry to share 
facilities – telecommunications may be one of the few examples. At least in the early stages of the 
evolution of CCS, it may not be desirable to take special powers to give another company access to 
such facilities. If such arrangements are desirable, they may better emerge by agreement. Regulatory 
arrangements should avoid erecting any barrier to such agreements. 
14 On the other hand, the CMA does not rule out an application for a petroleum mining permit by a person who does not hold 
a petroleum exploration permit. 
15 In such a case the competition may be resolved through commercial means, if one party agrees to sell its data and transfer its 
permit rights to the other.
16 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 98.
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10 Other Issues
Our discussion has not covered all the policy questions that concern new uses of subsurface resources, 
and the new possibilities of dispute that accompany them. CCS is but one of a number of emerging 
technologies. It is fair to say that up to five or ten years ago few of them had drawn any attention in 
New Zealand. There is no general process for the management of conflicts over subsurface resources 
in New Zealand. Even though the foregoing discussion has been focussed on petroleum, other 
resources and possible resources may require analysis in relation to CCS:
• Coal and coal seam methane
• Natural gas storage
• Subsurface disposal of waste fluids
• Geothermal energy
• Deep potable water aquifers 
• Minerals in deep saline aquifers.17
11 CCS and Enhanced Oil Recovery
A particular situation where CCS and petroleum activity come together is the use of CO2 as a solvent 
in enhanced oil recovery (EOR).18 CO2 or CO2-rich gases can be injected into an oil-bearing formation in 
order to stimulate oil recovery, after more conventional methods of production are no longer effective. 
Injected supercritical CO2 is miscible with petroleum, and allows more petroleum to be released from 
rock pores and flow towards a well for extraction. In some formations EOR with CO2 may recover an 
additional 25 to 40 per cent of the oil; but not all formations are amenable to CO2-EOR. Approximately 
50 per cent of the injected CO2 is returned to the surface with the produced oil and can be recycled for 
further use and the remainder is stored; this is known as “incidental” storage. This is to be distinguished 
from “incremental” storage which results where the depleted oil formation is later used for CO2 
storage.19 Even though there is no substantial record of EOR operations in New Zealand, experience 
over some decades internationally demonstrates the feasibility of sequestering CO2 in the producing 
formation. The Weyburn Project in Saskatchewan is an example.
17 Generally on such matters see Field et al, above n 1.
18 There is also enhanced gas recovery (EGR) and the term enhanced hydrocarbon recovery (EHR) is in use as well. EOR is a tertiary 
production method. 
19 The range of 30–50% CO2 left in formations is referred to by R Macrory and others, Legal Status of CO2-Enhanced Oil Recovery 
(UCL Carbon Capture Legal Programme, 2013) at 8. One study suggests that the Permian Basin in West Texas can sequester 
3 kg of CO2 per 1 kg of oil produced, and that the net sequestration is about 47% of what is injected; A Aycaguer, M Lev-on 
and A Winer, “Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions with Enhanced Oil Recovery Projects: A Life-cycle Assessment Approach” 
(2001) Energy Fuels 15: 303-308. But see S Hovorka, EOR as Sequestration: Geoscience Perspective (White Paper for Symposium 
on Role of EOR in Accelerating Deployment of CCS, 2010) who cautions that sequestration potential is very site-specific. 
The same caution is stated by P Marston and P Moore, “From EOR to CCS: The Evolving Legal and Regulatory Framework for 
Carbon Capture and Storage” (2008) 29 Energy Law Journal 421, 427.
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Five different scenarios have been identified:20
(i) Incidental storage during a “pure” EOR operation.
(ii) Incremental storage during EOR operations, maximising the quantity of CO2 injected for a given 
amount of oil production.
(iii) Incremental storage following termination of EOR operations. 
(iv) Storage during buffering or balancing operations.
(v) Long-term CCS storage for emission reduction purposes, ie with no EOR component.
Key issues from a regulatory point of view are the management of incidental storage from normal 
EOR operations, the transition from incidental storage to incremental storage, and the determining 
of incremental storage after the cessation of oil production.21 
Combining EOR with CCS is an attractive strategy. The combination could make CCS economically 
viable where the price of carbon and other incentives are insufficient to encourage companies to 
embark on projects. It could well be how New Zealand’s first CCS projects come into existence. 
The amount of CO2 that can be sequestered depends on a number of variables, including the location 
of injection wells, injection pressure, reservoir temperature, and the amount of water flooding 
that is used. A CCS element also requires EOR planning to investigate the integrity of the cap-rock 
more closely, the viability of higher injection pressures, and the state of existing abandoned wells. 
New EOR research is focussed on making a shift from the optimisation of petroleum recovery alone 
to the co-optimisation of petroleum recovery and CO2 storage. 
11.1 International experience with CO2-EOR
The usual pattern in most countries is that CO2-EOR projects are regulated under the petroleum 
legislation, with little alignment to the CCS or climate change aspects of the matter. In Alberta, for 
example, there is detailed regulation of EOR under the petroleum legislation, which states a clear 
objective of optimisation of petroleum recovery.22 There is no focus on emissions or monitoring, and 
the granting of offset credits under the climate change legislation is performed by a different agency 
that has no role in the design of the project. A CCS project without EOR is not regulated under the 
EOR provisions. Notable differences appear between the two kinds of regulation, for example, as to 
the baseline evaluation of the security of storage, the measuring, monitoring and verification (MMV) 
requirements, and the rules for post-closure liability.23 This creates a significant regulatory gap. In 
Saskatchewan CO2-EOR (including the Weyburn Midale projects) is regulated under the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act with no special provisions for CCS.24 In the European Union, the 2009 CCS Directive 
20 R Macrory and others, Legal Status of CO2-Enhanced Oil Recovery (UCL Carbon Capture Legal Programme, 2013) at 8.
21 J Garrett and S McCoy, 4th IEA International CCS Regulatory Network Meeting: Workshop Report 2012 (2012) at 21.
22 Alberta is an example: Energy Resources Conservation Board (now the Alberta Energy Regulator) Directive 065: Resources 
Applications for Oil and Gas Reservoirs, s 2.1.2, made under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act RSA 2000 c. O-5. In Alberta, 
there are six CO2-EOR projects approved.
23 See S Bonham and I Chrysostomidis, Regulatory Challenges and Key Lessons Learned From Real World Development of CCS 
Projects: Final Report (CO2 Capture Project, 2012).
24 RSS 1978 c. O-2.
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requires its provisions to apply to EOR if combined with geological storage.25 In the United Kingdom, 
the Energy Act 2008, foreshadowing the 2009 Directive, gives the Minister power to make orders 
extending the CCS regime to EOR for the purposes of the Emissions Trading Scheme, and makes 
efforts to harmonise and integrate the petroleum and CCS regimes, but inconsistencies remain and 
the effect is not clear.26
Texas, which has long experience in regulating EOR, appears to be at the forefront in developing 
specific geological storage rules which explicitly contemplate permitting a project as both an EOR 
project and a CO2 geological storage project. The rules provide for regulation of EOR, of CCS, or both 
simultaneously. The Director may require an operator to apply for a permit for CO2 storage if the well 
is no longer needed for EOR.27 
One difficulty that has been identified with the transition from EOR to CCS, or from incidental to 
incremental storage, is that the EOR operator will have had no obligation to carry out a full site 
characterisation to CCS standards. There will have been no compulsory baseline monitoring and 
site selection, although it may have been carried out voluntarily. This may not be careful enough, 
especially as to cap-rock formations. The EU Guidance Document on characterisation of the storage 
complex says:28
Reliance on a simplistic assumption that hydrocarbons have previously been trapped to prove the 
effectiveness of the seal will not be a prudent approach to characterisation of a potential storage 
complex and surrounding area.
Ensuring that CO2 storage will be permanent requires a sufficient cap rock covering the area, whereas 
oil and gas operations have no great need to investigate the cap rock. 
Overseas experience shows that a regulatory framework that brings the petroleum and the CCS 
aspects of CO2-EOR together is not easy to devise. There are few precedents to follow. That suggests 
that in New Zealand it is too early to get ahead of international practice and devise an elaborate 
fully-integrated statutory framework. What we propose are some limited measures to provide 
alignment and to eliminate barriers.
25 In Europe, an EHR / EOR project is not in itself within the scope of the EU Directive 2009/31/EC on CCS, but a mixed or 
combined project is: recital 20 of the Preamble. See H C Bugge, An Overview about Status of CCS and CCS Regulation, and Legal 
and Regulatory Change with Respect to CCS in Norway, Appendix C. There are very limited provisions in Australian legislation: 
Singleton and Garwych, above n 4, at 314.
26 Macrory and others, above n 20 at 23–24. 
27 Texas Administrative Code, Title 16 Economic Regulation, Part 1 Railway Commission of Texas, Chap 5 Carbon Dioxide (CO2), 
Subchap B Geologic Storage and Associated Injection of Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Rule § 5.201; <www.sos.state.tx.us/
tac/index.shtml>.
28 European Commission, Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide: Guidance 
Document 2: Characterisation of the Storage Complex, CO2 Stream Composition, Monitoring and Corrective Measures (2011) 
at 17.
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11.2 CO2-EOR in New Zealand
In New Zealand, EOR activity is probably authorised under the general rights granted to the holder of a 
petroleum mining permit under the CMA, subject to the acquisition of resource consents as necessary 
under the RMA. There is no specific provision for EOR with or without CO2.
29 
A CO2-EOR project could well be an early opportunity for a CCS operation in New Zealand. The economic 
benefits from enhanced oil production could combine with modest price pressure on greenhouse gas 
emissions in order to make a project attractive. The matter therefore appears to be a priority for attention. 
There is a CCS rationale for development of the regulatory framework for EOR operations under the 
Crown Minerals Act, in order to provide a measure of clarity and certainty about how such operations may 
be planned. We think it necessary that a company operating EOR and wishing to gain credits under the 
Emissions Trading Scheme should be required to come under the CCS regulatory regime. This will require it 
to undertake a site characterisation assessment prior to an injection permit being granted, and to ensure that 
measuring, monitoring and verification occurs, and that long-term liability will be provided for; however, it 
may be possible to devise a co-ordinated and appropriate path towards obtaining a CCS injection permit.
As to the proposed CCS legislation, we recommend:
• The proposed CCS legislation should be written so as to be open to the prospect of an EOR project 
providing geosequestration. 
• The regulation of CCS injection operations should be expressed in a manner that avoids making the use 
of CO2 for petroleum EOR purposes unlawful.
• The responsible Minister should have power, jointly with the Minister of Energy if that is a different 
minister, to recommend regulations for a co-ordinated approach to EOR with CCS characteristics. 
Regulations could co-ordinate the processes of the CCS legislation and the CMA, in ways that ensure 
that the objectives and the substantive requirements of both statutes are met. Processes will need to 
deal with projects that are from the start planned for both EOR and CCS purposes, and also with projects 
that start as EOR and only later pursue CCS purposes. 
29 The Crown Minerals (Petroleum) Regulations 2007 reg 34B require notice to be given before conducting “well stimulation operations” 
which are defined to include “any operation performed on a hydrocarbon reservoir in order to restore or enhance the reservoir’s 
productive potential by improving the flow of hydrocarbons into the well bore.” However this bare notice provision is very different 
from the detailed regulation found in most jurisdictions. RMA questions and land ownership questions about injection would need to 
be addressed as they were for CCS in Chapters 3 and 4. Such questions open up the possibility that the CCS legislation once enacted 
could provide a better regulatory pathway than the CMA, until such time as the latter Act addresses EOR thoroughly. 
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As to the Crown Minerals Act we recommend:
• CMA decision-makers can, and should, take CCS matters (the desirability of geological storage of CO2) 
into account in making decisions under the CMA. This is necessary, for example, to ensure that an EOR 
project can be evaluated both for its production of petroleum and for its sequestration of CO2. Without 
changes to the CMA, especially its stated purpose in section 1A, it will not be possible for CCS matters to 
be taken into account at all. Such changes would not require EOR projects to have a CCS character, they 
would simply ensure that if they are presented with that character then their appraisal can take that into 
account. This change would also open the door to the Minerals Programme stating that “good industry 
practice” can include CCS or sequestration. 
• The definition of “mining” (ie production) under the CMA should be amended to include CCS 
storage incidental to an authorised EOR activity. 
As to the Climate Change Response Act we recommend:
• It should be possible for the operator of a CO2-EOR project to become a voluntary participant in 
the Emissions Trading Scheme in order to claim credits in NZUs for removal activities, but only if 
an injection permit has been issued for the project under the CCS legislation. The operator of a 
CO2-EOR scheme who is operating only under the CMA should not be able to claim credits.
30
12 Recommendations
1. Conflicts between CCS activities and CMA activities should be avoided and resolved by vesting 
discretionary powers of a brief and reasonably general kind in the Minister or Ministers to 
evaluate the merits of the competing proposals, and to make decisions in the public interest. 
The powers will use methods of spatial separation (although it is unlikely to be the preferred 
option), permit applications and permit conditions, and the control of specific activities. 
2. The powers of the Minister or Ministers to avoid and resolve conflicts between CCS and CMA 
activities will apply to both CCS and CMA activities and will require provisions in both Acts. 
An amendment to the CMA will ensure that the Minister and other decision-makers may, and 
are required to, take into account CCS matters in making decisions under the CMA on permits, 
permit conditions and regulations. The amendment should ensure that the purpose of the CMA 
stated in section 1A does not prevent decision-makers from taking CCS considerations into 
account in the administration of the Act. 
3. The legislation should provide for the recognition of co-ordination agreements between resource 
users and should provide procedures for dispute resolution where necessary.
30 Carbon accounting is a major issue in law reform for EOR-CO2 in some jurisdictions especially ones with a baseline-and-credit scheme 
for GHG management. In those places a difficult question is whether a life cycle assessment should include the consumption of the 
additional oil produced. Fortunately such problems do not seem to arise under the NZ ETS: see Chapter 11.
Carbon Capture and Storage: Designing the Legal and Regulatory Framework for New Zealand164
4. The following matters and principles should be taken into account in the making of decisions on 
permits and conditions under the CMA and the CCS Act: 
 (i) Activity in both CCS and other subsurface resource uses is to be facilitated.
 (ii) Unreasonable interference with potentially useful subsurface resources should be avoided. 
 (iii) Consultation and agreement among operators is to be encouraged.
 (iv) No operator should have a veto over the activities of another operator or permit holder. 
 (v)  The Minister or Ministers are to make decisions in the public interest. The public interest can 
be left as a broad criterion to be applied in particular cases, or the legislation can make an 
effort to explain, define, and confine it.
 (vi)  Due regard should be had to the importance of investment certainty. Rights under permits 
granted before new CCS legislation comes into effect should be altered only where necessary 
in the public interest. Rights under permits where significant investments have been made in 
project development should be altered only where necessary in the public interest. 
5. The proposed CCS legislation should be written so as to be open to the possibility of encouraging 
both CCS exploration and petroleum discovery. 
6. The proposed CCS legislation should be written so as to be open to the prospect of an EOR project 
providing geosequestration. 
7. A company operating EOR and wishing to gain credits under the Emissions Trading Scheme should 
be required to come under the CCS regulatory regime. 
8. The regulation of CCS injection operations should be expressed in a manner that avoids making 
the use of CO2 for petroleum EOR purposes unlawful.
9. The responsible Minister should have power, jointly with the Minister of Energy and Resources if 
that is a different Minister, to recommend regulations for a co-ordinated approach to EOR with 
CCS characteristics. 
10. The regulatory framework for EOR operations under the CMA should be developed, in the light of 
a CCS rationale, in order to provide a measure of clarity and certainty about how such operations 
may be planned. 
11. The definition of “mining” (ie production) under the CMA should be amended to include CO2 
storage incidental to an authorised EOR activity. 
12. It should be possible for the operator of a CO2-EOR project to become a voluntary participant in 
the Emissions Trading Scheme in order to claim credits in NZUs for removal activities, but only if 
an injection permit has been issued for the project under the CCS legislation. 
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CHAPTER 8  
TRANSPORTATION OF  
CARBON DIOXIDE
1 Introduction
Carbon capture and storage operations and enhanced oil recovery operations (EOR) will commonly 
transport CO2 by pipeline from the sources where it has been captured to the storage site or EOR 
project. Pipelines involve questions of land access, safety, industry regulation, and decommissioning, 
which are dealt with in the following sections. Transportation of CO2 by pipeline is reasonably well 
understood technically, and poses few unknown risks. Although it is not risk free, it does not present 
the same explosion and pollution risks of petroleum or natural gas. On such matters and other 
engineering issues we draw on the study by Transfield Worley, Carbon Dioxide Transport and Pipelines 
- Engineering Requirements for Design, Construction and Operation,1 carried out in parallel with this 
study. In this examination of pipeline regulation we include the directly associated fittings, meters, 
valves, and compressor stations, but not pipes that form part of a capture facility or form part of an 
injection facility. We proceed on the assumption that pipeline operators may be the same companies 
that are carrying out injection operations, but that they just as well may be different companies. 
Moving CO2 by road or rail is unlikely to be important for CCS because of the cost and the complexity 
involved, having regard to the large quantities involved; according to the IPCC, transport of CO2 by 
tank truck or rail costs more than twice as much as by pipeline.2 Carbon dioxide is routinely transported 
by road for use in industry, and is covered by existing safety legislation, which will be adequate 
for if CCS road transport occurs. Moving CO2 offshore by ship is also less likely than by pipeline. 
(Transport offshore is also discussed in Chapter 9.) The generally-agreed preference is underground 
pipeline.3 Underground pipelines are more commonly accepted and are familiar in New Zealand, and 
undergrounding assists with stable process conditions, insulation, buffering, access costs, mechanical 
protection and protection from human interference.4 Because CO2 has been transported by pipeline 
for many years overseas, there is a well-understood base of engineering expertise in this area.5 
Operations, maintenance and monitoring are also well understood, and technology is available and 
routine.6 The main cause of CO2 pipeline incidents overseas appears to be material failure, followed 
1 Transfield Worley, Carbon Dioxide Transport and Pipelines - Engineering Requirements for Design, Construction and Operation, 
170212-RPT-X0001, (July 2013). 
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (2005) at 184.
3 M Roggenkamp and A Haan-Kamminga “CO2 Transportation in the European Union: Can the Regulation of CO2 Pipelines benefit 
from the Experiences of the Energy Sector” in I Havercroft, R Macrory and R Stewart (eds) Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging 
Legal and Regulatory Issues (Hart, Oxford, 2011) at 108; Transfield Worley CCS in New Zealand – Case Studies for Commercial 
Scale Plant Final Report (September 2010) at 20.
4 Transfield Worley, above n 1 at 79.
5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (2005) at 185.
6 At 186.
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by corrosion and outside force, especially vandalism.7 According to the IPCC, the risks could be similar 
to or lower than those already posed by pipelines used for oil and gas.8 
CCS projects will probably require new pipelines. It is unlikely that existing natural gas pipelines 
can be re-used, if they were available, because CCS pipelines operate at a higher pressure and have 
different design requirements. Natural gas pipeline maximum design ratings in New Zealand are 
70 bar,9 and operating pressures are usually 35 to 40 bar, depending on the age and quality of the 
asset, while CO2 in a supercritical phase is generally transported in a pressure range of 86 to 151 bar.
10 
The nature of a future New Zealand CO2 pipeline network is not easy to predict.
11 At the simpler end 
of a spectrum of possibilities is a point-to-point pipeline connecting one capture facility to a single 
storage facility. At the other end of the spectrum, a nationally planned multi-point source network 
or ‘hub’ could emerge. Building a network will be complicated by the uncertainty of the commercial 
drivers for CCS, the small number of projects, and the need to co-ordinate the plans and ambitions of 
multiple players. If there is a long interval between projects, it will not be easy to develop a network 
by scaling up; if a pipeline is built with surplus capacity for the future, there may be a long wait before 
the next project produces additional demand that will justify the underutilised capacity.12 
New Zealand does not have a specific Pipeline Act, and regulation of pipelines takes place primarily 
under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) and the Health and Safety in Employment 
(Pipelines) Regulation 1999. One possibility is to integrate transport regulation with capture and 
storage legislation.13 Overseas approaches vary; some jurisdictions offer a comprehensive statute on 
pipelines, and other jurisdictions include provision in the CCS regime. For example, Queensland and 
South Australia have integrated some aspects into CCS legislation; the OPGGSA requires a pipeline 
licence to be obtained for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, or operation of a pipeline.14 
In contrast, the Barrow Island Act of Western Australia extended the application of the Pipelines Act 
by including CO2 into the definition of petroleum. A separate new regime for CO2 pipelines has its 
attractions, but on the whole we consider it preferable to rely on existing legal constructs where 
they can be amended and adapted to deal effectively with the new technology. The IEA observes that 
transport is particularly an area where the CCS regulatory framework will involve the modification 
of existing laws rather than the introduction of new measures.15 Below we go in detail into our 
recommendation that the Health and Safety in Employment (Pipeline) Regulations 1999 should be 
extended to CO2 pipelines. 
7 World Resources Institute, CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Dioxide Capture, Transport, and Storage (2008) at 47.
8 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage “Summary for Policymakers” 
at 12.
9 Transfield Worley, CCS in New Zealand – Case Studies for Commercial Scale Plant. Final Report (September 2010) at 21, 35.
10 World Resources Institute, above n 7 at 44.
11 See the investigation by Transfield Worley, above n 1.
12 Global CCS Institute, Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Distribution Infrastructure: The Opportunities and Challenges Confronting CO2 
Transport for the Purposes of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) – An Observation Paper (August 2012) at 9.
13 Baker and McKenzie, Strategic Analysis of the Global Status of Carbon Capture and Storage: Report 3: Policies and Legislation 
Framing Carbon Capture and Storage Globally. Final Report (the Third Foundation Report) (Global CCS Institute, 2009) at 28.
14 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 210.
15 International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010) at 53.
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2 Siting and Land Access
The route of a CCS pipeline needs to be approved, and the pipeline operator needs rights to lay the 
pipeline across private and public property. In some jurisdictions this approval is described as route 
approval or siting authority. In New Zealand the matter appears to be a clear candidate for applying 
the principle of using existing law as much as possible. The RMA provides for both aspects in a 
manner that seems effective for CCS, and consistent with the use of the RMA for other CCS purposes. 
Under the RMA a pipeline operator, as a network utility operator, can obtain approval for land-use 
planning purposes and can obtain necessary property rights for access to land. Using the RMA would 
also treat CCS consistently with other pipeline projects; a new pipeline for natural gas would come 
under the RMA. The Gas Act 1992 is not relevant; even if it were amended to include CO2, it provides 
rights of entry onto private land only in relation to existing gas fittings, not a new pipeline, and it 
applies to supply, distribution, compression, and use of gas, not transmission. There does not appear 
to be any need for a new statute. 
A CO2 pipeline project may be part of a CCS injection project, or it may be separate. The law should 
make either possibility available, without trying to predict the evolution of the CCS industry, but 
it should promote procedural integration where possible. If an RMA notice of requirement for a 
designation for a pipeline is made along with a CCS injection permit, then it should be called in, and 
heard and processed with the injection permit and all ancillary applications. If a notice of requirement 
is made separately from an injection permit, then it will be a prime candidate for an RMA call-in 
anyway, along with ancillary applications, especially the applications made to regional councils. 
2.1 Pipeline siting and access approval under an  
RMA designation
The RMA was considered in detail in Chapter 2 in its application to CCS. The chief background point 
in relation to siting and land access is that under the RMA district councils and city councils (known 
as territorial authorities) have the power to control the use of land, including the use of land for a 
pipeline. The district plans of cities and districts are likely to require a pipeline proponent to obtain 
a resource consent for its project. However the role of the territorial authorities is affected by the 
power of a network utility operator to apply for a designation for a pipeline. 
Pipelines are one of a set of utility activities that are addressed by RMA provisions concerning network 
utility operators, requiring authorities, and designations. These provisions are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4, because of their importance to acquiring rights to property. A “network utility 
operator” is defined in section 166 to include a person who undertakes, or proposes to undertake, 
the distribution or transmission by pipeline of natural or manufactured gas, petroleum, biofuel, 
or geothermal energy. A network utility operator may apply to be approved as a “requiring authority.” 
A requiring authority may proceed to give a notice of requirement to a territorial authority requiring 
a designation in a district plan for a specific project. The notice must give details of the project in 
a similar manner to an application for a resource consent. The authority can state its requirements 
for safety zones as part of the notice. The procedure that must be followed provides for an open 
hearing with a right of appeal. As we noted above, the procedure may be modified and accelerated 
if the Minister calls in the designation. Once the designation is confirmed, the project becomes part 
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of the district plan so that the requiring authority need make no application for a land use consent 
to the district council. The procedure in effect gives notice to the community of the intended project, 
its route and its use of land. A designation protects the land from any use that would prevent or 
hinder the project.16 A requiring authority may use the Public Works Act 1981 to acquire land for 
a pipeline, or an interest in land such as an easement of pipeline right of way, unless it is able to obtain 
the necessary rights by agreement. 
A designation may be confirmed subject to conditions, in much the same way as a resource consent.17 
Conditions can ensure environmental protection in a number of ways, but in relation to a pipeline they can 
particularly impose requirements for environmental rehabilitation when a pipeline is decommissioned.
As we recommended in Chapter 4, section 166 of the RMA should be amended so that a company 
that undertakes, or proposes to undertake the distribution or transmission by pipeline of CO2 has the 
status of a network utility operator (along with a company undertaking CCS injection operations). 
We consider that this provides an effective means of approving the selection of a pipeline route 
and making land acquisition possible, especially because its procedures can include a call-in and 
integration with injection permit procedures. 
2.2 RMA controls outside a pipeline designation
The designation procedure under the RMA concerns territorial authorities, district plans, land use, 
and land acquisition. It does not limit the powers of regional councils, and it does not affect the 
obligation of a pipeline operator to apply for a resource consent for a number of activities associated 
with pipeline construction such as earthworks, stream crossings, vegetation clearance, and incidental 
discharges of gas or liquids to land, water, or air. If a pipeline goes out to sea, it will require a coastal 
permit for the occupation of space, disturbance of the seabed, and incidental effects. Marine pipelines 
are dealt with in Chapter 9. 
The application of RMA environmental controls of this kind to CCS pipelines raises many of the 
same questions about the application of the RMA generally that were addressed in Chapter 2. 
The recommendations that we made there and in other parts of this Report appear to be equally 
applicable to CCS pipelines. In particular:
(i)  Pipelines can be included in the procedures we propose for the integrated processing and hearing 
of an application for a CCS injection project. The law should allow an application for an injection 
permit to be considered along with an associated pipeline, and should equally allow applications 
for a pipeline and for injection separately. The procedures, modelled on RMA call-in procedures, 
will ensure co-ordinated decision-making.
(ii)  A National Policy Statement and a National Environmental Standard for CCS should extend in 
their provisions to CCS pipelines. 
16 Resource Management Act 1991, s 176.
17 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 168A(4), 171(2), and 174(4). An outline plan of the work must show any other matters 
proposed to avoid, remedy or mitigate any adverse effects on the environment: s 176A(3). 
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3 Safety
As noted above, the safety requirements of CO2 pipelines are well known. The effects of a CO2 pipeline 
accident on the environment or on human health and safety are likely to be less serious than those 
from natural gas, petroleum, and hazardous liquid pipelines. Regulating the safety of pipelines covers 
the construction, design and operation of the system, and includes maintenance and inspection. 
There is much international writing on the design and operational standards for CO2 pipelines. 
The Australian standard “AS 2885 – Pipelines – Gas and Liquid Petroleum” was revised in 2012 to 
incorporate guidelines for transport of CO2. Its application in New Zealand is discussed below. 
Another expression of current best practice is Design and Operation of CO2 Pipelines: Recommended 
Best Practice by Det Norske Veritas.18 The International Standards Organisation has announced its 
intention to develop a standard covering the full life-cycle of a CCS project.19 New Zealand participates 
in that work as an observer. 
3.1 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992
The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 was outlined in Chapter 2. It is relevant to CCS 
pipelines as well as CCS injection facilities. The general obligation to take all practicable steps to 
ensure that a place of work does not present a hazard to non-employees and people in the vicinity 
of the place of work is particularly relevant to pipelines.20 Before the HSEA was enacted, natural 
gas pipelines and their like were regulated by authorisations under the Petroleum Act, which were 
equivalent to a licence and prescribed in detail how the pipeline could be constructed and operated.21 
Under the HSEA the control of pipelines is not prescriptive in that way; instead, the chief mechanisms 
are the HSE (Pipelines) Regulations 1999, compliance with approved standards, and a certificate of 
fitness issued by a recognised inspection body. 
3.1.1 Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999
The Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999 appear to be suitable for the 
regulation of the safety aspects of a CCS pipeline carrying CO2, including pipeline design and operation. 
We consider different aspects in turn. The first is whether the Regulations apply as they stand to a CCS 
pipeline carrying CO2, most probably supercritical CO2. Regulation 2 defines a pipeline as: 
[A]ny pipeline or proposed pipeline likely to be permanent and used or intended to be used for 
the conveyance of any mineral, petroleum, geothermal fluid, natural gas, or any other fluid that,  
at ambient conditions, has inherent properties that may create a significant hazard[.]
18 In particular, see Det Norske Veritas, Design and Operation of CO2 Pipelines: Recommended Best Practice DNV-RP-J202 
(April 2010). See Global CCS Institute, Global Status of CCS (2012) at 125 for a table of existing standards.
19 Global CCS Institute, Global Status of CCS (2012) at 125.
20 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, ss 6 and 16. The duties are restricted to taking “all practicable steps” to ensure that 
there is no hazard. The duty to persons in the vicinity of the place (relevant to pipelines) is expressed in broad terms; the duties 
to persons in the work place who are not employees or invitees vary in character. 
21 Department of Labour, Guidelines for a Certificate of Fitness for High Pressure Gas and Liquids Transmission Pipelines 
(OSH 3430, February 2002) at 8, 9.
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Is CO2 a fluid that, at ambient conditions, has inherent properties that may create a hazard? Ambient 
conditions relate to the temperature and pressure of the surrounding environment. Carbon dioxide 
is benign at low concentrations, as part of human respiration for example, but unless it is diluted it 
is dangerous; walking into a room filled with pure CO2 is hazardous, if not lethal. A CO2 pipeline is 
therefore probably subject to the Regulations, although it is not as clear as it should be. The definition 
of a pipeline in regulation 2 includes compressors and related fittings. However it excludes a bulk 
storage operation, a pipeline within a plant, and a pipeline offshore that forms part of an offshore 
petroleum operation. This is consistent with industry norms, but arguably it leaves us with a lack of 
consistency for CO2 pipelines that form part of an offshore petroleum installation, because they will 
not be regulated under the Pipeline Regulations. There is also a lack of clarity on the point where the 
pipeline forms part of the offshore installation, but again one might expect that industry expectations 
would apply. There also seems to be some inconsistency for EOR operations. 
We recommend an amendment to make it clear that a CO2 pipeline is included in the Regulations. 
 The amendment should include CO2 pipelines for EOR purposes as well as CCS purposes. 
The amendment should make it clear that the Regulations apply to pipelines in the territorial sea, 
the exclusive economic zone, and on the extended continental shelf.22 
We recommend that the Regulations are clearer on exactly what facilities constitute a pipeline for 
the purposes of the Regulations. They should ensure that it is clear at what point, at what flange, the 
overall regulatory system ceases to control the CCS system as a capture facility, and, at the other end, 
at what point does the system cease to be a pipeline and becomes an injection facility. For CCS, it is 
important that there is a clear chain of custody, and a clear intermeshing of regulatory responsibility. 
The second issue is whether the Regulations can sufficiently regulate the safety aspects of CO2 
pipelines for CCS. The Regulations impose a general duty that complements those under the Act 
itself. Regulation 6 states:
An employer must take all practicable steps to—
(a) prevent the uncontrolled release of hazardous liquids, vapours, and gases; and
(b) prevent the uncontrolled accumulation of hazardous vapours and gases; and
(c) detect any hazardous accumulation of vapours or gases; and
(d) protect pipeline workers working in areas where hazardous liquids, vapours, or gases may 
exist, particularly in confined spaces.
Other general duties of an employer company are to have an identified manager supervising health 
and safety aspects, to mark the pipeline location, to keep land owners notified of hazards and contact 
persons, and to ensure that work around a pipeline causes no hazard. The company must give notice 
to the Secretary before beginning pipeline construction, operation, or abandonment.23 
22 Generally see Chapter 9 on the offshore legal framework. Ensuring that the Regulations apply beyond the territorial sea may 
require an amendment of the statute, not only the Regulations. 
23 Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999, reg 12.
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The notice must include full details of the company, the pipeline, plans, details of the material to be 
transported, working pressure, and hydrostatic test records. These notification requirements are light, 
in being qualified by the “all practicable steps” and in not requiring the approval of the Secretary for 
the activity.24 
Standards, design requirements and operation requirements are central parts of the regulation of 
pipeline safety, dealt with under regulation 8. An employer company must take all practicable steps 
to ensure that the pipeline is designed, constructed, operated, and maintained, and suspended or 
abandoned, in accordance with the appropriate part or parts of one of the four standards listed in the 
regulation. Regulation 8 goes on to say that if no standards are applicable then the work must be in 
accordance with generally accepted and appropriate industry practice. Promulgated international 
standards would certainly be a guide to such practice. Fortunately, much work has been done in 
this area and many international standards for CO2 pipelines are becoming available.
25 Standards 
covering design and operation include inspection, monitoring and testing, and integrity assessments.26 
We recommend that the Regulations give clear guidance to CCS pipeline designers and operators by 
ensuring that suitable up-to-date international standards apply in New Zealand.
One of the four standards stated in regulation 8 as available for an employer (pipeline company) to 
use is “NZS/AS 2885, Pipelines – Gas and Liquid Petroleum.” The Australian version of this Standard 
was revised in 2012 to cover the transport of CO2. However it is not clear that this revision is available 
under the regulation, because the regulation does not state that it includes amendments or updates 
made from time to time. The regulation lists the three parts of the Standard, which are dated 1995 
and 1997. In addition it does not appear that Standards New Zealand has adopted the Australian 
2012 amendments. The Transfield Worley study has identified possible problems if the new Australian 
standard is applied in New Zealand without modification of the current pressure limitations.27
The general law does not appear to provide any route for deeming a reference to a standard to be a 
reference to a standard as revised or amended from time to time.28 This is a shortcoming in our legal 
arrangements for the use of standards generally and not only in relation to CCS.
A certificate of fitness, issued by a recognised inspection body, is required for a pipeline before it can 
be operated: regulation 11. The Secretary may recognise a body as an inspection body if it operates 
effective and relevant quality assurance programmes, and is properly accredited. The inspection body 
24 It may be prudent to see a possibility that this will change. The Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and 
Extraction) Regulations 1999 had a number of such provisions, but in the 2013 Regulations many of them have changed to direct 
requirements. The emphasis on general performance standards has shifted with the requirement that a safety case be submitted 
and approved. 
25 In particular, see Det Norske Veritas Design and Operation of CO2 Pipelines: Recommended Best Practice DNV-RP-J202 
(April 2010). See Global CCS Institute Global Status of CCS (2012) at 125 for a table of existing standards. However, this research 
has not included examination of the standards themselves. 
26 See Det Norske Veritas Design and Operation of CO2 Pipelines: Recommended Best Practice DNV-RP-J202 (April 2010).
27 Transfield Worley (2013) above n 1 at 29.
28 The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 23(3) is quite clear that an amendment to material incorporated by reference 
after the commencement of the regulations shall not have effect until the regulations are changed. (However it is not clear that 
the Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations reg 8 is incorporation by reference; it may simply be reference.) 
The Standards Act 1988 s 23 says much the same thing: “A New Zealand standard may (...) be cited in an Act, regulation, or 
bylaw by the title and number given to it by the Council, and any such citation shall (unless the context otherwise requires) 
be deemed to include and refer to the latest New Zealand standard with that citation (together with any modifications to it) 
promulgated by the Council before the Act was passed or the regulation or bylaw made.” The sting is in the tail. Stability and 
clarity of the law is thereby promoted, but at a possible cost unnecessary obsolescence. 
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examines the pipeline and related equipment, and issues a certificate of fitness authorising the use 
of the pipeline. The employer must cease operations if the pipeline or equipment no longer complies 
with the certificate, unless it is allowed to operate under reduced pressures and other limitations.29 
A pipeline company must take all practicable steps to develop procedures for dealing with emergencies.30 
A thoroughly-prepared set of emergency procedures is essential. We consider that the requirement 
should be a simple and direct obligation, not qualified as to all practicable steps. Such a qualification is 
not characteristic of emerging best international practice for the management of CCS.31 
In fact, a number of obligations in the Regulations are stated as an obligation to take “all practicable 
steps” rather than simply as an obligation to do the thing. This formula should be reconsidered to 
ensure that the regulation of CO2 pipelines in New Zealand is of the same standard of quality as 
in other countries. While “all practicable steps” is suitable for a general duty to ensure safety or to 
provide a safe working environment, it is less defensible for an obligation to comply with a standard, 
or to hold a current certificate of fitness for a pipeline. In other parts of the New Zealand legal 
system, such obligations are imposed directly, and questions of practicability are taken into account 
in enforcement for non-performance of the obligation. In comparison to equivalent CCS legislation 
overseas “all practicable steps” stands out as setting an undemanding level of performance. It is good 
to see that “all practicable steps” is less of a feature of the recent HSE (Petroleum Exploration and 
Extraction) Regulations 2013.
In summary, it should be made clear that the HSE (Pipelines) Regulations apply to CO2 pipelines, 
both onshore and offshore; modern standards (with necessary modifications) for CO2 should be 
made applicable; and obligations to maintain certification and compliance with standards should be 
imposed directly without qualification as to all practicable steps. This also applies to the role of the 
Regulations in decommissioning, as noted below in this Chapter. 
3.1.2  Health and Safety in Employment (Pressure Equipment, Cranes,  
and Passenger Ropeways) Regulations 1999
The Health and Safety in Employment (Pressure Equipment, Cranes, and Passenger Ropeways) 
Regulations 1999 apply to the controller of pressure equipment (among other kinds of equipment), 
and pressure equipment includes a pressure vessel or the fittings, piping components and pressure 
piping for gases or liquids at pressures exceeding 50 kPag.32 At first sight it appears to include a pipeline 
for transporting CO2. Schedule 2 of the Regulations excludes from its operation pipelines under the 
Petroleum Act 1937 and those under the Gas Act 1992, and pressure vessels used in connection with 
compressors that compress natural gas or biogas for transmission. These exclusions do not seem to 
extend to new transmission pipelines for either natural gas or CO2. There is provision to apply for 
an exemption.33 
29 Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulation 1999, reg 11.
30 Regulation 17.
31 For example, section 126 of the Pipelines Act 2005 (Vic) requires safety management plans to be prepared before carrying 
out operations; the UK Pipelines Safety Regulations, reg 12 state that an operator shall ensure that no fluid is conveyed unless 
adequate arrangements have been made dealing with accidents, damage, or emergencies.
32 Health and Safety in Employment (Pressure Equipment, Cranes, and Passenger Ropeways) Regulations 1999, Schedule 1. 
‘Pipeline’ is also defined there. 
33 Reg 5.
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These HSE (PECPR) Regulations require the controller of equipment to which the Regulations apply 
to comply with a number of safety obligations; to obtain and have accessible certain information;34 
to take all practicable steps to ensure that the equipment is safe, is operated safely and within the 
limits it was designed to operate in, that it is maintained in a safe condition, and not operated unless it 
has a current certificate of inspection.35 The Regulations provide for inspection bodies, design verifiers 
and equipment inspectors, and for certification procedures.36 
It is unclear whether these HSE (PECPR) Regulations and the HSE (Pipeline) Regulations overlap.37 
There are differences between the two sets of Regulations, in that the former ones focus on the 
equipment used, inspection, and the prohibition of any unsafe equipment, while the focus of the 
latter is design, construction, operation and maintenance of a pipeline. However there are many 
aspects of overlap that do not seem desirable, at least in the case of a CCS pipeline, if not generally. 
The HSE (PECPR) Regulations are likely to apply to the capture aspects of a CCS operation, but we 
recommend that their effect be clarified. We have not examined whether they are suitable for that 
purpose as this is more a matter of general regulation of safety matters than the design of a specific 
CCS regulatory framework. If the PECPR Regulations are not suitable for the capture aspects of CCS, 
the legal option exists of applying for an exemption under the provision noted above, which would 
leave CCS capture facilities regulated for health and safety purposes only under the general provisions 
of the HSEA.
3.2 Other legislation 
We discussed in Chapter 3 that other legislation can be identified as likely to be applicable to pipelines, 
and generally to CCS operations. The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNOA) 
is one such Act. Its main application will be in labelling requirements. 
If CO2 were to be transported in containers the Hazardous Substances (Tank Wagons and Transportable 
Containers) Regulations 2004 would apply, as would the Hazardous Substances (Compressed Gases) 
Regulations 2004, and the Land Transport Rule: Dangerous Goods 2005. (The Maritime Rules under 
the Maritime Transport Act 1994 have further requirements for marine transport.) 
The Building Act 2004 also has application to CCS pipelines. A pipeline is not a building within the 
meaning of the Act if it is part of a network utility operation system owned or controlled by a network 
utility operator, who is defined as a person who inter alia undertakes or proposes to undertake the 
distribution or transmission by pipeline of natural or manufactured gas, petroleum, biofuel, or 
geothermal energy.38 We recommend that a pipeline for CO2 is added to this the definition. 
34 Reg 8.
35 Reg 10.
36 Regs 24, 25, 26, 27, Part 5.
37 The question may not have come up in practice if no new natural gas transmission line has been constructed since the repeal of 
the Petroleum Act 1937 in 1992. 
38 Building Act 2004, ss 7 and 9. The definition of a network utility operator makes no reference to the same status under the 
Resource Management Act 1991, so RMA status does not govern the Building Act status. 
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3.3 Conclusions on pipeline safety
In general we believe that CCS pipeline safety regulation can be carried out satisfactorily under the 
HSEA, with minor changes to bring CCS under it as recommended above.
Although organisational matters are not central to the purpose of this analysis, we make two points 
in relation to the organisational arrangements for the regulation of CCS pipeline safety. First, there is 
a good case from an administrative point of view for the High Hazards Unit (HHU), or any successor 
of it, to have jurisdiction over CCS pipelines. The HHU will move from the Ministry of Business 
Innovation and Employment with other workplace safety regulators to WorkSafe New Zealand. 
In the petroleum industry, wellsite operations come under the HHU but natural gas pipelines do 
not. At least in CCS, we consider that a better-integrated result will come from the inclusion of CCS 
pipelines as well as CCS injection sites within the work of the HHU, even though there is not a good 
case for describing CO2 pipelines as presenting high hazards. Secondly, we believe that the emphasis 
on co-operation and information-sharing between agencies that has been renewed after the Pike 
River Coal Mine disaster should extend to CCS.39 This emphasis is a welcome departure from the 
tendency of the last two decades to keep departmental functions separate, in silos, and to keep 
information gathering under one Act restricted to the purposes of that Act alone. Provisions inserted 
in the Crown Minerals Act 1991 in 2013 are examples to follow.40 
4 Industry Regulation Including Third Party 
Access and Price Control
A CCS project is a system of parts, in capture, transport and injection, that need to be co-ordinated, in 
respect of matters such as the despatch of CO2 from capture facilities, the provision and cost of pipeline 
services, and decisions about future investment in pipeline capacity. A CCS project that only involves 
one company, or one consortium or joint venture, will be able to co-ordinate such matters internally, 
without reference to external parties. That may be common in the early stages of CCS activity in 
New Zealand. However, it is desirable to look ahead to a more complex future, where pipelines 
are carrying gas from multiple capture facilities to multiple injection sites. In such circumstances, 
with multiple parties, more effort would be required to co-ordinate industry functions, and to make 
decisions on the management and extension of the system. In addition, it is possible that a major 
transmission pipeline would have an effectual monopoly. 
Experience of Industry Regulation in Electricity and Natural Gas.  There is a good deal of experience 
in dealing with such matters in relation to electricity and natural gas. In both industries, the provision 
of services is through a system that co-ordinates production, transmission, distribution and demand. 
The co-ordination exists on a general level, with respect to investment in new construction, and on a 
minute-by-minute level to match supply and demand. Transmission and distribution have monopoly 
characteristics. 
39 Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy: Volume 1 (October 2012) at 29.
40 For example, ss 90E and 90G, and s 33D. 
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Electricity is regulated under the Electricity Industry Act 2010 and the Electricity Act 1992. 
For some years in the 1990s and early 2000s, there was no formal regulation of industry issues in 
either electricity or gas. Self-regulation under multiparty contracts was able to deal effectively with 
metering and reconciliation. In the electricity industry self-regulation established and maintained 
the New Zealand Electricity Market at the wholesale level. Third party access issues were resolved 
in 1998 by the separation of electricity distribution functions from generation and retail, so that 
Transpower (owner of the national grid) and the local distribution companies could not compete 
with their customers in selling energy while running the monopoly transport system as well. 
The NZEM provided despatch and reserve functions, broadly equivalent to balancing and nominations. 
However self-regulation reached its limits and in 2003 the electricity industry became subject to 
statutory regulation by the Electricity Commission, which was succeeded by the Electricity Authority. 
Under statutory regulation there is now a clear procedure for the approval of new projects, especially 
transmission lines, that includes statements of opportunities, a grid investment test, and evaluation 
of grid upgrade proposals. For the allocation of costs among multiple users, the Transmission Pricing 
Methodology can be put in place after consultation. These procedures are complex, but they provide 
a pathway for decisions on proposals to invest capital in shared infrastructure projects and 
on payment for their use. Under self-regulation it was not easy or even possible to reach agreement 
on such matters. 
In the natural gas industry, a different path was taken. No wholesale market like the NZEM was 
established, and instead of statutory regulation a form of co-regulation was adopted. The Gas 
Industry Company was established in 2004 as an industry body with considerable authority to 
conduct industry self-regulation, but within the framework of the Gas Act 1992 to express the 
public interests in the matter and to give statutory backing to the system. This co-regulation has 
achieved a number of successes, but there have been several difficulties with balancing arrangements 
and in the availability of genuine third party access. The system may also struggle if a gas discovery 
outside Taranaki should require multiple parties to be involved in building and operating a major 
new pipeline.41 
In both industries, the prices of transmission and distribution are controlled by the Commerce 
Commission under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 1986. Initially a system of targeted price control was 
employed, bringing control in to effect only if thresholds of price and quality were breached. However 
this presented difficulties, and transmission and distribution are now generally regulated for price 
under a system that is called ‘default/customised price-quality path regulation.’
Issues.  From an overview of experience in the electricity and natural gas industries, one can identify 
industry regulation and governance issues that are likely to arise in relation to CCS.
(i)  Metering and reconciliation – rules to record the movement of quantities of gas.
(ii)  Gas quality. The quality of CO2 that can be injected into a shared pipeline system must 
be specified. 
41 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: New Zealand 2010 Review (2011) at 88; B Barton, “Law and 
Regulation for Energy Networks in New Zealand” in M Roggenkamp, L Barrera-Hernández., D Zillman, I del Guayo (eds), Energy 
Networks and the Law: Innovative Solutions in Changing Markets (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 274-291.
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(iii)  Balancing – day-to-day management of the inventory of gas in a pipeline in relation to 
nominations by shippers of quantities of gas for transport
(iv) Allocation of capacity rights, especially where spare pipeline capacity is low. 
(v)  Third party access – the rights of shippers to use a monopoly pipeline to sell gas in competition 
with the owner of the pipeline. Access to other essential facilities may also be an issue. 
Regulation can apply if negotiation is not successful. 
(vi) Approval of new projects involving more than one party.
(vii) Allocation of the costs for the use of shared infrastructure.
(viii) Price control of pipelines and other infrastructure with monopoly characteristics. 
Gas Quality.  Gas quality, point (ii) above, is significant for the safety, design and cost-effectiveness 
of a CO2 pipeline and storage system. Gases other than CO2 in the gas stream entering a pipeline can 
present technical challenges.42 Non-condensable gases such as oxygen, nitrogen, and methane can 
make it difficult to compress CO2 so as to enter its supercritical phase. Oxygen in the CO2 can lead 
to overheating at the injection point,43 and water in the CO2 stream increases the risk of corrosion of 
steel.44 Which of these issues will arise will vary; different industrial and natural sources and processes 
will produce different quality gas streams, and different engineering solutions will be possible to 
produce safe and cost-effective results. So flexibility is required. A single-project pipeline linking one 
source to one injection point may need no elaborate rules, and only notification of gas quality to the 
CCS regulator. A more complex network may require rules. We recommend a power in the CCS Act to 
require notification and to make regulations for gas quality.45 Regulations can deal with odourisation, 
which is favoured in some jurisdictions. The power to make regulations should be constrained to 
ensure conformity for marine CCS with the amendment of the London Dumping Protocol in 2006 to 
authorise CCS injection into the seabed only if the gas stream consists “overwhelmingly” of CO2.
46 
This applies to the territorial sea or coastal marine area as well as the EEZ. The Protocol obligation has 
been followed in law in Europe and in Queensland.47 
Third Party Access.  An example of a third party access provision for CCS is found in South Australia 
where the Minister may require the holder of a pipeline licence to convey a regulated substance for 
another person on terms mutually agreed by the parties, and failing agreement the Minister may 
determine the terms and conditions.48 The Pipeline Act 2005 of Victoria provides for third party 
42 Global CCS Institute, above n 12, at 33.
43 World Resources Institute, above n 7, at 45.
44 See Transfield Worley (2013) above n 1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report includes an example 
of quality specifications from the Canyon Reef Carriers, which was the first large CO2 pipeline in the United States. The pipeline 
was built in the 1970s and conveys 12,000 tonnes of CO2 daily. The specifications state the CO2 content shall be at least 95%, 
with permitted maximum amounts of water, hydrogen sulphide, total sulphur, nitrogen, hydrocarbons, oxygen, and glycol, and 
a maximum permitted temperature for the CO2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage, above n 5, at 182.
45 An example is section 45 of the Gas Act 1992; all gas supplied shall be of a quality and pressure prescribed under regulations.
46 London Dumping Protocol, Annex 1, Article 4.
47 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Article 12; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2009 (Qld), s 12. 
48 Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 (Sth Australia), s 49.
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access by saying that a licensee may enter into an agreement, but where there is failure to agree an 
application may be made to the Minister for a direction. In contrast, the Australian Commonwealth 
legislation simply says that a pipeline licence is subject to regulations that may be imposed for 
third party access.49 
Price Control.  The control of the prices and tariffs of CO2 gas transmission and related services could be 
carried out under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 1986. The power already exists under section 52N of that 
Act for the making of an Order in Council to impose Part 4 regulation on particular goods or services. 
Options.  In relation to the character of regulation to address these matters, options include self-regulation, 
co-regulation, and conventional regulation. The first two of those are suited to mature industries, and 
would need to be implemented in a way that would avoid the challenges that have accompanied them 
in other network industries. In relation to the level of detail of regulation, the possible options range 
from a simple approach that might include doing nothing, to an elaborate regulatory framework ready 
to handle all kinds of industry issues. The problem with an elaborate framework can be simply stated; 
until an actual CCS system appears in New Zealand, with more than one party involved in a connected 
network, it is hard to say what regulation should be put in place. It is undesirable to try to look too far 
ahead and enact legislation on the basis of what would be little more than conjecture. However some 
basic provisions in the CCS law will be beneficial, indeed necessary. They will give answers to some 
of the questions most likely to arise in the medium term. They will signal the likely future development 
of the law, and that will increase investment certainty. 
Recommendations.  We recommend therefore that the CCS legislation should authorise the making 
of regulations for industry regulation and governance, including metering and reconciliation, third 
party access to pipelines and other essential facilities, and the allocation of costs for shared facilities. 
5 Decommissioning 
Decommissioning, although it will not arise for many years, is an important part of the regulatory 
framework for pipelines. It could be covered by the HSEA and the RMA, with or without amendments, 
or it could be addressed under the CCS Act either through a pipeline permitting regime or by being 
directly imposed. 
Decommissioning generally involves the removal of surface facilities and restoration of the site following 
cessation of operations. Some jurisdictions also provide for removal of the pipelines, but this may not 
be essential and may cause more harm to ecological systems than if the pipelines were to remain where 
they lay.50 Indeed, pipelines conveying substances that pose more significant risks and hazards than CO2 
are not required to be removed, and it is quite possible that it is not necessary or desirable to excavate 
the entire pipe. The alternative is to leave the pipe in place, fill with water or inert material, plug it, 
and remove all surface equipment. A CO2 pipeline will leave far less residue than an oil or gas pipeline. 
There is little New Zealand experience with the removal or decommissioning of pipelines. 
49 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act (Cth), s 212.
50 An example is s 55 of the Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 (South Australia) which provides that where the pipeline 
has not been in use for a continuous period of more than three years the Minister may require its removal.
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The situation offshore is different; the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement states a policy of 
promoting the efficient use of occupied space in the coastal marine area by requiring the removal 
of any abandoned or redundant structure that has no heritage, amenity or reuse value.51 This could 
readily be interpreted to require removal only of structures on or close to the surface of the seabed. 
However, if the complete removal of a pipeline was insisted on, it would require a resource consent 
from the regional council. 
Ideally, a legal framework will not only prescribe decommissioning requirements but will also ensure 
that financial assurance is provided by a bond or otherwise for remediation and rehabilitation expenses. 
5.1 Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines)  
Regulations 1999 
The Health and Safety in Employment (Pipeline) Regulations do not specifically require a pipeline to 
be abandoned on cessation of operations. Nor do they state what abandonment involves. They do, 
however, require an employer to take all practicable steps to ensure that no hazard is created when 
a pipeline operation is being abandoned, and to notify the Secretary before abandonment of a pipeline 
of the name and address of every employer and manager appointed under the Regulations, the 
estimated date of abandonment, details of depressurisation, purging, cleaning and sealing, any details 
of changes to any existing cathodic protection system, and the details as to the practicable steps to 
be taken to ensure no hazard is created. There is no requirement that the Secretary approve these 
details. The Regulations require an employer to take all practicable steps to ensure that abandonment 
is in accordance with appropriate part or parts of the standards stated in regulation 8.52 We consider 
that our recommendation at 3.1.1 of this Chapter, above, should apply here, to impose the obligation 
to comply with standards directly without qualification as to all practicable steps.
5.2 Environmental rehabilitation under the RMA
The environmental aspects of decommissioning a CO2 pipeline on land will be dealt with under the 
RMA. (The environmental effects of pipelines beyond the territorial sea are regulated under the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 and are considered 
in Chapter 9.) A CCS pipeline of any size is likely to be approved by the making of a designation, 
accompanied by the grant of a number of ancillary regional council resource consents for earthworks, 
stream crossings, vegetation clearance, and incidental discharges of gas or liquids to land, water, 
and air. Conditions on the designation and the ancillary resource consents can include requirements 
for the rehabilitation of the environment when the pipeline is decommissioned. These requirements 
are likely to be stated in general terms, because any detail is likely to be obsolete by the time that 
a pipeline has reached the end of its useful life. 
51 New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010, policy 6(e).
52 The Recommended Practice DNV-RP-J202 Design and Operation of CO2 Pipelines (April 2010) does not include decommissioning, 
but the CO2PIPETRANS project covers the pipeline life-cycle and will include decommissioning. Whether the ISO standards will 
include decommissioning is unknown.
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A National Policy Statement for CCS can play a role in pipeline decommissioning by requiring decision 
makers (including those deciding on a designation) to have particular regard to relevant matters. 
A National Environmental Standard can go further, specifying that a disused CO2 pipeline is a controlled 
activity and then proceeding to impose requirements for rehabilitation and financial assurance. 
The requirements should be flexible and performance-based in their character so as to apply effectively 
to different sites and different technologies. Section 43D of the RMA states the relationship between 
a designation and an NES. 
We recommend that a National Environmental Standard and a National Policy Statement under the 
RMA make provision for the decommissioning of a CO2 pipeline. 
5.3 A different option: the CCS Act 
For the sake of completeness, however, we note another option of dealing with decommissioning 
under the CCS Act. The CCS Act could institute pipeline permits, with decommissioning requirements 
imposed as conditions of the permit. Or the CCS Act could simply impose decommissioning 
requirements directly, without the need for a pipeline permit. A permitting regime provides clarity and 
a sense of simplicity. This option is discussed below, as it would provide a comprehensive approach to 
pipeline regulation. However we do not consider that decommissioning questions alone require such 
an approach; the HSEA and the RMA seem to provide an adequate framework. 
6 The Form of Pipeline Regulation 
It is apparent from the discussion in this Chapter that a number of options are available. 
(i)  A new Pipeline Act with a permitting regime, including access to land, decommissioning, 
construction, operation and management, industry regulation and third party access. 
This option would involve a complete change to the New Zealand regulatory framework for 
pipelines and change of this magnitude is not necessary nor desirable. 
(ii)  A CCS Act with pipeline permits. This option may look tidy, and there are plenty of international 
examples, however, the result would be regulation of pipelines for CCS purposes differently from 
that of other kinds of pipelines. That is also undesirable. 
(iii)  A CCS Act working with the HSEA and RMA. The CCS Act would cover matters that are not 
dealt with under the HSEA or RMA, imposing obligations directly on any person who operates 
a CCS pipeline, but relying primarily on the existing legislation for health and safety and for the 
environment. This option is equally tidy, and has many international precedents. 
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As will be evident, in our view the best option is option (iii), the CCS Act working with the HSEA and 
RMA, and relying on them as much as possible. It is consistent with the principle that the existing 
regime for petroleum pipelines apply to CCS pipelines as far as possible.53 The key elements that 
cannot be provided for under existing legislation are industry regulation, including gas quality and 
third party access. Apart from those matters, our existing legal framework provides an adequate 
means of regulating pipelines for CO2. 
We reiterate that it should be possible for a company to obtain permission for a CCS pipeline 
separately from, or together with, permission for an injection project.54 Applications for approvals for 
either the transport phase or the injection phase should be able to stand independently or together. 
7 Emissions Accounting from the 
Transportation Phase
We propose in Chapter 11 of this Report that the CO2 emitter and the injection facilities be participants 
under the Emissions Trading Scheme.55 That appears to eliminate the need for transport facilities to be 
included separately under the scheme. Any discharge of CO2 or leakage from transportation would be 
accounted for by the fact that the capture facility has surrendered obligations for the total amount 
of CO2 that it has emitted, and that the injection facility receives credits only for the amount of CO2 
that it actually injects. 
8 Recommendations
1. As also recommended in Chapter 4, the RMA should be amended so that a company that 
undertakes, or proposes to undertake, the distribution or transmission of CO2 has the status of a 
network utility operator in order to be able to obtain a designation and rights of land acquisition. 
2. Where an RMA notice of requirement for a CO2 pipeline is made along with a CCS injection permit, 
it should be called in and heard and processed with that application and all ancillary applications, in 
order to provide procedural integration; but a separate application for a pipeline designation should 
also be possible. A National Policy Statement and a National Environmental Standard for CCS 
should extend in their provisions to CCS pipelines, and in particular decommissioning requirements.
53 R Pritchard, Carbon Capture and Storage – A Review of the Australian Legal and Regulatory Regime (June 2013) Appendix A.
54 Although permission is not required to construct a pipeline per se, consent will be needed by the regional council for ancillary 
activities covered by the RMA and details under the HSE Pipelines Regulations are to be provided to the Secretary before a 
pipeline is constructed or operated.
55 See Chapter 11 on the Emissions Trading Scheme, particularly 4.2: Losses During Transport.
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3. The Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999 should be amended: 
 (a)  to include pipelines carrying CO2, including pipelines in the territorial sea, the exclusive 
economic zone, and on the extended continental shelf;
 (b)  to clarify at what point a pipeline becomes part of an offshore petroleum installation and 
more generally exactly what facilities constitute a pipeline;
 (c)  to ensure that suitable up-do-date standards covering CCS pipelines specifically apply, 
without relying on a broad reference to generally accepted practice; 
 (d)  to ensure that obligations to maintain certification and compliance with standards are 
imposed directly without qualification as to “all practicable steps;” 
 (e)  to ensure that the effect of the HSE (Pressure Equipment, Cranes, and Passenger Ropeways) 
Regulations 1999 on the CCS stages of capture, transport, and injections is clarified. 
4. The Building Act 2004 should be amended to include a CO2 pipeline operator as a network 
utility operator.
5. The new CCS Act should include a power to require the notification of pipeline gas quality and 
a power to make regulations for pipeline gas quality. The power to make regulations for gas quality 
should refer to the requirements of the London Dumping Protocol.
6. The new CCS Act should authorise the making of regulations for industry regulation and 
governance, including metering and reconciliation, third party access to pipelines and other 
essential facilities, and the allocation of costs for shared facilities.
7. We recommend that a National Environmental Standard and a National Policy Statement under 
the RMA make provision for the decommissioning of a CO2 pipeline. 
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CHAPTER 9  
OFFSHORE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter concerns the regulation of carbon capture and storage at sea, or marine CCS – CCS 
in New Zealand’s territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and extended continental shelf. 
It first examines the significance of international law, then the effect of existing domestic legislation 
in the EEZ and extended continental shelf, and then addresses the impact of existing legislation in 
the territorial sea. It then examines regulation of the transport phase of marine CCS, which is most 
likely to be by submarine pipeline. The technical possibility of storing CO2 in deep ocean water is not 
considered because it is prohibited under international law.1 Although the physical, biological and 
regulatory environment in which marine CCS will occur is different from that onshore, many of the 
issues are the same. This chapter addresses the specifically marine aspects of the law. We note in 
passing the possible application of other marine legislation to a particular project, such as the Marine 
Mammals Protection Act 1978, Marine Reserves Act 1971, and Wildlife Act 1953. We also note that 
the application of laws of general application to either the territorial sea or to the exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf may need to be examined carefully. 
Globally, two of the 17 large scale integrated CCS projects presently operating or under construction 
are offshore, the Sleipner and Snøhvit projects, both off Norway. Of the 68 projects operating or 
under construction, or identified as in earlier stages of planning and evaluation, 13 are offshore.2 
The offshore storage capacity for CCS injection in New Zealand is not currently well understood, 
although potentially suitable formations have been identified – particularly off Waikato between the 
Manukau and Kawhia Harbours,3 and in the partially depleted Maui4 and Pohokura5 oil and gas fields 
off Taranaki. 
1 It is a form of marine dumping prohibited under the London Dumping Protocol.
2 Global CCS Institute, The Global Status of CCS Update January 2013 (Global CCS Institute, 2013); Global CCS Institute, 
Status of CCS Project Database, available www.globalccsinstitute.com as at 30 June 2013.
3 V Stagpoole, H Bushe and M Milner, Opportunities for Underground Geological Storage of CO2 in New Zealand: Report CCS-08/4 – 
Offshore Waikato Region (GNS Science, Report 2009/57, 2009).
4 The distance of the site from land and proximity to an active fault have been seen as barriers; PR King, KJ Bland, RH Funnell, 
R Archer and L Lever, Opportunities for Underground Storage of CO2 in New Zealand: Report CCS-08/5 – Onshore Taranaki Basin 
Overview (GNS Science, Report 2009/58, 2008) at 92.
5 The continued use of the field for natural gas production is seen as a limitation to its use for CCS; King and others, above n 4, at 95.
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1 The Impact of International Law on Marine 
CCS Injection and Post-Injection
1.1 Introduction
Although international law is not directly binding in the New Zealand domestic legal system, it remains 
important for marine CCS for two reasons. First, New Zealand is obliged on a state level to honour 
its international obligations by legislating consistently with them. Second, international law can be 
directly referenced or incorporated in legislation and thus become domestically binding, or aid in the 
interpretation of legislation where there is ambiguity, or where the implementation of international 
obligations is part of the purpose of the statute.6
Two kinds of international law, both treaty based, are relevant to marine CCS regulation. First, the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)7 provides jurisdiction for states to 
regulate various matters depending on the marine zone in question. Second, UNCLOS and other 
treaties provide substantive rules on environmental protection. Globally, no treaties specifically 
prohibit marine geological CCS, nor do they regulate it in detail.8 This is largely because the treaties 
affecting CCS the most have a primary purpose of preventing or mitigating the impacts of dumping, 
in the sense of the deliberate disposal at sea of waste and material of all kinds, and have not been 
developed to facilitate CCS. International developments have largely focused on removing barriers 
rather than imposing active regulation.9 
1.2 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
jurisdiction 
The most important jurisdictional provisions in UNCLOS for the purposes of marine CCS are in Parts 
2, 5 and 6. They divide coastal waters, broadly speaking, into four zones: internal waters (on the 
landward side of the baseline which runs along the low water mark and across bays), the territorial 
sea (extending from the baseline to 12 nautical miles), the contiguous zone (an overlay on the EEZ 
6 Police v Teddy [2013] NZHC 432, [2013] NZAR 299 at [20].
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 
16 November 1994).
8 Guidelines and risk assessment guidance developed under the London Dumping Protocol provide some detail, but are not 
binding as a matter of international law. 
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Special Report on Carbon Capture and Storage (2005) at 254.
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extending to 24 nautical miles from the baseline) and the EEZ (which extends to 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline and includes the underlying seabed). The jurisdiction provided to coastal states 
diminishes in each zone according to how far it is from the baseline. For all practical purposes, the 
regime in UNCLOS relating to the “EEZ” (which includes both to the water column and its underlying 
seabed and subsoil) is identical to the separate and overlapping regime in UNCLOS relating to the 
“continental shelf” (which includes only the seabed and subsoil). These regimes are provided for 
separately for historical reasons. The regimes are different only to the extent that the continental 
shelf extends beyond the EEZ, where this is labelled as the “extended continental shelf” and where 
the overlying water column is subject to the high seas regime.10
As for the territorial sea, Article 2 of the Convention provides that a coastal state’s sovereignty extends 
to its territorial sea, including its seabed and subsoil, but that sovereignty is subject to the Convention. 
In particular, the Convention provides a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea to the 
vessels of other states, and more generally Part 12 requires that the marine environment be protected 
and preserved. Sovereignty in the territorial sea is contingent on compliance with Part 12.
As to the EEZ, Article 56 sets out the rights, jurisdiction and duties of a coastal state. The jurisdiction 
is more limited than in the territorial sea, and does not amount to full sovereignty.11 Pore space in the 
continental shelf underlying the EEZ appears to amount to a “natural resource” for the purposes of CCS, 
which seems to provide a reasonable jurisdictional basis in international law for New Zealand national 
law for CCS in the EEZ.12 Jurisdiction also exists under UNCLOS in relation to offshore installations.13 
Coastal states also have sovereign rights in relation to the protection of the marine environment 
from pollution,14 and under UNCLOS have exclusive jurisdiction to engage in or authorise others to 
engage in dumping.15 As discussed below, CCS injection amounts to dumping under international law, 
which furnishes an additional and very clear jurisdictional basis for New Zealand law on the matter. 
Domestic regulation must, however, recognise the rights of other states in the EEZ, including the 
freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines.16 Article 79(4) 
affirms exclusive coastal state jurisdiction over pipelines where they are used in connection with the 
exploitation of the continental shelf, which would include CCS pipelines. A safety zone established 
around a CCS installation cannot interfere with recognised sea lanes essential to international 
navigation.17 Other provisions concern the extended continental shelf, beyond the 200 nautical 
mile limit and the international seabed area beyond the EEZ and the extended continental shelf.18 
Under UNCLOS, states are not permitted to appropriate areas of the international seabed area, and 
thus CCS injection here is currently prohibited under international law.19
10 In 2008, New Zealand received recommendations on the extent of its extended continental shelf from the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf. This area is subject to an overlay by which payments have to be made for its exploitation 
to the International Seabed Authority under Part XI of UNCLOS.
11 A full discussion of New Zealand’s jurisdiction to regulate CCS in its EEZ is contained in Appendix F, Part 1.
12 R Purdy and R Macrory, Geological Carbon Sequestration: Critical Legal Issues (Tyndall Centre, London, 2004), at 12.
13 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 58 and 60.
14 Article 56(1)(b)(iii).
15 Article 210(5).
16 Article 58.
17 Article 60(7).
18 Refer to Appendix F, Part 1.
19 Baker and McKenzie, Strategic Analysis of the Global Status of Carbon Capture and Storage Report 3: Policies and Legislation 
Framing Carbon Capture and Storage Globally (Global CCS Institute, Canberra, 2009) at 85.
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1.3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 
marine environment
Part 12 of UNCLOS addresses the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
Although CCS was not foreseen when the Convention was done in 1982, Part 12 is broadly stated 
and imposes obligations that are of general relevance to CCS.20 Perhaps most importantly, Part 
12 encourages more detailed rules to be developed internationally on pollution control, including 
dumping, which is addressed below. In summary, states have a general obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment under Article 192. Under Article 193, states have the sovereign right 
to exploit their natural resources in accordance with this duty. Article 195 provides that states must 
not transform one type of pollution into another. In practice, CCS injection is not likely to amount to 
pollution under UNCLOS, and has not been treated as such by the international community. However, 
the escape of injected gas into the water column may amount to pollution. If so, Article 204(2) would 
require that a permit for CCS be subject to monitoring to identify and respond to any leakage that is 
likely to cause harm. This is potentially significant in the domestic context, as there are questions over 
the extent to which limited duration consents under the EEZ Act and RMA are capable of imposing 
monitoring in the long term.21
Article 197 calls on states to cooperate on a global and regional basis. In the context of CCS, which 
internationally has been treated as a form of dumping, cooperation has been achieved through the 
London Dumping Convention (LDC)22 and Protocol (LDP)23 (to which New Zealand is a party) and the 
Dumping Protocol to the Noumea Convention.24 Marine CCS has generally been treated as a dumping 
under international law, rather than a land-based source of pollution. However, where injection 
occurs from pipelines and remotely controlled devices on the seafloor (rather than conventional 
“platforms”) most academic opinion appears to be of the view that this will not amount to dumping, 
and will instead be regulated under the less stringent requirements of international law on land 
based sources of pollution.25 However, this view is not unassailable, and it is recommended that the 
New Zealand law for all forms of marine CCS be conform to LDP and its related guidelines. 
Article 210(5) of UNCLOS imposes an obligation on states to require express approval for dumping, 
including CCS. That rules out what under the RMA and EEZ Act is termed permitted activity status. 
Article 210(6) also imposes an obligation on New Zealand to regulate dumping in a manner no less 
effective than the relevant “global rules and standards”, which for New Zealand would be those 
contained in the LDP. 
20 A full discussion of Part 12 is contained in Appendix F, Part 2.
21 This issue is discussed in general terms in Chapter 2.
22 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1046 UNTS 120 (signed 29 December 
1972, entered into force 30 August 1975).
23 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 36 ILM 1 
(signed 7 November 1996, entered into force 24 March 2006).
24 Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping [1986] PITSE 16 (signed 24 November 1986, 
entered into force 22 August 2005).
25 Purdy and Macrory, above n 12 at 20; J Friedrich, “Carbon Capture and Storage: A New Challenge for International Environmental 
Law” [2007] 67 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 211 at 219; International Energy Agency, 
Legal Aspects of Storing CO2: Update and Recommendations (2007) at 64; IPCC above n 9, at 255.
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1.4 London Dumping Convention and Protocol
The London Dumping Convention addresses deliberate disposal of material at sea as a form of 
marine pollution. For New Zealand, the London Dumping Protocol effectively replaces its parent 
Convention.26 It defines “dumping” as including:27 
[A]ny deliberate disposal into the sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms 
or other man-made structures at sea; [and] … any storage of wastes or other matter in the seabed 
and the subsoil thereof from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea. 
This is plainly wide enough to encompass the geological sequestration of CO2 in the seabed, and has 
been understood as such in international discussions. However dumping does not include the disposal 
or storage of wastes or other matter directly arising from or related to the exploration, exploitation 
and associated offshore processing of seabed mineral resources. Carbon dioxide injection that is for 
enhanced oil or gas recovery (EOR) is not subject to the Protocol, nor arguably is the injection of CO2 
that has been stripped from offshore natural gas,28 such as at the Sleipner CCS project in the North Sea. 
Importantly, the requirements of the LDP apply to all dumping at “sea”, which includes all marine 
waters (and underlying seabed and subsoil) other than internal waters.29 In other words, the LDP 
applies to the territorial sea, EEZ, the extended continental shelf and high seas,30 but not to waters on 
the landward side of the baseline. The LDP also applies to ships where they are loaded in the territory 
of a state party and the matter loaded is intended for dumping at “sea”.31 The Protocol implements a 
precautionary approach to dumping, by requiring parties to prohibit the dumping of wastes or other 
matter into the sea or seabed, unless they are contained within a list of substances in Annex 1 (described 
as a reverse list). Parties are obliged to require a permit for the dumping of Annex 1 substances.32 
Parties are obliged to adopt administrative measures to ensure that issuance of permits and permit 
conditions comply with provisions of Annex 2. They are also to seek opportunities to avoid dumping in 
favour of environmentally preferable alternatives. 
Prior to 2006, CO2 was not included in the reverse list of Annex 1, and marine CCS was thus prohibited 
under international law for those parties to the LDP. In 2006 the Parties to the Protocol decided to 
remove this obstruction to CCS. Annex 1(1) of the Protocol was amended to add CO2 to the list of 
materials that can be considered for dumping.33 Annex 1 is reproduced in full in Appendix F, Part 4. 
Annex 1(4) of the Protocol now imposes restrictions: 
26 London Dumping Protocol, above n 23, Article 23. The impact of the LDP on CCS regulation in New Zealand is discussed fully in 
Appendix F, Part 3.
27 London Dumping Protocol, above n 23, Article 1.
28 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 9, at 255.
29 London Dumping Protocol, above n 23, Article 1.
30 Although a coastal state only has international legal jurisdiction on the high seas in relation to its own ships and installations.
31 London Dumping Protocol, above n 23, Article 9(2).
32 Article 4. 
33 Resolution on the Amendment to Include CO2 Sequestration in Sub-Seabed Geological Formations in Annex 1 to the London 
Protocol Res LP.1(1) (2006).
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Carbon dioxide streams referred to in paragraph 1.8 may only be considered for dumping, if:
1. disposal is into a sub-seabed geological formation; and
2. they consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide. They may contain incidental associated 
substances derived from the source material and the capture and sequestration processes 
used; and
3. no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes or other matter. 
As well as the restrictions listed above, Annex 2 imposes obligations for dump-site selection, 
assessment of effects, monitoring, permitting, and conditions. (Annex 2 is reproduced in Appendix F, 
Part 4.) In summary, parties are obliged, when receiving an application to engage in CCS, to:
(i) make attempts to reduce the necessity for dumping;
(ii)  conduct a waste prevention audit (assess alternatives to dumping, including an evaluation of 
the types of wastes generated, the details of production processes, and the feasibility of waste 
prevention techniques);
(iii) require a waste prevention strategy if an opportunity exists for waste prevention;
(iv) consider whether appropriate opportunities exist to re-use, recycle or treat waste;
(v) characterise the waste according to its chemical, physical and biological properties;
(vi)  develop a national action list to provide a mechanism for screening wastes on the basis of their 
potential effects on human health and the marine environment, and categorise wastes into one 
of three possible categories;
(vii)  require information on dump-site selection, including its characteristics, the location of other 
uses and amenities, an assessment of fluxes, and feasibility;
(viii) require a comparative assessment of potential effects; 
(ix) provide for monitoring; and
(x) impose specified permit conditions, and provide for regular review of conditions.
Marine CCS is also subject to the LDP’s permitting and reporting requirements in Article 9, which is 
reproduced in full in Appendix F, Part 4. In short, Article 9 requires parties to:
(i) designate appropriate permitting, record keeping and monitoring authorities;
(ii) issue permits in accordance with the Protocol; and
(iii) report on certain matters to the IMO and other parties.
To a large degree the above requirements in Annex 2 and Article 9 are reflected in existing provisions 
in the RMA and EEZ Act regimes. However, in providing for CCS in these regimes and/or dedicated 
CCS legislation, care is needed to ensure compliance. The requirements should not be difficult to 
meet in the approval process. 
The LDP, as it currently stands, prohibits the dumping of CO2 into the water column because it falls 
outside of the specific forms of dumping allowable in Annex 1.
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It is recommended that New Zealand legislation on CCS in marine areas comply with the rules and 
criteria of the LDP for CCS as a form of dumping within the meaning of the Protocol. 
Some aspects of the LDP are relevant to the form of New Zealand legislation on CCS in marine 
areas. Article 4(1) requires that, in granting permits for Annex 1 substances, particular attention 
must be paid to opportunities to avoid dumping in favour of environmentally preferable alternatives. 
Article 4(2) requires notice to be given to the International Maritime Organisation if a form of dumping 
like CCS is prohibited. Annex 2(6) requires that a permit must be refused if the waste can instead be 
treated without undue risks. In each of these cases, CCS injection under the generic RMA / EEZ Act 
regimes would be problematic. The option recommended in this report for an overall approach of 
separate CCS legislation is therefore strengthened. 
For wider climate change policy, it is significant that the LDP stipulates that the acceptance of dumping 
does not remove the obligation to make further attempts to reduce the necessity for dumping.34 
New Zealand would therefore be obliged to accompany marine CCS with measures to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions such as by promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency. We recommend that this 
obligation be taken into account in policy making and law reform. 
1.5 Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Pacific 
Region by Dumping and Protocol on Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances Pollution, Preparedness, Response and 
Cooperation in the Pacific Region
Article 12 of the LDP provides that Parties shall cooperate on a regional basis to address dumping. 
This has led to the development of an amended Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Pacific 
Region by Dumping, under the Noumea Convention.35 
The Dumping Protocol entered into force on 22 August 1990. It does not prohibit CCS, because it 
takes the LDC approach that all dumping may be allowed as long as it does not fall within those 
substances in Annex 1. Annex 1 does not include CO2. An amended version of the Protocol as at 2006 
(although not in force) takes the opposite approach, and reflects the “reverse list” approach of the 
LDP. Under Article 4 it prohibits the dumping at sea36 of all matter37 other than those substances 
in Annex 1. Annex 1 of this version of the Protocol does not include CO2 for CCS injection. Further 
amendments to Annex 1 of the amended Noumea Dumping Protocol38 have also not entered into 
force. These amendments reflect the 2006 changes to Annex 1 of the LDP, thereby enabling CCS to 
the same extent as the version of the LDP currently in force. This version would reflect New Zealand’s 
existing obligations under the LDP but impose no more onerous obligations.
34 London Dumping Protocol, above n 23, Annex 2(1). The preamble to Resolution LP.1(1) (above n 33) explicitly provides that the 
enabling of the technology does not remove the need to address the root cause of CO2 production.
35 Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region [1986] PITSE 15 (signed 
24 November 1986, entered into force 22 August 1990). A detailed discussion of the effect of the Convention and its Protocols 
is contained in Appendix F, Part 5.
36 “Sea” is defined to include seabed and subsoil.
37 Defined in the Noumea Convention to include material and substances of any kind, form or description.
38 See Agenda Item 8.4, 11th Meeting of Parties to the Noumea Convention (30 August 2012) at 1.
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Parties to the Noumea Convention are also required to take all appropriate measures to prevent, 
reduce and where practicable eliminate pollution by the dumping matter at sea. As discussed earlier, 
injection would not likely amount to pollution. However, pollution may more likely include the escape 
of sequestered gas from the seabed into the water column, and thus New Zealand may be obliged to 
take appropriate measures to prevent such escapes. It is recommended that such requirements are 
contained within new dedicated CCS legislation, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
Another potentially relevant Protocol to the Noumea Convention is the Protocol on Hazardous 
and Noxious Substances Pollution, Preparedness, Response and Cooperation in the Pacific Region. 
This Protocol is not yet in force in any form. Broadly, parties would be required to set up systems 
for responding to pollution incidents. It is unlikely that CCS injection would amount to a pollution 
incident, but an escape of CO2 from a storage complex may do so. The Protocol would impose an 
obligation to prepare for an escape of CO2, and to engage in measures to respond to such an escape if it 
occurred.39 Irrespective of New Zealand’s international obligations on this matter, it is recommended 
that such measures be included in new CCS legislation (as discussed in Chapter 6).
1.6 Summary in relation to international law
In this section of this Chapter, we have concluded that international law provides an adequate 
jurisdictional basis for New Zealand to regulate marine CCS in the territorial sea, EEZ and extended 
continental shelf, but that it does not allow CCS injection to occur beyond the extended continental 
shelf in the international seabed area. New Zealand law for all kinds of marine CCS must conform 
to the London Dumping Protocol, specific requirements of which have been noted. New Zealand 
should also follow LDP guidelines. On the whole these requirements are manageable. They indicate 
the desirability of regulating the injection of CO2 under a new CCS Act, rather than under the RMA 
and EEZ Act. Our recommendations are listed at the end of this Chapter.
The next parts of the Chapter turn to New Zealand national law.
2 Legislation for the Exclusive Economic  
Zone, Continental Shelf, and Extended 
Continental Shelf 
2.1 Introduction
As on land, some aspects of CCS at sea are already regulated under domestic legislation. However, none 
of this law has been developed to target CCS specifically. This section considers law that is relevant to 
CCS in the EEZ and beyond. The EEZ extends two hundred nautical miles from the coastline, although 
the territorial sea (out to the twelve nautical mile limit, and considered later in this Chapter) is excluded. 
We include the extended continental shelf over which New Zealand has rights beyond the two-hundred 
39 Protocol on Hazardous and Noxious Substances Pollution, Preparedness, Response and Cooperation in the Pacific Region, Article 6.
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mile limit, although its legal character is slightly different from that of the EEZ. New Zealand has one of 
the world’s largest EEZs. We identify existing provisions that affect marine CCS activities, and the extent 
to which they are adequately regulated already. Problematic provisions are identified, and options and 
recommendations are provided. 
2.2 Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic 
Zone Act 1977
The Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 has only passing relevance 
to marine CCS. In short, the Act is concerned with the establishment of international law maritime 
zones for the purposes of domestic law, and with the setting of the geographical extent of these 
zones. It is not discussed further in this Report.
2.3 Continental Shelf Act 1964 
The Continental Shelf Act 1964 asserts New Zealand’s jurisdiction over its continental shelf, in 
accordance with the jurisdiction available under UNCLOS.40 The “continental shelf” under the Act 
is broadly similar to the EEZ, and includes the seabed and subsoil beneath the EEZ. It is different 
from the EEZ because it excludes the overlying water column and includes the “extended continental 
shelf”.41 It does not include the seabed and subsoil beneath the territorial sea.42 All rights exercisable by 
New Zealand with respect to the continental shelf and its natural resources for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting those natural resources are vested in the Crown. The resources relevant 
to CCS are “the mineral and other natural non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil”. 
The Continental Shelf Act does not provide an environmental management regime. It does not 
regulate mineral exploration or extraction other than making the Crown Minerals Act 1991 apply,43 
and other than providing for payments to be made under Article 82 of UNCLOS for the exploitation of 
the natural resources of the extended continental shelf, beyond 200 nautical miles. Any installation 
or device constructed on the continental shelf in connection with the exploration of the continental 
shelf or the exploitation of its natural resources is subject to the law of New Zealand. The Act also 
authorises the establishment of safety zones around installations or devices on the continental shelf 
or on the seabed beneath the territorial sea. 
For CCS operations to proceed on the continental shelf, we consider that no amendment of the 
Continental Shelf Act is required. This is consistent with other operations on the continental shelf 
such as petroleum operations.44 The only question that seems to arise is whether the Continental 
Shelf Act provides a secure enough basis for the extraterritorial application of New Zealand law to 
CCS installations, platforms, and pipelines in or on the EEZ or continental shelf; under section 7 the 
40 For more details, see Appendix F, Part 10. 
41 An area of seabed and subsoil beyond the 200 nautical mile limit of the EEZ, extending throughout the natural prolongation 
of the land territory of New Zealand (Continental Shelf Act 1964, s 2(1)).
42 Except for the limited purpose of making certain forms of regulations under section 8 of the Act.
43 Continental Shelf Act 1964, ss 5, 5AA, and 5A, which reflect different stages in the application of the CMA to the EEZ. 
From 24 May 2013 the CMA applies equally to petroleum and non-petroleum minerals activities in the EEZ. 
44 See ResourcesLaw International, Appendix A, Chapter 14, where it is recommended that such issues be regulated in the same 
way as with the existing petroleum industry. 
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installation must be constructed in connection with the exploitation of the natural resources of the 
continental shelf for jurisdiction to apply. This seems to be adequate to include the exploitation of 
geological storage capacity or pore space as “natural resources”. Any amendment to include CCS 
more explicitly would need to take international law into account. 
As for the extended continental shelf, CCS there is not likely in the foreseeable future, so we 
consider that no action is needed for now to address the issue of payments required under Article 82 
of UNCLOS. 
2.4 Law reform under way 
At the time of writing, the Marine Legislation Bill is expected to make substantial changes to two of the 
Acts most significant for CCS, especially in regard to discharges and dumping: the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (EEZ Act) and Maritime Transport Act 
1994 (MTA).45 In the interests of simplicity and coherence, we consider the EEZ Act and the MTA as 
if the Marine Legislation Bill is enacted in its present second reading form, as reported back from the 
Select Committee.46 Care is plainly needed with that assumption. 
A summary of the present position under the EEZ Act and MTA, prior to Marine Legislation Bill 
amendment, is as follows.47
• CCS is likely classified as “dumping” under the EEZ Act and MTA, and is thus subject to the MTA 
regime, and excluded from the EEZ Act regime.
• Because a CCS injection platform would not amount to an “offshore installation” under the MTA, 
no permit is currently required for injection in the EEZ under that (or any) Act, and that absence 
of permitting may amount to a breach of New Zealand’s international obligations under the LDP.
• Part 19 of the MTA, concerning the discharge of harmful substances, is likely not to apply to CCS 
injection because any discharge that amounts to “dumping” is excluded from the Act’s scope.
• An escape of CO2 from a CCS injection platform or storage formation does not amount to dumping 
or a harmful substance, and is not currently restricted under the MTA or the EEZ Act.
45 Since the text was written, the Bill was enacted, on 22 October 2013, as the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Amendment Act 2013 and the Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2013. Different provisions will come 
into force on different dates. 
46 The EPA has intimated that the transfer of discharge and dumping functions will occur towards the end of 2013: stakeholder 
workshop on offshore mining, NIWA Offices, 20 June 2013, response of A-J Millward (EPA) to an oral question.
47 A detailed analysis is provided in Appendix F, Part 6.
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2.5 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012 
The EEZ Act is New Zealand’s main environmental protection legislation for the EEZ. The need to 
enact legislation to protect the environment beyond the twelve nautical mile limit had long been 
recognised.48 The purpose of the Act is to promote the sustainable management of the natural 
resources of the EEZ and continental shelf, and (to summarise) to protect the environment from 
(among other things) pollution by controlling discharges and dumping.49 “Natural resources” are 
defined to include the seabed and subsoil in relation to the EEZ, and the mineral and other non-living 
resources of the seabed and subsoil in relation to the continental shelf. 
Control of activities under the EEZ Act.  Section 20 specifies a number of the activities that are 
controlled by the Act, including activities relevant to CCS; the construction of structures or submarine 
pipelines on or under the seabed, the removal of non-living natural material from the seabed or subsoil, 
the disturbance of the seabed or subsoil, and the deposit of any thing in on or under the seabed. 
However this section does not apply to the discharge of harmful substances, or to the dumping of 
waste or other matter, both of which are separately controlled.50 If the activity in question for a 
project is listed in regulations as “permitted” then no permission is required; otherwise, with few 
exceptions, it requires the project proponent to apply for and obtain a marine consent under the Act. 
The Act relies extensively on the making of regulations to provide detailed management of activities. 
Regulations can classify activities as permitted (requiring no marine consent), discretionary (requiring 
consent to be obtained from the Environmental Protection Authority), or prohibited. (A non-notified 
discretionary activity has been proposed as well.) It is reasonably clear that a marine CCS project will 
require a marine consent even if many particular activities of low environmental effect are classed as 
permitted, and even before getting to the status of the CCS injection itself. 
Rights of occupation of coastal space are not allocated under the EEZ Act. They are allocated by 
resource consent under the RMA in the territorial sea. Similar rights are also allocated to mineral and 
petroleum operators under the Crown Minerals Act 1991. Although we have not gone into the matter 
in detail, we recommend that the proposed CCS Act ensure that a CCS operator has a statutory basis 
for its occupation of marine space. (Safety zones can be provided under the Continental Shelf Act 
1964 for installations on the seabed below both the EEZ and territorial sea, although this would not 
provide an adequate legal foundation for the initial occupation by the installation.)
Control of dumping and discharges under the EEZ Act.  One of the main changes made by the Marine 
Legislation Bill is a transfer of most of the provisions on dumping and discharges in the EEZ from the 
MTA to the EEZ Act. As for discharges, the MTA will continue to regulate discharges from ships, with the 
exception of mining discharges. All other discharges will be regulated under the EEZ Act. 
48 Atkins Holm Joseph Majeury and ERM NZ Ltd, Comparative Review of Health, Safety and Environmental Legislation for Offshore 
Petroleum Operations (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2010); B Barton, “Offshore Petroleum and Minerals” 
[2011] NZLJ 211; K A Palmer, “Environmental Management of Oil and Gas Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf of New Zealand” (2013) 31 JERL 123.
49 Marine Legislation Bill, cl 92 inserting a new s 10 in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) 
Act 2012. 
50 Marine Legislation Bill, cl 96 inserting a new s 20 in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) 
Act 2012. 
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Of the term “discharge” the Act says, in terms that are materially the same as the MTA, that “[d]
ischarge includes any release, disposal, spilling, leaking, pumping, emitting, or emptying; but does 
not include dumping”.51 The scheme is that anything that amounts to dumping is not subject to the 
discharge provisions of the Act. “Dumping” is defined in the same section of the EEZ Act:52
Dumping– 
(a) means,–
(i) in relation to waste or other matter, its deliberate disposal or storage; and
(ii) in relation to a ship, an aircraft, or a structure, its deliberate disposal or abandonment; but
(b) does not include–
(i) the disposal into the sea of waste or other matter from a ship, an aircraft, or a structure, 
or the equipment of a ship, an aircraft, or a structure, if the disposal is incidental to,  
or derived from, the normal operation of the ship, aircraft, structure, or equipment; or
(ii) the disposal or storage of waste or other matter directly arising from, or related to,  
a mining activity
This new definition of dumping is plainly wide enough to include the geological sequestration of CO2, 
as is its source in the London Dumping Protocol described above. The definition is broadly the same 
as it was in the MTA.53 There is a minor difference relevant to CCS where it excludes the disposal 
or storage of matter arising from or related to a “mining activity”, while the old MTA definition 
requires it to be related to associated offshore processing of seabed mineral resources. Under the 
old definition, CO2 stripped out of natural gas produced offshore and sequestered offshore would 
therefore not be dumping if the processing was on an offshore platform, while the new definition 
excludes from the definition of dumping both that and onshore processing with a return of CO2 to the 
sea for reinjection.54 The distinction seems unintended and anomalous, and we recommend that both 
kinds of CCS activity are regulated without distinction. The exception for disposal arising from mining 
activity also extends to the injection of CO2 for the purposes of enhanced oil recovery or enhanced 
gas recovery (EOR). 
Although CCS injection that did not fall within the definition of dumping could be regulated as a 
discharge under the EEZ Act, in practice the Act only restricts the discharge of “harmful” substances. 
Regulations have yet to be promulgated to classify what qualifies as a harmful substance, but it seems 
at least possible that CO2 would not be classified as such (due to the fact it is unlikely to have adverse 
effects on the marine environment in most cases). If CO2 were not classified as a harmful substance 
(and were of a kind that did not amount to dumping), it is most likely that CCS injection in the EEZ 
would not be restricted under New Zealand law.55 This is an undesirable state of affairs. 
51 Marine Legislation Bill, cl 90 inserting new items in s 4 of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental 
Effects) Act 2012. The interpretive aid is not an exclusive definition. 
52 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, s 4.
53 Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 257 before the Marine Legislation Bill becomes law.
54 In Norway, the Sleipner CCS project is the first kind, and Snøvit the second. Both are managed under petroleum law rather than 
dedicated CCS legislation (see H-C Bugge, Appendix C).
55 It is arguable that if it were not the discharge of a harmful substance, CCS would be the “deposit of any thing … in, on or under 
the seabed” regulated under section 20 of the EEZ Act. Section 20 expressly does not apply to the discharge of a “harmful” 
substance, but arguably could apply to the discharge of a non-harmful substance. However, it seems more likely that the 
intention of the Act is for non-harmful discharges to fall outside the Act. The deposit of things in, on or under the seabed is more 
likely designed to encompass the placement of objects, such as artificial reefs, rather than discharges.
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There is a power in the EEZ Act to make regulations to prescribe substances as toxic or hazardous 
waste. If this is used for CO2, then CCS in the EEZ will be ruled out completely.
56 What is toxic or 
hazardous is not defined except by the regulations, but statutory interpretation and international 
law instruments are likely to ensure that the term is not unduly strained to apply it to CO2. Previous 
experience with the MTA suggests that CO2 is unlikely to be classified as toxic or hazardous. 
CCS Injection Presently Regulated as Dumping.  In summary, the injection of CO2 into the seabed 
of the EEZ for CCS purposes, with few exceptions, is dumping within the meaning of the EEZ Act; 
it is illegal until regulations are made and a marine dumping consent for a project as a discretionary 
activity is obtained from the Environmental Protection Authority.57 The Act, implementing the 
London Dumping Protocol, does not authorise regulations that would classify dumping as a permitted 
activity.58 However, for domestic law purposes, CCS fits uncomfortably within the concept of either 
a dumping or a discharge. As recommended in Chapter 2, injection should be managed as a separate 
activity under dedicated CCS legislation rather than a dumping or discharge under the EEZ Act 
(or the RMA).
CCS Leakage from Storage or from an Installation as a Discharge.  In contrast to the injection of 
CO2, the escape of CO2 from a storage complex or installation is classified as a discharge and not 
dumping. However, the Marine Legislation Bill proposes to continue the approach of the MTA that 
only discharges of harmful substances are restricted under the EEZ Act.59 As in the case of toxic or 
hazardous substances, there is no real definition of what is a harmful substance except for what is 
specified in EEZ Act regulations. No such regulations exist yet. The present situation under the MTA is 
that the discharge of CO2 from an installation is not the discharge of a harmful substance.
60 If CO2 were 
classified as a harmful substance under the EEZ Act, section 24A would restrict discharges from an 
injection installation into the water column, but not into the water column from a geological storage 
formation, which is not a “structure.” The result is not a strong framework for the management of 
the integrity of CCS storage formations. In fact it leaves the real possibility that CO2 leakage from 
formations would not be regulated. While such leakages are a remote possibility, and unlikely to be 
harmful if they occur (except to the overall intention of removing CO2 from the atmosphere), there 
is no doubt that they should be under statutory oversight. We recommend that there be stronger 
control of leakages from marine CCS storage formations outside of the EEZ Act.61 Jurisdiction for the 
management of storage formations should not be divided but should stay under new CCS legislation, 
56 Marine Legislation Bill, cl 100 inserting s 29A(3)(e) in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) 
Act 2012, definition in cl 90 inserting s 4, and cl 96 inserting s 24E. For the purpose of transport by ship, CO2 is considered to 
be a hazardous substance under the Maritime Transport Act regime. However, this is for ship safety purposes only (under the 
Maritime Rules) and does not mean CO2 is treated as a hazardous substance for the purposes of the Marine Protection Rules.
57 Marine Legislation Bill, cll 96 and 107, inserting ss 24F and 87B in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012. Special provisions govern the granting of a marine consent for dumping. Because it is dumping, 
CCS is not the discharge of a harmful substance, and is not the deposit of a thing under the seabed: cl 96 inserting ss 20 and 
24AA.
58 Marine Legislation Bill, cl 100 inserting s 29A(2)(c) in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental 
Effects) Act 2012. 
59 Marine Legislation Bill, cl 90 inserting s 4 definition in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental 
Effects) Act 2012; cl 96 inserting s 24A; cl 100 inserting s 29A(3). 
60 Marine Protection Rules, Part 200. Compare with Parts 24A and 150, but they deal with ship safety. 
61 For example, the EU CCS Directive provides that an operator must take corrective measures in the event of leakage, and imposes 
a duty on the regulator to do so if the operator fails to do so (see Bugge, Appendix C). Also see ResourcesLaw International, 
Appendix A, Chapter 7.
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covering both land based and marine operations. This is because detailed, industry-specific, and 
responsive regulation is needed for on-going management of CCS formations, and because the escape 
of gas from a formation is intimately connected to the regulation of the site selection and injection 
processes, already governed under CCS specific legislation. 
We make the same recommendation of stronger control of leakages or discharges of CO2 from CCS 
operations on offshore installations, under the new CCS legislation. Although this results in stricter 
regulation of CCS operations than of petroleum operations offshore, and boundary issues will arise 
where a project has both petroleum and CCS characteristics, we consider it more important to enable 
the CCS regulatory agency to be aware of and to be able to manage all CO2 leakages and discharges 
from CCS operations. 
Recommendation.  CCS is unsuited in many respects for the legislative framework of the EEZ Act. 
CCS does not fit comfortably within the concept of a dumping or a discharge. A number of limitations 
in the legislation suggest that the new CCS law should govern the injection of CO2 for CCS, the 
movement of CO2 within a storage formation, any leakage of CO2 from a storage formation, and any 
discharge or leakage of CO2 from a CCS operation on an offshore installation. Those matters should 
be removed from the EEZ Act entirely, and from its requirement for a marine consent to dump CO2, to 
discharge CO2, and to place matter under the seabed. Consent should continue to be required under 
the EEZ Act for incidental discharges and the construction and placement of structures and pipelines. 
This is similar to what we have found in relation to other legislation such as the RMA, and we make 
the same recommendation for the EEZ Act. 
New Law to Conform to London Dumping Protocol.  We recommend that new CCS legislation 
conform to the requirements of the London Dumping Protocol in respect of marine CCS. The Protocol 
requires that injection into the seabed be prohibited to the extent it does not meet the criteria specified 
in Annex 1 of the Protocol (reproduced in full in Appendix F, Part 4). National legislation must also 
require some form of authorisation to be obtained for marine CCS injection, equivalent in the EEZ Act 
and RMA to a discretionary activity; a requirement that will be met under the CCS legislation that 
we propose.62 The procedural requirements of Annex 2 of the LDP must also be reflected in national 
legislation, as noted above. Subordinate CCS legislation could usefully refer to formal guidelines 
produced under the LDP, as matters with which decisions should be consistent.63 
Ancillary Effects on the Environment.  As on land, some activities ancillary to CCS injection will require 
environmental approval. Under the EEZ Act, section 20 provides the main statement of activities that 
are controlled. It puts aside, as we have seen, dumping and the discharge of harmful substances to other 
sections, but it will catch CCS operations such as the construction and use of an injection installation 
as a structure, construction and use of a pipeline, and drilling as a disturbance of the seabed or subsoil. 
As in other parts of this Report, especially in relation to the RMA, we consider that ancillary effects 
62 The EEZ Act would have to classify CCS as a discretionary activity for it to be enabled. 
63 SG Intersessional Technical Working Group on CO2 Sequestration London Protocol: Specific Guidelines for Assessment of Carbon 
Dioxide Streams for Disposal into Sub-Seabed Geological Formations (2007), adopted by the 2nd Meeting of Contracting Parties 
under the London Protocol; SG Intersessional Technical Working Group on CO2 Sequestration Risk Assessment and Management 
Framework for CO2 Sequestration in Sub-Seabed Geological Structures (CS-SSGS)(2006), adopted at the joint session of the 
28th Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties under the London Convention and the 1st Meeting of Contracting Parties under 
the London Protocol. Part 180 Maritime Rules, Rule 180.8 is an example of such a reference. CCS literature has recognised 
the value of adapting international frameworks to national contexts: Parsons Brinckerhoff, Development of a Measurement, 
Monitoring and Verification Technical Framework for Geological Storage of CO2 in Australia (Global CCS Institute, June 2012).
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on the environment from a CCS project should remain under ordinary environmental management, 
while the core CCS functions of CO2 injection, management in the storage formation, and movement 
and leakage contingencies are moved to the CCS Act. In making that division it will be necessary to 
decide on some boundary matters, such as whether disturbance of the seabed and subsoil by drilling 
is under one Act or the other. The questions under the EEZ Act will be different from under the RMA. 
We have not sought to resolve all such boundary matters. 
Relationship between EEZ and CCS Acts.  We emphasise the importance of an aligned and unified 
procedure for CCS exploration and injection that brings together all the main questions about a 
project, whether under the RMA, EEZ Act, or CCS Act. For the main approval of a CCS project, we 
recommend a single board of inquiry that will determine whether to grant a CCS injection permit, and 
all marine consents and resource consents required for the project. 
We also consider it important to ensure that CCS decision-making under the EEZ Act is supported by 
suitable statutory guidance, standards and policy guidance in order to facilitate CCS while subjecting it 
to proper scrutiny. This guidance and direction should mirror the statutory amendments, NES and NPS 
that we consider should occur with respect to the RMA. Given the centralised nature of decision making 
under the EEZ Act, this may be easier to achieve politically than under the RMA. Just as with the RMA, 
amendments to the EEZ Act should direct a decision maker to have regard to the positive effects of CCS 
on climate change, and should prevent CCS from being obstructed by the direction in section 59(5)(b) 
not to have regard to the effects on climate change of discharging greenhouse gases into the air. 
Development of EEZ Act Regulations. With the statutory framework for the environmental 
management of the EEZ in place, more activity in making regulations can be expected. As we have 
noted, the EEZ Act makes much use of regulations to implement it in different industries and different 
circumstances. Oil and gas operations will be one of the first industries involved, for its exploration, 
development and production phases. Many oil and gas operations are similar to those required for CCS 
in their marine environmental effects. Examples are geophysical exploration, drilling rigs and wells, 
the construction and use of platforms and subsurface installations, and platforms. CCS is obviously 
different in handling a less environmentally harmful substance, but the similarities are such that there is 
considerable overlap. We recommend that CCS be part of the regulatory programme under the EEZ Act. 
A new “non-notified discretionary” activity status in the EEZ Act has been proposed as an option 
for oil and gas operations, and for dumping.64 It may be suitable for some CCS operations. For a full 
CCS injection project, however, our recommendation in this Report is that a proposal is subject to 
notification and a public board of inquiry. In addition, a Regulatory Impact Statement on EEZ Act 
regulations has considered CCS briefly, noting its predictable and low effects on the marine habitat.65 
The Statement suggests that permitted activity status would be in line with the Act, although this 
appears to overlook the LDP’s requirement that CCS be subject to obtaining an authorisation. But the 
Statement gives CCS low priority and leaves it out of the present round of regulations. 
Recommendations in relation to the EEZ Act are found at the end of this Chapter.
64 Minister for the Environment (A Adams) “Next steps for new law to protect the environment” (press release, 18 April 2013). 
Since the text was written, the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Amendment Act 2013 
has been enacted, introducing that activity, although regulations implementing it have not yet been made. 
65 Ministry for the Environment, Regulatory Impact Statement: Regulations under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act (December 2012) at paras 101-104.
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2.6 The Maritime Transport Act 1994
The Maritime Transport Act 1994 embodies rules and principles of maritime law. It implements a 
number of international conventions relating to shipping and marine matters. It contains a number 
of provisions, many of which also implement international law, on marine pollution. Maritime and 
Marine Protection Rules are made under it. Like the EEZ Act, it is expected to be affected by substantial 
amendments proposed in the Marine Legislation Bill. Three aspects of the MTA are particularly 
relevant to marine CCS.
Dumping beyond Continental Waters. The MTA will continue to regulate the dumping of matter in 
certain cases.66 One of these is emergencies, which is not important in CCS, and the other is dumping 
from New Zealand ships or installations beyond the extended continental shelf, which for CCS is 
only a distant possibility, and is currently unlawful under international law.67 It is recommended that, 
in the proposed CCS Act, New Zealand prohibit the injection of CO2 by New Zealand structures or 
vessels beyond the extended continental shelf. The result will be greater clarity, and is in accordance 
with the IEA Model Framework and what is likely to be a prohibition under UNCLOS.68 
Structures.  Hazardous offshore installations and hazardous pipelines in the territorial sea and EEZ 
are regulated by Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) under Part 20 of the MTA.69 In summary, the powers 
under Part 20 do not currently apply to a CCS injection installation, because it is not a hazardous 
offshore installation or hazardous pipeline, in that it does not discharge and is not likely to discharge 
a harmful substance into water or the seabed. In Rules relating to Part 20, CO2 is not classed as 
harmful substance. The regulation of escapes of gas from storage formations or installations therefore 
could not be achieved through the exercise of the Director’s Part 20 powers to take action regarding 
hazardous structures. We consider that this is appropriate. If a risk of leakage of CO2 from an injection 
installation meant that the installation became “hazardous” under Part 20, it would unfairly penalise 
CCS operators for the discharge of CO2 more than other CO2 emitters (who are not currently restricted 
under the MTA or EEZ Act). 
Civil Liability for Pollution Damage from Ships and Structures.  Part 25 of the MTA implements 
relevant international conventions on civil liability for pollution damage from ships and structures. 
The Marine Legislation Bill proposes to add Part 26A to the MTA, addressing civil liability for pollution 
of the marine environment from marine structures, and partially replacing Part 25.70 In summary the 
effect of these two parts is as follows.
66 Marine Legislation Bill, Sched 3 inserting new ss 262 and 262A in the Maritime Transport Act 1994. Earlier we considered the 
transfer of other dumping to the EEZ Act. 
67 See Appendix F, Part 8. It would also need a licence under s 6 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Act 1996. 
International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage: Model Regulatory Framework (2010) at 55. The model text says that 
CCS should not occur beyond the EEZ but a more correct reading of UNCLOS is that CCS is not permitted beyond the extended 
continental shelf (where a state has one). Subject to payment to the ISBA, a state’s sovereign rights in relation to the extended 
continental shelf are co-extensive with rights in relation to the continental shelf proper. Note that it is only CCS that is unlawful 
beyond continental waters, not all dumping. 
68 A state cannot appropriate an area of the international seabed area.
69 Part 20 is discussed in detail in Appendix F, Part 19. On definitions see Maritime Transport Act 1994, ss 222, 225 and 247.
70 A detailed discussion of Part 25 and proposed Part 26A is contained in Appendix F, Part 9, based on the Select Committee report. 
The Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2013 now enacts these proposals, although different provisions come into effect on 
different dates.
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(i)  A CCS injection installation is not a “structure” as currently defined in the Act, but it seems at 
least possible that a purposive approach could conclude otherwise.
(ii)  CCS injection, as long as a harmful escape of gas is not likely, would not amount to “pollution 
damage” and not trigger Parts 25 or 26A. We consider this to be appropriate. 
(iii)  An escape of CO2 from a storage formation, if it caused damage and if a structure were interpreted 
to include an injection installation, may be subject to uncapped liability under Parts 25 and 26A, 
depending on whether injection is to be characterised as dumping. 
(iv)  An escape of CO2 from a CCS injection platform would not be subject to either Part 25 or Part 26A, 
because (unless a purposive approach concluded otherwise) the platform will not amount to an 
offshore installation under the Act, and because CO2 would not amount to a harmful substance.
Liability under these Parts of the MTA will only accrue if damage actually occurs. It is generally 
thought that escapes of CO2 from an injection facility or a storage formation are unlikely to cause 
environmental damage; CO2 dissipates more rapidly than oil, it is not toxic, and it is not explosive. 
Marine pollution control under the MTA is aimed at oil and like pollutants, and does not appear to be 
well suited to the case of CCS. We have not carried out a full analysis of the possibilities of civil and 
monetary liability. What we consider important is that CCS installations be effectively managed to 
prevent leakage and discharge. We recommend that escapes of CO2 from a storage formation after 
injection, and escapes of CO2 from an injection installation in the EEZ, should be subject to the CCS 
legislation. This is because once the CO2 is stored it must remain underground if the CCS operation 
is to be effective. The EEZ Act would not be effective to achieve this kind of oversight. The CCS Act 
should provide a means to manage an operation, and if needs be to shut it down or prosecute for 
infringements of permit conditions, including conditions relating to leakage from a storage formation. 
Our recommendations in relation to the Maritime Transport Act 1994 are summarised at the end of 
this Chapter.
3 Legislation for the Territorial Sea 
In its territorial sea, extending out to the twelve nautical mile limit, New Zealand enjoys full 
sovereignty. It is a part of New Zealand for the purposes of the application of New Zealand law. 
The only material constraints are the right of innocent passage under UNCLOS, the provisions for the 
protection of the marine environment under Part 12 of UNCLOS, and the London Dumping Protocol, 
discussed above (which applies equally to the territorial sea and EEZ). The terminology used in relation 
to the territorial sea can be confusing and complex. For present purposes, the terms territorial sea, 
coastal marine area and marine and coastal area, used in different legislation, have slightly different 
meanings but refer to roughly the same area and are broadly interchangeable. In the context of this 
part of the chapter concerning domestic law, we mainly use the Resource Management Act 1991 term 
“coastal marine area” for simplicity.
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Some legislation relevant to the coastal marine area applies to CCS on land as well, notably the RMA. 
Such Acts are considered only to the extent that they apply specifically to the sea. The EEZ Act does 
not apply to coastal marine area. Aspects of the MTA, such as Part 20 (discussed above), apply to the 
coastal marine area.
3.1 The Resource Management Act 1991 in the coastal  
marine area
The Resource Management Act 1991 and its significance for CCS was considered in Chapter 2 
of this Report. The conclusion reached there was that the RMA did not provide a legal framework 
under which CCS would be possible. It recommended that new CCS legislation should be enacted 
to regulate the injection and storage of CO2, while the exploration phase, pipeline transport, and 
incidental aspects of a CCS operation would continue to be dealt with under the RMA. This section 
considers the special application of the RMA to the coastal marine area, and evaluates and applies the 
general recommendations to the matters that arise there. 
The coastal marine area is the area of foreshore, seabed and coastal water between the mean high 
water springs tide mark and the twelve nautical mile limit of the territorial sea. It is therefore much 
the same area as the territorial sea. The coastal marine area does not include the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) beyond the twelve nautical mile limit. Under the RMA, regional councils have primary 
responsibility for the regulation of activities in the coastal marine area. Regional councils have 
particular responsibility for discharges of contaminants into land, air or water in the coastal marine 
area, the dumping of matter in the coastal marine area, and rights of occupation of the coastal marine 
area.71 Discharges and dumping in the coastal marine area are restricted by sections 15A to 15C, as 
well as section 15. Special regulations also apply. Occupation of any part of the coastal marine area, 
and any construction in it or disturbance of it are restricted by section 12. In both cases a coastal 
permit, which is a kind of resource consent, can be obtained to authorise the activity, unless it is 
already authorised under a regional coastal plan as a permitted activity.
The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement is a national level instrument that provides policy 
guidance to the making of regional policy statements and coastal plans, and to the granting of coastal 
permits. Under section 58, the NZCPS can include objectives and policies relating to New Zealand’s 
international obligations affecting the coastal environment. A full discussion of the impact of the 
NZCPS is contained in Appendix F, Part 13. In summary, the present NZCPS, made in 2010, produces 
a protection-focused approach to the coastal marine area, with no specific provisions for CCS, and 
seems likely to discourage the granting of consent for CCS injection. 
Regional policy statements and regional coastal plans also contain objectives and policies that are 
relevant in determining whether a CCS proposal would meet the purpose of the RMA. They must give 
effect to the provisions of the NZCPS,72 but can provide policies that are more detailed and regionally 
specific. Regional coastal plans also contain the rules that trigger the need for a resource consent in a 
particular situation. Rules and policy guidance therefore vary from region to region, in much the same 
way as they do on land. 
71 Resource Management Act 1991, s 30.
72 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 62(3) and 67(3)(b).
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Two general sets of issues about the operation of the RMA in the coastal marine area present 
themselves for consideration in turn; discharges and dumping (relating both to CCS injection and also 
to ancillary emissions) and the occupation of coastal marine area space by a CCS operation. 
3.1.1 Discharges and dumping in the Coastal Marine Area
The RMA controls pollution in the coastal marine area in three different ways that are relevant to 
CCS, in addition to the general coastal permits required under section 12 for the use of the coastal 
marine area (such as erecting structures and disturbing the seabed).73
The first is in sections 15A-15C, which impose controls on discharges and dumping in the coastal 
marine area, in order to implement certain obligations under the London Dumping Protocol and other 
instruments. Of these sections section 15A, controlling dumping, appears at first sight to affect the 
injection of CO2 into the seabed in the coastal marine area, as it requires a resource consent to be 
obtained for dumping from an offshore installation (that is, in accordance with the LDP, dumping 
cannot be provided for as a permitted activity). However, the definition of an “offshore installation” 
in section 2 of the RMA (which refers to section 222(1) of the MTA) currently includes only those 
installations that are used for the purpose of exploration for, or the exploitation or associated 
processing of, any mineral, which appears to exclude CCS installations. Similarly, a CCS project would 
not currently require a consent under section 15B, (discharges of contaminants from installations), or 
15C (dumping or storage of hazardous and noxious substances from installations). The result of this 
is that CCS injection in the coastal marine area would instead require consent under section 15 of the 
RMA (discharges generally).
This restricted definition presents difficulties for the regulation of a non-mineral activity such as CCS 
that are apparent at several points in this analysis. It is quite likely that the exclusion of non-mineral 
installations was inadvertent, so that the complications for CCS operations come by way of a side 
wind rather than as a deliberate legislative choice. One might advance a purposive interpretation that 
the legislature spoke of the exploration and exploitation of minerals in a sense that was intended to 
include CCS, but that interpretation does seem to run counter to the express words used. We consider 
that the result is artificial and contrary to the overall intention and design of the RMA for the Act to 
draw a distinction between CCS installations and mineral installations for the purposes of its general 
regimes on discharges and dumping. In particular, the fact that an installation is used for a non-mineral 
purpose should not serve to allow the dumping of matter or the storage of radioactive or hazardous 
waste, which would otherwise be restricted or prohibited (as required by international law, and as 
provided for in section 15C and in regulations relating to dumping under section 15A). Section 15 
alone would not impose the restrictions on CCS required by the LDP. We therefore recommend that 
the definition of an “offshore installation” in section 222(1) of the MTA be amended to include all 
man-made structures in the coastal marine area. The revised definition would automatically be 
imported into the RMA, and no amendment would be required to the definition in section 2 of the Act.
73 The consents likely to be required under the Act are more fully discussed in Appendix F, Part 11. 
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Assuming this amendment was made, CCS injection would, as a form of dumping under the Act, require 
consent under section 15A of the RMA.74 Section 15B, concerning the discharge of contaminants from 
offshore installations, would not apply to the core activities of CCS injection, although incidental 
activities may trigger the section depending on the particular project. Section 15C is unlikely to apply 
to CCS operations.
The second way the RMA controls pollution in the coastal marine area is under the Resource 
Management (Marine Pollution) Regulations 199875 which control dumping and discharges from ships 
and offshore installations, and which impose further restrictions on the matters to which sections 
15A and 15B apply. Section 360(ha) of the RMA empowers these regulations to deem any activities 
to which section 15A of the Act applies (dumping) to be prohibited activities. This prohibition is then 
deemed to be included in all regional coastal plans, with the result that a person cannot apply for 
resource consent for that activity. 
In relation to dumping, the Regulations largely import the substantive requirements of the LDP 
into New Zealand law, and require applications to dump to comply with the matters in Schedule 
3 of the Regulations.76 However, they do not include the amendments made to the LDP in 2006 
regarding CCS. Regulation 4 deems certain dumping to be either prohibited or discretionary. 
The effect of regulation 4 is that the dumping of waste or other matter, other than the waste or other 
matter specified in subclauses (2) and (3) (in terms that do not include CO2), in the coastal marine 
area from an offshore installation is deemed to be a prohibited activity in any regional coastal plan 
or proposed regional coastal plan.77 Injection of CO2 in the coastal marine area amounts to dumping 
under the Act.78 Marine CCS would therefore be prohibited in the coastal marine area, assuming that 
the definition of an offshore installation was expanded to include an injection installation.
One way to remove this prohibition and facilitate CCS is to amend the Resource Management 
(Marine Pollution) Regulations by updating them in line with the 2006 amendment of the London 
Dumping Protocol that provided a path forward for CCS. However our preferred route is to remove 
CCS injection from the RMA and the Regulations altogether, consistently with our recommendations 
for onshore and for the EEZ. 
Certain kinds of ancillary discharges under section 15B that are dealt with in the Marine Pollution 
Regulations will be subject only to the Regulations rather than the provisions of the relevant regional 
plan (unless provided otherwise in the Regulations).79 These include oil (more specifically, those 
substances listed in Schedule 1 of the Regulations), noxious liquid substances (those substances listed 
in Schedule 2 of the Regulations), grade A and B treated sewage, garbage, and ballast water, along 
with discharges “made as part of normal operations of ship or offshore installation” (as described in 
Schedule 4 of the Regulations). 
74 And be subject to the prohibition in the Marine Pollution Regulations, discussed below.
75 Made under Resource Management Act 1991, s 360(1)(ha) to (hh). See an analysis of the Marine Pollution Regulations in 
Appendix F, Part 12.
76 Marine Pollution Regulations, reg 5.
77 Because it takes the approach (as did the LDP before amendment) that only the listed substances are eligible to be dumped.
78 Resource Management Act 1991, s 2.
79 Marine Pollution Regulations, reg 16; RMA, s 15B(3); Wood v West Coast RC [2000] NZRMA 193 (EnvC).
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The third way that the RMA restricts marine pollution is in section 15, which just as on land prevents 
a person from discharging a contaminant to land or water. It applies to the coastal marine area, but not 
to anything to which section 15A or section 15B applies.80 In practice, this exception would limit the 
relevance of section 15 in the coastal marine area (assuming again that the definition of an offshore 
installation were expanded), because section 15B restricts the discharge of all contaminants from 
offshore installations. Section 15 would apply to leakages from pipelines, which is discussed later. 
A related issue is the extent to which the RMA regulates the leakage of CO2 from an offshore storage 
formation out of the seabed into the water column, during or after injection.81 Here, section 15 might 
apply and require consent to be obtained, because the discharge would not be from an offshore 
installation or ship, and therefore sections 15A and 15B would not apply.
These provisions do not deal with the particular characteristics of CCS in a desirable way. In particular, 
the prohibition in the Regulations has only a general intent and should not be allowed to prevent CCS, 
especially as it has failed to keep up with the relevant international agreement. The injection of CO2, 
its storage in geological sequestration, and any possible leakages from storage, should therefore all 
be dealt with under the proposed CCS legislation rather than under the RMA, just as appears to be 
desirable onshore. Offshore the Act must give effect to Annexes 1 and 2 of the LDP, in the same way 
as the EEZ Act must. 
Ancillary discharges from CCS operations in the coastal marine area should continue to be regulated 
under the RMA, as they are with petroleum operations. We recommend that the definition of an offshore 
installation under the MTA (and therefore the RMA) be extended to include a CCS injection installation. 
This would ensure that ancillary discharges from CCS operations are governed under section 15B and the 
Marine Pollution Regulations, and would ensure compliance with obligations under the LDP.
3.1.2 Coastal occupation
While onshore rights to occupy land must be obtained as a matter of property law, offshore in the 
coastal marine area the matter is controlled by the RMA and the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai 
Moana) Act 2011. The latter Act declares that the common marine and coastal area (which is most 
of the coastal marine area)82 is owned neither by the Crown nor by any other person. Rights of 
occupation are obtained under the RMA through administrative procedures managed by regional 
councils. Designations, which we believe can play a major role for CCS onshore, are not available in 
relation to land in the coastal marine area. 
The first of the land occupation needs of a CCS project in the coastal marine area is likely to be for a 
pipeline. A CCS pipeline will probably be buried beneath the foreshore and seabed, especially near the 
shoreline, in order to minimise risks to the pipeline from interference. This will also ease interference 
with other uses of the coastal marine area, but the routing of a pipeline is still likely to be relatively 
constrained. The second use of coastal marine area land is for the wellhead and injection installations, 
including during drilling. Some installations may only be on the seabed; but in any event none of them 
will occupy much area. We consider the issues for these two kinds of coastal occupation below. 
80 Resource Management Act 1991, s 15(3); also s 12(6).
81 This is discussed in full in Appendix F, Part 15.
82 The common marine and coastal area excludes Crown land and privately owned fee simple estates.
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The third aspect of occupation can be dealt with briefly; occupation of the storage formation by 
sequestered CO2. Subsurface geological formations are as much part of the coastal marine area as 
they are part of the land owned by an onshore land owner. We do not believe that CCS can usefully 
be managed by regional councils as part of their administration of coastal occupation under the RMA. 
We recommend that the use or occupation of the subsurface of the coastal marine area for CCS 
purposes, including storage formations and pore space, be removed from control under the RMA, 
chiefly section 12(2), in the same manner as it is removed from control by land owners on shore. 
A coastal permit under section 12 should not be required for the initial or on-going occupation of 
the subsurface by injected CO2, but should still be required for the occupation of the surface of the 
coastal marine area (for example, for the footprint of the injection site and for the pipeline route). 
We recommend an amendment to section 12 of the RMA, to clarify that the presence of injected CO2 
under the seabed for the purposes of CCS does not amount to a coastal occupation for the purposes 
of the Act or require consent by virtue of section 12.
As the RMA stands at present, a CCS project using the common marine and coastal area for 
pipelines and injection facilities will require a coastal permit under section 12. The regional coastal 
plan states objectives, policies and matters to be taken into account in deciding whether to issue 
a coastal permit, just as plans do for other resource consents. The issue of a permit may also be 
affected by regulations, National Environmental Standards (NESs), National Policy Standards 
(NPSs), the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS), and policy direction in regional policy 
statements. Policy 7(1)(b) of the NZCPS requires regional coastal plans to identify areas of the 
coastal environment where particular uses are inappropriate, or may be inappropriate without 
consideration of effects through the resource consent or plan change process.
The underlying scheme of the RMA for the grant of a coastal permit for occupation of the 
common marine and coastal area, under the provisions of the regional coastal plan, is reasonably 
straightforward, but it has been made more complicated by provisions aimed at solving problems in 
aquaculture arising out of the “first in first served” rule for the allocation of space. The Act provides 
alternative methods of allocation to be used on the initiative of the regional council or the Minister of 
Conservation.83 Nonetheless, “first in first served” remains the default rule. While first in first served 
may not be suitable in a place and in an industry where there is competition for coastal space, the 
default rule may be quite adequate for a CCS project in a less busy area, especially when all that 
the project requires in an inshore area is a route for a buried pipeline, and few small installations at 
wellheads which might be inshore or well offshore. Tendering for authorisations to occupy for CCS 
projects would be inappropriate.
Coastal occupation raises reform questions that we have encountered at a number of points in the 
RMA about national consistency and the removal of undue barriers to CCS. The specific issues are 
whether a coastal permit should be required, and if so on what terms. One option is simply to take 
coastal occupation for CCS out of the RMA, and put it in the CCS Act; but that would not be consistent 
with what we have recommended for occupation rights onshore, which is to use RMA designation 
procedures. In fact, it seems quite proper that there should be scrutiny under the RMA of the siting of 
83 Cash tenders, weighted-attribute tendering, auction and balloting are all contemplated: Ministry of Fisheries, Aquaculture 
Legislative Reforms 2011, Overview; Department of Conservation, Technical Guidance Note 5 to Aquaculture Legislative Reforms 
2011: Mechanisms for Managing Allocation of Coastal Space (May 2012). A detailed analysis of Part 7A in the context of CCS is 
contained in Appendix F, Part 14.
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a CCS project; industrial facilities would be unsuitable on a waahi tapu area or a popular swimming 
beach. However it may be better to make sure of national consistency by ensuring, through an NES 
or legislation, that CCS facilities are classified as discretionary activities in regional plans, and not 
non-complying or prohibited; and that they will be evaluated on a first-in-first-served basis rather 
than ill-fitting allocation methods.84 Consistency will also be promoted by the call-in of all RMA 
applications to be heard together with the application for a CCS injection permit. 
A further issue in coastal occupation for CCS purposes is the presence of existing coastal permits 
in the way of a CCS operation. While it is unlikely that a CCS injection platform would need to be 
constructed in waters occupied by a mussel farm, it is possible that a belt of coastal permits, especially 
for aquaculture, could straddle a route for a CO2 pipeline. Section 122(5) lays down that a coastal 
permit does not grant rights of exclusive occupation unless it says so expressly and it is reasonably 
necessary to achieve the purposes of the permit to do so, but the matter has its complexities.85 
Where a coastal permit has been granted on an exclusive basis, it seems desirable that there be some 
equivalent of the powers onshore for the compulsory acquisition of the rights necessary for essential 
network operations. This could be specific to CCS, in the CCS Act, as a ministerial power to modify 
a coastal permit to allow CCS infrastructure to be constructed and operated, subject to the payment 
of compensation for losses if any. Alternatively, it could be general (because the issue seems wider 
than CCS alone) and take the form of a procedure under the RMA for the modification of the rights 
under an exclusive coastal permit to allow for network utilities or other necessary infrastructure, 
with a balancing of the interests of the two parties and compensation payable for losses if any. 
We do not choose between the alternatives, because one of them is general rather than CCS-specific, 
and simply recommend that provision be made to ensure that a CCS operation not be impeded by 
a coastal permit granted for exclusive occupation. 
The exploration phase of CCS will generally have coastal occupation needs that are only transient, 
but advanced exploration may include the drilling of a test well, and test injections. Provision for CCS 
operations (such as through an NES or call in) should facilitate exploration as well as injection. 
We therefore recommend that RMA requirements for a coastal permit for occupation of coastal space 
on the surface of the seabed apply to CCS operations (including exploration), subject to restrictions 
in an NES to prevent a CCS application from being classified in a regional plan as non-complying or 
prohibited; and to ensure that they are evaluated on a first-in-first-served basis rather than any other 
allocation method. Our more general recommendations for an NPS, an NES, and a call-in procedure 
to hear RMA matters along with CCS Act ones also apply. Changes to the NZCPS to acknowledge the 
useful possible role of marine CCS is also desirable. 
Recommendations in relation to the RMA in the coastal marine area are summarised at the end of 
the Chapter. Our more general recommendations on the application of the RMA to CCS, in Chapter 2, 
are also relevant to the application of the Act in the coastal marine area: amendments to the RMA, 
an NPS, an NES, and a call-in procedure to hear RMA matters along with CCS matters. 
84 There may be options in adapting the powers of the Minister to give directions on allocation methods under s 165K. However 
that section and related sections were not enacted to resolve CCS issues, and are not likely to provide properly for it. We have not 
explored a related question of a CCS pipeline needing to cross coastal space that is already occupied such as by a marine farm. 
85 In particular note the definition of “occupy” in section 2. 
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3.2 The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011
The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 provides for the recognition of Māori customary 
interests and title in the marine and coastal area. It declares that the “common coastal and marine 
area” has a special status, where neither the Crown nor any other person can own the land, and where 
navigation and recreational access are assured.86 The Act repealed the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 
and revived Māori customary interests which had been extinguished by that Act. The Act recognises 
three levels of interests. The first is a general right of a group exercising kaitiakitanga to participate 
in conservation processes, for example as to marine reserves or marine mammals. The second level is 
a “protected customary right” under section 51. A Māori group can obtain such a right if it can show 
that the right has been exercised since 1840, continues to be exercised, and is not extinguished. It can 
become protected if it is recognised by agreement with the Crown or by an order of the High Court. 
An application for an RMA resource consent in a protected customary right area cannot be granted if 
it will have adverse effects that are more than minor on the exercise of the right unless the right-holders 
have consented. 
The third level of interest is “customary marine title” under section 58. A Māori group can obtain 
such title if it can show that it holds an area in accordance with tikanga, and has exclusively used 
and occupied it since 1840 without substantial interruption. This will be difficult for many groups 
to establish. The title can be recognised by agreement with the Crown and ratification by an Act of 
Parliament, or by an order of the High Court. An applicant for a resource consent such as a coastal 
permit for an activity within a customary marine title area will generally require an “RMA permission 
right” from the holder of the title. Under sections 66 to 68, this permission right is discretionary and 
not subject to appeal or objection.
The Act provides for infrastructure that may need to cross either of these protected areas to be an 
“accommodated activity” under sections 63 to 65. Without it, the holders of rights to an area could 
refuse permission for necessary resource consents to be granted. The pathway to accommodated 
activity status begins with a company being a network utility operator under the RMA. It proceeds 
to impose additional requirements; reasonable necessity for national or regional social or economic 
well-being, consideration of alternative routes, and the securing of agreement or a ministerial 
override.87 Earlier in this Report, it was recommended that a CCS operator have the status of a network 
utility operator under the RMA, so the “accommodated activity” route is open. 
We recommend that the use of the subsurface of land for CCS injection and storage purposes under 
both protected customary right areas and customary title areas should be vested in the Crown as are 
such rights elsewhere; see Chapter 4. Options are available, however. Such a vesting could apply to 
protected customary right areas only, if the size and number of customary title areas is unlikely to 
interfere with foreseeable CCS operations, with the possibility of obtaining accommodated activity 
rights instead. 
86 The common coastal and marine area is identical to the coastal marine area under the RMA, except for the exclusion of privately 
owned land and certain Crown owned land: s 9. For navigation and recreation, see ss 26 and 27. A more detailed analysis of the 
impact of the Act on marine CCS is contained in Appendix F, Part 16.
87 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, s 64(2)(h), 65(1)(a)(i), and Schedule 2. These provisions are complex. 
The requirement for national or regional social or economic well-being may be difficult to meet if the benefits of CCS are 
characterised as entirely in respect of climate change. 
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4 Health and Safety 
The construction of offshore installations for petroleum activities is currently regulated under the 
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013. These 
Regulations were discussed in Chapter 6, and it was concluded that they do not currently apply to CCS 
operations, but are generally appropriate for CCS purposes, and should be amended to govern CCS.
In the marine context specifically, Part 5 of the Regulations impose requirements in relation to 
certificates of fitness and verification schemes for offshore installations.88 These requirements are 
generally appropriate as a framework to regulate the construction of offshore CCS installations. 
In Chapter 6 it was noted that it may be useful to refer to or incorporate by reference specific 
international standards on the construction of CCS installations, rather than rely on the discretion 
of an inspection body when issuing a certificate of fitness, the approval of safety cases, or “generally 
accepted and appropriate industry practice”. 
It is not clear whether the HSE Petroleum Regulations apply to the EEZ and extended continental 
shelf, or are limited to the coastal marine area. The HSEA has express application to ships and 
aircraft beyond 12 nautical miles, but is silent as to its general extraterritorial effect. The Regulations 
themselves apply to “offshore installations”, “offshore” being defined as “anywhere that is the 
seaward side of the mean high-water mark”.89 This shows an intention for the Regulations to apply in 
the EEZ and extended continental shelf. However, the matter should be clarified in the HSEA under 
which the Regulations are made.
We recommend that the construction and fitness of offshore CCS injection installations be regulated 
under the HSE Petroleum Regulations by extending their application, that reference be made to 
specific international standards on CCS, and that the application of the HSEA and its Regulations in 
the EEZ and the extended continental shelf be expressly confirmed by amending the Act.
5 The Transport Phase of Marine CCS
5.1 Introduction
The transportation phase of marine CCS involves the movement of purified, supercritical CO2 from 
capture point to injection site, via either pipeline or ship. 
The transport of CO2 by ship for CCS purposes is a distant prospect for New Zealand. Research on the 
possibility is under way internationally, but the technology is in its infancy, and shipping is not a visible 
issue in CCS law reform. If it becomes a closer prospect in New Zealand, issues such as ship construction, 
manning, operation and the management of discharges will arise mainly under the Maritime Transport Act 
1994 and the Maritime Rules made under it, and under the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 
1996. A number of international legal instruments will affect the legislation, such as MARPOL, SOLAS, and 
international codes on dangerous goods and the carriage of compressed gases. 
88 Discussed further in Appendix F, Part 17.
89 Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013, reg 3.
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5.2 International law on submarine pipelines
Pipelines are the most likely way that CO2 will be carried to offshore CCS injection sites. International 
law has only a limited impact on the regulation of CO2 pipelines. Article 79(4) of UNCLOS affirms 
coastal state jurisdiction over pipelines used in connection with the exploitation of the continental 
shelf. In allowing CCS pipelines to be constructed and used, a coastal state must also have regard 
to cables or pipelines already in position. The Basel Convention addresses the movement of hazardous 
wastes and other wastes for disposal across international borders, but is unlikely to apply to 
CCS transport.90 
5.3 Pipelines under the RMA and EEZ Act
In the coastal marine area, a coastal permit will be required under section 12 of the RMA to lay a CCS 
pipeline. This has been discussed above. 
In the coastal marine area, an unintended discharge of CO2 from a CCS pipeline before injection will 
constitute a discharge of a contaminant into water under section 15 of the RMA, and if not permitted 
may be the subject of an abatement notice, enforcement order or prosecution; but such enforcement 
action is less likely to be important where CO2 escapes have only minor or undetectable adverse 
effects on the environment. The environmental effects of an escape of CO2 from a pipeline into the 
water column are not well understood but are thought to be minor.91 The matter is discussed further 
in Chapter 8.
The more significant impact would be penalties or directions under health and safety legislation or 
dedicated CCS legislation, which should provide for design and operational standards of pipelines. 
This is discussed below.
In the EEZ, the laying of a submarine pipeline on or under the seabed requires a marine consent 
under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012.92 The 
application for a marine consent will initiate the process of examination of the environmental effects 
of the pipeline proposal. The siting of the pipeline would be part of that examination, although 
commercial questions about siting to serve multiple projects would not be considered. When a 
marine consent is issued, it will be subject to numerous conditions on the construction and operation 
of the pipeline. Conditions can authorise incidental disturbance and discharges of harmful substances 
from the pipeline. 
90 Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 1673 UNTS 57 (signed 
5 May 1992, entered into force 5 May 1992); Bech-Bruun EOR/CCS 360 Degree Legal Review (Global CCS Institute, 2012) at 24; 
IPCC Special Report on Carbon Capture and Storage (2005) at 189. The Waigani Convention (which applies to the South Pacific 
Region specifically) mirrors the substantive provisions of the Basel Convention and thus would not restrict the transport of CO2.
91 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Carbon Capture and Storage, above n 9, at 188.
92 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, s 20(2)(b). The default position until 
regulations prescribe otherwise is that all activities in s 20 are discretionary and thus require consent. The Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects – Permitted Activities) Regulations 2013 class submarine cables as a 
permitted activity, but not pipelines. Pipelines, involving more disturbance of the seabed, are likely to remain discretionary 
activities needing a marine consent.
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In the EEZ, it is desirable that regulations be made under the EEZ Act for pipelines. Regulations are 
the main way that the Act brings about the detailed management of activities, and reliance on the 
Act’s general provisions should not continue indefinitely. The first main target of EEZ Act pipeline 
regulations will probably be natural gas pipelines. We recommend that the opportunity be used to 
provide for CO2 pipelines as well. EEZ pipeline regulations can ensure suitable enforcement options 
for any environmental effects of pipelines that are restricted under the Act, including policy guidance 
around suitable alignments through sensitive areas. 
However, in contrast to the position under the RMA (where the discharge of all contaminants is 
restricted and thus subject to enforcement action), the EEZ Act restricts only the discharge of harmful 
substances.93 The Act does not empower regulations to be made for discharges of non-harmful 
substances.94 This means that the escape of CO2 from a pipeline would not be subject to the Act or 
regulations.95 A condition on a marine consent to prohibit other discharges or leaks from a pipeline 
may be desirable in order to allow enforcement action to be taken for escapes of CO2.
96 However, 
although the power of the Environment Protection Authority to impose a condition on a marine 
consent to lay a pipeline is wide, a condition must still relate to the adverse effects of the activity 
on the environment or existing interests, and not simply the effectiveness of a CCS operation. Thus 
it is possible that the EPA cannot validly impose a condition to prevent the escape of a non-harmful 
substance like CO2 from a pipeline. This is a lacuna that needs to be addressed. In relation to CCS, 
we consider that regulation and enforcement of leakage is required even if no one is hurt, no other 
interests are damaged, and the environment suffers no adverse effects, to ensure the effectiveness of 
CCS operations. How this lacuna should be addressed is discussed in a moment.
As with the RMA, other significant regulatory tools to manage leakage in the EEZ are the health 
and safety legislation and the proposed dedicated CCS legislation, which will address design and 
operational standards for pipelines and prevent leakages before they occur. 
5.4 Pipelines under the Maritime Transport Act 1994 and the 
EEZ Act 
If the Marine Legislation Bill amendments are passed into law, authorisations to lay pipelines on the 
continental shelf will be made under the EEZ Act rather than the Maritime Transport Act. Furthermore 
(as detailed in Appendix F, Part 19), the power to take action or issue instructions under Part 20 of 
the MTA (regarding hazardous pipelines) would not apply to an escape of CO2 from a CCS pipeline. 
93 The Marine Legislation Bill in cl 96 proposes that a new s 24A in the EEZ Act restrict the discharge of a harmful substance from 
structures and submarine pipelines into the sea or into or onto the seabed of the EEZ. What is a harmful substance will be 
specified by regulations: cl 90.
94 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, ss 29A and 31, as amended by clauses 100 
and 101 of the Marine Legislation Bill.
95 Although, as mentioned earlier, regulations are empowered to define what is included within the definition of a harmful 
substance. Such regulations have not yet been made. It would be open to include CO2 as a harmful substance, but we 
consider that this would be artificial given that CO2 in many cases is unlikely to cause more than minor environmental effects. 
The intention behind the transfer of discharge functions from the Maritime Transport Act to the EEZ Act does not appear to 
be a wholesale change in substantive direction: Regulatory Impact Statement: Transfer of Discharge and Dumping Regulatory 
Functions from Maritime New Zealand to the Environmental Protection Authority (September 2011). CO2 is not, and would not fit 
comfortably, within the class of substances currently listed as harmful under the Maritime Transport Act.
96 The general duty to avoid, remedy and mitigate adverse effects in s 25 is not subject to enforcement; however a breach of a 
condition is through the issue of an abatement notice: ss 125 and 132. 
CHAPTER 9: OFFSHORE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 209
It is better that the powers in Part 20 of the MTA do not apply to pipelines, as they would produce an 
undesirable overlap in jurisdiction. 
Civil liability for marine pollution more broadly remains under the Maritime Transport Act, currently 
in Part 25 and in a new Part 26A to be inserted by the Marine Legislation Bill. This was discussed 
above in the context of discharges from injection installations.97 In summary, a CCS pipeline operator 
is unlikely to be liable for an escape of CO2 under Parts 25 or 26A because CO2 is not a “harmful 
substance” under the MTA; however the Act does not prevent a person from taking other forms of 
civil action, such as an action in negligence for damages. If CO2 were classified as a harmful substance 
for the purposes of Parts 25 and 26A then a pipeline owner would be subject to additional statutory 
liability for any escape of CO2 that caused pollution damage. The case for doing so is not a strong one, 
in terms of likely slight environmental effects and in terms of unnecessarily disincentivising CCS. If it 
is done, it should be done for the purposes of Parts 25 and 26A only, and not for the wider purposes 
of the Act; that would cause an overlap of jurisdiction by enabling MNZ to take action in relation to 
hazardous pipelines under Part 20 of the MTA.
5.5 Pipelines under the Health and Safety in Employment Act
The Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999, made under the HSEA, are 
relevant to the regulation of pipelines used in CCS. The effect of these regulations is discussed in 
Chapter 8, and the conclusions reached in that chapter apply equally at sea. The applicability of the 
HSEA itself is discussed in Chapter 2.
The HSE (Pipelines) Regulations provide a logical site for the detailed regulation (construction, design 
and technical standards) of CCS pipelines on land. We recommend that the detailed regulation of marine 
pipelines as places of work be included in the HSE Pipeline Regulations. We acknowledge that the 
application of the Act and Regulations to a submarine pipeline buried below the seabed isolated from 
people, in deep water and far from shore, and posing very little risk to health and safety, is somewhat 
artificial. The HSEA and its regulations are aimed at personal health and safety. However for many 
years New Zealand has chosen to use the HSEA as the main law for the safety and physical integrity 
of installations of this kind. There is no separate statute for pipelines or for oil and gas operational 
requirements. We prefer to recommend a solution that is compatible with the general legal framework 
rather than one that departs from it. Our recommendation will provide cohesion in the statutory and 
regulatory fabric, and will impose a single regime for CCS pipelines that traverse land and marine areas. 
The HSE Pipeline Regulations will form the primary means of addressing leakage from CCS pipelines, 
given that the RMA and EEZ Act are limited in this respect, as discussed above. 
In short, we consider that the HSE Pipeline Regulations should be extended to address the design, 
construction and safety requirements of CCS pipelines through certifications of fitness, by extending 
the definition of a “pipeline” and incorporating CCS specific standards. The application of the 
Regulations in the EEZ should be clarified; at present the extraterritorial application of the HSEA 
in relation to structures is uncertain, and the HSE Pipeline Regulations do not clarify the position. 
We consider that it is desirable for the regulations and the Act to apply to pipelines and other 
structures in the EEZ which should be deemed to be places of work under the Act. 
97 A detailed discussion of liability for escapes of CO2 from pipelines is provided in Appendix F, Part 18.
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However, even with a clarification that seabed structures in the EEZ are places of work under the 
HSEA and the extension of the HSE Pipeline Regulations, there remains the gap or lacuna in the EEZ 
Act in relation to escapes of CO2 from a pipeline in the EEZ. The HSEA regime is not concerned with 
discharges which do not affect health and safety. In our view the underlying policy point is that leaks or 
discharges of CO2 from all elements of the CCS system should be subject to regulatory management, 
whether or not an environmental or health and safety issue is present. The CCS regulator should have 
all necessary powers to regulate, even though it need not do so in all cases. We see three ways to fill 
this gap, each one of which has advantages and disadvantages. 
First, it is possible to extend the EEZ Act to regulate discharges of CO2, by amending the Act in this 
specific way or by extending the definition of harmful substances under EEZ Regulations. This would 
appear logical, because it is where other discharges to the marine environment are already regulated. 
However, making a special case for discharges of CO2 could result in pressure for other special 
cases, and would not be in accordance with the basic approach that only truly harmful substances 
are intended to be regulated by the Act (as discussed above). Second, it is possible to extend the 
HSEA and its Pipeline Regulations to cover escapes of gas that do not affect health and safety. 
The regulation of the seabed in the EEZ would already be regulated here to the extent that it is a 
place of work. However, including the regulation of non-harmful discharges in an Act that does not 
generally address effects other than those on health and safety would disrupt the statutory scheme 
of the Act and make the regulation of CO2 discharges less visible. 
The third option, which on balance we prefer, is to include appropriate regulation within the proposed 
CCS Act. This is logical because the matter is peculiar to CCS. Admittedly, it places something of an 
outlier in an Act not otherwise concerned with discharges to the marine environment (other than from 
storage formations) and thus not particularly visible. But even if it is not a perfect fit, it goes in the CCS 
Act better than anywhere else. We conclude that the CCS Act should make it an offence to discharge 
CO2 from a pipeline in the EEZ or extended continental shelf unless authorised under the Act.
5.6 Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1966
The Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1966 protects cables and pipelines from 
damage, particularly from trawling and anchoring. “Pipeline” is defined to include a pipeline for the 
conveyance of gas, including natural gas, so it probably encompasses CCS pipelines.98 In short, a CCS 
operator laying a pipeline will strictly liable for any damage done to an existing pipeline or cable99 and 
criminally liable if done negligently or wilfully.100 However it will be equally protected for damage 
done to its own pipeline. Once a CCS pipeline is no longer needed or used, the owner is obliged to 
notify the Minister of this fact.101 A pipeline can also be protected under the Act by the gazetting of a 
protected area in the territorial sea or EEZ, restricting fishing and anchoring.102 We recommend that 
the Act remain applicable to marine CCS pipelines.
98 Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1966, s 2.
99 Section 7.
100 Section 11.
101 Section 9. Similarly, Policy 6 of the NZCPS provides that an abandoned or redundant structure in the coastal marine area shall 
be removed.
102 Section 12. A number of protected areas have been implemented, including in parts of the Hauraki Gulf and around the Maui A 
and B pipelines.
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5.7 Recommendations concerning transport by marine pipeline
Recommendations concerning transport of CO2 by marine pipeline are broadly the same as those 
concerning transport via pipeline on land. The routing of pipelines will be governed under the RMA 
and the EEZ Act. The general health and safety legislation should apply. Only minor modifications are 
required to produce this result. Our recommendations are summarised below. 
6 Recommendations
International law
1. International law provides an adequate basis for domestic jurisdiction to regulate marine CCS in 
the territorial sea, EEZ and extended continental shelf, but does not allow CCS injection to occur 
beyond the extended continental shelf in the international seabed area.
2. CCS operations that convey CO2 from land by pipeline to an injection installation on the seafloor, 
with no platform above the surface of the water, should be required by New Zealand law to 
comply with the requirements of the London Dumping Protocol, even if strictly they do not need 
to do so. 
3. New Zealand law for all forms of marine CCS must conform to the London Dumping Protocol, 
and in particular the following requirements: 
 (a) Disposal must be into a sub-seabed geological formation, and not into the water column; 
 (b)  The material injected must consist overwhelmingly of CO2, with no wastes added for the 
purpose of disposal; but it may contain incidental associated substances derived from the 
source material and the capture and sequestration process; and 
 (c)  The permitting process must involve the consideration of waste prevention, the treatment of 
waste, the characterisation and categorisation of waste, the provision of information on the 
selection of an appropriate dump (injection) site, a comparative assessment of effects, and 
the imposition of reviewable conditions specified in Annex 2. 
4. Marine CCS injection should be governed under a new CCS Act, and removed from the RMA and 
EEZ Act regimes. It cannot be classified as a permitted activity within the meaning of those Acts. 
5. New Zealand remains under a general obligation to accompany marine CCS with measures to 
reduce the need for CCS, such as by promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency, and this 
obligation should be taken into account in policy making and law reform.
6. A CCS Act and permits for CCS must provide for monitoring, measures to prevent escapes of CO2 
into the water column, and measures to respond to escapes if they occur. 
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Recommendations in relation to the EEZ Act 
7. In relation to the EEZ Act, we make the following recommendations (assuming that the transfer 
of control of discharge and dumping from the Maritime Transport Act, pursuant to the Marine 
Legislation Bill, takes place). Regulation of CCS (including CO2 injection, storage, and possible 
leakage) in the EEZ and the extended continental shelf should be removed from the EEZ Act and 
regulated instead under a new CCS Act. Regulation under the new CCS Act should include the 
injection of CO2 arising from offshore natural gas processing. 
8. The regulation of discharges of CO2 from injection installations in the EEZ should occur under the 
new CCS Act, rather than through an extension of the EEZ Act’s regime on harmful substances.
9. The new CCS Act should prohibit marine CCS injection that is not in accordance with Annex 1 of 
the London Dumping Protocol, and should require compliance with the processes in Annex 2 of 
the LDP. Reference should also be made to guidelines produced under the LDP, as instruments 
with which CCS operations should be consistent.
10. Until a CCS Act is enacted, dumping regulations under the EEZ Act must be consistent with the LDP 
(for example, not classifying CCS as a permitted activity) and provide an avenue for applications 
to be assessed, because in the interim CCS will be caught by the EEZ Act’s provisions on dumping.
11. The CCS Act and the EEZ Act should remove the need for marine consent under the EEZ Act 
to dump CO2, discharge CO2, or place matter under the seabed. Consent should continue to be 
required under the EEZ Act for incidental discharges, the construction and placement of structures 
and pipelines, and disturbance to the seabed. Incidental discharges of CO2 from installations in 
the EEZ should be controlled under the new CCS Act because they are unlikely to be restricted 
under the EEZ Act. 
12. A single board of inquiry process should be utilised for decision making on authorisations under 
the RMA/EEZ Act and CCS legislation, without use of a non-notified discretionary activity status. 
13. The EEZ Act should be amended to direct a decision maker to have regard to the positive effects 
of CCS on climate change, and should prevent CCS from being obstructed by the direction not to 
have regard to the effects on climate change of discharging greenhouse gases into the air.
14. CCS should be part of the regulatory programme under the EEZ Act.
Recommendations in relation to the Maritime Transport Act 1994 
15. In relation to the Maritime Transport Act 1994, we make the following recommendations assuming 
that the transfer of control of discharge and dumping from this Act to the EEZ Act takes place, 
pursuant to the Marine Legislation Bill. Marine CCS injection by a New Zealand ship or structure 
beyond the EEZ and extended continental shelf should be prohibited, and the prohibition should 
be stated in the new CCS Act.
16. The regulation of CCS storage formations (including injection and any leakage of gas) should 
occur in the new CCS Act, and not Part 20 of the MTA (which concerns hazardous structures 
and operations).
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17. The regulation of discharges of CO2 from CCS injection installations should not occur under 
Part 20 of the MTA. In the EEZ they should be subject to the new CCS Act, and, in the coastal 
marine area, to the RMA. In both they should also be subject to the Emissions Trading Scheme.
18. CO2 is not, and should not, be considered a “harmful substance” to be regulated under Part 20 
of the MTA.
19. Legal recourse for pollution damage is required by UNCLOS, and Parts 25 or 26A of the MTA should 
remain unchanged. The main control of CO2 leakage should be under the proposed CCS Act. 
20. A CCS injection installation should be included within the definition of a “structure” under the 
MTA, to ensure that any discharges of harmful substances (such as incidental discharges of oil) 
are subject to Parts 25 or 26A.
Recommendations in relation to the RMA in the coastal  
marine area 
21. The regulation of CCS injection (comprising dumping and discharge) in the coastal marine area 
should be removed from the RMA and controlled under new CCS legislation, which must conform 
to the requirements of Annexes 1 and 2 of the LDP.
22. The regulation of CCS storage formations after injection, including leakage, should also be 
removed from the RMA (and also Part 20 of the MTA) and controlled under new CCS legislation.
23. Ancillary discharges from CCS installations (including incidental discharges of CO2 to air or water) 
should be regulated under the RMA by including a CCS injection installation in the definition of an 
offshore installation under the MTA and therefore the RMA. 
24. RMA requirements for a coastal permit for occupation of coastal space should continue to 
apply to CCS surface operations (including exploration), subject to restrictions to prevent a CCS 
application from being classified in a regional plan as non-complying or prohibited; and to ensure 
that they are evaluated on a first-in-first-served basis rather than any other allocation method. 
25. The use or occupation of the subsurface of the coastal marine area for CCS purposes, including 
storage formations and pore space, should be removed from control under the RMA, so that the 
initial and continued presence of injected gas does not amount to occupation. 
26. Provision should be made to ensure that a CCS operation not be impeded by a coastal permit 
granted for exclusive occupation.
27. We recommend an amendment to section 12, to clarify that the presence of injected CO2 under 
the seabed for the purposes of CCS does not amount to a coastal occupation for the purposes of 
the Act or require consent by virtue of section 12.
28. RMA requirements should continue to apply to incidental discharges from an injection installation 
(including escapes of CO2 to air or water), noise effects, and the disturbance of the seabed in the 
coastal marine area. 
29. The NZCPS should be amended to acknowledge the benefits of marine CCS. 
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Recommendations in relation to the Marine and Coastal Area 
(Takutai Moana) Act 2011
30.  A CCS operation should have the status of an “accommodated activity” by reason of being 
a network utility operator under the RMA.
31. The use of the subsurface of land for CCS injection and storage purposes under both protected 
customary right areas and customary title areas should be vested in the Crown as are such 
rights elsewhere.
Recommendations in relation to health and safety 
32. The construction and fitness of offshore CCS injection installations should be regulated under the 
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013 by 
extending their application, that reference be made to specific international standards on CCS, 
and that the application of the HSEA and its Regulations in the EEZ and the extended continental 
shelf be expressly confirmed by amending the Act.
Recommendations in relation to transport by marine pipeline 
33. Those aspects of pipelines already regulated under the RMA (including the alignment of pipelines 
and any discharge of CO2 from pipelines) should remain under the RMA. Those aspects of pipelines 
already regulated under the EEZ Act (including alignment of pipelines) should remain under the 
EEZ Act. 
34. Regulations for pipelines, including CCS pipelines, should be made under the EEZ Act. 
35. The Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999 should be extended to apply 
to CCS pipelines in marine areas as well as onshore. Technical standards specific to CCS should be 
incorporated. The HSEA should be amended to clarify that it applies to pipelines and structures 
in the EEZ and on the extended continental shelf, and that submarine pipelines are places of work 
under the Act. 
36. The proposed CCS Act should regulate the discharge of CO2 from a pipeline in the EEZ or extended 
continental shelf. 
37. The Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1966 should continue to apply to CCS pipelines.
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CHAPTER 10  
LIABILITY
1 Introduction 
Liability is a very general term, describing any number of obligations under the legal system; it may 
be imposed by civil or criminal law, or by statute. Liability will arise where harm is caused to persons, 
property, or the environment. Most aspects of existing law imposing liability apply without difficulty 
to a CCS project during its exploration and injection phases. It will be recalled from our discussion on 
the risks of harm from CCS in Chapter 1 that as time progresses the risk reduces, and that the main 
risks arise at injection or immediately after site closure. However, it is possible that the integrity of 
the storage formation will not be as anticipated or the CO2 does not behave as expected and leakage 
results, causing harm long after injection has ceased and the site has been closed. This issue raises 
questions about the length of time that a CCS operator, and its insurers, may need to stand prepared 
to make good any harm caused and the possibility that the operator company may no longer be 
solvent or even in existence. 
The focus of this chapter is on civil law as it applies to CCS. Some aspects of this civil law apply 
to proprietary or possessory rights to land and especially the subsurface, so they touch on matters 
addressed in Chapter 4. The main issue that follows, and the main issue from a policy and law reform 
perspective, is the question of long-term liability following CCS site closure, as this is where a gap 
exists in the legal framework. 
The key issues for certain types of liability are that harm, or loss, must be proved, and must be shown 
to have been caused by the defendant’s act or omission. Because of the nature of CCS, a claimant 
may not suffer harm until operations have ceased, and the operator may no longer exist or have the 
financial ability to make good any harm caused. Overseas, the risks associated with CCS have been 
managed for some years now in relation to enhanced oil recovery and similar activities. According 
to the IEA, there are no recorded injuries or fatalities caused by leakage from CO2 pipelines, and 
there is no case law so far for liability arising from harm suffered by CO2 injection for enhanced oil 
recovery.1 Carbon dioxide is generally considered a safe and non-toxic substance, although at high 
concentrations it can be harmful and even fatal.2 
1 International Energy Agency, CO2 Capture and Storage: A Key Carbon Abatement Option (2008) at 82; M de Figueiredo, 
The Liability of Carbon Dioxide Storage (PhD thesis in Technology, Management and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2007) at 27; International Energy Agency, Legal Aspects of Storing CO2: Update and Recommendations (2007) at 41.
2 A Ingelson, A Kleffner, and N Nielson, “Long-term Liability for Carbon Capture and Storage in Depleted North American Oil and 
Gas Reservoirs – A Comparative Analysis” (2010) 31 Energy Law Journal 431, at 436.
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Before proceeding to consider the relevant civil law or private law matters, we can briefly dispose of 
questions of criminal and regulatory liability. Both cases deal with extreme situations, and in neither 
of them do we see a need for any change in the law. Criminal law punishes the wrong-doer, and does 
not restore the victim to the position they had been in but for the wrong. Criminal liability is of general 
application and not specific to activities associated with CCS. A person who has in his or her charge 
or under his or her control anything which, in the absence of care, may endanger human life is under 
a legal duty to take reasonable precautions against and to use reasonable care to avoid such danger.3 
The case law imports a wide meaning to the term “anything” and there is no reason to believe that it 
would not include CCS operations or the CO2 itself.
4 A person is liable if the act or omission is a major 
departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person; and no more than ordinary 
negligence is required.5 Further, a mistake or error of judgment does not necessarily constitute a 
failure to take reasonable care.6 Criminal nuisance occurs when a person does any unlawful act or fails 
to discharge a legal duty which he knew would endanger the lives, safety, or health of the public or 
any individual.7 An unlawful act may be a breach of legislation such as health and safety regulations.8 
If a failure to exercise this legal duty results in death of a person it is culpable homicide.9 Therefore 
any CCS operator who fails to use reasonable care to avoid causing danger to human life will be liable 
if death results. It is not necessary to prove that the accused had sole, complete, or exclusive charge 
or control of an operation. 
Regulatory liability arises out of the enforcement provisions of regulatory statutes such as the RMA, 
the EEZ Act, the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, or the Climate Change Response Act 
2002. The proposed CCS Act will have its own enforcement provisions, which should be no less 
rigorous than equivalent legislation. Regulatory enforcement generally includes the possibility of 
criminal prosecution, enforcement orders, infringement notices, and the like. 
An example is the RMA, where a defendant corporation is liable on conviction for an offence such 
as the unauthorised discharge of a contaminant to a fine not exceeding $600,000 and a fine not 
exceeding $10,000 every day for a continuing offence.10 The offence is one of strict liability subject 
to prescribed defences. In addition the Environment Court has powers to make an enforcement 
order for a person to do or to cease doing something, to remedy or mitigate adverse effects on the 
environment, and to pay for costs and expenses associated with the offence. The Court can require 
the consent authority to review the resource consent with a view to cancellation.11 For less serious 
non-compliance, an enforcement officer can issue an abatement notice or an infringement notice. 
There is no reason that regulatory provisions of this kind need alteration in their application to CCS 
operations; they are a normal part of compliance management in all businesses. 
3 Crimes Act 1961, s 156.
4 R v Turner (1995) 13 CRNZ 142, at 149 (mussel processing factory).
5 Crimes Act 1961, s 150A; Long v R (1995) 13 CRNZ 124, at 127, 128; [1995] 2 NZLR 691.
6 Long v R, ibid. 
7 Crimes Act 1961, s 145.
8 B Robertson (ed), Adams on Criminal Law (looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CA145.02]. 
9 Crimes Act 1961, s 160(2)(b).
10 Resource Management Act 1991, s 339.
11 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 128, 314 and 339.
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2 Civil liability
Civil liability for tortious actions raises issues for CCS operators under the heads of negligence, 
nuisance, and trespass. However, any claim raised under these heads will have to consider the 
elements of causation, remoteness, and any defences that may be available; a claim will turn on the 
facts of the case. 
2.1 Negligence
Liability for negligence will arise where conduct of the defendant falls below the standard demanded 
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. So, for example, where a person 
claims negligence by a CCS operator, it must be shown that a duty of care was owed to the plaintiff, 
that the duty was breached, and that any damage resulting from the breach was not too remote.12 
The Supreme Court has recently held in North Shore City Council v Attorney General that to establish 
a duty of care in novel situations it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that: 
(a) the loss was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s act or omission;
(b) the loss occurred within a relationship that was sufficiently proximate; and
(c) there are no external factors negating a duty of care. This involves a balancing of the moral claims 
of the parties – whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty – and includes considering 
the wider effects of the decision on society.13 
The previous approach of the House of Lords, determining whether a duty of care existed, provided 
a framework, but the Supreme Court considered that formulae, although helpful, can not provide 
answers.14 Citing South Pacific Manufacturing Co v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd,15 
the Supreme Court said that to determine whether a duty of care exists involves a balancing exercise and 
that the important object is that all relevant factors be weighed.16 Any issue of proximity will depend 
on the facts of the case but the main concerns for claims of negligence for CCS are in regards to 
foreseeability and the external, or policy reasons of why not to impose a duty of care. 
The likely scenario for a claim in negligence is where CO2 leaks from either the transportation or 
injection stage and causes harm to land, livestock, or persons. For a CCS operator to be found in 
breach a duty of care owed to an occupier or land owner above a geological storage formation or 
below transportation pipes, the key issue will be whether the defendant operator was exercising the 
skill expected from a skilful and experienced person in the profession, judged at the time the work 
was done.17 This may raise issues where an operator is following current best practice, but (due to the 
12 See S Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (Brookers, Wellington, 2009). See also C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Fleming’s 
the Law of Torts (10th ed, Thomson Reuters, NSW, 2011) at 123.
13 North Shore City Council v Attorney General [2012] NZSC 49 (27 June 2012) (The Grange) [2012] 3 NZLR 341, at 403, 404.
14 The Court was referring to the tests adopted in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 and Caparo Industries plc 
v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
15 South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282 (CA) at 294.
16 The Grange, above n 13, at 404.
17 Todd, above n 12, at 370. McLaren Maycroft & Co v Fletcher Development Co Ltd [1973] 2 NZLR 100 (CA).
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time-frame involved) technology or practice changes. In situations where an operator is following 
best practice, we must ask whether it was foreseeable that, should the CO2 escape, it was likely to 
cause harm. 
Perhaps the key policy issue in the Supreme Court’s decision in North Shore City Council is the 
external reasons why no duty of care should be imposed. There is the argument that CCS is a 
public good and the benefit to society and the environment outweighs the harm to the plaintiff. 
This reasoning would imply that it would be unfair, unjust and unreasonable to impose a duty on an 
operator who was advancing technology to mitigate climate change. On the other hand, even if the 
operator is exercising best practice, is it foreseeable that seismic activity might occur and affect the 
storage formation so that CO2 escapes? This point indicates the importance of careful site selection, 
including performance and risk assessment. Clearly, where an operator has failed to follow best 
practice and to undertake adequate site assessment, it could be said that it is foreseeable that harm 
may result. In this situation, even taking into account the policy reasons of not imposing liability, 
it could be unfair, unjust, and unreasonable to not impose a duty of care. 
Any claim for negligence must result from actual damage, and can include property damage and 
economic loss. It is not the risk itself that needs to be foreseeable, but it is the harm that results 
from the risk that needs to be foreseeable. Any harm caused to property will give the plaintiff a claim 
for damages for the damaged or destroyed property, loss of profits, and non-pecuniary loss such as 
foreseeable worry and anxiety.18 It must be remembered, however, that each case will turn on its facts.
The accident compensation scheme.  New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme means that 
there need be less focus on civil liability for personal accident and injury that in most other countries 
that are developing their CCS law. The Accident Compensation Act 2001 provides a comprehensive, 
no-fault scheme to cover any claims for personal injury caused by an accident whether inside or 
outside employment. The Act removes the right of a person injured through accident to sue any other 
person for compensation for wrongful death or personal injury, although in a few circumstances 
exemplary damages may be sought. Liability for accidents in New Zealand, especially from negligence, 
is therefore confined to liability for damage to property and consequential loss. 
Despite the theory that the Accident Compensation Act eliminates payments of compensation or 
reparations for personal injury through accident, there is a trend of an increase in the use of the 
courts’ powers to make awards of reparation to victims in criminal cases. This includes health and 
safety cases; the HSEA particularly refers to powers under the Sentencing Act 2002. Although this 
reparation is not the same in character as damages as a remedy in a civil claim, it can sometimes 
be significant.
2.2 Nuisance 
There are two forms of nuisance in tort law, private nuisance and public nuisance. Private nuisance 
is a wrong against land and requires that a person has a sufficient interest in the land (possession 
or occupation) before an action can be brought against the defendant. It requires that there be an 
unreasonable interference, which can be indirect or consequential, with a right to use the land, or with 
18 Sappideen and Vines, above n 12, at 297–299.
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enjoyment of the land, and requires proof that there was actual or imminent harm.19 Whether the 
interference is unreasonable turns on the nature of the harm, and will not take into account any 
abnormal sensitivity the claimant may have.20 Also the time, intensity and duration of the nuisance 
must be unreasonable. Smillie explains that:21 
The nuisance standard [of reasonableness] is concerned with resolving the competing land use 
claims of private individuals, and the fact the defendant’s operation benefits many people outside 
the range of its physical impact is irrelevant to that issue. If private rights are to be sacrificed to 
the general public welfare, this should be authorised by the legislature, preferably with express 
provision for compensation [footnotes omitted].
Liability for nuisance requires a continuing or recurring interference with the plaintiffs use or enjoyment 
of land.22 Therefore in a situation where a CO2 leak is continuous or intermittent but provides no more 
than an inconvenience it is unlikely a claimant would be successful. A successful claim for nuisance is 
shown by Hawkes Bay Protein Ltd v Davidson,23 where the plaintiffs – the Davidsons – suffered loss and 
enjoyment of their land from an offensive odour that emanated from the defendant’s rendering plant. 
Even though the business had a resource consent to discharge contaminants into air, the stench was 
so noxious that it made the Davidson property unusable. The Davidsons were awarded damages for 
loss of enjoyment and for the loss of value to the land. Another nuisance case in circumstances similar 
to CCS is Gulf Oil Corp v Hughes,24 where a waterflood project for oil recovery caused salt water to 
enter a nearby fresh water well which was used for domestic and livestock purposes. The water was 
rendered unusable and the plaintiffs had to purchase and transport fresh water for their land. The 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma found the defendant liable for the damage caused, and held that where 
a lawful business creates a private nuisance causing substantial injury to property, the aggrieved 
party may be compensated for the injury sustained. If the leak can not be stopped and is of high 
concentrations to cause a loss of enjoyment to the land then an operator will be liable. However, any 
leak that is of low concentrations may even be beneficial to neighbouring plant life, and is unlikely to 
be more than an inconvenience as it will dissipate into the atmosphere. 
The exception to the rule that nuisance requires an indirect or consequential, unreasonable interference 
with actual or imminent harm is where the defendant, or the person occupying or in control of the 
land, has bought something on his land or let it accumulate there and has made a non-natural use of 
the land, and the thing escapes. This is known as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.25 The distinction is that 
Rylands v Fletcher applies to a one-off event, rather than an on-going nuisance, and the defendant 
will be held strictly liable. However, for the rule in Rylands v Fletcher to apply a claimant would need 
to argue that CCS operations involve the non-natural use of the land. At first sight one may think 
that this argument would succeed, but the contrary can also be argued.26 The case law is not clear 
19 J Smillie “Nuisance” in Todd, above n 12, at 462.
20 Bloodworth v Cormack [1949] NZLR 1058.
21 Smillie “Nuisance” in Todd, above n 12, at 475.
22 At 477.
23 Hawkes Bay Protein Ltd v Davidson [2003] 1 NZLR 536. 
24 Gulf Oil Corp v Hughes 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962).
25 Rylands v Fletcher (1865) 3 H & C 774; 159 ER 737 (Ex); (1866) LR 1 Exch 265 (Ex Ch); (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (HL).
26 See Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 at 280; Irvine & Co v Dunedin City Council [1939] NZLR 741, at 775; Transco plc v Stockport 
Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61; [2004] 2 AC 1 (HL) at para 10, per Lord Bingham; Autex Industries Ltd v Auckland 
City Council [2000] NZAR 324.
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and legislative clarity is desirable. As a general rule, imposing strict liability is more appropriately a 
matter for Parliament than the courts.27 The key question whether a CCS operation involves the use 
of a dangerous thing and is a non-natural use of the land is ultimately a question of law and fact to 
be determined by the judiciary. There are defences available under Rylands v Fletcher which include 
(a) default of the plaintiff; (b) act of God; (c) act of a stranger; (d) statutory authority; or (e) consent. 
The second form of nuisance is public nuisance, which requires that a section of the public, or 
community, is affected rather than individuals. This would certainly be the case if environmental 
effects were found to have contaminated groundwater. In this case, the Attorney-General may bring 
proceedings against an operator, or private individuals may if they have suffered particular damage 
over and above that suffered by the public generally.28 The only defence available to a claim for public 
nuisance is statutory authority.29 However, in practice, such proceedings are now rare; public nuisance 
has largely been supplanted by statutory rules for the protection of the environment, such as under 
the RMA. 
The likely scenarios of liability for a CCS operator include nuisance arising out of transporting the 
CO2 which is likely to be a non-natural use, nuisance from leakage from the storage operations, or 
migration of CO2 in a geological storage formation, which could be a natural use. In any case, any 
leakage is likely to be a continuous event that attracts liability under the general law of nuisance, 
rather than a one-off event that attracts strict liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 
2.3 Trespass
Any unjustified, direct interference with land, including the subsurface below it, which is in the 
possession of another, is a trespass.30 Liability occurs whether the act was intentional or negligent. 
Clearly, a claim of trespass will result from any above-ground interference where access arrangements 
have not been gained for any structures or pipelines that are required, but liability will also arise 
where underground pipes intrude onto neighbouring land.31 Where CO2 migrates to enter underneath 
the land of a plaintiff, a nuisance rather than a trespass occurs, as the migration is not a direct result 
but consequential. The same will be the result above ground, where a pipeline leaks and the wind 
blows CO2 onto neighbouring land. The question will be whether the interference with the plaintiff’s 
land is a necessary or natural consequence of the defendant’s act,32 or an inevitable result.33 The key 
difference between a claim for trespass and nuisance is that there does not need to be any damage or 
imminent harm from the trespass, as is the case for nuisance.
In the United States and Canada there have been numbers of cases for trespass of substances, 
including gases, where the court has held that the entry of invisible gases where they do harm or 
27 Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Easton Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264, at 305 per Lord Goff. 
28 Smillie “Nuisance” in Todd, above n 12, at 508.
29 At 515.
30 Smillie “Trespassing on Land” in Todd, above n 12, at 424. See also Waugh v Attorney-General (No 2) [2006] 2 NZLR 812; Bocardo 
SA v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd [2011] 1 AC 380; [2010] UKSC 35. Also see chapter 4 on property rights for a discussion on 
subsurface trespass. 
31 Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd [2011] 1 AC 380; [2010] UKSC 35.
32 Smillie, “Trespassing on Land” in Todd, above n 12, at 435.
33 B Matheson, “Air” in D Nolan (ed) Environmental & Resource Management Law (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at 674. 
Matheson says that this makes it hard to prove liability for air pollution because of the unpredictability of air currents.
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cause substantial interference is a trespass.34 On the other hand Ragsdale has argued that a strong 
public policy of encouraging hydraulic fracturing operations has substantially shielded operators from 
liability for an injected fluids subsurface trespass.35 He cites Summer’s The Law of Oil and Gas, and says 
that although there may be a trespass, it is doubtful that an injunction should be issued where the 
trespass is irretrievable. He says public policy should favour good faith CCS storage efforts. Daintith 
has likewise observed that American courts are reluctant to impede productive development and 
new technology by the application without adjustment of long-established concepts of subsurface 
ownership and trespass.36 There is certainly a good argument that public policy should favour CCS 
development because of its purpose as a climate change mitigation tool, but how far the New Zealand 
courts would go actively to shield operators from liability is much less clear. 
A clear definition of rights to ownership of geologic storage formations is one option against a claim 
of trespass, and nuisance as well, as the likelihood of an interim injunction would be of critical concern 
to a CCS operator. Under current law a land owner could justifiably apply to the court for an order 
that operations be ceased, potentially causing extensive financial cost and delay to the operator of a 
CCS project. The different options to prevent this possibility are the subject of Chapter 4. One option, 
followed in Victoria, is for the legislature to grant to the government the ownership of geological 
storage formations,37 so that a land owner cannot sue in trespass or nuisance for its use. Another 
option to defining ownership is to give authority for access by law, for if the law imputes an authority 
there can be no trespass.38 What we have recommended in Chapter 4 is that statute vest in the Crown 
all rights and powers necessary to explore for CCS capacity, to develop CCS capacity, to inject CO2 
and other greenhouse gases into the subsurface of land, and to sequester them there permanently; 
along with all necessarily incidental rights and powers. 
2.4 Remedies 
2.4.1 Injunctions
The risk of an injunction is significant commercially, because an injunction can bring the development 
of a project to a halt. An unexpected interruption can have severe effects on the financing of the project. 
There are two types of injunctions available. An interim injunction can be awarded quickly and without 
proof of damage in a full trial.39 It may be awarded where harm is imminent and an urgent response 
is required before the plaintiff’s claim can be heard in full on its merits. The applicant must meet 
a two-prong test: first it must show that there is a serious issue to be tried, and second, it must 
demonstrate that the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the injunction.40 An interim 
injunction requiring a CCS operator to cease operations until the substantive case can be heard would 
34 Ingelson, Kleffner and Nielson, above n 2.
35 T Ragsdale, “Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass” (1993) 28 Tulsa Law Journal 311, at 336, 337 and 338.
36 T Daintith, “The Common Law of Underground Energy Resources in the United States” in D Zillman et al, Energy Underground 
(book forthcoming from Oxford University Press, 2014). 
37 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 14.
38 See R v Fraser [2005] 2 NZLR 109, at 118.
39 A Barker, “Interim Injunctions” in P Blanchard (ed) Civil Remedies in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2011) at 294.
40 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (HL).
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cause extensive cost to an operator, just as would be an injunction ordering operations to stop because 
of interference with the plaintiff’s right to its property. In contrast, a permanent injunction is awarded 
after a hearing of the substantive case in full on the merits, if it is the necessary remedy to protect 
a legal or equitable right.41 The court will not grant an injunction if it would be futile to do so. 
2.4.2 Damages
Compensatory damages are to place the claimant in the position they would have been in, had the tort 
not occurred.42 An award of damages can include the cost of any consequential loss for any damage, loss 
in value of the land, wrongful use of the land, or general damages for interference with the plaintiff’s 
privacy and quiet enjoyment of the property, and for distress and any anxiety caused.43 Assessment of 
damages is a question of fact, but in McElroy Milne v Commercial Electronics Ltd Cooke P said:44 
[T]he ultimate question as to compensatory damages is whether the particular damage claimed is 
sufficiently linked to the breach of the particular duty to merit recovery in all the circumstances.
Generally, a claim for damages must include all losses past, present, and future, as any further claim 
arising under the same cause of action will be barred, despite the event that new loss has been 
suffered. However, in cases where the civil wrong is a continuing one and new and distinct damage 
occurs a new cause of action may exist.45 
2.5 The Limitation Act 2010
The Limitation Act 2010 reforms the previous legislation, and provides a defence to claims for damages 
that are made six years after the date of the act or omission, unless the claimant has late knowledge 
of the claim, where the Act then provides for a further three years from the date of knowledge, or no 
longer than 15 years after the act or omission.46 The Act defines the date when the claimant has late 
knowledge as the date when the claimant is aware of (or ought reasonably to be aware of) certain 
facts; that the act or omission on which the claim is based had occurred; that the act or omission was 
attributable to the defendant; and that (if relevant) the claimant has suffered loss.47 
Thus, the Limitation Act prevents persons raising stale claims, and due to the “late knowledge” rules 
does not cause difficulties for a claimant who wishes to make a timely claim where harm is caused by 
CCS operations that have ceased some time ago. The key issue is who an aggrieved claimant can sue. 
41 A Barker, “Permanent Injunctions” in Blanchard, above n 39, at 236.
42 Attorney-General v Geothermal Produce New Zealand Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 348, at 359. 
43 Smillie in Todd, above n 12.
44 McElroy Milne v Commercial Electronics Ltd [1993]1 NZLR 39, at 41
45 P Blanchard (ed), Civil Remedies in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2011) at 93, 94.
46 Limitation Act 2010, ss 11, 12. 
47 Section 14. This summarises the full list. 
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3 Civil Liability During the Operational Phase  
of CCS
The general position under the common law is that a CCS operator is liable for any act of negligence, 
trespass or nuisance that it commits. This is the ordinary situation of any company in business. 
Companies reduce the risk of committing such acts, and for being liable for them, by good quality 
business practice and by risk management procedures. What needs to be considered is whether there 
should be departures from the ordinary position in order to accommodate the special character of CCS. 
Subsurface trespass and nuisance are candidates for different treatment where the CCS injection is so 
deep that it is unconnected to the enjoyment of the surface. Such different treatment is recommended 
and will be facilitated through arrangements regarding property rights (see Chapter 4) and not in 
changes to the general law or tort. These arrangements as to property rights will remove the ability of 
a land owner to claim subsurface trespass or nuisance.
Liability during the operational phase of CCS operations should remain with the CCS operator. 
This follows the approach overseas. Indeed, it is not usual for the regulation of an industry to exclude 
liability for negligence and other wrongs, and arguably the legal framework for CCS should be no 
different. It has been said that the only controversial issue about short-term CCS liability is when it 
ends and when long-term liability begins.48
As part of the process of granting an injection permit under the new CCS Act, financial assurance 
should be required in order to cover remedial activities, MMV responsibilities, and liability for leaked 
emissions under the ETS. 
4 Long-term Liability for CCS 
Long-term liability can be addressed in three ways; it can be either assumed by Government, it can 
remain with the operator, or it can be shared between government and industry. Pritchard provides a 
useful discussion in Appendix A on the different arrangements, including a summary of advantages and 
disadvantages. For this reason they will not be repeated here. Some challenging and complex issues are 
raised by long-term liability, and some jurisdictions provide a clear framework for it, others do not.
The issue of long-term liability is linked to the permitting process and requirements of site closure. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 5 that we recommend that an injection permit ends when a site closure 
authorisation is given, with the effect that the operator’s regulatory liability and liability to account 
for GHG emissions also come to an end. The focus of this section is on liability after site closure and 
after the injection permit has come to an end. The issue is, if anything goes wrong, who will undertake 
remedial activities and who will pay? Will they also be liable for harm to the climate? Over long 
periods of time, it becomes more possible that a commercial company is no longer in existence when 
something goes wrong, or no longer has the financial ability to pay. We must therefore consider how 
long-term liability will be allocated, and whether government has a role in managing long-term risks. 
48 R Campbell, “Long-term Liability for Offshore Geosequestration” [2006] AMPLA Yearbook 515, at 518.
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Long-term liability has been considered more of a stewardship role because there is also a positive 
obligation to continue monitoring (although this is part of the site closure authorisation procedure) 
and to perform any remediation measures should they be required.49 
A careful balancing of competing interests is required in assessing the liability framework for CCS. 
CCS is a key climate change mitigation tool, the benefits of which need to be weighed against the 
possible harm that may be caused to individuals. Operators need to have security of investment, but 
not at the cost of imposing financial burdens on land owners and the general public. 
4.1 International thinking
At this point it is useful to return to the IEA Model Regulatory Framework on liability during the 
post-closure period. The model text is as follows.
1.  Subject to the terms of this section …, where a closure authorisation has been issued for a 
storage site, responsibility for the storage site transfers to the relevant authority.
2.  On transfer of responsibility for a storage site to the relevant authority, the relevant authority 
assumes:
a)  responsibility for any liabilities for damage caused by the storage site, including but not 
limited to:
i. damage to the environment;
ii. damage to human health;
iii. damage to other resources;
iv. damage to third-party assets;
v. the cost of corrective measures required to limit the extent of the damage; and
vi. the cost of remediation measures associated with the damage;
b)  responsibility for:
i.  monitoring the storage site;
ii.  undertaking any corrective measures; and
iii.  undertaking any remediation measures;
3.  Despite paragraph 2 of this section …, in the post-closure phase an operator remains 
responsible for any liabilities for damage caused by a storage site if that damage results from 
fault or negligence of the operator during the project period.
Thus the IEA says that the relevant authority “assumes” responsibility for liability. The Australian 
offshore legislation states that the Commonwealth indemnifies the licence holder against claims 
for damages, unless the licensee no longer exists, when the liability is taken to be a liability of the 
Commonwealth.50 There is no exclusion for claims arising from negligence, although the liability must 
be attributable to an act done or omitted to be done in the carrying out of operations authorised by 
the licence. 
49 See M Granger Morgan and S McCoy, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the Legal and Regulatory Barriers (RFF Press, 
New York, 2012).
50 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), ss 400, 401. For a good general appraisal of the 
issues, see Minter Ellison, Carbon Capture and Storage: Report to the Australian Greenhouse Office on Property Rights and 
Associated Liability Issues (Canberra: Australian Greenhouse Office, 2005), and R Campbell, ‘Long-Term Liability for Offshore 
Geosequestration’ [2006] AMPLA Yearbook 515.
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Similarly, in Alberta the Crown undertakes to indemnify the lessee against tort claims if the act was 
done or omitted to be done in the exercise of rights under the licence and that any other conditions in 
regulations are met (once promulgated). On issuance of a site closure certificate the Crown assumes 
liability for statutory obligations. Liability for emissions seems to remain with the licensee.51 
In contrast, the EU Directive provides for a transfer of responsibility to the competent authority 
for monitoring, corrective measures, and ETS liability, but only (i) after the elapse of a minimum of 
twenty years from closure (unless the competent authority is convinced that (ii) is complied with), 
(ii) if all available evidence indicates that the stored CO2 will be completely and permanently contained 
and (iii) on the making of a financial contribution for thirty years’ monitoring.52 But full exposure to 
liability is curbed. The Directive states that where there has been fault of the operator, concealment 
of information, negligence, wilful deceit or a failure to exercise due diligence the competent authority 
shall recover the costs from the former operator. This “claw back” has been much discussed as a 
limitation on the completeness of the transfer. 
Interestingly, long-term liability is not provided for in Queensland or Victoria. In Queensland, injected GHGs 
become the property of the state after decommissioning, but the extent that liability is so transferred is 
unclear.53 In Victoria, risk must be evaluated before an authority is cancelled, and long-term monitoring 
and verification must be paid for, but there is no provision for liability or its transfer.54
Granger Morgan and McCoy say, quite rightly, that the legal and institutional framework needs to 
ensure that a publicly governed and financially responsible entity will monitor closed geological 
storage sites, undertake any required remediation, and provide the public with the assurance that 
compensation will be paid for damage to persons or property.55 We agree, and recommend that the 
CCS regulatory agency takes on the role of continued monitoring, paid for by the operator, and will 
be responsible for any remediation work required. In regards to how this will be funded, a number of 
options are discussed below.
4.2 Policy issues in a transfer of long-term liability to the Crown
The above discussion on the various approaches to long-term liability internationally shows there 
are a few options available. The first option is that long-term liability remains with the operator, 
which is the approach in Victoria and Queensland. Clearly this option is not realistic in the long term. 
Practically speaking, we must accept that companies do not last forever. It would not be reasonable 
to consider an entity to retain the finances necessary indefinitely on the assumption that harm may 
arise. Relying on this option is likely to leave an injured party without any recourse in the event that 
the CO2 does not behave as expected after site closure. 
51 See N Bankes, The Developing Regime for the Regulation of Carbon Capture and Storage Projects in Canada (2013) Appendix B.
52 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Articles 18-20. For thinking on the 
detail of the criteria, see European Commission, Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide Guidance Document 3 Criteria for Transfer of Responsibility to the Competent Authority (2011).
53 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s 181. The section is entitled ‘Responsibility for injected GHG streams after 
decommissioning’ but ownership does not generally impose liability. 
54 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 112, 174 et seq. Section 187 deals with the occupiers’ liability of the 
holder of an authority. The disparate approaches of the states, and of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2006 (Cth), is a contentious issue in Australia, and efforts are under way to co-ordinate them. 
55 Granger Morgan and McCoy, above n 49, at 133.
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The option of government assuming liability raises a number of issues. One view is that the tax payer 
should not be liable for picking up the bill for any harm caused by a CCS operator; the principle of 
polluter pays should not be offended. Further, industry regulation does not generally extend to 
excluding liability for negligence and other wrongs, and the framework for CCS should not be any 
different. Also, any claim by companies to be relieved of liability is inconsistent with their claim that 
the risks are small. On the other hand, government needs to encourage and foster this new industry. 
It would also recognise the special long-term character of CCS storage.56 Any problem with CCS 
injection is going to appear relatively soon, and the risk decreases quickly after the end of injection 
operations, so that a few years post-closure the residual risk to the government is very small. It will 
be necessary to identify what liability is actually being assumed. Is it liability for remedial operations 
only, or is it liability to compensate for harm to property and the climate too? 
An alternative is a shared arrangement between government and industry. However, as Pritchard 
says, “mechanisms for this are unclear and would require significant new law and could set precedents 
for policy in other areas”.57 
4.3 Recommendations on long-term liability
We consider that New Zealand should follow the approach by the IEA, the EU, and the Australian 
offshore legislation, and recommend that the Crown assumes liability following site closure 
authorisation. This is not without limitations however. The Crown’s liability is restricted to loss or 
damage arising out of operations authorised and carried out under an injection permit. The extent of 
liability is further curbed by the power of the Crown to recover costs from the former operator where 
harm has been caused by the fault or negligence of the operator, or where the operator has concealed 
information or deceived the regulator, or where the operator has failed to exercise due diligence. 
(Exactly what kinds of fault or negligence are grounds for recovery by the Crown will need refinement, 
lest the transfer of liability be undermined, but for the time being we follow the pattern of the IEA 
Model Framework and the EU Directive.) Claims against the Crown for exemplary damages should be 
prohibited. Liability of the Crown will not extend to harm caused by CO2 from acts of a third party, 
such as interference with the integrity of a storage formation. 
The Crown’s liability also includes the obligation to perform remediation measures should they be 
necessary, and to fulfil any obligations regarding climate liability. The obligation to undertake MMV is 
also transferred to the Crown but this is dealt with as part of site closure (see Chapter 5) and is funded 
by the operator. 
The regulatory framework will need to ensure that liability will only be transferred when stringent 
preconditions are met regarding granting a site closure authorisation. The onus is on the operator to 
satisfy the agency that the conditions for a site closure authorisation (discussed in Chapter 5) are met.
56 B Barton, “Carbon Capture and Storage Law for New Zealand: A Comparative Study” (2009) 13 NZJEL 1 reviews the Australian 
debate about the arguments on either side of a government assumption of liability. 
57 R Pritchard, Carbon Capture and Storage – A Review of the Australian Legal and Regulatory Regime (June 2013) Appendix A.
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No matter which of the above options to long-term liability is selected the tax payer will be shielded 
by a stringent regulatory procedure before liability will be transferred. The criteria that must be 
met before a site closure authorisation is granted will provide reassurance to the public that the 
government is not taking a high risk in assuming liability. 
4.4 How should the transfer of liability expressed? 
As can be seen from the discussion on international thinking, some jurisdictions provide an 
indemnity, others state that liability is assumed. An example of New Zealand practice that transfers 
responsibility can be found in the Environmental Protection Authority Act 2011. The Act transferred 
the responsibilities from the disestablished Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) to the 
new Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). Section 30(1) provides: 
(e) all rights, liabilities, contracts, entitlements, and engagements of ERMA become the rights, 
liabilities, contracts, entitlements, and engagements of the EPA; and
…
(h) anything done, or omitted to be done, or that is to be done, by, or in relation to, ERMA is to 
be treated as having been done, or omitted to be done, or to be done, by, or in relation to, the 
EPA; and
(i) the commencement, continuation, or enforcement of proceedings by or against ERMA may 
instead be carried out by or against to EPA without amendment to the proceedings; and
(j) a matter or thing that would, but for this section, have been completed by ERMA may be 
completed by the EPA.
Whatever terminology is chosen, the key requirement for the legal framework for CCS is ensuring 
that long-term liability will be transferred to the Crown. We make no recommendation as to how this 
will be implemented. One recommendation we do make is that there should be a statement of the 
right of a person to sue the Crown instead of the permit holder where that person has suffered loss 
or damage.
4.5 Funding long-term liability
It is necessary at this point to define what is required to be funded. The legislative framework that 
we recommend requires long-term monitoring costs to be borne by the operator, as part of the site 
closure process. Any claim for personal harm will likely be covered by ACC. This leaves the costs of 
remediation, harm to property, and climate liability to be covered. We discuss three options below.
The first option for funding long-term liability involves establishing a fund based on levies gained 
from industry; it could be based on the amount of CO2 injected, or a grading system based on site 
characterisation, or an annual fee. Trust funds have been used overseas and provide a mechanism by 
which the entities responsible for creating the risk pool funds to compensate any pre-determined 
injuries and possibly any remediation required. The key issues are determining the extent of injuries 
covered, calculating the appropriate level of payments required and what they are for, and defining 
the appropriate level of compensation. Methods for quantifying risk have been identified and are 
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available.58 The IEA consider a public-private pooling structure is likely to be the most suitable option 
to provide long-term assurances, such as use of an insurance pooling model or a compensation 
(trust) fund model.59 The approach in Alberta offers a useful example. Bankes says that the post-
closure stewardship fund is funded by a fee per tonne of injected CO2. The fund may be used for MMV, 
reclamation, re-abandonment and remedial activities but not for liability that the Crown has under its 
obligations to indemnify the licensee, nor to cover liability for emissions accounting.60 The advantage 
of using a trust fund is the clear benefit to the tax payer, and that risk is spread across industry. 
The disadvantage is the administrative costs involved and the increased costs to the operator by 
having to set aside funds. This option may be unduly complex for New Zealand, because of the likely 
low number of CCS projects in the foreseeable future. 
The second option is for government to charge a rent on the use of the subsurface which can fund any 
possible liability. This is similar to the above option, but the difference being that it appears a simpler and 
possible less costly arrangement than establishing a trust fund to be administered by an agency. Instead, 
the payments go into general Crown funds. Queensland uses such a mechanism, and requires an annual 
rent to be paid.61 South Australia also charges an annual fee which is based on the licence area.62
The final option is that the Crown is to meet liability if and when it occurs without any fund or levy 
system required. Effectively, the tax payer will be funding long-term liability. Reassurance is gained 
from the complexity of the regulatory system, which not only will minimise the risk of harm arising 
in the first place but will ensure that liability will not be transferred until the risk is extremely low.
This is a difficult issue. On one hand, the polluter should pay. On the other hand, the complexities and 
costs involved in establishing and maintaining a funding mechanism and the reality that the risk that 
government will be exposed to will be minimal weighs against requiring such a mechanism. Thus, we 
recommend that because of the overall benefit of CCS, a CCS operator should not have additional 
costs imposed on it, and that assumption of liability by the Crown includes the responsibility to pay 
for any harm caused, subject to the limitations discussed at 4.3 above. 
58 See C Trabucchi, M Donlan, M Huguenin, M Konopka, S Bolthrunis, Valuation of Potential Risks Arising from a Model, 
Commercial-Scale CCS Project Site (Industrial Economics Incorporated, June 2012).
59 International Energy Agency, CO2 Capture and Storage, above n 1, at 131.
60 Bankes, above n 51, Appendix B.
61 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s 86.
62 For example, the current annual fee for a gas storage licence is AUD3,365.00 or AUD618.00 per km2 of the total licence area, 
whichever is the greater; Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Regulations 2013, Schedule 1.
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5 Recommendations 
1. Liability during the operational phase of CCS operations should remain with the CCS operator, 
although liability for underground trespass and nuisance will be restricted as part of the property 
rights arrangements under the new CCS Act. As part of the process of granting an injection permit 
under the new CCS Act, financial assurance will be required in order to cover remedial activities, 
monitoring, measurement and verification responsibilities, and liability for leaked emissions 
under the ETS. 
2. After the regulator grants a site closure authorisation, the Crown should assume civil claims 
against the CCS operator that arise out of operations authorised and carried out under the 
injection permit. The Crown may recover costs from the operator where the operator has been at 
fault or negligent, has concealed information or deceived the regulator, or has failed to exercise 
due diligence. The Crown will not be liable for exemplary damages, or for the acts of a third party. 
The assumption of liability should make it clear that a person who has suffered loss or damage 
can sue the Crown instead of the former operator. 
3. The operator should remain liable for monitoring, measurement and verification until there has been 
no significant migration, leakage, or unexpected behaviour for a specified time. The operator should 
be required before site closure to pay the costs of implementing a long-term monitoring plan. 
4. After the regulator grants a site closure authorisation, liability for remediation and emissions 
accounting should be assumed by the responsible agency. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CCS AND THE  
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME
1 Basics of the ETS
The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 
(CCRA) is New Zealand’s main policy instrument for the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) including CO2. The NZ ETS is unique because it applies to all GHGs covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol and includes all sectors. The principle ‘all gases, all sectors’ is ambitious by world standards. 
It imposes some complexity on the design of the system, and in addition transitional measures for a 
phased implementation of the Scheme mean that some sectors still remain outside it. 
Policy pressure on GHG emissions under the NZ ETS has been reduced by the phased implementation 
of the Scheme, by a cap on prices, by a reduction of surrender obligations in energy and liquid fossil 
fuels to one unit for every two tonnes of emissions, and other measures. If, at some stage in the 
future, new policy pressure is to be put on GHG emissions, it is likely to come through changes to 
the ETS and amendments of the CCRA. The result would be a higher price on CO2, and an increased 
commercial attractiveness for CCS. However the question of promotion of CCS by such a policy lies 
outside this Report. 
The need to ensure effective accounting for emissions makes clear the need to have a thorough 
site plan for a CCS operation, in order to identify potential leakage pathways, provide adequate 
monitoring, and require an effective reporting system to validate consistent and reliable data and 
information. The same need applies to CCS pipelines.
2 Two Main Approaches to Accounting for CCS
International thinking sees two main possibilities for the place of CCS under an ETS, and for the 
removal of CO2 that it performs. The first of them has not been followed in New Zealand but is 
explained briefly for the sake of clarity. 
2.1 CCS as a reduction of emissions or an avoided emission 
This first approach to emissions accounting is centred on the idea of CCS as a reduction an avoidance 
of emissions, which needs to be measured against what would have been emitted. This is the approach 
that the European Union has taken, and which is adopted in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories and the International Standards Organisation’s ISO 14064 Standard on 
GHG accounting. It requires the CO2 emitter to estimate a baseline of emissions that would otherwise 
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have been emitted, had the CO2 not been sequestered, and to compare that to actual emissions. 
The emitter then must pay only for the emissions that have not been sequestered. Each company 
in the chain of CCS operations, from capture, transport and injection, must be participants, so that 
each operation can account for leaked emissions. The approach entails complexity and the risk of 
inaccuracy, because of the difficulty of defining a baseline to estimate avoided emissions, especially 
as to the “parasitic load” which is the extra energy required to power the processes of capture, 
transmission and injection.1 Issues regarding accounting for leakage recur in the literature, but are 
often not relevant to New Zealand because of the different method adopted here. 
2.2 CCS as a separate sink function with an entitlement  
to credits of units for CO2 removal 
New Zealand has adopted the second approach of separate credits for removals such as CCS, with 
consequences that lead to a simpler and more reliable approach to CCS. The producers of CO2 must 
either satisfy their obligations by surrendering units (NZUs) or by fixed price option for the emission 
produced. The operators of CCS injection facilities receive credits for the CO2 that they store.
2 
This approach still accounts for each step of the CCS chain, but it does not differentiate between 
captured and emitted CO2. It is left to the operators of the installation and storage facility to 
distribute the value from the credits obtained. This approach does not need transport to be included 
as any discrepancy between the amount of CO2 emitted and the amount injected will be accounted 
for as a loss during the transport phase; to include transport would result in double-counting the 
emissions. Any losses that do arise will be subject to contractual arrangements between the pipeline 
operator and the storage operator or emitter. This approach has a lower administrative burden, 
simpler monitoring, and lower costs. It is considered more reliable because it does not require the 
estimation of a baseline of emissions that would have been generated without the CO2 capture 
process. An additional and important advantage is that offering credits for carbon sequestration may 
help establish an independent CCS industry.
1 M Granger Morgan and S McCoy, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Removing the Legal and Regulatory Barriers (RFF Press, 
New York, 2012) at 142. 
2 See I Guddas, T Hohmuth, and L Schafer, “Crediting CO2 Sequestration – An Alternative Approach to Integrating CCS into the 
EU ETS” (2008) Carbon and Climate Law Review 387. 
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3 The NZ ETS Structure
New Zealand’s ETS treats geologically sequestered CO2 as a removal activity, thus crediting the 
injector for emissions successfully sequestered. Its general architecture is conducive to CCS.
3.1 Points of obligation generally upstream
NZ ETS obligations are determined in relation to activities, which are described in Schedules 3 and 4 
of the Climate Change Response Act 2002. Companies carrying out some activities are mandatory 
participants, and others are voluntary participants. 
The NZ ETS was designed so that the activities that come under it are upstream in the supply chain. 
Thus, for natural gas, the activity caught for the ETS is at the production wellhead, rather than at the 
power station or the retail gas customer. This reduces the number of participants in the scheme and 
simplifies its administration. (Forestry is an exception.) In addition, large users such as electricity 
generators tend to participate voluntarily, in order better to manage their ETS obligations. The eligible 
activities are identified in Schedule 4 parts 3 and 4. 
Participants in the stationary energy sector are required to monitor and report their emissions in 
accordance with the Climate Change (Stationary Energy and Industrial Processes) Regulations 2009. 
Because of the strategy of upstream points of obligation, the Act and Regulations generally require 
participants to account for emissions at the point of production of coal or gas, or, for large users, 
at the point of purchase. Power stations therefore must account for their CO2 when they buy their 
fuel, not when they burn it, and not when they release the CO2. They are however allowed to make 
“stockpile adjustments.” 
3.2 Participants under the ETS
The CO2 captured for CCS may come from various sectors, including the stationary energy and 
industrial processes sector or agriculture. Whether the emitter is required to surrender for its 
obligations of its emissions becomes important because of the wording of the section that provides 
for CCS, which we will come to shortly. 
Mandatory participants are listed in Schedule 3; participants from the stationary energy sector 
include those that mine coal and natural gas, refine petroleum, and generate electricity or industrial 
heat from geothermal fluids (this does not include all participants, only those that meet certain 
thresholds). The participants from the industrial processes sector include producers of iron steel and 
aluminium.3 Manufacturers of fertilisers containing nitrogen are included from the agricultural sector. 
Producers of bioenergy are not required to surrender units for CO2 that results from the combustion 
of used oil, waste oil, and waste.4 
3 Climate Change (Stationary Energy and Industrial Processes) Regulations 2009.
4 Climate Change Response Act 2002, s 206.
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Section 60 allows participants listed in Schedule 3 to apply for an exemption by Order in Council. 
The order must not materially undermine the environmental integrity of the scheme, unless the 
Crown has signed a Negotiated Greenhouse Agreement (NGA). One such arrangement is in place 
with the New Zealand Refining Company. It exempts the company from being a participant under 
the scheme in respect of the activity of refining petroleum, listed in Part 3 of Schedule 3 until the end 
of 2022, or on the day after the NGA is terminated.5 Instead, the NGA places an obligation on the 
company to maintain best practice in energy efficiency to reduce the amount of GHG emissions per 
unit of product. This is important because New Zealand Refining Company is the country’s only oil 
refinery, and the main supplier of petroleum products to the New Zealand market, and the exemption 
effectively eliminates the emissions from the refinery from receiving any credits should the CO2 be 
sequestered. This will be explained below. It should also be noted that the General Exemption Orders 
exempt certain activities that do not meet the desired thresholds for participation.
Voluntary participants are listed in Schedule 4; they include forestry removal activities, other removal 
activities (including CCS) and purchasers of certain liquid fossil fuels, coal or natural gas.
3.3 Surrender and allocation of NZUs
In accordance with section 63 of the CCRA, a participant is liable to surrender 1 unit for each whole 
tonne of emissions from each activity listed in Schedule 3 or 4 that the participant carries out, as 
calculated in accordance with the Act and at the times required by the Act. But the following section 
modifies this, and states a person who carries out an activity in parts 2-6 of Schedule 3 (certain 
activities from the liquid fossil fuels, stationary energy, industrial processes, agricultural, and waste 
sectors) and activities from the liquid fossil fuels and stationary energy sectors listed in Schedule 4 is 
only liable to surrender 1 unit for each 2 whole tonnes of emissions from the activity. These industries 
must purchase their NZUs from the domestic market.6
In an effort to reduce the cost of compliance to those industries that may suffer from having to compete 
within the international market, the Government makes free allocations of NZUs. Manufacturers of 
iron and steel from iron sand, aluminium, carbon steel from cold ferrous feed, cementitious products, 
and clay bricks and field tiles receive free allocations of emission units which they are then able to 
trade. The cost of emissions is therefore reduced for these industries.
3.4 Removal activities
Some participants in the NZ ETS carry out “removal activities.” They therefore have entitlements 
under the ETS to claim a credit in NZUs for each tonne that they remove from the atmosphere. 
This is in contrast, of course, to the position of most NZ ETS participants who have liabilities to 
surrender emissions units for the GHG emissions from their activities. The main class of removal 
activity is forestry, but others are listed in Schedule 4 Part 2. 
5 Climate Change (The New Zealand Refinery Company Limited) Exemption Order 2009.
6 Following the amendments to the ETS in 2012, certain Kyoto units (ERU and CERs) can not be surrendered to meet NZ 
ETS obligations.
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The manufacture of methanol is the only industrial process activity at present that has an entitlement 
to receive units. The manufacture of methanol embeds natural gas (which is mainly methane). 
The embedding is classified as a removal activity under Schedule 4 part 2, subpart 1. If one looks at 
the supply chain, the result of this entitlement under the ETS becomes clear. The natural gas producer 
incurs ETS liability on production of the gas. It passes the cost of doing so on to its purchasers, including 
the methanol company. The methanol company is reimbursed for this cost by being issued NZUs. It 
reports its manufacture of methanol and claims NZUs periodically under the Climate Change (Other 
Removal Activities) Regulations 2009. 
If natural gas is lost in the course of processing or transmission from the natural gas field to the 
methanol company, then the ETS retains its integrity; units have been surrendered for that gas, and 
no removal credits are issued for it. Similarly, if the methanol company itself loses the gas before 
embedding it in the methanol, then it will have no claim for removal credits.
However, as a policy matter we consider it generally desirable that the proposed CCS legislation help 
keep track of CO2 in CCS operations, rather than disregard losses from leakage and fugitive emissions. 
4 How the ETS applies to CCS
Carbon capture and storage is referred to in the CCRA as a removal activity in Schedule 4, Part 2, 
Subpart 2, which reads:
Storing of carbon dioxide after capture, where—
(a) a person is required to surrender units under this Act in respect of the emissions that would 
result if the carbon dioxide was not captured and stored; and
(b) the result of the carbon dioxide being captured and stored is a reduction from emissions 
reported in New Zealand’s annual inventory report under the Convention or Protocol or any 
emissions report from New Zealand under a successor international agreement; and
(c) any prescribed threshold is met. 
This provision, the only reference to CCS in the Act, is not yet in force and will apply on and after 
a date set by Order in Council.7 In the NZ Emissions Unit Register, no participants are registered at 
the present as engaged in CCS. When it comes into force, Schedule 4 Part 2 Subpart 2 will authorise 
a company to register as a voluntary participant for a CCS projects.8 At the time that it comes into 
force, two ancillary provisions may be resorted to:
(a) section 168(1)(m), for the making of a regulation to set a threshold, as stated in paragraph (c) – 
most likely if it is thought that the ETS should not apply to small CCS projects. It could apply for 
example to exclude test projects.
(b) Section 168(1)(n), for criteria for registering as a participant in relation to CCS, and for criteria for 
“the type of carbon capture and storage” in respect of which a person may register as a participant. 
7 Climate Change Response Act 2002, s 2A(14). 
8 Section 57.
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Both of these powers may be resorted to in order to provide more fully for CCS under the ETS, but neither 
of them provides for any significant tailoring of the provision; they are both essentially restrictive. 
Restriction on eligibility to obtain credits for removal.  Schedule 4 of the CCRA says that for CCS to 
qualify as a removal activity, it must be where “a person” is required to surrender units in respect of 
the emissions that would have occurred without the CCS. This important point was mentioned above. 
While allowing the emitter and the injector to be different entities, this has the effect of restricting 
the issue of credits to CO2 that was covered by the ETS, and on which a surrender obligation would 
have otherwise fallen. For those industries that are not required to surrender an obligation (biofuels 
producers, the New Zealand Refining Co) no credit can be given to them for CO2 from them that is 
geologically sequestered. It appears that the NZ ETS gives those companies no incentive to consider 
CCS when it becomes possible. This appears undesirable from a policy point of view. We recommend 
that the CCRA be amended to allow companies that are not required to surrender units in respect of 
emissions to be eligible for credits for CCS as a removal activity. 
It should be noted that when CCS uses emissions from bioenergy (BECCS) it creates negative emissions 
by reducing the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. However, it is undesirable to prevent producers 
of bioenergy from receiving credits for any CO2 stored from their operations and to withhold an 
incentive to that kind of technology. The IPCC Guidelines recommend including negative emissions 
from BECCS in national inventories.9
Enhanced oil recovery.  Enhanced oil recovery (EOR or enhanced hydrocarbon recovery) involves 
injecting CO2 or other liquids into an oil or gas reservoir to mobilise the oil or gas and increase the 
amount that is recovered. The CO2 is mixed with the oil or gas and some is retrieved with the oil 
and gas. However some of the CO2 is retained in the storage reservoir, and this gives EOR some 
characteristics of CCS or a removal activity. In the EU, EOR is not listed in Annex 1 of the ETS Directive 
so is therefore not included, but in a combined EOR and CCS project the storage installation would 
be covered by the scheme.10 We consider the matter in more detail in Chapter 7. At this point we note 
the policy question of recognising EOR as a removal activity under the NZ ETS. Our recommendation 
is it should be possible for the operator of an EOR-CO2 project to become a voluntary participant in 
the NZ ETS, but only if an injection permit has been issued for the project under the CCS legislation. 
This will ensure that the long-term storage capability of the exercise is properly scrutinised. 
4.1 CCS reporting
The Climate Change (Other Removal Activities) Regulations 2009 provide for the measurement, 
reporting, and claiming of NZUs for methanol and for synthetic gases. Amendments to these 
Regulations appear to be necessary in order to make similar provisions for CCS. The alternative is 
parallel regulations for CCS specifically as a removal activity. 
9 S Holloway, A Karimjee, M Akai, R Pipatti and K Rypdal, 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Volume 2 
Energy, Chapter 5 “Carbon Dioxide Transport, Injection and Geological Storage” at 5.8.
10 See Bech-Brunn, EOR/CCS 360-Degree Legal Review (Global CCS Institute, November 2012).
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It is desirable to co-ordinate such regulations for CCS reporting under the NZ-ETS with the measurement, 
monitoring and verification (MMV) requirements that we recommend for CCS projects. (See Chapter 
6.) The MMV data will include data and calculations of fugitive emissions and any leakage from the 
storage complex. The MMV data will be reported to the CCS regulator and to the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) in respect of the NZ ETS. The MMV data should be the basis of the ETS 
reporting and claiming of NZUs. There should be co-ordination in the making of NZ ETS regulations and 
the CCS MMV regulations. It could be informal or it could be formal with regulations made on the joint 
recommendation of the different ministers responsible. 
The IPCC Guidelines provide valuable guidance on how national inventories should account for CO2 
transport, injection and geological storage. They address accounting for leakage from a CCS storage 
complex, suggesting that emissions be estimated from the MMV results. The International Standard 
Organisation’s ISO 14064 on GHG accounting is another point of reference for reporting requirements.11 
Generally, we consider that the proposed CCS legislation should ensure that CCS operations record 
and report in enough detail to support the operation of the NZ-ETS. 
Measurement of venting.  Currently, under the Climate Change (Stationary Energy and Industrial 
Processes) Regulations 2009, participants that mine natural gas are to measure and report emissions 
from venting, flaring, and own use need. If a company is required to report the amount of CO2 that is 
vented and flared into the atmosphere and combusted before the point of sale by using a hydrocarbon 
accounting system (prescribed in regulation 17) then imposing measurement, monitoring and 
verification requirements on CCS operators seems fair. Even though the IPCC Guidelines suggest 
estimation of these “fugitive” emissions, whether they should in fact be measured is worthy of further 
consideration.
4.2 Losses during transport
The design of the NZ ETS emphasises the use of upstream points of obligation, with subsequent 
entitlements to credits where removals occur. This has positive consequences for CCS in relation to 
transport and the possibility of leakage and other losses of CO2 in the chain before final geological 
storage. Where CO2 is derived from the burning of coal or natural gas, for example, the activity 
that attracts the obligation to surrender units is the production of coal at the mine, or gas from the 
wellhead. NZUs are surrendered by the coal company or the gas company. Where the power company 
or industrial user that buys the fuel is a voluntary participant, it surrenders units when it makes the 
purchase. From there on, the fuel is paid for, as it were, in the ETS. If some of the CO2 resulting from 
it is lost in transit to a CCS facility, then there is no harm done to the integrity of the ETS. There is no 
need to make special provision for losses of CO2 at different stages in the CCS chain before its final 
geological storage. The case is the same as that of methanol described above.
11 M McCormick A Greenhouse Gas Accounting Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage Projects (Center for Climate and Energy 
Solutions, February 2012) provides guidance on the calculation of emissions with respect to CCS projects that is consistent with 
the ISO standard. 
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4.3 Leakage from a storage formation
It is possible that a CCS storage project may not perform as planned and leak CO2 into the 
atmosphere.12 Such a leakage could occur after NZUs under the NZ ETS have been granted for the 
removal by injection. The data showing a leakage and its extent would come from the measurement, 
monitoring and verification (MMV) programme under the CCS Act. A substantial leakage would affect 
the integrity of the ETS; the escaped CO2 for which NZUs had been issued would not in fact have been 
removed. In order to maintain the integrity of the ETS, it is necessary for those NZUs to be reversed 
or cancelled, or for NZUs to be paid back. 
Under the NZ ETS as it stands at present, participants are not exposed to a specific process for the 
reversal of NZUs credited to their accounts. There is a process in the CCRA to bring about an effective 
reversal by an amendment of an emissions return, if the chief executive of the EPA is satisfied that 
the information contained in the emissions return is incorrect.13 However he or she can only go back 
4 years in making such amendments,14 which will be insufficient where leakage results well into the 
closure period. In addition, the power to amend because “the information contained in an emissions 
return is incorrect” may be interpreted to be confined to amendment where the return was incorrect 
at the time that it was submitted, without including incorrectness because of a subsequent event, 
such as leakage. These provisions could be strengthened to provide a review of credits, by extending 
the 4-year period, and making it clear that the Chief Executive has power to amend because of a 
subsequent event, and the power to cancel NZUs issued to a CCS company. However it may not be 
desirable to confine the matter to one of amendment of a return. 
We consider that there should be a more explicit provision for the event of leakage from a CCS storage 
operation. In international analysis and discussion, the question has been in debate, most recently at 
UNFCCC meetings in early 2013. No agreement was reached on the matter. It should be remembered 
that New Zealand’s approach to GHG accounting for CCS is different than other approaches. 
Fortunately, our approach seems to simplify the matter. In our view the overriding objective must be 
to maintain the integrity of the ETS, and that a CCS operation that is not performing as it should is 
not entitled to retain credits for CO2 that has escaped. Information about a leakage would come from 
the MMV programme, and would be reported under the Climate Change (Other Removal Activities) 
Regulations 2009 or parallel regulations made for CCS. The Regulations (or the Act, if necessary) 
should be amended to require NZUs for the leakage to be surrendered. 
The CCS operator will be subject to this obligation to surrender units for any leakage during the 
injection period, and during the closure period that follows it. However upon the issue of a site closure 
authorisation, the operator’s liability to surrender such units for leakages comes to an end. This is dealt 
with in detail in Chapters 5 and 10. We recommend that in addition the CCS operator must continue 
to be a participant in the NZ ETS until the site closure authorisation is issued. This requires the CCS 
operator to continue to have a holding account even though the removal activity has ceased. 
12 It should be noted that leakage only includes unanticipated discharge of CO2 to the atmosphere. This is different than leakage 
outside of the storage formation but still contained underground; this is referred to as migration of the CO2 It may be desirable 
for the CCRA to define what constitutes leakage for the purposes of the NZ ETS.
13 Climate Change Response Act 2002, s 120.
14 Section 127.
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After the site closure authorisation, which can only be after it is shown that the injected CO2 is 
behaving as expected and may be some years after the last injection has taken place, the CCS operator 
is no longer obliged to surrender units for any leakage, and the obligation is transferred to the Crown. 
5 Recommendations 
1. Storing CO2 after capture should be a removal activity under the NZ ETS whether or not a person 
is required to surrender units in respect of the emissions that would result. Paragraph (a) in 
Schedule 4 part 2, Subpart 2 of the Climate Change Response Act 2002 can simply be deleted.
2. The Climate Change (Other Removal Activities) Regulations 2009 should be amended (or 
complemented with parallel regulations) for CCS, in order to provide for measurement, monitoring 
and reporting of CO2 that is sequestered, and for any other matters required for the management 
of CCS as a removal activity. The MMV requirements under the proposed CCS legislation should 
form the basis for data and reporting of injection and any leakage from CCS storage sites. 
3. The Climate Change Response Act 2002, Schedule 3 should be amended to include CO2 
geosequestration as an activity for which a person must be a participant under the NZ ETS. This 
will place the obligation on a CCS operator to surrender NZUs for any leakage from a storage 
site. The CCS operator will be subject to this obligation during the injection period and during the 
closure period.
4. The CCS operator must continue to be a participant in the NZ ETS until the site closure 
authorisation is issued.
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CHAPTER 12 
POLICY MATTERS REQUIRING  
EARLY ATTENTION 
In this Chapter we identify and briefly discuss three aspects of carbon capture and storage that, 
judging by experience overseas, are likely to emerge early on the New Zealand policy agenda. 
1 Improving Public Awareness  
and Understanding
A lack of public acceptance and understanding of CCS has been identified in many countries as one 
of the key barriers to CCS projects.1 Public acceptance and understanding of CCS will be important 
during the process of application for a permit for a CCS operation. We have identified the compelling 
case for public participation in such applications. There is growing experience and analysis of public 
engagement with different results for different projects. Some projects, such as Barendrecht in 
the Netherlands and FutureGen in the United States, were rejected or cancelled because of public 
opposition; others, such as Wallula in the United States and Otway in Australia, have had public 
support.2 A public awareness programme should emphasise the role of CCS in climate change 
mitigation and greenhouse gas emission reductions; it is an effort to do something about climate 
change. A focus on the bigger picture of climate change mitigation may help public perception and 
the reality that we must do something about our emissions, and that CCS is part of the answer. 
A public awareness programme will also have to be entirely open about the nature of a CCS project 
and its actual and possible impact on human health and safety and on the environment. Generally, 
New Zealanders care about the environment,3 and CCS can be shown to be an effort to protect the 
environment rather than to harm it. 
In Chapter 3 we noted the desirability of separate institutions for CCS advocacy and for CCS regulation, 
in order to minimise the possibility, or the perception of a possibility, that a regulatory agency has 
a preference for CCS. 
1 Environmental Non-Government Organisation (ENGO) Network on CCS, ENGO Perspectives on Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) (Global CCS Institute, 2012) at 6.
2 World Resources Institute, CCS and Community Engagement: Guidelines for Community Engagement in Carbon Dioxide 
Capture, Transport, and Storage Projects (2010) at 40.
3 See Report of the Green Growth Advisory Group Greening New Zealand’s Growth (December 2011) at 2.
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2 CCS Ready
“CCS Ready” (CCSR) is the term being used in some countries for a policy that encourages or requires 
industry to prepare for CCS during the design and planning of new facilities (such as a thermal power 
plant) in order to enable a CCS retrofit in the future, even though CCS is not possible or not required 
at the present.4 A key advantage is that it is more economical in the long term to plan for and provide 
for CCS at the outset. It may mean that plant design choices are made to facilitate carbon capture at 
some future date. A disadvantage, however, is that it may lock in technology, especially carbon-using 
technology, that may ultimately prove not to be the best option and may end up as stranded assets.5 
For New Zealand, our ETS and low fossil fuel dependence means that expectations for CCS may not 
be so high and a stringent level of CCSR may not be so easily justified. Very few new thermal power 
plants are being built, and there are no new coal power plants on the horizon. 
Different policy mechanisms to promote CCSR are as follows. 
Mandating CCSR.  Any new plants or plants undergoing significant modification would have to 
accommodate CCS. This has been the approach by the European Union, where all new fossil-fuelled 
power plants of a specified size are to have the space available for a retrofit if a storage site is available 
and transport and capture is technically and economically feasible.6 In New Zealand this approach 
would not be inconsistent with prevailing approaches to government policy that favour market 
mechanisms rather than direct regulation.
Emission standards.  Requiring companies to limit the amount of CO2 that is emitted could spur 
innovation and encourage industry to introduce CCS and plan on a CCSR basis. An example California, 
where emission standards apply to all new electricity generators. One point that should be noted 
is that the Bill that introduced the emission performance standards also combined the standards 
with fiscal policy and prohibited long-term investment in the entity unless the emission performance 
standards were met.7 This exemplifies the use of diverse policy tools to pursue an objective. There is a 
difference between emission standards to reduce GHGs and those to improve air quality, although in 
some sectors the effect is generally the same. For example, the Air Emission Standards for Electricity 
Generation in Alberta in Canada do not include CO2 and only apply to sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides 
and primary particulate matter emissions.8 Again, as noted above, this type of regulation is not suited 
to present New Zealand policy approaches, especially approaches to greenhouse gas emissions.
4 ICF International CCS Ready Policy: Considerations and Recommended Practices for Policymakers (Global CCS Institute, 
17 February 2010).
5 Global CCS Institute, CCS Ready Policy and Regulations – The State of Play: Progress Towards the Implementation of CCS Ready 
Policy and Regulatory Frameworks (August 2012), at 8. 
6 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114, Article 33 amends Directive 2001/80/EC.
7 Senate Bill 1368, California Public Utilities Code §8340-8341.
8 Alberta Environment Alberta Air Emission Standards for Electricity Generation and Air Emission Guidelines for Electricity 
Generation (December 2005) at 1.
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Economic incentives.  Encouraging industry through the use of tax exemptions or reductions, grants, 
or an emissions trading scheme (ETS) is not new. Under an ETS one option is to provide credits for 
investment in CCSR, or to increase the cost of emissions over time so that the cost of abatement 
reduces. One well known problem with utilising this type of policy instrument is ensuring that the 
level of tax, or cost of carbon, is set at the correct level to be effective. The prevailing wisdom is that 
a price in excess of £35-40 (NZD 57-65) per tonne is required to really drive investment in low carbon 
technologies, which shows a case for a back-stop policy such as CCSR.9 Since New Zealand already has 
a functioning ETS it would not prove unduly complicated to offer additional credits (at a level prescribed 
in regulations) for industry participants that upgrade to CCSR. Canada offers a similar incentive.10 
Information measures.  A CCSR certification programme can provide information to consumers and 
industry, and can act as a marketing tool to promote CCSR as a desirable attribute. However, before 
CCS is promoted as desirable it may be necessary to run education programmes to inform the public 
on the characteristics and advantages of CCS and CCSR; otherwise the effect may be the opposite of 
that desired. 
We make no recommendation for CCSR policy. The matter lies somewhat outside our brief of 
devising and recommending a legal and regulatory regime to allow CCS proposals to be evaluated 
and put into effect if thought suitable. Additionally, mandating CCSR or emission standards would 
cut across policies and usual policy approaches in New Zealand. Nevertheless it is important 
to note the presence of CCSR in policy action concerning CCS in a number of countries. It could 
have a niche application, or a more general one if a wider range of policy instruments to address 
climate change were to be sought. CCSR could be a transition tool towards a low-carbon economy. 
The Climate Change Response Act 2002 could be used to advance CCSR, since its purpose is to enable 
New Zealand to meet its obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
3 Enhanced Oil Recovery and CCS
In Chapter 7 we identified enhanced oil recovery using CO2 (CO2-EOR) as a leading contender for 
the first CCS activities in New Zealand, because the economic benefits of increased oil production 
can complement other drivers such as the price of carbon in the Emissions Trading Scheme. EOR 
has not occurred in New Zealand on any substantial scale, and there is virtually no regulation aimed 
specifically at it. (It is likely to be authorised under the Crown Minerals Act 1991 as an operation 
incidental to the mining of petroleum, subject no doubt to obtaining resource consents under the 
RMA.) There is a strong case for early action in policy and law reform in order to facilitate CO2-EOR. 
We made a number of recommendations for this purpose in Chapter 7.
9 Global CCS Institute, CCS Ready Policy and Regulations, above n 5 at 25.
10 See N Bankes, Appendix B.
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CHAPTER 13  
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations on each topic have been gathered together at the end of each Chapter. 
Here, we restate the recommendations under the heading of each statute, proceeding alphabetically, 
with general recommendations at the front and international law at the end. Under the heading 
of each statute we have where possible restated the recommendations in the order of the sections 
that will be affected. We have left repetition and overlap where it occurs, for the sake of clarity, 
and have repeated recommendations in cases where they apply equally to two Acts. We hope that 
this will make it easier to see the implications of the recommendations for existing law and the 
proposed CCS Act. 
After each recommendation in brackets is the number of the Chapter from which it came, and after 
the colon the number of the recommendation as stated at the end of that Chapter. 
1 General
1. A stand-alone CCS statute should be enacted. (2:12)
2. The injection and storage of CO2 should be authorised under the new CCS Act, while the RMA 
continues to apply to other aspects of CCS operations. (2:1)
2 Building Act 2004
3. The Building Act 2004 should be amended to include offshore installations used for CCS, and to 
include a CO2 pipeline operator as a network utility operator so that a CO2 pipeline is not treated 
as a building. (2:16)
4. The Building Act 2004 should be amended to include a CO2 pipeline operator as a network utility 
operator. (8:4)
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3 Proposed Carbon Capture and Storage Act
General
5. We do not make a recommendation as to the title of the legislation. (3:1)
6. We recommend that public participation be initiated at an early stage of CCS development, and 
that it continues throughout the life of the project with varying levels of engagement. Nonetheless, 
there should only be one formal public hearing, which also covers RMA applications, as part of the 
permitting process for an application for an injection permit. Special provision should be made for 
Māori participation. (3:6)
7. We do not make any recommendation as to what agency should regulate CCS activities. (3:7)
Purpose and principles
8. We recommend that the purpose of the Act be to facilitate and to regulate the permanent 
geological sequestration of CO2, as part of efforts to reduce the emission into the air of greenhouse 
gases, in such a way as to protect the environment and human health and safety. (3:2)
9. We recommend that the proposed CCS Act include an obligation for all decision makers under it 
to have particular regard to: 
 (i) the protection of underground sources of drinking water; 
 (ii) the management of conflict between CCS and other uses of subsurface resources; and
 (iii)  the protection of market confidence in emission reductions through regulatory clarity and 
proper GHG accounting. (3:3)
10. We recommend that decision makers be obliged to have regard to, or to take into account, the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi). (3:4)
11. We recommend that the relationship between these principles and the purpose of the Act be 
stated clearly to ensure that the principles support the purpose but are not capable of being read 
down or dismissed by giving undue priority to the purpose. (3:5)
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Property rights
12. The new CCS Act should vest in the Crown all rights and powers necessary to explore for CCS 
capacity, to develop CCS capacity, to inject CO2 and other greenhouse gases into the subsurface 
of land, and to sequester them there permanently; along with all necessarily incidental rights and 
powers. (4:5)
13. The vesting of subsurface CCS rights by the Act should be expressed in a way that makes it clear 
that the land owner has no proprietary right of action against the Crown or its permittee for the 
effect of the Act. Compensation should be payable for actual loss or diminution of value of the 
land, but not otherwise. (4:6)
Permits 
14. We recommend a system for the granting of a CCS exploration permit and then a CCS injection 
permit. (We do not consider it necessary to have a CCS pipeline permit.) The permit system 
will facilitate the regulation of different aspects of the public interest, the allocation of public 
resources, the identification of a commercial interest, and various ancillary rights and duties. (5:1)
Exploration permit
15. An exploration permit gives the holder the exclusive right to explore a specified area for 
storage formations for a limited time and to undertake the work necessary to complete a site 
characterisation, which is necessary for an application for an injection permit. Test injections 
may be carried out with approval. The exploration permit gives a priority right to an injection 
permit. (5:2)
16. An application for an exploration permit will include details about the technical qualifications 
and financial resources of the applicant, and its proposed work plan. It will include a public 
participation proposal detailing the level of public engagement proposed for the life of the project, 
including consultation with Māori. There will be no formal hearing. The Act will state the criteria 
for determining an application. (5:3)
Injection permit
17. An injection permit will allow a company to drill injection wells, to inject CO2 for permanent 
storage, and to undertake activities incidental thereto. The holder of an exploration permit will 
have priority to apply. An application will provide a full analysis of the project in a site plan. (5:4)
18. An application for an injection permit will be considered by a board of inquiry modelled on RMA 
procedures, with a hearing that allows for public participation, including representation or other 
means of involving Māori and the regional council. The procedure will bring related RMA and 
EEZ Act resource consent applications together with the injection permit application to be heard 
together. (5:5)
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19. A board of inquiry shall not approve an application for an injection permit unless it is satisfied that 
the CCS project applied for will not present significant risk of leakage from permanent storage, 
significant risk to health and safety, or significant risk to the environment. Approval of a permit 
will be subject to conditions, will include approval of the site plan, and will require measurement, 
monitoring and verification. (5:6)
20. The detailed regulation of CCS activities will be governed by an approved site plan, rather than by 
permit conditions. The site plan will include site characterisation, environmental impact assessment, 
work programme, monitoring plan, corrective measures plan, and site closure plan. The site plan 
will be approved by the board of inquiry initially but the permit holder can vary it subsequently 
with approval by the regulatory agency. The site plan will be subject to review. Approval may be 
withdrawn and reinstated on terms stated in the Act. An approved site plan must be in place in order 
to carry out injection activities. Approval may be withdrawn and reinstated. (5:7)
21. The regulatory agency will have the power to make a direction to the permit holder where 
significant leakage, unexpected migration or other irregularity occurs, in order to protect the 
environment, human health, other resources, or third-party assets. (5:8)
22. An injection permit will not be issued for any specific term, and will remain in effect until a closure 
authorisation is given, or (in limited circumstances) the permit is surrendered or cancelled. (5:9)
Site closure
23. The regulatory agency shall not grant a closure authorisation unless it is satisfied that there 
is no significant risk of future leakage or irregularity in the storage site, that the site has been 
decommissioned as required by the site closure plan and by the regulatory agency, that the CO2 
is conforming with the behaviour anticipated in modelling, that the site is evolving to long-term 
stability, that a long-term monitoring plan has been provided, that financial obligations have been 
fulfilled, and overall that operations have resulted in safe and permanent storage of CO2. (5:10)
24. We do not make a recommendation for a minimum duration for the closure period between the 
end of injection and the issue of a closure authorisation. (5:11)
25. A closure authorisation will signify the end of liability for the CCS operator. (5:12) 
Detailed regulation
26. The detailed regulation of CCS activities is governed by a site plan, approved by the board of 
inquiry upon the grant of an injection permit, and subject to review by the regulator. The permit 
holder may vary it subsequently with approval by the regulator. Injection activities may not occur 
without an approved site plan. The regulatory agency may withdraw the approval if there is a 
significant risk of leakage or risk to human health, the environment, or other resources, or if there 
is non-compliance with the CCS Act. (6:1)
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27. The site plan will contain the following components:
 (i) Site characterisation
 (ii) Environmental impact assessment
 (iii) Work programme
 (iv) Monitoring plan
 (v) Corrective measures plan
 (vi) Site closure plan. (6:2)
28. The regulatory agency shall have power to make a direction to the permit holder, where significant 
leakage, unintended (or unexpected) migration or other irregularity occurs, in order to protect 
the environment, human health, other resources, or third-party assets. (6:3)
29. In the event of leakage or significant irregularities the regulatory agency may require the operator 
to undertake corrective measures or may undertake those measures itself and recover the cost 
from the permit holder. (6:4)
General permit provisions
30. The permitting regime will contain ancillary provisions common in permitting systems, such as 
notifiable events, inspections, reporting, transfers, variations, cancellation, enforcement, and 
dispute resolution procedures. A register will be established for information on existing and 
previous permits, and to provide an information portal to the public. (5:13)
31. The legislation will confer the power to require financial assurance of a character and size that 
will protect the interests of the public and the functioning of the regulatory agency in respect 
of enforcement. (5:14)
Liability
32. Liability during the operational phase of CCS operations should remain with the CCS operator, 
although liability for underground trespass and nuisance will be restricted as part of the property 
rights arrangements under the new CCS Act. As part of the process of granting an injection permit 
under the new CCS Act, financial assurance will be required in order to cover remedial activities, 
monitoring, measurement and verification responsibilities, and liability for leaked emissions 
under the ETS. (10:1)
33. After the regulator grants a site closure authorisation, the Crown should assume civil claims 
against the CCS operator that arise out of operations authorised and carried out under the 
injection permit. The Crown may recover costs from the operator where the operator has been at 
fault or negligent, has concealed information or deceived the regulator, or has failed to exercise 
due diligence. The Crown will not be liable for exemplary damages, or for the acts of a third party. 
The assumption of liability should make it clear that a person who has suffered loss or damage 
can sue the Crown instead of the former operator. (10:2)
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34. The operator should remain liable for monitoring, measurement and verification until there has been 
no significant migration, leakage, or unexpected behaviour for a specified time. The operator should be 
required before site closure to pay the costs of implementing a long-term monitoring plan. (10:3)
35. After the regulator grants a site closure authorisation, liability for remediation and emissions 
accounting should be assumed by the responsible agency. (10:4)
Pipelines, industry regulation and third party access
36. The new CCS Act should include a power to require the notification of pipeline gas quality and a 
power to make regulations for pipeline gas quality. The power to make regulations for gas quality 
should refer to the requirements of the London Dumping Protocol. (8:5)
37. The new CCS Act should authorise the making of regulations for industry regulation and 
governance, including metering and reconciliation, third party access to pipelines and other 
essential facilities, and the allocation of costs for shared facilities. (8:6)
Relationship with other subsurface resources
38. Conflicts between CCS activities and CMA activities should be avoided and resolved by vesting 
discretionary powers of a brief and reasonably general kind in the Minister or Ministers to evaluate 
the merits of the competing proposals, and to make decisions in the public interest. The powers 
will use methods of spatial separation (although it is unlikely to be the preferred option), permit 
applications and permit conditions, and the control of specific activities. (7:1)
39. The powers of the Minister or Ministers to avoid and resolve conflicts between CCS and CMA 
activities will apply to both CCS and CMA activities and will require provisions in both Acts. 
An amendment to the CMA will ensure that the Minister and other decision-makers may, and are 
required to, take into account CCS matters in making decisions under the CMA on permits, permit 
conditions and regulations. The amendment should ensure that the purpose of the CMA stated in 
section 1A does not prevent decision-makers from taking CCS considerations into account in the 
administration of the Act. (7:2)
40. The legislation should provide for the recognition of co-ordination agreements between resource 
users and should provide procedures for dispute resolution where necessary. (7:3)
41. The following matters and principles should be taken into account in the making of decisions on 
permits and conditions under the CMA and the CCS Act: 
 (i) Activity in both CCS and other subsurface resource uses is to be facilitated.
 (ii) Unreasonable interference with potentially useful subsurface resources should be avoided. 
 (iii) Consultation and agreement among operators is to be encouraged.
 (iv) No operator should have a veto over the activities of another operator or permit holder. 
 (v)  The Minister or Ministers are to make decisions in the public interest. The public interest can 
be left as a broad criterion to be applied in particular cases, or the legislation can make an 
effort to explain, define, and confine it.
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 (vi)  Due regard should be had to the importance of investment certainty. Rights under permits 
granted before new CCS legislation comes into effect should be altered only where necessary 
in the public interest. Rights under permits where significant investments have been made 
in project development should be altered only where necessary in the public interest. (7:4)
42. The proposed CCS legislation should be written so as to be open to the possibility of encouraging 
both CCS exploration and petroleum discovery. (7:5)
43. The proposed CCS legislation should be written so as to be open to the prospect of an EOR project 
providing geosequestration. (7:6)
44. A company operating EOR and wishing to gain credits under the Emissions Trading Scheme should 
be required to come under the CCS regulatory regime. (7:7)
45. The regulation of CCS injection operations should be expressed in a manner that avoids making 
the use of CO2 for petroleum EOR purposes unlawful. (7:8)
46. The responsible Minister should have power, jointly with the Minister of Energy and Resources 
if that is a different Minister, to recommend regulations for a co-ordinated approach to EOR with 
CCS characteristics. (7:9)
Marine CCS
47. CCS operations that convey CO2 from land by pipeline to an injection installation on the seafloor, 
with no platform above the surface of the water, should be required by New Zealand law to 
comply with the requirements of the London Dumping Protocol, even if strictly they do not need 
to do so. (9:2)
48. New Zealand law for all forms of marine CCS must conform to the London Dumping Protocol, 
and in particular the following requirements: 
 (a) Disposal must be into a sub-seabed geological formation, and not into the water column; 
 (b)  The material injected must consist overwhelmingly of CO2, with no wastes added for the 
purpose of disposal; but it may contain incidental associated substances derived from the 
source material and the capture and sequestration process; and 
 (c)  The permitting process must involve the consideration of waste prevention, the treatment of 
waste, the characterisation and categorisation of waste, the provision of information on the 
selection of an appropriate dump (injection) site, a comparative assessment of effects, and 
the imposition of reviewable conditions specified in Annex 2. (9:3)
49. Marine CCS injection should be governed under a new CCS Act, and removed from the RMA and EEZ 
Act regimes. It cannot be classified as a permitted activity within the meaning of those Acts. (9:4)
50. A CCS Act and permits for CCS must provide for monitoring, measures to prevent escapes of CO2 
into the water column, and measures to respond to escapes if they occur. (9:6)
51. The regulation of discharges of CO2 from injection installations in the EEZ should occur under the 
new CCS Act, rather than through an extension of the EEZ Act’s regime on harmful substances. (9:8)
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52. The proposed CCS Act should regulate the discharge of CO2 from a pipeline in the EEZ or extended 
continental shelf. (9:36)
53. Marine CCS injection by a New Zealand ship or structure beyond the EEZ and extended continental 
shelf should be prohibited, and the prohibition should be stated in the new CCS Act. (9:15)
54. The regulation of CCS storage formations (including injection and any leakage of gas) should 
occur in the new CCS Act, and not Part 20 of the MTA (which concerns hazardous structures and 
operations). (9:16)
55. The regulation of discharges of CO2 from CCS injection installations should not occur under Part 20 
of the MTA. In the EEZ they should be subject to the new CCS Act, and, in the coastal marine area, 
to the RMA. In both they should also be subject to the Emissions Trading Scheme. (9:17)
General
56. The proposed CCS Act should include a general power to make regulations to give effect to the 
purpose of the Act, especially for health and safety reasons, and powers for the inter-agency 
exchange of information. (2:14)
4  Climate Change Response Act 2002
57. It should be possible for the operator of a CO2-EOR project to become a voluntary participant in 
the Emissions Trading Scheme in order to claim credits in NZUs for removal activities, but only 
if an injection permit has been issued for the project under the CCS legislation. (7:12)
58. Storing CO2 after capture should be a removal activity under the NZ ETS whether or not a person is 
required to surrender units in respect of the emissions that would result. Paragraph (a) in Schedule 4 
part 2, Subpart 2 of the Climate Change Response Act 2002 can simply be deleted. (11:1)
59. The Climate Change (Other Removal Activities) Regulations 2009 should be amended (or 
complemented with parallel regulations) for CCS, in order to provide for measurement, monitoring 
and reporting of CO2 that is sequestered, and for any other matters required for the management 
of CCS as a removal activity. The MMV requirements under the proposed CCS legislation should 
form the basis for data and reporting of injection and any leakage from CCS storage sites. (11:2)
60. The Climate Change Response Act 2002, Schedule 3 should be amended to include CO2 
geosequestration as an activity for which a person must be a participant under the NZ ETS. This 
will place the obligation on a CCS operator to surrender NZUs for any leakage from a storage 
site. The CCS operator will be subject to this obligation during the injection period and during the 
closure period. (11:3)
61. The CCS operator must continue to be a participant in the NZ ETS until the site closure 
authorisation is issued. (11:4)
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5  Crown Minerals Act 1991
62. A new CCS Act should be enacted separately from the Crown Minerals Act 1991. (2:11)
63. The definition of “mining” (ie production) under the CMA should be amended to include CO2 
storage incidental to an authorised EOR activity. (7:11)
64. The powers of the Minister or Ministers to avoid and resolve conflicts between CCS and CMA 
activities will apply to both CCS and CMA activities and will require provisions in both Acts. 
An amendment to the CMA will ensure that the Minister and other decision-makers may, and are 
required to, take into account CCS matters in making decisions under the CMA on permits, permit 
conditions and regulations. The amendment should ensure that the purpose of the CMA stated in 
section 1A does not prevent decision-makers from taking CCS considerations into account in the 
administration of the Act. (7:2)
65. The regulatory framework for EOR operations under the CMA should be developed, in the light of 
a CCS rationale, in order to provide a measure of clarity and certainty about how such operations 
may be planned. (7:10)
6  Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012
66. In relation to the EEZ Act, we make the following recommendations (assuming that the transfer 
of control of discharge and dumping from the Maritime Transport Act, pursuant to the Marine 
Legislation Bill, takes place). Regulation of CCS (including CO2 injection, storage, and possible 
leakage) in the EEZ and the extended continental shelf should be removed from the EEZ Act and 
regulated instead under a new CCS Act. Regulation under the new CCS Act should include the 
injection of CO2 arising from offshore natural gas processing. (9:7)
67. The regulation of discharges of CO2 from injection installations should occur under the new CCS 
Act, rather than through an extension of the EEZ Act’s regime on harmful substances. (9:8)
68. The new CCS Act should prohibit marine CCS injection that is not in accordance with Annex 1 
of the London Dumping Protocol, and should require compliance with the processes in Annex 2 
of the LDP. Reference should also be made to guidelines produced under the LDP, as instruments 
with which CCS operations should be consistent. (9:9)
69. Until a CCS Act is enacted, dumping regulations under the EEZ Act must be consistent with 
the LDP (for example, not classifying CCS as a permitted activity) and provide an avenue for 
applications to be assessed, because in the interim CCS will be caught by the EEZ Act’s provisions 
on dumping. (9:10)
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70. The CCS Act and the EEZ Act should remove the need for marine consent under the EEZ Act 
to dump CO2, discharge CO2, or place matter under the seabed. Consent should continue to be 
required under the EEZ Act for incidental discharges, the construction and placement of structures 
and pipelines, and disturbance to the seabed. Incidental discharges of CO2 from installations in 
the EEZ should be controlled under the new CCS Act because they are unlikely to be restricted 
under the EEZ Act. (9:11)
71. A single board of inquiry process should be utilised for decision making on authorisations under 
the RMA/EEZ Act and CCS legislation, without use of a non-notified discretionary activity 
status. (9:12)
72. The EEZ Act should be amended to direct a decision maker to have regard to the positive effects 
of CCS on climate change, and should prevent CCS from being obstructed by the direction not to 
have regard to the effects on climate change of discharging greenhouse gases into the air. (9:13)
73. Those aspects of pipelines already regulated under the RMA (including the alignment of pipelines 
and any discharge of CO2 from pipelines) should remain under the RMA. Those aspects of pipelines 
already regulated under the EEZ Act (including alignment of pipelines) should remain under the 
EEZ Act. (9:33)
74. Regulations for pipelines, including CCS pipelines, should be made under the EEZ Act. (9:34)
75. CCS should be part of the regulatory programme under the EEZ Act. (9:14)
7 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms 
Act 1996
76. The classification of CO2 under the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (not 
classified as hazardous) remain unchanged. (2:15)
8 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992
77. The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 and regulations under it should apply to CCS 
operations. (2:13)
78. The Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013 
should be amended to include CCS operations. (6:5)
79. The construction and fitness of offshore CCS injection installations should be regulated under the 
Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2013 by 
extending their application, that reference be made to specific international standards on CCS, 
and that the application of the HSEA and its Regulations in the EEZ and the extended continental 
shelf be expressly confirmed by amending the Act. (9:32)
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80. The Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999 should be amended: 
 (a)  to include pipelines carrying CO2, including pipelines in the territorial sea, the exclusive 
economic zone, and on the extended continental shelf; 
 (b)  to clarify at what point a pipeline becomes part of an offshore petroleum installation and 
more generally exactly what facilities constitute a pipeline;
 (c)  to ensure that suitable up-do-date standards covering CCS pipelines specifically apply, 
without relying on a broad reference to generally accepted practice; 
 (d)  to ensure that obligations to maintain certification and compliance with standards are 
imposed directly without qualification as to “all practicable steps.” 
 (e)  to ensure that the effect of the HSE (Pressure Equipment, Cranes, and Passenger Ropeways) 
Regulations 1999 on the CCS stages of capture, transport, and injections is clarified. (8:3)
81. The Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) Regulations 1999 should be extended to apply 
to CCS pipelines in marine areas as well as onshore. Technical standards specific to CCS should be 
incorporated. The HSEA should be amended to clarify that it applies to pipelines and structures 
in the EEZ and on the extended continental shelf, and that submarine pipelines are places of work 
under the Act. (9:35)
9  Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana)  
Act 2011
82. A CCS operation should have the status of an “accommodated activity” by reason of being 
a network utility operator under the RMA. (9:30)
83. The use of the subsurface of land for CCS injection and storage purposes under both protected 
customary right areas and customary title areas should be vested in the Crown as are such rights 
elsewhere. (9:31)
10 Maritime Transport Act 1994
84. In relation to the Maritime Transport Act 1994, we make the following recommendations assuming 
that the transfer of control of discharge and dumping from this Act to the EEZ Act takes place, 
pursuant to the Marine Legislation Bill. Marine CCS injection by a New Zealand ship or structure 
beyond the EEZ and extended continental shelf should be prohibited, and the prohibition should 
be stated in the new CCS Act. (9:15)
85. The regulation of CCS storage formations (including injection and any leakage of gas) should 
occur in the new CCS Act, and not Part 20 of the MTA (which concerns hazardous structures and 
operations). (9:16)
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86. The regulation of discharges of CO2 from CCS injection installations should not occur under Part 20 
of the MTA. In the EEZ they should be subject to the new CCS Act, and, in the coastal marine area, 
to the RMA. In both they should also be subject to the Emissions Trading Scheme. (9:17)
87. CO2 is not, and should not, be considered a “harmful substance” to be regulated under Part 20 of 
the MTA. (9:18)
88. Legal recourse for pollution damage is required by UNCLOS, and Parts 25 or 26A of the MTA should 
remain unchanged. The main control of CO2 leakage should be under the proposed CCS Act. (9:19)
89. A CCS injection installation should be included within the definition of a “structure” under the 
MTA, to ensure that any discharges of harmful substances (such as incidental discharges of oil) 
are subject to Parts 25 or 26A. (9:20)
11 Resource Management Act 1991
General
90. The drafting of CCS legislation should draw on the accrued capability and experience with the 
management of comparable activities under the RMA. (2:10)
91. The injection and storage of CO2 should be authorised under a new CCS Act, while the RMA 
continues to apply to other aspects of CCS operations. (2:1)
92. The RMA will be amended so that the injection of CO2 for permanent sequestration will not be 
the discharge of a contaminant. Injection and any migration or leakage from a geological storage 
formation will be dealt with under the proposed CCS Act and not the RMA. (2:2)
93. Incidental discharges from CCS injection activities and transport (for example occasional 
discharges of CO2 to the atmosphere, or stormwater runoff from industrial facilities) will remain 
regulated under the RMA, and continue to be discharges to land, air or water under that Act, 
regulated by the regional council. (2:3)
Purpose and principles, NES and NPS
94. Section 7 will be amended to ensure that regard will be had to the benefits to be derived from the 
use and development of CCS. (2:4)
95. A National Policy Statement will be made under the RMA in order to provide nation-wide guidance 
and policy direction for CCS activities that remain subject to the RMA. Alternatively, provisions in 
the proposed CCS Act can be deemed to be an NPS. (2:6)
96. A National Environmental Standard should be considered to facilitate aspects of CCS operations, 
especially pipelines. (2:7)
97. We recommend that a National Environmental Standard and a National Policy Statement under 
the RMA make provision for the decommissioning of a CO2 pipeline. (8:7)
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Call in, matters to be taken into account
98. The powers of the Minister for the Environment to call in a proposal of national significance 
under sections 140 to 150AA of the RMA will be amended to provide that, where a person makes 
an application for an injection permit under the proposed CCS Act, the Minister shall exercise 
his or her powers to call in all RMA aspects of the proposal to be heard and decided in the same 
process as that for the injection permit. A board of inquiry will be empowered to decide the RMA 
resource consents along with the injection permit. The public participatory processes under 
each Act should be aligned so that submissions are processed and heard only once in relation to 
a single CCS proposal. (2:8)
99. Where an RMA notice of requirement for a CO2 pipeline is made along with a CCS injection permit, 
it should be called in and heard and processed with that application and all ancillary applications, 
in order to provide procedural integration; but a separate application for a pipeline designation 
should also be possible. A National Policy Statement and a National Environmental Standard 
for CCS should extend in their provisions to CCS pipelines, and in particular decommissioning 
requirements. (8:2)
100.  Sections 70A and 104E and related provisions will be amended to ensure that CCS is not 
unintentionally obstructed by the policy of removing from the RMA the consideration of the 
discharge into air of GHGs. A second exception can be added to sections 70A and 104E to allow 
councils and consent authorities to have regard to the extent that the use and development of 
CCS enables a reduction in the discharge into air of GHGs, either in absolute terms or relative to 
the use and development of non-renewable energy without CCS. (2:5)
Designation
101.  The requiring authority system under the RMA leading to a Public Works Act process should be 
made available for CCS pipeline and CCS injection operations for the compulsory acquisition of 
surface rights to land. (4:1)
102.  As also recommended in Chapter 4, the RMA should be amended so that a company that undertakes, 
or proposes to undertake, the distribution or transmission of CO2 has the status of a network utility 
operator in order to be able to obtain a designation and rights of land acquisition. (8:1)
103.  The RMA will be amended to extend the list of network utility operators in section 166 to a 
person who operates, or proposes to operate, a network for the purpose of carbon capture, the 
transmission of CO2 and geological storage of CO2. This will make a CCS company eligible to 
become a requiring authority with rights to designate and to acquire land and rights of way 
compulsorily, and will facilitate status as an accommodated activity under the Marine and 
Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. (2:9)
104.  The definition of “network utility operator” in section 166 of the RMA should include a person who 
undertakes or proposes to undertake a CCS pipeline operation or a CCS injection operation. (4:2)
105.  In relation to injection operations, eligibility should be confined to persons holding injection 
permits for CCS operations. (4:3)
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Coastal Marine Area
106.  The regulation of CCS injection (comprising dumping and discharge) in the coastal marine 
area should be removed from the RMA and controlled under new CCS legislation, which must 
conform to the requirements of Annexes 1 and 2 of the LDP. (9:21)
107.  The regulation of CCS storage formations after injection, including leakage, should also be removed 
from the RMA (and also Part 20 of the MTA) and controlled under new CCS legislation. (9:22)
108.  We recommend an amendment to section 12, to clarify that the presence of injected CO2 under 
the seabed for the purposes of CCS does not amount to a coastal occupation for the purposes of 
the Act or require consent by virtue of section 12. (9:27)
109.  The regulation of discharges of CO2 from CCS injection installations should not occur under Part 20 
of the MTA. In the EEZ they should be subject to the new CCS Act, and, in the coastal marine 
area, to the RMA. In both they should also be subject to the Emissions Trading Scheme. (9:17)
110.  Ancillary discharges from CCS installations (including incidental discharges of CO2 to air or 
water) should be regulated under the RMA by including a CCS injection installation in the 
definition of an offshore installation under the MTA and therefore the RMA. (9:23)
111.  RMA requirements should continue to apply to incidental discharges from an injection 
installation (including escapes of CO2 to air or water), noise effects, and the disturbance of the 
seabed in the coastal marine area. (9:28)
112. The NZCPS should be amended to acknowledge the benefits of marine CCS. (9:29)
113.  RMA requirements for a coastal permit for occupation of coastal space should continue to apply to 
CCS surface operations (including exploration), subject to restrictions to prevent a CCS application 
from being classified in a regional plan as non-complying or prohibited; and to ensure that they are 
evaluated on a first-in-first-served basis rather than any other allocation method. (9:24)
114.  The use or occupation of the subsurface of the coastal marine area for CCS purposes, including 
storage formations and pore space, should be removed from control under the RMA, so that the 
initial and continued presence of injected gas does not amount to occupation. (9:25)
115.  Provision should be made to ensure that a CCS operation not be impeded by a coastal permit 
granted for exclusive occupation. (9:26)
116.  A procedure should be introduced for the grant of an overlapping coastal permit for necessary 
infrastructure with a balancing of the interests of the two parties. (4:4)
117.  Those aspects of pipelines already regulated under the RMA (including the alignment of pipelines 
and any discharge of CO2 from pipelines) should remain under the RMA. Those aspects of 
pipelines already regulated under the EEZ Act (including alignment of pipelines) should remain 
under the EEZ Act. (9:33)
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12  Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection 
Act 1966
118.  The Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1966 should continue to apply to CCS 
pipelines. (9:37)
13  International Law Matters
119.  International law provides an adequate basis for domestic jurisdiction to regulate marine CCS in 
the territorial sea, EEZ and extended continental shelf, but does not allow CCS injection to occur 
beyond the extended continental shelf in the international seabed area. (9:1)
120.  New Zealand remains under a general obligation to accompany marine CCS with measures to 
reduce the need for CCS, such as by promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency, and this 
obligation should be taken into account in policy making and law reform. (9:5)
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Introduction
(i) Purpose of Report
This report has been prepared by Robert Pritchard for the University of Waikato, Hamilton, 
New Zealand as part of a carbon capture and storage (CCS) legal and regulatory research project for 
the New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.
This report reviews Australia’s experience in the design and development of a CCS legal and regulatory 
regime for its offshore area (the regulatory regime). It has been prepared for the limited, albeit specific 
and important, purpose of identifying issues that may be of value to New Zealand in designing and 
developing a regulatory regime of its own to facilitate the development of CCS as a mechanism for 
reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, both onshore and offshore.
(ii) The IEA Model Framework
The 2010 IEA publication Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (the IEA Model 
Framework) has summarised the scope of regulatory issues that need to be addressed:
Regulatory frameworks are required to ensure the effective stewardship of CO2 storage sites 
over the long term, the protection of public health and the environment, and the security of 
CCS activities. Appropriate regulatory frameworks are also required to clarify the rights and 
responsibilities of CCS stakeholders, including relevant authorities, operators and the public. 
Additionally, regulations are needed to underpin performance and associated incentive schemes, 
commercial transactions relating to CCS operations, and also to build public confidence in, and 
acceptance of, the technology.
The IEA Model Framework identified 29 issues that it saw as critical to the regulatory regime. It focused 
primarily, as does this report, on the issues associated with CO2 storage since issues associated with 
CO2 capture and transport are likely to fall within existing regulatory frameworks. The IEA Model 
Framework also provided a model text for regulating the following activities: 
(a) exploration for a potential storage site, including site characterisation and selection;
(b) operation of a storage site;
(c) cessation of injection activities at a storage site;
(d) closure of a storage site; and  
(e) transfer of responsibility for a storage site to a relevant government authority. 
Carbon Capture and Storage: Designing the Legal and Regulatory Framework for New Zealand260
(iii) The Effectiveness and Affordability of CCS
CCS has the potential to be possibly the most effective mechanism for reducing global GHG gas 
emissions – provided it can be deployed affordably. The cost of capture is believed to be the largest 
cost component of CCS (usually greater than 80%) but there is considerable variability according to 
technology choice, CO2 purity, site-specific and regulatory factors. 
The regulatory regime has a crucial role in providing an efficient investment environment to enable 
CCS to be deployed affordably. 
(iv) Uncertainty over Regulation of GHG Emissions,  
Including the Price of Carbon
The regulation of GHG emissions across the entire economy, including the imposition of a price on 
carbon, also has a great deal to do with the affordability of CCS. 
As the IPCC has suggested:
[O]nce the full cost of the complete CCS system has been accounted for, CCS systems are 
unlikely to deploy on a large scale in the absence of an explicit policy or regulatory regime that 
substantially limits greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere. 
According to the International Energy Agency, to be affordable in the long term, CCS may require 
a global long-term carbon price of around US$52 per tonne. To induce switching in the short-term, 
the price may need to be considerably higher, perhaps two or three times higher. 
With effect from July 2013, the Australian government imposed a price on carbon, commencing 
with a comparatively high fixed price of $23/tonne in the first year, escalating annually for another 
two years, before changing to a market-based price. Carbon pricing has been insufficient to induce 
technology switching on any scale in Australia. More importantly, carbon pricing faces the prospect 
of repeal in Australia following the change of government in September 2013. 
The high cost of CCS and the absence of adequate economic incentives in Australia, as elsewhere, 
is likely to remain the major barrier to its widespread deployment; hence the need for continuing 
focus on the efficiency of the regulatory regime.
(v) Main Regulatory Issues Addressed in this Report
Irrespective of cost, investors will not commit to CCS projects unless there is clarity of the regulatory 
regime, particularly in relation to property and liability issues.
The main property issues are:
(1) the right of access – not only to the surface of land or subsea area for operations but also to the 
underground aquifer or pore space into which injection and storage could occur (the storage 
site) – and the need to avoid conflict with present and future petroleum operations; 
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(2) the right to inject substances into the storage site;
(3) the right to continue to store the injected substances in the storage site and the right to later 
remove them; and
(4) the main liability issue is the long-term liability for leakage of the injected substances. 
(vi) Australia’s Experience to Date
By contrast with New Zealand, Australia has a federal system of government. Each Australian State 
has jurisdiction both onshore and in its coastal waters (up to three nautical miles offshore from 
the low water baseline) but the Commonwealth has jurisdiction beyond State jurisdiction to the 
outer edge of Australia’s continental shelf. Australia’s offshore area provides most of the potential 
storage sites.
The Commonwealth was an early mover, internationally, in enacting in 2008 a CCS legal and 
regulatory regime for its offshore area, which it folded into the existing offshore petroleum legislation, 
retitling it as the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Commonwealth) 
(whose storage provisions are referred to in this review as the Offshore Storage Act or more simply as 
OSA or the Act). 
The Australian legislation to date (for both onshore and offshore areas) comprises:
 Offshore Storage Act 2006 (Commonwealth)  
(whose storage provisions became operative in 2009)
 Barrow Island Act 2003 (Western Australia)
 Petroleum Act 2000 (South Australia)
 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Queensland)
 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Victoria)
 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Victoria)
The Commonwealth and the Australian States have, however, taken an inconsistent approach towards 
the promotion of onshore projects in their respective jurisdictions and towards risk management: 
All of the Australian CCS regimes adopt different thresholds, criteria and definitions including in 
relation to suitable site selection, serious situations, responses to risk, and whether the stored 
substance is behaving as predicted. These regimes also have very different approaches to the 
treatment of the long-term liabilities of project operators with some jurisdictions providing 
different levels of indemnities and others electing to leave the loss where it falls.1 
1 N Swayne (nee Durrant), “Carbon Capture and Storage Laws in Australia: Project Facilitation or a Precautionary Approach?”, 
(2010) Environmental Liability, Vol 18 Issue 4, at 148–157.
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A consequence of the Australian legislative inconsistency is that:
[D]iffering liability rules … across the jurisdictions [have created] unnecessary legal uncertainty 
and higher transaction costs, acting as a barrier to the commercial deployment of CCS technology.2 
[Australia] has some of the most extensive laws on CCS in the world, yet the differing positions 
currently being taken on long-term liabilities may prove a real hindrance to investment in  
the technology.3
(vii) The Need for Conflict Avoidance and for  
Legal and Regulatory Clarity and Certainty
In our opinion, it is not so much any jurisdictional differences in liability rules that are a hindrance 
to CCS investment in Australia but the potential for conflict between operators of petroleum and 
GHG storage activities, coupled with the daunting cost of CCS as an emissions reduction mechanism 
in itself, a cost that is made more daunting by any uncertainty over long-term liability. There is a 
need to focus on conflict avoidance and efficient conflict resolution between petroleum operators 
and storage operators. There is also a very strong case for legal and regulatory clarity and certainty, 
including the limitation of common law liability.
(viii) The Formulation of the Australian Offshore  
Regulatory Regime
In reviewing Australia’s experience for the purposes of the NZ research project, we have largely 
confined ourselves to the Commonwealth’s offshore regulatory regime that led the way. The OSA is 
the main Australian legal instrument to which we will refer. The purpose of the OSA was:
[T]o establish a system of offshore titles, similar to the offshore petroleum titles that already exist 
…, that will authorise the transportation by pipeline and injection and storage of greenhouse gas 
substances in deep geological formations under the seabed … Each form of activity will have the 
potential to impact on the other, both beneficially and detrimentally. The Bill therefore provides 
for regulatory decisions made in respect of each form of activity to take into account potential 
impacts on the other.4  
(ix) The Approach of this Paper
The OSA was formulated in 2008 after a process of consultation between the federal government 
and industry in which 12 key issues were considered and canvassed by the government’s 2008 
discussion paper. 
2 N Swayne,  and A Phillips,  “Legal Liability for Carbon Capture and Storage in Australia: Where Should the Losses Fall?” (2012) 
29 EPLJ 189 at 190.
3 I Havercroft, et al, Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) at 3.
4 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008, Australian Parliament, 2008.
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This paper approaches the review of Australia’s experience relating to its offshore CCS regime by 
discussing in turn the implementation of each of the original issues. For convenience of treatment, 
the paper has divided some of the original issues into discrete components, expanding the list to the 
15 issues set out below:
1. What legislation should be used to provide the access and property rights?
2. What management system is needed for the release and award of exploration areas?
3. What regulation is needed to manage environmental issues?
4. What regulation is needed to manage occupational health and safety issues?
5. What regulation is needed for site management?
6. What specific regulation is needed for monitoring and verification of stored substances?
7. What specific regulation is required for remediation and mitigation of leakage?
8. What specific regulation is required for reporting requirements?
9. What regulation is needed in respect of site closure?
10. What regulation is needed to manage transport?
11. What regulation is needed in respect of long-term liability?
12. What regulation is needed in respect of performance bonds and guarantees?
13. What regulation is needed to manage interactions with the petroleum industry?
14. What regulation is needed to manage interactions with other users of the sea?
15. Who should be the regulator?
In discussing many of the issues, we have provided a table headed ‘Summary of Advantages and 
Disadvantages’ that in each case is an edited version of a table that appeared in the government’s 
2008 discussion paper.
Following each issue, we have provided various comments, which are a mixture of comments by 
others, including officials of the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, and ourselves.
Where the text is underlined, this denotes our personal views on specific points that we hope will be 
of particular interest to the project research team.
We reiterate that the focus of this paper is on Australia’s offshore regime.
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1 What legislation should be used to provide 
the access and property rights?
The Commonwealth had a choice of 3 legislative options for its offshore regulatory regime. 
It ultimately decided that, to minimise complexity, legislation combining both petroleum and GHG 
storage operations was desirable. The 3 options were:
(i) Project-specific legislation
By the Barrow Island Act 2003, the State of Western Australia had made project-specific provision for 
CCS for the Gorgon LNG Project. The Commonwealth rejected this type of project-specific legislation 
for a number of reasons: 
• project proponents would have no certainty as to their future access until after exploration
• the question would remain of under what framework any initial exploration would be undertaken
• time would be required to develop new legislation for each new project as proposed
• it would become difficult to manage project variations and changes in future practices and
• it would not provide consistency.
(ii) Stand-alone or separate storage legislation
Stand-alone storage legislation (i.e. separate from the petroleum legislation) was seen as increasing 
the risk that future changes to either the storage industry or the petroleum industry would not take 
the other industry into account.
Stand-alone legislation could have been developed as a ‘satellite act’ of the petroleum legislation but 
this was considered by the Commonwealth to be cumbersome and potentially inefficient.
(iii) Amendment of the Offshore Petroleum Act (OPA)  
(whose storage provisions are now referred to in this  
report as the OSA)
Many of the companies wishing to undertake storage activities were expected to be petroleum 
companies, either wishing to store greenhouse gases that they had produced themselves or acting in 
collaboration with the power generation industry.
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Most of the technologies, equipment and techniques used for injection and storage are identical to 
those used in the petroleum industry. It was particularly recognized that the petroleum industry had 
considerable injection experience in respect of:
• natural gas for permanent disposal in remote areas where there is no market for the natural gas
• natural gas reinjected to increase the volume of liquids produced from a well and
• carbon dioxide for enhanced oil recovery.
Combining all requirements within a single piece of legislation was seen as easier for users.
Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Project - Specific 
Legislation
Problems of inconsistency,  
industry uncertainty
Stand-Alone 
Legislation
Single purpose legislation will be shorter Requires a new framework for 
providing access and property rights
Will require extensive cross reference 
to the OPA to manage interactions 
with the petroleum industry
Offshore Petroleum 
Act (OPA)
Draws on well established and 
understood framework for providing and 
managing access and property rights
Provides an integrated management 
regime, reducing the need for new 
regulations, dealing for essentially 
identical activities
Act becomes very large
Could be perceived as making 
greenhouse matters the province of 
the petroleum industry
The Commonwealth opted for a single, combined regime. The OPA thus became a huge piece of 
legislation with 791 sections and 7 schedules. 
The OSA now provides a comprehensive statutory system of access and property rights for exploring 
for and using offshore storage sites, as well as for exploring for and developing petroleum fields. 
Unlike the Commonwealth, the State of Queensland opted for stand-alone legislation. 
The first step in the process of providing access and property rights to potential storage sites under the 
OSA is that the government carries out an initial screening of potential storage sites before making 
a decision to release specified areas for exploration. These areas can then be bid for by applicants, 
as described in the next section of this report. 
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Comments by ResourcesLaw
(i) Preference for Stand-Alone Legislation 
 Contrary to what the Commonwealth of Australia decided, we recommend stand-alone 
legislation rather than consolidation with existing petroleum legislation. We consider it to be 
more straightforward and suitable for a new storage regime.
(ii) Regulatory Certainty is Paramount 
 Despite our own preference for stand-alone legislation, we do not believe the type of 
legislation to be a critical issue for investors; their paramount concern will always be with 
regulatory certainty. 
(iii) What New Zealand Should Do 
 We suggest that New Zealand’s legislative approach should be based on whatever may be 
the most expedient for New Zealand, paying respect to its existing mining, petroleum and 
environmental laws.
2 What management system is needed for the 
release and award of exploration areas?
There are two basic alternatives for awarding exploration areas (assessment permits) to prospective 
GHG operators:
• direct allocation to potential users based on some criteria such as perceived need; or
• some form of competitive process, allowing the selection of a winning bid, following an initial 
screening of potential sites by the government.
Australian petroleum legislation has always provided for a competitive bidding process. 
There are 2 types: 
• cash bidding (which involves bidders tendering a cash amount for the rights to the area, but is 
rarely used) or
• more typically, work program bidding (in which bids are assessed in terms of the commitments 
that bidders put forward; a condition of awarding the exploration area is that the commitments 
must be met). 
For GHG assessment permits, both types of bidding were provided for in the OSA,5 although it is 
highly unlikely that cash bidding will ever be used in practice.
Advance screening by the government of areas prior to release was considered essential to ensure 
that areas are appropriate and that the needs of other users of the sea are taken into account.
5 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 288.
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The alternative procedure of direct allocation of areas to project proponents would have provided 
greater certainty to potential operators at an early stage but was rejected by the Commonwealth as 
it was not open and transparent.
Some stakeholders disagreed at the time, arguing that direct allocation would reduce uncertainty 
about access to sites and would promote a more rapid uptake.
The government decided that, overall, the market, operating under a bidding system, would provide 
the best results. It was thought that, to capitalise on an investment in assessing a greenhouse storage 
site, a storage operator would have a very strong incentive to do business with a greenhouse gas 
producer (and vice versa).
Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Competitive bidding process Provides a transparent market 
based process for allocation  
of areas
Less certainty for greenhouse gas 
storage proponents
Direct allocation of areas Provides greenhouse storage 
proponents with greater certainty 
as to access
Not a transparent process
No certainty that the ‘best’ 
potential applicant is awarded 
the area
Comments by ResourcesLaw
(i) Assessment Permits
 The OSA makes it an offence to inject or store a substance in an offshore area unless it is authorised 
by an injection licence under the OSA or is otherwise authorised by the petroleum regime.6
 Under the OSA, assessment permits are granted for a term of 6 years, with one possible extension 
of 3 years.7
 An assessment permit carries the right to explore for GHG storage formations and, if successful, 
the exclusive right to convert this to a holding lease or an injection licence.
(ii) Rights of Petroleum Title Holders
 It is important to emphasise that the OSA makes special provisions for petroleum title holders: 
(1) Petroleum title holders also have the right to explore for GHG storage formations in their 
title areas without an assessment permit.8 
(2) They may also apply for injection licences if there is not already an assessment licence or 
an injection licence in force over the petroleum production area.9
6 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 356.
7 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 293.
8 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 98.
9 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 369.
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(iii) Criteria for Award of Assessment Permits: Who is the ‘Most Deserving’?
 Blocks are advertised for application by qualified bidders, that is bidders having appropriate 
technical qualifications, financial resources and a suitable work program.10 
 The task in granting an assessment permit is to select the work program bid most likely to achieve 
the fullest assessment of the GHG storage potential within the permit area. Multiple applicants 
are ranked according to the order in which they are considered to be “most deserving” of the 
grant.11 The criteria for determining who is most deserving must be made publicly available by 
the Minister and may relate to economic, technical and public interest matters. Typically the 
criteria would be expected to include:
(1) the number and timing of wells to be drilled, assuming there is an adequate supporting 
program of geological and geophysical work; 
(2) the amount, type and timing of seismic surveying to be carried out; 
(3) other new surveying, data acquisition, sampling, monitoring and reprocessing to be carried out; 
(4) the amount, type and timing of any purchasing or licensing of existing data; 
(5) potential migration paths for injected GHG substances; 
(6) potential impacts on petroleum operations; 
(7) the extent to which the proposed work program takes account of existing or potential 
petroleum operations; and
(8) whether an applicant has a GHG stream for injection.
(iv) Obligations Attached to Assessment Permits 
 Assessment permits are subject to a range of statutory obligations.12 In addition, they will 
contain a range of permit-specific conditions.13
 The permit holder must apply to the Minister for further specific approval prior to undertaking 
‘key greenhouse gas operations’ (such as drilling) under the permit.14 The Minister may attach 
conditions to any such approval and compliance with those conditions itself becomes a condition 
of the permit.
 The Minister must not approve any key greenhouse gas operations if there is a risk of significant 
adverse impact on petroleum operations.15 
10 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 296.
11 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 298.
12 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 290 and s 291.
13 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 298.
14 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 292.
15 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 292.
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(v) The Risk of Adverse Impact on Petroleum Operations 
 In addition, the Minister has power to give directions to a permit holder to eliminate, mitigate 
or manage a risk of a significant adverse impact on existing or future petroleum operations.16 
Failure to comply is an offence of strict liability.17
(vi) Maintaining Assessment Permits in Good Standing
 Where a work program condition has not been complied with, the permit would normally be in 
default and would be cancelled. However, the permittee can maintain ‘good standing’:
(1) by undertaking to spend an amount equal to the agreed monetary value of the outstanding 
work commitments on qualifying additional work in permits over alternative acreage. 
The defaulting permit holder must agree in writing to maintain its good standing and must 
make a public statement about its undertaking at the time of cancellation or determination 
of their permit, or at such time as may be agreed with the Minister. A permit holder will 
be deemed to be in good standing once such an agreement is reached, until such time as it 
fails to progress with its undertaking; and
(2) by satisfying the Minister that the work undertaken has demonstrated that the area is 
unlikely to contain a commercial-scale storage formation. 
 According to Departmental guidelines, a permit holder that is in default of its work program 
conditions under an assessment permit, but wishes to maintain its good standing, may be able 
to do so by satisfying the Minister that it has made a significant attempt to assess the GHG 
storage potential of the permit area. The Minister may take into account whether the defaulting 
permit holder has completed work in excess of the second highest bid for the permit area.
(vii) Holding Leases and Injection Licences 
 If a permittee discovers an ‘eligible greenhouse gas storage formation’,18 it must apply to the 
Minister to declare the storage formation as an identified storage formation.19 
 A declaration of a storage formation allows the permittee to apply for a 5 year holding lease20 
or an injection licence for an indefinite term over the declared storage formation.21
(viii) Determination of Suitability and Spatial Extent of Holding Leases and Injection Licences
 The ‘fundamental suitability determinants’ (which the permittee must specify in its application) 
and geological factors together determine the spatial extent of a storage formation and hence 
the boundaries of a future holding lease or injection licence. 
 
16 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 316.
17 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 317.
18 As defined by Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 21. The formation must be part of a geological 
formation that is suitable for the permanent storage of at least of at least 100,000 tonnes.
19 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 312.
20 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), Part 3.3. Under s 322, a holding lease remains in force 
for 5 years. There is also provision under s 336 for the grant of a special holding lease for an indefinite duration where an 
applicant unsuccessfully applies for an injection licence.
21 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), Part 3.4. Under s 359, an injection licence remains in force 
indefinitely. Under s 360, it may be terminated if there are no injection operations for 5 years.
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 A potential storage formation must fulfill simple criteria such as effective sealing mechanisms 
and possible migration pathways that could be suitable for storage. However, a detailed 
evaluation of the ‘fundamental suitability determinants’ (which include such factors as the 
amount of GHG substance to be stored, injection rates and sites, and the effective sealing 
mechanism) has to be determined before the formation can be considered an eligible 
storage formation. 
 Potential subsurface migration pathways could be extensive and a GHG substance may continue 
to migrate in subsurface areas for many years after injection has ceased. Work programs 
proposed in applications may include fieldwork outside the permit area where this is aimed at 
identifying possible risks of leakage or other adverse impacts that may arise in the long term. 
This may require expenditure and work to be undertaken outside the assessment permit area, 
in which case it is the applicant’s responsibility to seek the appropriate access permission.
 Storage formations will commonly be much larger than petroleum accumulations and may 
often cover a large proportion of an assessment permit area. This factor is taken into account in 
the OSA, which does not require the relinquishment of part of a GHG assessment permit area, 
unlike in the case of petroleum.
 These key differences, especially the potentially large spatial extent of storage formations, also 
highlight the importance of taking ‘basin management’ into account in GHG storage activities. 
Basin management includes considerations such as basin-wide reservoir pressure regimes, and 
possible impacts on petroleum and groundwater resources.
(ix) The Alternative Case of Direct Allocation of Assessment Permits
 The relatively slow uptake of potential storage sites in Australia continues to throw doubt on 
the efficacy of competitive bidding as a method of allocating assessment permits over potential 
storage sites. 
 We consider there is a strong argument in principle for direct allocation, at least for early-stage 
CCS projects. The increased investment certainty that it provides could lead to a more rapid 
uptake of projects.
 The potential for conflict with petroleum operations remains very real. It is discussed further in 
section 13 of this report.
3 What regulation is needed to manage 
environmental issues?
Although the storage industry will not usually involve the production of petroleum and the risk of 
petroleum spills, the environmental risks that apply to the storage industry will be similar to those 
that apply to petroleum operations. They may include, for example, disturbance of habitat during 
construction, operation and decommissioning and potential impacts on migratory species. 
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There are also some specialised risks associated with the impact on any leakage of greenhouse gases 
to the environment, including, for example, the potential impacts of acidification of water. 
Developing new arrangements for the storage industry was thought to duplicate existing arrangements. 
Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Use of petroleum  
industry model
Improved efficiency through the 
use of proven system
Develop new arrangements Would require duplication  
of existing arrangements
Comment by ResourcesLaw
(i) Before storage projects may commence, the existing environmental laws provide that 
environmental approval be granted by the Minister for the Environment, which requires the 
proponents to file a detailed environmental impact statement, to make it available for public 
inspection and to take account of public submissions. 
(ii) The importance of community consultation prior to the grant of environmental approval is to be 
emphasised.22
(iii) As a general principle, legal appeal processes in respect of environmental approvals should be 
confined to points of law and should not put courts in the position where they must review 
issues that relate to environmental and social merit (cf Resource Management Act 1991 s 299). 
 As with environmental regulation of the petroleum industry, the OSA gives wide power to the 
Minister to issue remedial directions to authorise the taking of remedial action and, to recover 
the costs of doing so from the operator.23
(iv) It may be a little early to be sure, but it appears that management of the environmental impacts 
of assessment and injection activities under the broad framework applied to petroleum activities 
is an efficient way of proceeding.
(v) There is, however, the obvious additional and ongoing need to specifically regulate the safe and 
secure storage of CO2 by effective site management, as to which see section 5 of this report.
22 See in this regard P Ashcroft, and C Cormick, “Enabling the Social Shaping of CCS Technology,” Chapter 17 in I Havercroft, et al 
(eds), Carbon Capture and Storage; Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) at 251–263.
23 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), ss 591–598.
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4 What regulation is needed to manage 
occupational health and safety issues?
Occupational health and safety risks for the offshore storage industry are similar to those for 
petroleum operations but compliance is less onerous since CO2 is not flammable. 
The role of the existing environmental authority could be expanded to include greenhouse transport, 
injection and storage within its scope of activities.
Any other approach would require additional legislation and regulation covering essentially identical 
activities and the establishment of a body to undertake the regulation. This would require the same 
skill set as are already available skills that are both expensive and in short supply. This approach would 
also lead to increased costs.
Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Use of petroleum 
industry model
Improved efficiency through the 
use of proven system
Develop new 
arrangements
Would require duplication of existing 
petroleum arrangements
Issue of access to expertise
Comment by ResourcesLaw
Applying the occupational health and safety framework for the petroleum industry to the storage 
is considered appropriate.
5 What regulation is needed for  
site management?
Leakage from storage sites poses possible environmental and health risks. It also has the potential 
to partially negate the purpose of storage, which is to prevent emission of greenhouse gases to 
the atmosphere. Even if no leakage occurs, undesirable migration could impact adversely on other 
resources, such as petroleum or potable water.
There were two basic regulatory approaches open to the government in 2008:
(1) submission of site management plans by proponents, for approval by the regulator; or
(2) prescriptive management plans, overseen by the regulator.
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Prescriptive criteria were considered unsuitable where there is a lack of experience and where the 
circumstances of each individual project are likely to be quite different (for example, different 
quantities and injection rates, different geology). Each project would need to be considered on a 
case-by-case basis. What might be an acceptable deviation in the migration path of the injected 
substance in one case might pose unacceptable risks in another. 
An outcome-oriented approach to regulation would allow site-specific factors to be taken into 
account and provide a basis for the adoption of emerging best practice. Thus, the legislation should 
require an operator to lodge a comprehensive site plan for approval. A greenhouse gas injection licence 
should not be granted until a project-specific site management plan is approved by the regulator. 
The plan should contain detailed modelling of the expected behaviour of the GHG substance after 
injection, including the expected migration path or paths.
The site management plan would need to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the regulator, that the 
site and its management would result in ‘safe and secure’ storage. 
The site management plan would need to identify all risk factors and show that risks had been reduced 
as low as reasonably practicable. The regulator would then have to decide whether these risks, taking 
into account potential mitigation and remediation strategies, were acceptable.
Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Use of site plan model Allows for use of objective-based 
regulation
Provides flexibility to deal with 
site-specific factors
Allows for rapid adoption of best 
practice and new technologies
Lower certainty of regulatory 
requirements
Use of prescriptive 
regulation
Better certainty of regulatory 
requirements
Simplifies submission and 
approvals process, but not 
necessarily outcomes
Does not provide site-specific flexibility
Does not allow for improvements in  
best practice
Creates high levels of duty of care 
responsibilities for the regulator
Comments by ResourcesLaw
(i) We consider that site management plans are seen as the preferred approach to the regulation of 
environmental risks. 
(ii) Under the OSA, the site management plan is the core regulatory document for each project 
and provides the basis for the day-to-day regulatory interaction between the operator and the 
regulator. It must be updated periodically and whenever there is a material change in risks.
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(iii) Compliance with the site management plan should be a condition of the storage licence.24 
(iv) See further the succeeding three sections of this report in relation to each of the specific issues 
of (1) monitoring, (2) leakage and (3) reporting.
6 What specific regulation is needed  
for monitoring (including verification)  
of stored substances?
It was envisaged that monitoring should be carried out:
• pre-injection;
• continuously during injection and 
• for an appropriate period thereafter. 
Monitoring may involve ambient air monitoring, water monitoring, shallow subsurface monitoring, 
as well as a range of techniques to monitor the movement of the injected substance in the storage 
formation. Some monitoring may be continuous, while other might be carried out at intervals, 
depending on site specific factors.
Any monitoring and verification system requires accurate and relevant information that is readily 
available to the community and independently verifiable.
Monitoring requirements will be highly dependent on site-specific factors and are closely related to 
the detection of, and reaction to, any incidents that occur, and hence to mitigation and remediation 
actions that might be required. For these reasons, it was considered most efficient for monitoring to be 
integrated with the site plan. Specifically, the proponent should be required to propose a monitoring 
and verification plan that satisfied the regulator that any serious events in the reservoir would be 
detected in a timely manner. Timely detection of incidents is essential.
The government decided that integration of monitoring and verification requirements into the site 
plan would provide the linkage needed between different facets of site management. 
Comment by ResourcesLaw
It is considered appropriate for the site management plan to contain a comprehensive monitoring 
and verification program to be implemented by the licensee throughout the injection phase and 
post-injection phase of the project, to ensure that the injected greenhouse gas substance is behaving 
as predicted or, if it is not, to identify any risks to the environment, safety or other resources.
See further section 9 of this report concerning post-injection monitoring, both before site closure and 
post-site closure.
24 OSA, s 358.
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7 What specific regulation is required for 
remediation and mitigation of leakage?  
The risk of significant adverse impact
If monitoring were to show that the storage site is leaking or behaving in a way that is likely to lead to 
leakage to the environment, or impact on other resources, then remediation or mitigation strategies 
may need to be implemented.
Should a serious situation arise, the site management plan should provide a basis for establishing the 
need for remediation and mitigation and should set out strategies for management of identified risks. 
Remediation and mitigation could involve huge expense for the drilling of wells and injection or 
extraction of large quantities of fluids. If the injected substance behaves otherwise than predicted, 
or appears likely to do so, the regulator will need power to direct the licensee to take action 
to eliminate, mitigate or manage any risk posed by the situation, including the suspension or 
permanent cessation of operations, as well as the taking of action to prevent or remedy any damage 
that might arise.
Again, integration of remediation and mitigation strategies into the site management plan would 
provide the linkage needed between different facets of site management. 
The OSA confers wide power on the Minister to issue directions, including remedial directions where 
there is a significant risk of significant adverse impact (often abbreviated to SROSAI) and where a 
serious situation arises.25 This is also important to protect existing petroleum interests. 
Comment by ResourcesLaw
It is considered appropriate for the site management plan to specify the safeguard measures that 
will be implemented to ensure that the injected greenhouse gas substance does not deviate from the 
expected migration path and does not escape into the atmosphere, supported by regulatory powers 
to direct outcomes in the event that a serious situation arises.
8 What specific regulation is required  
for reporting requirements?
Accurate and regular information will be required on the volume and location of greenhouse gas 
emissions that have been abated and are stored underground to meet current and future inventory 
reporting and commercial requirements and to engender public confidence.
25 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), ss 376-382.
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Detailed regulations on reporting requirements need to be developed, having regard to need of the 
community to understand fully the fate of the greenhouse gas substance and any requirements 
through a carbon trading scheme and international reporting obligations.
Reporting should include regular reports of the amount of greenhouse gases stored, together with 
any losses from the transport and injection processes. Reporting may need to be compatible with the 
requirements of any emissions trading scheme and any international obligations.
Comments by ResourcesLaw
(i) Because reporting requirements can be onerous, they should be made compatible with any 
requirements of emissions reporting that apply to the rest of the economy.
(ii) Australia has national greenhouse gas emissions reporting (NGER) legislation. This is compatible 
with its existing carbon pricing scheme. 
(iii) Australia’s carbon pricing scheme faces the prospect of repeal if there is a change of government 
in September 2014.
9 What regulation is needed in respect  
of site closure?
As part of the site closing process, the licensee should be required to remove or decommission any 
structures, plant and equipment, to plug any remaining exploration or injection wells and make good 
any damage to the seabed and subsoil. These requirements are consistent with those placed on the 
petroleum industry.
Requiring the operator to undertake post-injection monitoring should provide a clear and transparent 
system for managing risk. Risks would be assumed by industry in a way analogous to any other 
industrial process. Moreover, the operator should have both the experience and knowledge to 
undertake activities in the most cost-effective manner.
The licensee will need to conduct extensive monitoring and verification of the behaviour of the 
injected greenhouse gas substance, in order to make reliable predictions as to its potential migration 
and interaction with the surrounding geological structures. The licensee may be required to undertake 
precautionary or remedial work to prevent or mitigate harmful effects on the geotechnical integrity 
of the storage site. The objective during this phase should be for the licensee to satisfy the regulator 
that all reasonable possibilities have been provided for.
The regulator should be able to compare predictions of the behaviour of the greenhouse gas substance 
with actual results, in order to inform future regulatory practice and to ensure that no unforeseen 
events take place. 
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A site closing certificate would be issued once a high degree of certainty had been attained 
by the regulator.
Once the regulator the regulator is satisfied, the licensee may apply for closure, which would result in 
the surrender of the title and the cessation of the statutory obligations for long-term liability.
Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Post-injection/pre-closure
Undertaken by 
operator as part of 
their obligations 
under their injection 
licence
Clear and transparent means of addressing 
liability
Risks managed in a similar way  
to other industries
Makes use of operator experience  
and expertise
Undertaken by the 
regulator using 
funds provided by 
the operator 
Certainty as to timing for end of  
statutory obligations
Provides an incentive for greenhouse gas 
operations by reducing uncertainty about 
future liabilities
Period to closure uncertain
Undertaken by the 
regulator using 
public funds
Certainty as to timing for end of  
statutory obligations
Provides an incentive for greenhouse gas 
operations by reducing uncertainty about 
future liabilities
Liability issues less clear
Potential lack of expertise  
by the regulator
Funds may not be sufficient  
to cover costs
Undertaken 
by operator as 
statutory obligation
Clear and transparent means of  
addressing liability
Makes use of operator experience  
and expertise
Liability issues clear
Potential lack of expertise  
by the regulator
Funds may not be sufficient  
to cover costs
Provides government support for 
project through an non-transparent 
mechanism
Post-closure period
Undertaken 
by operator as 
statutory obligation
Cumbersome additional access 
tenure would be required
Does not provide for changes in 
company circumstances
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Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Undertaken by the 
regulator using 
funds provided by 
the operator 
Certainty as to timing for end of  
statutory obligations
Allows monitoring to continue 
independent of company circumstances
Provides an incentive for greenhouse gas 
operations by reducing uncertainty about 
future liabilities
Potential lack of expertise  
by the regulator
Funds may not be sufficient  
to cover costs
Undertaken by the 
regulator using 
public funds
Certainty as to timing for end of  
statutory obligations
Allows monitoring to continue 
independent of company circumstances
Provides an incentive for greenhouse gas 
operations by reducing uncertainty about 
future liabilities
Liability issues clear
Potential lack of expertise  
by the regulator
Funds may not be sufficient  
to cover costs
Provides an effective government 
subsidy through non-transparent 
mechanisms
Comments by ResourcesLaw
(i) It is appropriate that post-injection/pre-closure monitoring be undertaken by operators.
(ii) It may also be appropriate for operators to be required to make financial provision for post-closure, 
long term monitoring after they have vacated the site.
(iii) As for post-closure liability, see section 11 of this report.
10 What regulation is needed to  
manage transport?
Pipelines to transport greenhouse gases are an integral part of any GHG injection and storage project. 
The risks associated with these pipelines will be very similar to those for petroleum pipelines.
No need was seen by the Commonwealth for special rules for the storage industry.
Comment by ResourcesLaw
It is appropriate that the rules applicable to the existing petroleum pipeline regime should apply to 
GHG pipelines.
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11 What regulation is needed in respect of  
long-term liability?
Up until site closure, the proposed regulatory system would establish comprehensive statutory 
responsibilities of title holders with respect to the protection of the environment, other seabed 
resources and human health and safety, in exactly as the same way as for petroleum. 
After site closing, there are four options for long-term liability:
(1) no new regulation;
(2) new regulation under which government explicitly assumes long term liability;
(3) new regulation where industry is required to assume long term liability;
(4) new regulation to share long term liability between government and industry.
No new regulation would involve relying on common law for long-term liability. Under this 
option, greenhouse gas title holders would not be immunised from common law liability to 
persons who suffer injury or loss as a result of their actions. Nor would their liability be limited. 
This non-intervention would extend to all forms of common law liability, including over the long term. 
The government would therefore not ‘take over’ long-term liability from project participants. 
Nor would the government provide any indemnity to project participants in respect of any liability 
they might incur. 
In the long term, the risk may effectively pass to the community because project participants 
may cease to exist or because of some other time related factor such as availability of witnesses. 
For example, if GHG operations were to result in personal injury or loss to individuals, at a time when 
there were no project participants still available to be sued, or where damages were for some other 
reason irrecoverable, the cost would in practice be borne by the community. This would, however, 
be the consequence of the passage of time, not of any assumption of liability on the part of 
government. Storage industry participants would therefore need to make their own arrangements to 
deal with potential common law liability, as an ordinary cost of doing business, as must members of 
any other industry.
Under existing arrangements relating to petroleum, the OPA does not exclude, limit or allocate 
common law liability of title-holders or others engaged in offshore petroleum operations. Common 
law liability lies where it falls. 
If government were to explicitly assume long-term liability, this would effectively be a subsidy. 
Any subsidies may better be delivered directly rather than through this indirect mechanism which lacks 
transparency and puts the government in the position of accepting highly uncertain potential liabilities.
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New regulation to require industry to assume liability could only realistically involve the 
establishment of some sort of fund to meet liabilities. No other options are practicable given the 
long term nature of potential liabilities (in the order of thousands of years) and the potential life of 
industrial participants. This would have the effect of posing additional costs on industry compared 
with existing law. There would also be a major issue in determining the quantum for contributions 
to any such fund. 
A system could be developed through which industry and government shared long-term liability. 
However, mechanisms for this are unclear and would require significant new law and could set 
precedents for policy in other areas. In any event, the ‘no new regulation’ option effectively provides 
a system where liabilities would be shared between industry and the community, with government 
effectively assuming a greater share of liability due to the passage of time.
Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
No new regulation Makes use of existing frameworks
Provides incentive to industry to take 
practical actions to minimise exposure
Provides a mechanism by which 
liabilities would be shared over time
Does not set new precedents for 
government policy 
Lack of precedents in this industry 
means that the outcome of common 
law application remains to be tested
Perception that long term liability has 
not been addressed
Potential disincentive to investors
New regulation under 
which Government 
explicitly assumes 
long-term liability
Provides an incentive to  
project investors
Government exposure to future  
costs unclear
Incentive provided in a  
non-transparent manner
Could set precedents for government 
policy in other areas
Incentive for industry to take practical 
actions to minimise exposure unclear
New regulation where 
industry is required 
to assume long-term 
liability
Could impose higher costs than 
necessary on industry through the 
need to contribute to a fund which 
would be held in perpetuity
Issue of determining appropriate level 
of contribution to a fund
Incentive for industry to take practical 
actions to minimise exposure
New regulation to 
share long-term 
liability between 
government  
and industry
Unclear as to how liabilities  
could be shared
May provide an incentive to industry 
to take practical actions to minimise 
exposure
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Comments by ResourcesLaw
(i) Site Closing Certificate
 The OSA provides for an injection licensee to apply for a site closing certificate.26 Once issued, 
it remains in force indefinitely.27
(ii) Declaration of Closure Assurance Period
 A site closing certificate entitles the licensee to apply to the Minister, after the expiration of 
15 years from its issue, to declare a ‘closure assurance period’. The Minister must be satisfied 
that the injected substance is ‘behaving as predicted’ in the original site plan and there is 
‘no significant risk’ of a ‘significant adverse impact’ on the geological integrity of the formation, 
on the environment or on human health or safety.28 
(iii) Indemnity by Commonwealth Against Certain Liability
 After declaration of the closure assurance period, the present and past holders of an injection 
licence are thereafter, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the regulations, 
indemnified by the Commonwealth against future liability for damages that may be attributable 
to an act or omission in the operations that were authorised by the licence.29 The Commonwealth 
does not assume the liability itself.
(iv) Assumption of Liability by Commonwealth 
 If an otherwise liable licensee has ceased to exist, the Commonwealth assumes the liability itself.30
(v) No Case For Imposition of Additional Liability
 It is in our view appropriate that there be no statutory imposition of long-term liability. Either the 
issue is best left to the common law in the same way as it is for petroleum and other industries, 
or a statutory limitation should be enacted. 
(vi) Remote Likelihood of Commonwealth Liability
 The circumstances where the Commonwealth might become liable under the OSA as presently 
framed are remote in the extreme. 
(vii) A Case for More Generous Limitation of Liability?
 There may be a strong environmental argument for enacting an earlier and more generous 
statutory limitation for holders of injection licences in order to nurture CCS.
26 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 386.
27 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 394.
28 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 399.
29 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 400.
30 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 401.
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12 What regulation is needed for performance 
bonds and guarantees?
It is common practice in the Australian on-shore mining and petroleum industries to require financial 
bonds or guarantees for site rehabilitation. Such bonds and guarantees are also normal practice 
internationally. These bonds or guarantees are usually required from the commencement of the 
project and the amount reviewed during the project to take account of any changes that occur. 
Bonds and guarantees have not been required of the Australian offshore petroleum industry 
because of the nature of the industry involved (large companies with the resources to undertake 
any decommissioning and site rehabilitation required and their need to maintain their social licence 
to operate). 
The storage industry is still very new. There is a relatively high degree of uncertainty about risks and 
it is likely that an array of potential company ownership, structures and sizes may be involved in new 
projects. It is considered prudent to provide for the possibility of bonds and guarantees to ensure that 
funding is available for key activities. 
It is appropriate that the need be assessed by the regulator on a case-by-case basis to minimise costs.
For long term monitoring after site closure, it is likely that a bond or guarantee would be required 
to reflect the long term need for monitoring and the need to maintain certainty as to migration and 
potential impacts.
Comment by ResourcesLaw
It is considered appropriate that provision be made for bonds and guarantees to be sought by the 
regulator according to the characteristics and circumstances of each project.
13 What regulation is needed to manage 
interactions with the petroleum industry?
This issue is to a large extent already addressed in section 2 of this report. 
Most of Australia’s offshore areas that may be attractive for greenhouse gas injection and storage 
would already be covered by petroleum titles. Over time, some of these will be relinquished and 
become vacant. 
In most cases, petroleum and storage activities will be able to co-exist but there is considerable risk 
that storage activities could impact negatively on petroleum operations. This could occur through 
migration of GHGs into a petroleum pool and displacing the petroleum, making it effectively 
unrecoverable or leading to incompatibility problems with petroleum production equipment. 
Similarly, future petroleum operations could impact negatively on an established storage operation. 
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(i) Pre-commencement petroleum titles
It was considered by the government to be a policy imperative that the rights of pre-commencement 
petroleum title holders (that is those titles that are in force before the greenhouse gas regulatory 
framework was put in place) be preserved. Impinging on these rights would increase sovereign risk 
with the likely result of reducing petroleum activities in Australian waters.
Options to avoid adverse impacts on pre-commencement titles include:
• avoiding areas covered by pre-commencement petroleum titles;
• allowing greenhouse gas operations to proceed only with the agreement of the petroleum title holder;
• requiring greenhouse gas proponents to demonstrate that they will have no significant impact on 
petroleum operations.
Avoiding areas covered by pre-commencement titles effectively means that no areas would be 
available for greenhouse operations. A system of overlapping titles is therefore necessary.
In the absence of an agreement between affected parties, storage operations could only proceed if the 
proponent could demonstrate no significant adverse impact on the pre-commencement petroleum 
title holder’s rights.
In the event that a storage proponent is unable to reach a commercial agreement with a petroleum 
title holder, they will face significant risks in their ability to operate. Prospective storage title holders 
should, however, be in a position to evaluate these risks before making any investment decisions.
Comment by ResourcesLaw
As already discussed in section 2 of this report, the OSA provides that the Minister must not 
approve operations under an assessment permit if there is a risk of a significant adverse impact on 
petroleum operations.31 
We consider it appropriate that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the rights of 
pre-commencement petroleum title holders be protected by requiring storage operators to 
demonstrate that their activities will not have a significant adverse impact on petroleum operations.
(i) Post-commencement titles
It is also important to ensure that the system developed for the storage industry is not an obstacle to 
later petroleum operations.
Options available include:
• giving one industry (either petroleum or greenhouse gas) precedence over the other;
• giving precedence to whichever industry was first granted a title in the area in question; and 
• allowing the government to decide which industry should proceed based on the specific 
circumstances of the case in situations where both industries cannot co-exist.
31 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 292.
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Giving precedence to one industry (the ‘preferred industry’ option) over the other (that is, petroleum 
always preferred or greenhouse gas always preferred) raises the risk that major opportunities in one 
industry will be foregone in return for a lesser opportunity in the other. Against this, the other industry 
would have greater investment certainty. 
Allowing the regulator to make decisions on which industry should proceed in cases where they 
cannot co-exist allows the relative merits of the two competing opportunities to be taken into account 
(the ‘public interest’ model). It also allows for flexibility if the relative importance of petroleum and 
greenhouse gas operations change. It also enables commercial agreements between the parties to 
be taken into account, which could lead to acceptable compromise solutions. This could be done 
through a public interest test in which the regulator would consider the relative merits of the two 
competing proposals. Criteria could include social, economic and environmental factors.
However, to provide confidence to investors it would be necessary to limit this test to titles earlier 
in the series than production licences or injection licences, after which point title holders could be 
making large investments. Thus, once an injection licence or production licence has been granted, the 
other industry would have to demonstrate no significant adverse impact, in the same manner as is 
done for pre-commencement petroleum titles.
Management of this system would require that certain post-commencement petroleum titles 
(that is those that overlap a greenhouse gas title) are identified and operators are required to inform 
the regulator of proposed activities so that the regulator can then inform the greenhouse gas title 
holder and ensure that activities can co-exist. Storage title holders (except for holders of injection 
licences) would have to be under a similar obligation.
The difference between these options in terms of administrative requirements was considered by 
the government to be negligible. In a ‘preferred industry’ or ‘first-in-first-served’ option the reduced 
compliance costs on the first industry may be counterbalanced by increased compliance costs 
for the second.
Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Preferred industry 
option
Increased certainty for the  
preferred industry
Reduced certainty for the  
non-preferred industry
No ability to decide which 
 industry represents the most  
important opportunity
Limited basis for commercial 
agreements between industries
First-in-first-served 
option
Increased certainty for the second 
industry to enter the area
Reduced certainty for the second 
industry to enter the area
No ability to decide which  
industry represents the most  
important opportunity
Limited basis for commercial 
agreements between industries
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Summary of advantages and disadvantages
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Public interest 
model
Increased flexibility to allow the most 
‘valuable’ development opportunity  
to proceed
Provides a basis for commercial 
negotiations between industries
Reduced certainty for industry
Comment by ResourcesLaw
The need for a conflict avoidance and efficient conflict resolution requires careful consideration. 
It may be considered appropriate that, in the event that activities cannot co-exist, post-commencement 
petroleum titles and storage titles will need to be prioritised using a public interest test.
14 What regulation is needed to manage 
interactions with other users of the sea?
Other users of the sea include fisheries, marine transport, communications and defence. 
Greenhouse gas activities have the potential to impact on the users through environmental impacts 
affecting fisheries and through the physical presence of structures (for example impacts on fishing 
trawling, the hazard to navigation represented by fixed structures, and access to defence practice areas. 
All these potential impacts are essentially identical to those posed by petroleum operations. 
The OPA protects these rights by requiring other users to be taken into account in the process and 
demonstrating that impacts have been minimised to the extent practical. 
Comment by ResourcesLaw
We consider it appropriate that the management of interactions with the rights of other users of the 
sea be addressed in the same way as for the petroleum industry.
15 Who should be the regulator?
This is an Australia-specific issue arising from Australia’s federal system of government. 
Given the large number of areas in the Australian offshore regulatory framework which will require 
decisions or approvals by a regulator, the question of who should be responsible for these tasks was 
an important one.
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There were two basic options: 
(1) the existing Joint Authority (JA) model used for petroleum, whereby day-to-day decisions are 
delegated to the adjacent States or Territories; or
(2) administration by the Commonwealth.
Administration through the JA model offered the advantages:
(a) use of existing administration systems;
(b) close involvement with the day-to-day administration of petroleum could provide synergies for 
managing GHG activities;
(c) ensuring close involvement with the States/Territories on projects that are likely to be relevant 
to their interests.
Administration by the Commonwealth is feasible because of the small number of potential projects 
and also provides a number of advantages:
(a) it would provide greater national consistency, which may be particularly important given that 
this is a new industry and many regulatory approvals in the early stages of the scheme will 
set precedents;
(b) not all jurisdictions have the expertise or desire responsibility for managing GHG operations;
(c) given that projects will be in offshore waters under Commonwealth legislation, delegation of 
decision-making powers to the States/Territories could lead to additional complexity if issues 
arise relating to long term liability.
An element of greenhouse gas activities more suited to the JA regulation model related to pipelines. 
This approach was well suited because all known potential greenhouse gas pipelines associated with 
offshore storage projects will traverse areas of State/Territory jurisdiction as well as Commonwealth 
waters. Leaving pipeline administration under current arrangements would provide for better 
coordination of decision making than applying the Commonwealth model.
Comment by ResourcesLaw
This paper has focused, as we said at the beginning, on the offshore CCS regime in Australia, which 
is now quite settled. Some Australian States nonetheless have yet to establish onshore CCS regimes.
So far as offshore is concerned, we consider it appropriate that the regulation of greenhouse gas 
injection and storage activities in Australia be the responsibility of the Minister responsible for 
petroleum operations.
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APPENDIX B
The Developing Regime for the Regulation of 
Carbon Capture and Storage Projects in Canada
Nigel Bankes
Professor of Law
The University of Calgary
Two developments since the time of writing should be noted:
(i) Alberta Energy Regulator came into existence 17 June 2013, with proclamation in force of most of 
Responsible Energy Development Act. It immediately took on all functions of the Energy Resources 
Conservation Board (ERCB). See Responsible Energy Development Act SA 2012 c R-17.3 ss 38 & 45. 
The Alberta Energy Regulator replaces the ERCB.
(ii) The Alberta Regulatory Framework Assessment was released in August 2013, available at  
<www.energy.alberta.ca/Initiatives/3544.asp>.
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1 Outline of the report
This report examines the legal and regulatory regime for carbon capture and storage projects as it has 
developed in Canada. The report focuses on the experience of one province, Alberta. While recognizing 
that there are three links in the CCS chain (capture and compression, transportation, and injection 
and long term sequestration) this report focuses on the legal and regulatory issues associated with 
injection and long term sequestration. 
Part two of the report offers some brief introductory comments on the role of carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) in meeting Canada’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments. It also refers to 
some of the key policy reports and initiatives of the federal and provincial governments and mentions 
important CCS and CCS-EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) projects that are being developed in Canada. 
Part three of the report introduces the developing legal framework in Canada. Canada is a federal 
state but most of the responsibilities for regulating CCS projects lie with provincial governments. 
This report focuses on the legal regime as it has developed in the Province of Alberta. There are three 
reasons for this emphasis. First, Alberta has a large oil and gas industry and the most experience in 
dealing with one of the principal analogous activities to CCS, acid gas disposal (AGD). Second, Alberta 
is the province that is most committed to CCS as part of its mitigation efforts. Alberta has invested 
heavily in CCS both through financial contributions to projects but also by developing a legal and 
regulatory regime for CCS activities. Third, and related to the last point, Alberta is the province that 
has made the most progress in developing that legal and regulatory regime. In developing a legal 
framework this report suggests that it is useful think about four groups of issues: (1) property or 
ownership issues, (2) regulatory (project review and approval or permitting) issues, (3) liability issues, 
and (4) carbon accounting and crediting issues.
Part four of the report deals with the property law issues associated with the development of a 
CCS regime. It focuses on two issues, the ownership of pore space for sequestration purposes and the 
development of a pore space leasing regime for pore space that is the subject of public ownership. 
Alberta resolved to clarify ownership of pore space by enacting declaratory legislation vesting pore 
space in public ownership. Following that, Alberta introduced a disposition scheme consisting of a 
short term evaluation permit and a longer term sequestration lease.
Part five of the report examines the regulatory regime that Alberta has put in place for the review 
and approval of CCS projects in the province. The government has chosen to build upon the expertise 
of the province’s main oil and gas regulator the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), 
and, in particular, the ERCB’s experience in regulating acid gas disposal projects. It is characteristic of 
Alberta’s regulatory approach in this area that most of the detailed directions to project proponents 
take the form of Directives and project approvals (with terms and conditions) rather than primary 
legislation and regulations. The statutory “hook” on which all of this hangs is quite slender. The report 
discusses one important CCS project, Shell Canada’s Quest project which has progressed through the 
ERCB’s regulatory process.
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While Alberta’s regulatory response is largely based on adapting the approach used for AGD projects 
to the different scales (volume, geography and time) involved in CCS projects, Alberta also initiated 
a comprehensive multi-stakeholder review of its regulatory framework. This process, known as the 
Regulatory Framework Assessment, completed its work at the end of 2012 but the Minister has yet 
to release the report. Part five concludes with a discussion of some of the changes to the existing 
regulatory scheme that the RFA has suggested. 
Part six of the report examines the way in which Alberta has chosen to deal with issues of liability 
associated with CCS projects. The report identifies four different type of liability: (1) potential tort 
liability in the event that the project causes harm to some person or persons, (2) statutory liability 
with respect to abandonment and re-abandonment obligations, (3) liability for ongoing monitoring 
of the site and the injected carbon dioxide (CO2), and (4) potential accounting liability for any 
emissions of CO2 from the project site. In sum, the Alberta scheme contemplates that liability during 
the operating phase of the project should remain with the operator and its working interest partners. 
Once a closure certificate is issued most liabilities are assumed by the Crown (but not any potential 
greenhouse gas accounting liability). Some of the costs associated with the transfer of liability will be 
funded by the CCS industry through the creation of the Fund but other liabilities (and in particular any 
tort liability that the Crown assumes) remain unfunded.
Part seven of the report deals with the regulatory treatment of CCS projects for carbon crediting 
purposes. Alberta uses a baseline and credit system to regulate the emissions intensity of large final 
emitters in the province (facilities that emit more than 100,000 tonnes of GHGs per year). An emitter 
can meet its target in a number of ways including by reducing emissions or by purchasing offsets. 
An offset is an activity undertaken by a non-regulated entity that reduces GHG emissions over a 
business as usual baseline. At a conceptual level, CO2 that is captured and sequestered can be treated 
as either an avoided emission at the regulated facility or as an offset (in which case the regulated 
entity declares the captured CO2 as an emission and then acquires offset credits from the operator of 
the injection facility). Alberta has elected to qualify CCS projects as giving rise to offset credits rather 
than as an avoided emission.
There are two appendices. Appendix I provides the text of the scheme approval issued to Shell Canada 
for the Quest Project. Appendix II is an example of a sequestration lease.
2 The role of CCS in meeting greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets in Canada
Federal and provincial governments in Canada have made significant investments in the development 
of carbon capture and storage (CCS). These governments, and in particular, the federal government, 
and the governments of Alberta, and Saskatchewan anticipate that CCS will make a significant 
contribution in meeting emission reduction targets to which each has committed.
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2.1 Canada’s targets
Canada did ratify the Kyoto Protocol and in doing so committed to achieving a reduction in emissions 
of minus six per cent of 1990 emissions by the end of the first commitment period, 2012. Canada 
failed to achieve that target and gave notice in December 2011 that it would withdraw from the 
Protocol effective December 2012. Consequently, Canada is no longer a party to the Protocol although 
it remains a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Canada did sign on to the Copenhagen Accord and as such followed the United States in making 
a commitment to reduce emissions by 17% by 2020 over a 2005 baseline. 
A wedge diagram prepared by the National Round Table on the Economy and the Environment shows 
CCS as making a significant contribution to reduced GHG emissions in Canada.1
2.2 Provincial targets
Alberta’s Climate Change Strategy (2008)2 committed Alberta to “a 50% reduction in emissions by 
2050, compared to business as usual, or a 14% reduction below 2005 levels by 2050”. According to the 
province’s calculations this represents a reduction in annual emissions of 200 Mt by 2050. Provincial 
policy contemplates that 24 Mt of this reduction will come from energy efficiency measures, 37 Mt 
from renewable energy sources and fully 139 Mt from CCS projects.
Saskatchewan is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% over 2006 levels by 2020 
and sees CCS as making a contribution to reduced emissions. Other provinces have more aggressive 
targets. For example, Nova Scotia remains committed to reducing GHG emissions by 10% below 
1 National Round Table on Environment and Economy’s “Achieving 2050: A Carbon Pricing Policy for Canada”, 2009. The NRTEE 
(since abolished) does not establish government policy but federal government officials still refer to this wedge diagram when 
discussing Canada’s commitment to CCS. See, for example Kathryn Gagnon, “Canada Update, CCS Legal and Regulatory 
Developments”, IEA 4th CCS Regulator Network Meeting, (Paris, France, May 9, 2012) <www.iea.org/media/workshops/2012/
ccs4thregulatory/new/KathrynGagnon.pdf>.
2 <www.environment.alberta.ca/01757.html>. 
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1990 levels by 2020 while Ontario is committed to a 15% reduction over the same (Kyoto) base year. 
British Columbia is committed to a 33% reduction by 2020 over 2007 levels stated to be equivalent 
to 12% below 1990 levels by 2020).3 British Columbia is exploring CCS opportunities within the 
province (especially in the upstream oil and gas sector) and, as with Alberta, also has experience with 
regulating acid gas disposal projects.
2.3 Government support for CCS projects and technology
The federal and (some) provincial governments have offered significant support for the development 
of carbon capture and storage technology. While the most important form of support is no doubt the 
direct financial support that has been made available to commercial scale demonstration projects 
governments have also invested in the development of public policy and public awareness by striking 
high level task forces and regulatory reviews to assess the implications of CCS projects and technology 
from a broad variety of perspectives. The most important initiatives in this context include:
The ecoEnergy Carbon Capture and Storage Task Force (2008)
This joint federal/provincial task force produced a report entitled, Canada’s Fossil Future: The Way 
Forward on Carbon Capture and Storage.4 
Carbon Capture and Storage Development Council (2009)
This Council, the members of which were appointed by the Government of Alberta prepared a report 
entitled, Accelerating Carbon Capture and Storage Implementation in Alberta.5
Alberta’s Regulatory Framework Assessment (2013)
The Government of Alberta initiated the Regulatory Framework Assessment (RFA) in March 2011. The 
RFA was a multi-stakeholder process that was designed to review the technical, environmental, safety 
and monitoring requirements for CCS and to recommend regulatory changes to enable the deployment 
of CCS in a safe, responsible and efficient manner. The project steering committee submitted the final 
report to the Minister of Energy at the end of 2012 but the report has yet to be released.6
The Carbon Capture and Storage Research Consortium of Nova Scotia (CCS Nova Scotia)
CCS Nova Scotia is a not-for-profit corporation whose members are the Province of Nova Scotia, 
Nova Scotia Power Inc. and Dalhousie University.7 The consortium is conducting multidisciplinary 
research into the issues involved in the capture, transport, storage and monitoring of stationary 
sourced carbon dioxide emissions in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner. Work to date has 
included reports on the regulatory and legal requirements for both onshore and offshore CCS projects 
as well as more technical reports assessing capture options and storage options.8
3 All of the targets in this paragraph are drawn from David Suzuki Foundation, All Over the Map: a comparison of provincial climate 
change plans (2012) <www.davidsuzuki.org/publications/reports/2012/all-over-the-map-2012/>. 
4 ecoEnergy Carbon Capture and Storage Task, Canada’s Fossil Future: The way forward on Carbon Capture and Storage, (2008). 
<www.energy.alberta.ca/Org/pdfs/Fossil_energy_e.pdf>.
5 Carbon Capture and Storage Development Council, Accelerating Carbon Capture and Storage Implementation in Alberta, Final 
Report, (2009). <www.energy.alberta.ca/Org/pdfs/CCS_Implementation.pdf> The Council also produced an interim report.
6 The author served as a member of the steering committee.
7 <www.ccsnovascotia.ca/index.php>. 
8 All of the reports are confidential. The author was engaged as a reviewer for both the onshore and offshore legal and 
regulatory reports.
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Both the Alberta and federal governments have provided direct financial support to a number of 
commercial scale CCS projects in Canada. The most important of these are:
2.3.1 Shell Canada Energy Quest Project
Shell Canada Energy, on behalf of the Athabasca Oil Sands Project, a joint venture among 
Shell Canada, Chevron Canada Limited and Marathon Oil Sands L.P., is advancing Quest, a fully 
integrated CCS project (i.e. capture, transport, inject and store CO2) capturing over one million tonnes 
of CO2 per year from the Scotford upgrader to be transported by pipeline to an injection location 
northeast of the Scotford Complex for injection into the Basal Cambrian Sandstone reservoir (saline). 
The CO2 could also be made available for use in enhanced oil recovery projects. The project has been 
approved by provincial regulatory authorities. Part 5 of the paper reviews the approval process for the 
Quest Project. The Government of Canada will be providing funding of $120 million for this project. 
The Government of Alberta is contributing $745 million through its CCS Fund.
2.3.2  Enhance Energy – Alberta Carbon Trunk Line Carbon Capture  
and Storage Project
The Alberta Carbon Trunk Line project will include a fully integrated carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
system incorporating gasification, capture of CO2 emissions, transportation, storage and enhanced 
oil recovery (EOR). Enhance Energy will provide CO2 gathering and distribution infrastructure 
for CO2 emissions from facilities in Alberta’s Industrial Heartland (including the North West 
Upgrader). The captured CO2 from these sites will be transported via a 240-km pipeline to mature 
oil reservoirs in central and southern Alberta, where it will be injected for enhanced oil recovery 
purposes. The Government of Canada will be funding about $30 million for the project through the 
Clean Energy Fund, in addition to $33 million from the ecoENERGY Technology Initiative. The province 
of Alberta will contribute $495 million over 15 years.9
2.3.3 The Aquistore Project
The Aquistore project will involve commercial scale CO2 capture at SaskPower’s Boundary Dam 
coal fired power plant (Estevan, Saskatchewan) followed by injection at a co-located site in the 
Williston Basin which is a large sedimentary basin extending though southeastern Saskatchewan, 
southwestern Manitoba, North and South Dakota, and Montana. First deliveries for injection are 
expected in 2014. The federal government has contributed $9 million through ecoENERGY Technology 
Initiative and $5 million through Sustainable Development Technology Canada (SDTC).
2.3.4 Other projects
Alberta was committed to supporting two other projects. One project, TransAlta’s Pioneer project 
would have involved capture at a coal fired power plant, and a second, Swan Hills Synfuels would 
have involved an in-situ coal gasification project with the captured gas being used for enhanced oil 
recovery projects. Both proponents have withdrawn their projects for economic reasons including, 
in the case of Swan Hills, chronically low natural gas prices in North America. 
9 <www.solutionsstarthere.ca/70.asp>. 
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2.3.5 The Weyburn/Midale Project
One of the most studied geological sequestration projects in the world is the CO2-EOR project at 
Weyburn and the neighbouring Midale field. CO2 for the project is produced in the Great Plains 
synfuels plant in Beulah North Dakota and shipped by a 325 km pipeline to the Weburn field 
in Saskatchewan. The Weyburn field first began producing oil in 1954. CO2 injection began in 
2000 and currently about 6500 tonnes/day new CO2 is injected at the Weyburn site and about 
1250 tonnes/day at the adjacent Midale field. Current estimates (2011) are that about 
18 million tonnes have been stored to date. The project has been intensively studied by an international 
group of experts initially convened by the Greenhouse Gas Program of the International Energy 
Agency in collaboration with the Petroleum Technology Research Centre and the University of Regina. 
One of the outputs of the project is a paper by Zukowsky on The Regulatory Framework Governing 
Injection and Storage of Carbon Dioxide at the Cenovus Weyburn and Apache Midale Enhanced Oil 
Recovery Operations in Saskatchewan.10 
2.3.6 Standard setting initiatives
In addition to the initiatives of governments it is also important to refer to the work that has been 
undertaken collaboratively by industry, government and others to develop standards and protocols 
for both project approval purposes and most importantly for carbon accounting purposes and for 
crediting offsets. 
The most important examples here include the work of the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) 
in developing CSA Standard Z741-12 on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide (October 2012) 
and the work of Alberta Environment and Sustainable Development in conjunction with a number of 
industry players and consultants in the development of a number of Offset Quantification Protocols. 
These Protocols are designed to provide a common methodology for quantifying the carbon credits 
(offsets) that may be generated by CCS projects and by CO2/EOR projects. The most relevant of these 
protocols are two Protocols for Enhanced Recovery Projects and a Draft Protocol for the Capture of 
CO2 and Storage in Deep Saline Aquifers.
11
2.3.7 Civil society organizations in Canada and CCS
No civil society organization in Canada has championed the case for CCS in quite the way that 
the Bellona Foundation has in Norway. The most prominent NGO engaged in active discussion 
of CCS in Canada is the Pembina Foundation in Alberta.12 While emphasising that CCS is not a 
“silver bullet” response to the problem of climate change, Pembina does accept that CCS can and 
should make a contribution as part of a suite of mitigation measures including commitments to 
renewable energy. Pembina representatives have also been engaged in some if not all of the regulatory 
review initiatives launched by governments referred to above. In addition, Pembina, in conjunction 
with the University community, convened a public discussion of CCS issues focused around a number 
10 (2010) IEA GHG Weyburn-Midale CO2 Monitoring and Storage Project <www.ccs101.ca/ccs_pro/publications/canadian_publications>.
11 The Protocols as well as guidance documents and background documents on the preparation of the protocols are all available 
on the website of Alberta Offsets Registry <www.carbonoffsetsolutions.climatechangecentral.com/offset-protocols/
approved-alberta-protocols>. 
12 <www.pembina.org/climate/carbon-capture-and-storage>. 
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of discussion papers13 dealing with such subjects as the environmental and economic opportunities 
and challenges and a paper on the legal associated with implementing large scale CCS projects.
2.3.8 The North American Sequestration Atlas
It is important that regulators have an understanding of the availability of suitable sequestration 
geology. To that end, agencies in Canada and the United States have collaborated to develop and 
publish successive editions of a North American Sequestration Atlas which identifies (and quantifies 
at a high level) the sequestration potential (categorized in terms of saline aquifers, depleted oil 
and gas reservoirs and unminable coal seams) of the individual provincial and state jurisdictions. 
The Atlas, now available in its 4th edition (2012), also maps major emitters within these jurisdictions.14
3 A framework for analyzing the developing 
regime for the regulation of carbon capture 
and storage in Canada
Canada is a decentralized federation in which the ten provinces wield significant authority in relation 
to the natural resources within each province - both by virtue of the ownership of public lands and 
resources within the province, and by virtue of important heads of legislative authority. The dominant 
position of the provinces in relation to natural resources was confirmed in 1982 with the so-called 
resources amendment to the Constitution. Thus, the provinces are responsible for regulating both 
the upstream oil and natural gas industry as well as the electricity sector including most generating 
facilities (the federal government has an important role in relation to nuclear facilities). 
The federal government has indicated that it will develop sector specific regulations for greenhouse 
gas emission reduction regulations under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999.15 
One set of regulations has already been adopted: the Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Coal-fired Generation of Electricity Regulations.16 These regulations contemplate that CO2 that is 
captured and stored in accordance with provincial regulatory standards will be treated as an avoided 
emission for the purpose of the regulations.17
It is broadly acknowledged that the responsibility for the detailed regulation of capture, transportation 
and storage facilities within the CCS chain will be assumed by the provinces.18 The situation is therefore 
quite different from that in the United States where the federal government has an important role to 
13 The papers are all available on the above web site under the heading “Thought Leader Forum”, November 10, 2008.
14 The Sequestration Atlas is available here: <www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/atlasIV/>.
15 SC 1999, c.33.
16 SOR/2012-167, August 30, 2012, <www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/regu/sor-2012-167/latest/sor-2012-167.html> and with the Regulatory 
Impact Assessment Statement (RIAS) here <www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2012/2012-09-12/pdf/g2-14619.pdf#page=21>. 
17 Id., section 3(5).
18 There is one important exception: an interprovincial or international CO2 pipeline will be subject to federal regulation under the 
National Energy Board Act, RSC 1985, c. N-7. Thus the NEB regulates the CO2 pipeline that provides service to the Weyburrn/
Midale project: Reasons for Decision, Souris Valley Pipeline Limited MH-1-98, October 1998.
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play through EPA’s (Environment Protection Agency’s) Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program 
which is developed under the terms of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).19
In earlier writings I have suggested that, at least from a legal perspective, it is useful to distinguish four 
types of issues when considering the development of an appropriate legal and regulatory regime for 
CCS activities and I shall use that framework in this analysis: (1) the property issues, (2) the regulatory 
issues, (3) liability issues, and (4) carbon crediting and accounting issues. These categories provide the 
headings for the next four parts of the paper.
4 The property issues
CCS projects may give rise to at least two types of property questions. The first relates to the ownership 
of pore space. This question is often framed in terms of a competition between the surface owner and 
the mineral owner but it can also be framed in terms of a competition between public ownership 
and private ownership, i.e. no matter whether pore space for sequestration purposes is vested in 
the surface owner or the mineral owner, is there a case for the state to take preemptive action in 
the public interest and simply vest the pore space resource in the state (i.e. in public ownership)? 
The second type of question arises in those situations in which the government is the owner of pore 
space. In such a case the government needs to decide how it will make decisions about how to allow 
third parties to acquire pore rights for sequestration projects. In particular, there might be a question 
about whether the government should proceed in an ad hoc manner or should design a new form of 
tenure to accommodate CCS projects.
4.1 Ownership of pore space in Alberta 
When CCS issues were first raised in Alberta in the 2005 – 2010 period there was considerable discussion 
about the ownership of pore space for sequestration purposes. The discussion was principally framed 
in terms of whether or not Alberta would follow the American approach with respect to natural gas 
storage and assign ownership of pore space rights to the owner of the surface, or whether it would 
follow a so-called English model and assign ownership of pore space to the mineral owner.20 
In retrospect, and especially in light of the UK Supreme Court decision in Star Weald Basin Limited v. 
Bocardo SA,21 that distinction was likely misconceived. In the Star Weald decision the Court confirmed 
the principle that under English law (and therefore presumably throughout the common law world), 
the starting premise is that the surface owner owns all subsurface resources that can reasonably be 
exploited. That premise might be rebutted such as where the legislature elects to vest a particular 
resource in the state (for example, the UK Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934 under consideration in 
Star Weald) but such exceptions will not be given an expansive interpretation. The specific holding 
19 For EPA’s UIC program and the Class VI permit regulations for geological sequestration wells see <www.water.epa.gov/type/
groundwater/uic/index.cfm>. States can attain “primacy” under this program if they develop their own regulations which meet 
or exceed the federal standards but unless they do the federal regulations apply.
20 See, for example, N Bankes, J Poschwatta and M Shier, “The Legal Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage in Alberta” (2008) 
44 Alberta Law Review 585.
21 2010 UKSC 35. 
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in Star Weald was to the effect that a party, Z, who has acquired the petroleum rights in block B 
underneath B’s land from the Crown, still commits a trespass against B when it acquires surface 
rights from B’s neighbour and then drills directionally under B’s land to tap into the reservoir without 
acquiring any working rights from B. The Court effectively concludes that while the declaratory 
provision of the UK’s legislation was effective to vest petroleum rights in the Crown, that is all that it 
did; all other rights in relation to the subsurface remained with the owner of the surface (subject to 
additional statutory provisions that provided for the compulsory acquisition of the necessary right 
to work the petroleum). Star Weald then favours the surface owner in any competition between the 
mineral owner and the surface owner in relation to pore space ownership, although much might 
depend upon the language of reservation or severance that establishes the existence of separate 
mineral estates.22
An additional element in the discussion in Alberta was the appreciation that the scale of CCS projects23 
might require an operator to deal with multiple owners (whether surface owners or mineral owners) 
when attempting to put together the necessary package. There was the concern that this might give 
rise to large transaction costs, delays and the possibility of holdouts.24
Thus, and perhaps for a combination of reasons, the province in the end elected to introduce 
declaratory legislation vesting title to pore space in the Crown.25 The provision now appears as 
section 15.1 of the Mines and Minerals Act.26
It is hereby declared that
(a)  no grant from the Crown of any land in Alberta, or mines or minerals in any land in Alberta, 
has operated or will operate as a conveyance of the title to the pore space contained in, 
occupied by or formerly occupied by minerals or water below the surface of that land,
(b)  the pore space below the surface of all land in Alberta is vested in and is the property of the 
Crown in right of Alberta and remains the property of the Crown in right of Alberta whether 
or not 
(i)  this Act, or an agreement issued under this Act, grants rights in respect of the subsurface 
reservoir or in respect of minerals occupying the subsurface reservoir, or
(ii)  minerals or water is produced, recovered or extracted from the subsurface reservoir, and
(c) the exception of pore space under this section is deemed to be an exception contained in the 
original grant from the Crown for the purposes of section 61(1) of the Land Titles Act.
The Act did not define the term “pore space” although the term was subsequently defined in the 
Carbon Tenure Sequestration Regulation27 to mean “the pore contained in, or occupied by or formerly 
occupied by minerals or water below the surface of land.”
22 In Alberta the severance typically occurred in the original grant from the Crown in which the Crown reserved out all mines 
and minerals. Thus the Crown owns about 80% of the mineral estate in the province. Early grants and grants to the railway 
companies did not contain such a reservation and thus some landowners acquired mineral rights. These owners might in turn 
created severed estates by their own reservation practices: Borys v CPR [1953] AC 217.
23 The physical plume of CO2 associated with a commercial scale injection project may extend over several square kilometers 
(and migrate updip over time) while the pressure plume might extend across a much larger area.
24 Discussed in Bankes, Legal Issues Associated with the Adoption of Commercial Scale CCS Projects, (2008), <www.pubs.pembina.org/
reports/ccs-discuss-legal.pdf>.
25 SA 2010, c. 14. 
26 RSA 2000, c. M-15.
27 Alta. Reg.68/2011, s.1(i). 
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The legislation goes on to shield the Crown from any possible claims to compensation that might be 
made by a party that claims that the legislation has worked an expropriation:
(4)  It is deemed for all purposes, including for the purposes of the Expropriation Act, that no 
expropriation occurs as a result of the enactment of this section. 
(5)  No person has a right of action and no person shall commence or maintain proceedings
(a)  to claim damages or compensation of any kind, including, without limitation, damages 
or compensation for injurious affection, from the Crown, or
(b)  to obtain a declaration that the damages or compensation referred to in clause (a)  
is payable by the Crown, as a result of the enactment of this section.
Section 15.1 therefore serves as the principal proprietary basis for geological sequestration operations 
in Alberta but only where the project is a pure storage or disposal project, likely a saline aquifer 
project. If the project is conceived of as an enhanced oil recovery project using CO2 as a miscible or 
immiscible flooding agent then the operation will be based upon the operator’s (and its partners’) 
existing petroleum and natural gas tenures (which may be Crown leases or leases granted by the 
private owner of the mineral estate).
Given the scope of New Zealand’s review exercise and the reference in the terms of reference to 
Māori interests, it is perhaps worth highlighting one of the other subsections in this amendment, 
section 15.1(2).28 This section makes it plain that the declaratory effect of the legislation does not 
apply to Crown lands the title to which is vested in the Crown in right of Canada rather than the 
Crown in right of Alberta. In doing so the legislation is making a necessary constitutional concession 
since any attempt by the province to define the scope of the federal government’s estate would 
necessarily be unconstitutional. The federal property affected by this exclusion comprises not 
only the large national parks within Alberta but also Indian reserves, title to which is understood 
to vest in the federal Crown in trust for the particular bands or First Nations. Since such reserves 
generally include mineral title as well as surface title, it seems fairly clear than any geological storage 
space beneath the reserve will accrue, one way or another, to the benefit of the particular band or 
First Nation. While Canada has adopted a disposition regime for oil and gas rights on reserve29 there is, 
as yet, no parallel regime for geosequestration rights.
4.2 The tenure regime: Alberta
Having made the decision to vest pore space for sequestration purposes in the Crown it became 
necessary for the province to also address the means by which it would allow potential CCS operators 
to acquire derivative rights to pore space. The province accomplished this by amending its Mines 
and Mineral Act to add a new Part 9 titled “Sequestration of Captured Carbon Dioxide”. In addition, 
the province promulgated the Carbon Sequestration Tenure Regulations30 to further implement the 
Act and has developed standard form sequestration leases and licences. The first such leases have 
been granted to Shell Canada Limited for the Quest Project.31
28 The text is as follows: “Subsection (1) does not operate to affect the title to land that, on the date on which this section comes 
into force, belongs to the Crown in right of Canada.”
29 See Indian Oil and Gas Act, RSC 1985, c.I-7.
30 Alta. Reg. 68/2011.
31 One of Shell’s six leases is reproduced as Appendix II to this report.
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Before examining the regime that Alberta has put in place it is perhaps worth referring to two other 
options that might have been considered. The first was the licensing scheme that the province has used 
for over two decades to accommodate acid gas disposal projects. The second was the ad hoc special 
agreement scheme that Alberta used to accommodate some of the early oil sands developments. 
4.2.1 Licences for injection wells
Acid gas disposal projects (dealt with in further detail below) involve the capture of waste 
gas streams with a high acid content at natural gas processing plants. The acid gases typically 
comprise some combination of hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and CO2. In an AGD project the operator, 
instead of incinerating the waste stream and recovering the sulphur through further processing 
(eg the Klaus process), captures the entire stream and injects the captured gas into a hydrocarbon 
formation or a saline aquifer. Such projects have operated in the province essentially without any 
form of tenure from the Crown with the operator relying instead on a licence issued under section 56 
of the Mines and Minerals Act.32 Section 56 provides as follows:
Injection wells
56(1) Subject to section 57, a person has, as against the Crown in right of Alberta,
(a)  the right to use a well or drill a well for the injection of any substance into an underground 
formation, if the person is required by or has the approval of the Energy Resources 
Conservation Board to do so, and
(b)  the right to remove and withdraw any machinery, tool, plant, building, erection and 
fixture used in or in connection with the operation of that well, if the removal or 
withdrawal is approved by the Board.
(2)  A person who exercises a right referred to in subsection (1)(a) (a) shall indemnify the Crown in 
right of Alberta for loss or damage suffered by the Crown in respect of any claims or demands 
made by reason of anything done by that person or any other person on that person’s behalf 
in the exercise or purported exercise of that right, and
(b)  shall abandon the well when so directed or authorized by the Energy Resources 
Conservation Board, in accordance with the directions of the Board.
The licence took the form the form of standard form letter issued by the Department of Energy. 
It was generally considered that this provided an inadequate basis for a commercial scale CCS 
project. However, it is still possible that section 56 licences in conjunction with amended version 
of section 54 will be used to authorize small scale experimental projects as well as shallower 
projects which do not meet the depth requirements for permits and leases issued under Part 9 of the 
Mines and Minerals Act and the Regulations.33
32 Some suggest that section 54 was also relevant. While the new section 54 discussed below is clearly relevant, the old section 54 
used only to refer to operations for the recovery of minerals.
33 Under the Carbon Sequestration Tenure Regulation, Alta. Reg. 68/2011 permits and leases may only be issued in respect of 
“deep subsurface reservoirs”. The regulation defines a deep subsurface reservoir as “the pore space within an underground 
formation that is deeper than 1000 metres …”.
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The new section 54 read as follows:
(1)  No person shall…
(b)  inject any substance into a subsurface reservoir that is the property of the Crown in right 
of Alberta unless the person is authorized to do so under this Act or by an agreement.
(5)  The Minister may authorize in writing the conducting of operations in respect of a mineral or 
subsurface reservoir that is the property of the Crown in right of Alberta and that is not the 
subject of an agreement issued under this Act where the Minister is of the opinion that the 
operations are desirable in respect of the exploration for or the development, processing or 
recovery of minerals or the sequestration of captured carbon dioxide.
4.2.2 Special agreements
Oil and gas rights in the province of Alberta are typically issued as standard form licences or leases 
following a bonus bidding procedure (a Crown sale). However, the Minister also has the exceptional 
power under section 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act, with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council, to issue an agreement that departs from the standard form. The terms of such an agreement 
may vary the application of the Act. The Province used this form of agreement in the early development 
of oil sands projects and there was some suggestion that this would also be an appropriate vehicle 
for authorizing early CCS projects in ways that might facilitate adaptive management and learning 
by doing. This option clearly had its attractions and while the province did proceed to authorize two 
new forms of tenure for sequestration purposes it also, at the same time, amended section 9 to add a 
paragraph expressly addressing the “storage or sequestration of substances in subsurface reservoirs”. 
The section now reads as follows:
9.  Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any regulation or agreement, the Minister, on behalf 
of the Crown in right of Alberta and with the authorization of the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council, may
(a)  enter into a contract with any person or the government of Canada or of a province or 
territory respecting ….
(iii)  the storage or sequestration of substances in subsurface reservoirs;
….
(vi)  any matter that the Minister considers to be necessarily incidental to, in relation to 
or in connection with any of the matters referred to in subclauses (i) to (v);
(b)  issue an agreement
(i)  containing a provision that is a variation of a provision of this Act or the regulations 
that would otherwise apply to the agreement, or
(ii)  making inapplicable a provision of this Act or the regulations that would otherwise 
apply to the agreement; …. (emphasis supplied)
It is perhaps telling that the province elected to use the new standard form sequestration lease for 
Shell’s Quest Project rather than a section 9 special agreement.
4.2.3 The tenure provisions
Alberta’s sequestration tenure regime is created by Part 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act and the 
Carbon Sequestration Tenure Regulation. The scheme offers two forms of tenure an evaluation permit 
and a carbon sequestration lease.
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Evaluation permit
An evaluation permit may be granted on application. In addition to fees and rentals, an applicant for 
a permit (section 3) must propose a monitoring, measurement and verification (MMV) program that 
meets certain requirements. In particular, the plan must contain (section 7(1)) “an analysis of the 
likelihood that the operations or activities that may be conducted under the permit will interfere with 
mineral recovery”. This analysis is required because of a new provision in the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act (OGCA) which provides that “The Board shall not grant a CO2 injection scheme approval unless 
the lessee of that agreement satisfies the Board that the injection of the captured carbon dioxide 
will not interfere with (a) the recovery or conservation of oil or gas, or (b) an existing use of the 
underground formation for the storage of oil or gas.”34
A permittee must comply with an approved MMV plan (section 7(2)). Once granted the permit:
[G]rants, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permit, the right to conduct 
evaluations and testing, including the drilling of wells and injection of substances as approved 
by the Board, into deep subsurface reservoirs within the location of the permit to evaluate 
the geological or geophysical properties of the deep subsurface reservoirs for the purposes of 
determining their suitability for use for the sequestration of captured carbon dioxide.
Deep subsurface reservoirs are defined as pore space in an underground formation that is deeper than 
1,000 metres below the surface. A permit does not grant any right to win, work, or recover minerals. 
A permit can be granted for an area of up to 73,728 hectares (which is about 284 square miles). 
A permit may be grouped (section 8) with other contiguous permits for the purposes of meeting the 
MMV filing requirements. An evaluation permit is valid for a five year term.
Sequestration Lease
The process for acquiring a sequestration lease follows that outlined above for permits with some 
additional requirements. A party may proceed directly to a lease.35 The additional requirements are: 
(1) evidence that the location is suitable for CO2 sequestration, and (2) a closure plan in addition to 
the MMV plan. The closure plan must set out (section 18) “a description of the activities satisfactory 
to the Minister that the lessee will undertake to close down sequestration operations and facilities”. 
The MMV program must also address (in somewhat more detail than in the permit application) 
the effect of the proposed operations on mineral recovery. In particular, it must contain 
(section 15(b)):
[A]n analysis of the likelihood that the operations or activities that may be conducted under 
the carbon sequestration lease will interfere with mineral recovery, based on the geological 
interpretations and calculations the lessee is required to submit to the Board pursuant 
to Directive 65 in its application for approval of the injection scheme under the Oil and  
Gas Conservation Act…
The lease grants the same rights as the permit plus the right to inject captured CO2 (section 9(3)). 
The size limits for the lease are the same as for a permit as are the grouping rules (section 14).
34 RSA 2000, c. O-6 (s.39(1.1))
35 Shell Canada proceeded directly to lease for the Quest Project i.e. it did not acquire a permit and then a lease.
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A lease is granted for an initial term of 15 years. There is no right of renewal (see section 11(1)), 
“but the Minister may renew for successive 15 year terms subject to any terms and conditions 
prescribed by the Minister at that time” – and perhaps only with respect to a portion of the lease area 
or with respect to certain zones (section 11(2)).
The Regulations suggest that the Government is committed to learning by doing and to procedures 
of adaptive management. Thus, MMV programs for leases and closure plans are only valid for 
three years and must be successively renewed during the term of the lease and upon lease renewal 
(section 16 for MMV and section 19 for the closure plan). The closure plan provision also contains 
the important requirement that the lessee must provide (section 19(3)(c))“an evaluation of 
whether the injected captured carbon dioxide has behaved in a manner consistent with the 
geological interpretations and calculations the lessee submitted to the Board pursuant to Directive 
65 in its application for approval of the injection scheme under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act”. 
This is crucial for understanding how the CO2 plume is performing as against the modeling that was 
undertaken before injection commenced.
This last point suggests that there is some overlap in content between the leasing regime created by 
Part 9 of the Act and the regulations, and the regulatory regime under the jurisdiction of the Energy 
Resources Conservation Board (ERCB). I will elaborate on this in the next section.
4.3 Conclusions on the property issues
(1) Alberta concluded that ownership of pore space might be contentious and might therefore 
create considerable legal uncertainty which might delay commercial scale implementation of 
CCS projects. In light of that, Alberta chose to deal proactively with the problem of pore space 
ownership by enacting declaratory legislation vesting pore space in the Crown. The legislation 
also made it quite clear that no person would have a cause of action against the Crown for 
damages or compensation as a result of the statutory vesting of pore space in the Crown.
(2) Having vested title to the pore space in the Crown the government, in the same legislation, also 
created a tenure regime for pore space. There are two forms of tenure, evaluation permits and 
sequestration leases. It is not necessary for an operator to proceed from a permit to a lease; 
an operator may go straight to a lease if it has an adequate information basis on which to make 
the application. The first such leases have been granted to Shell Canada for the Quest Project.
(3) The tenure amendments to the Mines and Minerals Act also provide for MMV Plans, closure 
plans and closer certificates. These issues are all dealt with in more detail in Part 5.
5 The regulatory regime in Alberta
In developing a regulatory regime to govern the review and approval of carbon capture and storage 
projects, Alberta has drawn heavily on existing approaches to the regulation of acid gas disposal 
projects (AGD). Indeed, from the perspective of the main energy regulator in the province, the Energy 
Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), carbon capture and storage projects are a subset of acid gas 
disposal projects, albeit presenting problems of scale that are not present in AGD projects.
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Given the ERCB’s reliance on the AGD analogy this section of the report begins with an account of 
how the Board regulates the approval of AGD projects. 
5.1 The regulation of acid gas disposal projects
Acid gas disposal or injection refers to the injection and geological disposal of mixed streams of CO2 
and hydrogen sulphide (H2S). AGD began in Alberta in 1989 as a response to the dual challenge posed 
by the need to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions from natural gas processing plants and by falling 
prices for elemental sulphur produced as part of conventional processing. In essence, the idea is to 
take the sulphur emissions stream and inject it back into the ground. While the principal emissions 
target has always been H2S, the waste stream from the typical processing plant also contains CO2 as 
an impurity. The injection ratios for approved injection projects vary between 83% H2S and 14% CO2 
to 2% H2S and 95% CO2. Since 1989 the Board has approved over 50 AGD schemes for a variety of 
target formations including saline formations, depleted oil and gas reservoirs and in a few cases into 
the water leg of a producing oil reservoir.36
AGD is regulated in Alberta by the ERCB under the terms of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act37 (OGCA) 
and regulations. The purposes of the statute include conservation of the resource, prevention 
of pollution and the economic development of the resource.38 Prior to the 2010 amendments 
(discussed below) the Act itself had very little to say about geological disposal beyond a number 
of generic sections that require ERCB approval before a person may engage in a particular activity. 
Thus a person requires ERCB approval before: (1) drilling a well (including evaluation and injection 
wells) (section 11), (2) operating or constructing a facility (including a facility for the disposal of 
hydrocarbon wastes) (section 12), (3) proceeding with a scheme for (a) an EOR operation, (b) the 
processing or underground storage of gas, (c) the storage or disposal of any fluid or substance to an 
underground formation through a well, or (d) the storage treatment or disposal of oilfield waste 
(section 39). The italicized language is particularly pertinent to AGD and CCS projects.
The regulations offer some limited additional guidance as to the content of applications but 
the ERCB provides much more detailed instructions through a series of “Directives” including 
Directive 51 dealing with “Injection and Disposal Wells” and the more general Directive 65, 
“Resources Applications”.39 This latter includes a series of units dealing respectively with general 
disposal schemes, acid gas disposal schemes and gas storage schemes. Directive 65 requires an 
applicant for AGD approval to provide information on containment of injected substances, reservoir 
characteristics, hydraulic isolation, equity and safety.40
36 S Bachu and K Haug, “In Situ Characteristics of Acid-Gas Injection Operations in the Alberta Basin, Western Canada: 
Demonstration of CO2 Geological Storage” in S Benson (ed), Carbon Dioxide Capture for Storage in Deep Geologic Formations 
– Results from the CO2 Capture Project, Volume 2, Geologic Storage of Carbon Dioxide with Monitoring and Verification, Elsevier, 
2005 at 867–876. 
37 RSA 2000, c.O-6.
38 OGCA, s.4. 
39 The Directives are all available on the Board’s website <www.ercb.ca/regulations-and-directives/directives>. 
40 In addition to the text of the Guides there has been some discussion of the Board’s regulatory requirements in the technical 
literature. See in particular H.L. Longworth, G.C. Dunn and M. Semchuk, “Underground Disposal of Acid Gas in Alberta, Canada: 
Regulatory Concerns and Case Histories” in Proceedings of the Gas Technology Symposium, (28 April – 1 May, 1996, Calgary 
Alberta, paper # SPE 35584) at 181–192.
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Under the heading of containment the ERCB expects the applicant to be able to show that the injected 
fluids will be contained within a defined area and geologic horizon and ensure that there will be no 
migration to a hydrocarbon-bearing zone or groundwater. Hence the applicant will be expected to 
provide a complete and accurate drilling history of offsetting wells within several kilometres as well as 
information on the permeability of the cap rock and any fracturing. The applicant will also be expected 
to identify folding and faulting and comment on how this relates to seismic risk – both the effect of 
seismic activity on the integrity of the project and the effect of disposal schemes on (increased) seismic 
activity. Under the heading of reservoir characteristics the applicant will need to describe and analyse 
the native reservoir, the composition of the waste stream and phase behaviour as well as migration 
calculations and proposed bottom hole injection pressures. Board approvals will be limited to 90% of 
formation fracture pressures. The Board will expect an assessment of the effect of the acid gas on the 
target zones. Under the heading of hydraulic isolation the Board expects the applicant to demonstrate 
that all potable water bearing zones as well as hydrocarbon bearing zones are hydraulically isolated 
from the proposed injection wells by cement and/or casing with all injection occurring through tubing 
appropriately isolated from the casing by packer with casing integrity confirmed by an inspection log.
Many of the safety concerns that apply to AGD projects are the same as those that apply to all sour 
gas wells and facilities including pipelines. These include a requirement for the development of an 
emergency response plan (ERP) including an emergency planning zone that is the area of land that 
may be impacted by an H2S release and may include the processing plant, the injection well and the 
connecting pipeline. The Board expects to see evidence of broad public consultation on both the ERP 
and all other matters related to the proposed project. Finally, under equity issues the Board expects 
the applicant to provide evidence that all offsetting mineral rights owners have been contacted as 
well as details of outstanding objections or concerns. 
Perhaps surprisingly, very few AGD applications have triggered a public hearing and formal reasons 
for decision from the Board approving a project.41 
In sum, AGD schemes present a range of regulatory challenges that will be similar to those which will 
have to be faced in the design of a CCS regulatory scheme. In some cases the risks associated with 
CCS will be lower than those associated with AGD. For example, length of pipeline will be far less of 
a concern with a CO2 pipeline than it is with respect to an H2S pipeline given the significantly more 
hazardous properties of H2S. On the other hand, the sheer scale of CCS projects suggests that lateral 
migration issues will be far more significant than the migration issues associated with the disposal of 
relatively small volumes of acid gas into well defined physical/structural traps.
5.2 The Board’s Mutatis Mutandis Bulletin
In July 2010 the Board issued a Bulletin, ERCB Processes Related to Carbon Capture and 
Storage Projects,42 in which it confirmed its intention to treat CCS projects as a form of acid gas 
disposal. In doing so it drew attention to the relevant Directives particularly Directive 65 and Directive 
51 dealing with Injection and Disposal Wells.
41 EUB Decision 2001-43, Re Duke Energy Midstream Services Canada Ltd, proposed modifications to the Puce Coupe plant; EUB 
Decision 99-31, Re Northrock Resources, application for a proposed sour gas processing plant in the Pembina field; EUB Decision 
2000-42, Re Burlington Resources Canada Energy Ltd application to modify an existing sweet gas processing plant. 
42 ERCB Bulletin 2010-22.
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5.3 Amendments to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act and the 
Regulatory Add-ons to the Mines and Minerals Act
At the same time as the legislature amended the Mines and Minerals Act to address the two main 
property issues outlined above (ownership of pore space and the creation of a tenure regime) 
it also amended the Oil and Gas Conservation Act to give the Board some additional direction 
with respect to the approval process for CCS projects. It also added some regulatory elements to 
Part 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act. This latter was an unusual step for the Government of Alberta. 
Historically there has been a fairly clear demarcation between the content of the Mines and 
Minerals Act and the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. Under this demarcation the Mines and Minerals 
Act addresses the property and financial (royalty) issues associated with Crown owned minerals 
(eg the forms of tenure, issuance of tenure and continuation of tenure) while the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act deals with the regulation of energy projects. However, with the creation of the new 
forms of sequestration tenure, the Department of Energy will be critically involved in some aspects of 
project regulation. These are highlighted below (section 5.3.3).
5.3.1  The Amendments to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act to accommodate 
CCS Projects
The province clearly accepted the premise of the Board’s Bulletin 2010-22 to the effect that the 
Board was already well equipped to deal with the review and approval of CCS projects but the 
legislation did make two important changes to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act as well as a number 
of minor changes. The first significant change was to harmonize one of the key liability provisions of 
the Act with the amendments to the Mines and Minerals Act which proposed a transfer of liability. 
This is dealt with in Part 6 of this report which focuses on liability. The second significant change 
was to amend the “scheme approval” section of the Act (already referred to above in the context of 
AGD projects) to explicitly refer to CCS projects. As amended, this provision now reads as follows:
39(1) No scheme for 
…..
(d) the storage or disposal of any fluid or other substance to an underground formation  
through a well, 
 may be proceeded with unless the Board, by order, has approved the scheme on any 
terms and conditions that the Board prescribes. 
(1.1) The Board may not approve a scheme for the disposal of captured carbon dioxide to an 
underground formation under subsection (1)(d) that is pursuant to an agreement under  
Part 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act unless the lessee of that agreement satisfies the Board 
that the injection of the captured carbon dioxide will not interfere with 
(a)  the recovery or conservation of oil or gas, or 
(b)  an existing use of the underground formation for the storage of oil or gas. 
(2)  Prior to the Board approving a scheme under subsection (1)(d), it shall refer the application 
to the Minister of Environment for that Minister’s approval with respect to the application 
as it affects matters of the environment. 
(3)  The Minister of Environment may give approval with or without conditions, but when 
conditions are imposed, the Board shall, if it approves the scheme, make its order subject 
to the same conditions imposed by the Minister of Environment when that Minister  
gave approval. 
…..
Carbon Capture and Storage: Designing the Legal and Regulatory Framework for New Zealand304
The amendment created a sub-category of storage and disposal projects namely CO2 disposal projects 
that are proceeding under Part 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act43 and it provides a clear instruction to 
the Board that it may not approve a CCS project unless the applicant has convinced the Board that 
the project will not interfere with hydrocarbon recovery operations or an existing storage operation. 
The fact that the word “existing” only qualifies the use of a formation for storage operations suggests 
that the applicant and the Board must have in mind not only current hydrocarbon recovery operations 
but also possible future operations.
5.3.2 The Board’s review of Shell’s Quest Project
Since the amendment was passed the Board has considered one application for approval of a CCS 
project. This was Shell Canada’s application for approval of the Quest Project.44 The project is associated 
with the long standing Athabasca Oil Sands Project (AOSP) and the Scotford Upgrader where 
new facilities are designed to capture up to 1.2 megatonnes of CO2 per year for ongoing injection. 
The cumulative stored volume is expected to be greater than 27 Mt of CO2 over the expected 25 year 
life of the Scotford Upgrader. The application was actually a composite application involving not only an 
application under section 39 of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act but also an application for approval of 
a CO2 pipeline and for the necessary capture facilities at the Scotford Upgrader.
The Board identified the following list of issues with respect to the applications (at 4):
• the corporate structure of the applicant and other legal issues; 
• the need for the project; 
• amendment to the Scotford Upgrader; 
• pipeline transmission of CO2 to the injection sites; 
• sequestration of CO2 —containment in the subsurface; 
• public safety and emergency response; 
• environment and socio-economics; 
• monitoring, measurement, and verification; 
• public consultation, communications, and access to information; 
• the public interest; and 
• ongoing approval processes. 
43 It should be noted then that the provision does not apply to CO2-EOR projects (such projects would be dealt with under section 
39(1)(a) which does not trigger the need for the approval of the Minister of the Environment) and would not apply to a CCS 
project that was proceeding on a Crown tenure or licence that was not issued under Part 9 of the MMA (eg a section 11 special 
agreement or a section 54 & section 56 licence).
44 Shell Canada Limited, Application for the Quest Carbon Capture and Storage Project, Radway Field, July 10, 2012, 2012 AERCB 008.
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The Board decision covers close to sixty pages of text with additional figures and appendices. 
I cannot review all of these issues here but I will briefly review how the Board addressed six issues: 
(1) proof of containment, (2) the protection of hydrocarbon production and storage interests, (3) the 
protection of potable groundwater, (4) the treatment of legacy wells, (5) monitoring, measurement 
and verification (MMV), and (6) how Shell, as the applicant, made use of third party evaluations in 
order to support its application.
Containment
Proof of geological containment is perhaps the most important issue that a CCS proponent 
must address. In this case there was considerable evidence that the target storage complex the 
Basal Cambrian Sand (BCS) would provide appropriate containment. The base of the storage formation 
is sealed by the Precambrian granite basement (at para. 136) while the seals above included shales 
(between 90m and 22m in thickness), salt formations between 35m and 85m in thickness and an 
evaporite formation. The water chemistry of these shallower formations indicated that they were 
isolated as did evidence of pressure differences in relation to other formations. Additionally, Shell 
noted that a number of porous zones would act as baffles (ie they would restrict any vertical fluid 
flow since they would allow CO2 to migrate into these zones). There was no evidence of faulting 
(at para. 196) while there was evidence that the area has been one of relative tectonic stability over a 
long period of geologic time. Thus, the BCS is clearly a very favorable geological storage site.
Hydrocarbon production interests
As noted above, the Board may not approve a CCS scheme unless the proponent “satisfies the Board 
that the project will not interfere with hydrocarbon production and storage interests.” The evidence 
showed that there was no organic material below the base of the BCS and therefore no hydrocarbon 
source rock; while the BCS itself (at para 130) “exhibits no structural or stratigraphic closure as a 
trapping mechanism for oil or gas, and for that reason was not suitable for natural gas storage either, 
even though the BCS storage complex has excellent sealing capacity.” Furthermore, the nearest 
producing hydrocarbon formation lies more than 1,000 metres above the BCS and 10 km from the 
storage wells. This allowed the Board to conclude (at para. 180) (and notwithstanding the fact that 
there were existing Crown leases granting rights down to the basement as well as non-Crown oil and 
gas rights) that there was little prospect that anybody would apply to drill an oil or gas well into the 
formations in the “Location” (at para 180 and see also at paras 187 – 188). Furthermore, the evidence 
suggested that, on a prospective basis, the Crown would not lease oil and gas rights within the zone 
of interest (at para. 180). 
All of this allowed the Board to conclude (at paras. 187 – 188) that Shell had satisfied the statutory 
test – although the Board does state a few paragraphs later (at para. 195), “that producing fields 
might see a slight increase in salinity or acidity of produced fluids, but finds that their lateral and 
vertical distances from the injection area—the nearest field is 1000 m vertically and 10 km laterally 
from the injection area—render this outcome unlikely.” Implicitly, the Board must be concluding that 
this risk is not inconsistent with the non-interference test prescribed by the statute.
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Protection of potable groundwater
While the Oil and Gas Conservation Act requires that the applicant establish that its proposed 
operation will cause no harm to (or more precisely “will not interfere with”) oil and gas interests, 
there is no similar requirement in relation to potable groundwater. However, the ERCB is clearly 
of the view that it has the responsibility to ensure that CCS operations will not affect potable 
groundwater. In this case the target formation is highly saline (311,000 milligrams/litre TDS). 
The Board addressed concerns as to the potential for groundwater contamination at several points 
in its decision emphasising, inter alia, the completion requirements for injection wells, the fact that 
there would be three layers of casing cemented to surface (at para. 198), and the importance of 
the proposed MMV program (combined with development of baseline data including well testing 
within a 3.2 km radius of any injection well (at 356 – 360.)) See further discussion of the MMV 
program below. 
The treatment of legacy wells
The CCS literature confirms that one of the principal possible pathways for leakage is posed by 
the existence of legacy wells within the storage complex. A working definition of a legacy well 
(see para 181) is an old well (long since abandoned) which penetrates the proposed storage complex 
(in this case the BCS). It is clear that Shell carefully selected its injection target with a view to 
minimizing the number of legacy wells it would need to deal with. In this case there are only four 
legacy wells within the area of interest and the nearest was located more than 18km from any of 
the proposed injection wells. Three of the wells were abandoned between 1949 and 1955 and the 
other in 1978. In one case the evidence was to the effect that the abandonment left about 900m of 
open hole below the first cement plug (at paras and 126 & 183). However, the Board was satisfied 
that there was little risk of the injected substances migrating and reaching the legacy wells and 
even it did there was little risk that the induced pressure increases at these locations would lift the 
brine to reach protected groundwater aquifers (at paras 181 – 186). The Board did however indicate 
(at para. 340) that it would require Shell to address in its annual reporting the need for additional 
monitoring wells adjacent to the legacy wells if a risk emerged that the plume pressure might be 
sufficient to raise BCS brine to the base of groundwater protection (BGWP).
It seems safe to assume that the licensees of these legacy wells did not object to Shell’s proposal. 
If they had objected that would likely have been noted in Board’s decision. We do not, however, know 
from the decision whether these licensees never objected from the outset, or whether Shell was able 
to satisfy any concerns that they might have had. Given that an operation to pressure up formations 
penetrated by a legacy well increases the risk for the licensee and working interest participants in that 
legacy well, one might have expected that a licensee of such a well would seek to have Shell take an 
assignment of the licence or to have Shell provide an indemnity to cover any costs associated with 
possible future re-abandonment operations. But perhaps these licensees simply thought the risk of a 
problem was too small given the distance between the injector and legacy wells. The decision is silent 
on the point.
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Monitoring, Measurement and Verification (MMV)
Shell submitted a comprehensive MMV program for the project emphasising, as did the Board, the 
importance of conducting appropriate baselines studies over the next two years before injection 
begins. The MMV measures include three (shallow) non-saline groundwater monitoring wells for each 
injection well, at least three deep injection wells in the Winnipegosis formation in the upper part 
of the storage complex, repeated 3-D seismic to monitor the plume, and the use of InSAR a radar 
based technology to measure any ground deformation (ground heave) associated with the injection 
activities. The Board also emphasised that the MMV program needed to be adaptive (at para 333) and, 
in recognizing that the proposed MMV program had yet to be finalized, took the opportunity to add 
a number of conditions to the scheme approval and also to warn Shell that additional requirements 
might be imposed as the project evolved, depending upon how the injection plume performed. 
Some of these requirements such as the possible need for additional evaluation wells could be quite 
onerous. Indeed of the 23 conditions included in the Board’s decision, 21 relate to the MMV portion of 
the report.45 This should not, I think, be read to mean that the Board was dissatisfied with the quality 
of Shell’s proposal but instead reflects the importance of the issue. In the end the MMV conditions are 
best read as the outcome of a dialogue between the proponent and the Board in which both parties 
seem to be using best efforts to design an MMV program that permitted both Shell and the Board 
(at para. 273) “to verify that actual storage performance conforms to model-based forecasts, and to 
trigger additional control measures to prevent or correct any loss of containment before significant 
impacts occurred.”
Third party assessments
Shell took the unusual step of having several aspects of its application materials vetted by external 
assessors and filing those assessments with the Board in support of its application. On the technical 
side, Shell retained Det Norsk Veritas (DNV) (at paras. 143 and 278) to review Shell’s proposed 
MMV program. DNV issued a “certificate of fit for purpose”. Shell also retained Oxand (at para. 148) 
to assess the long term (200 years) integrity of injection wells. And finally, Shell retained the 
Pembina Institute (at para 369), Alberta’s highest profile ENGO, to evaluate and provide advice to 
it on its public consultation and communication program. These assessments (and Shell’s responses 
to the assessments) were presented as part of the evidence supporting its application and in Shell’s 
words, to encourage transparency in relation to the technical aspects of the proposal (at para. 143).
5.3.3  Regulatory issues included in the amendments to the  
Mines and Minerals Act
As noted above, the province decided to include in the CCS tenure rules certain matters that are 
concerned more with the regulation of CCS projects than they are with the proprietary issues on 
which a disposition statute such as the Mines and Mineral Act typically focuses. Specifically, the Act 
and the regulations deal with three matters that might ordinarily have fallen within the jurisdiction 
of the ERCB: (1) MMV plans, (2) closure plans, and (3) the issuance of closure certificates. I am given 
to understand that the government decided to deal with these issues in the MMA (and thus to have 
45 I have included the scheme approval for the Quest Project as Appendix I.
Carbon Capture and Storage: Designing the Legal and Regulatory Framework for New Zealand308
them dealt with in-house in the Department of Energy rather than through the ERCB) because of the 
transfer of liability that the legislation provides for. The government wanted to be in control of the 
circumstances in which liability would be transferred.
MMV plans
The regulations require an applicant for a permit (section 3(2)(d)) and for a lease (section 9(2)(e)) to 
file an MMV plan but do not offer much guidance as to the content of the plan except with respect to 
the possible effects of the project on hydrocarbon recovery. Thus, in the case of a permit the applicant 
must provide (section 7(1)(b) “an analysis of the likelihood that the operations or activities that may 
be conducted under the permit will interfere with mineral recovery”, and similarly, in the case of a 
lease the applicant must provide (section 15(b)) “an analysis of the likelihood that the operations or 
activities that may be conducted under the carbon sequestration lease will interfere with mineral 
recovery, based on the geological interpretations and calculations the lessee is required to submit 
to the Board pursuant to Directive 65 in its application for approval of the injection scheme under 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act”. A lessee must renew its MMV plan at least every three years 
(section 16) and must file an annual report (section 17) with the Minister “that sets out the findings 
and observations” from the MMV operations that the lessee has conducted.
Closure plans
An applicant for a lease must include in its application a closure plan (section 9(2)(f). At this time 
the regulations offer little guidance as to the content of the closure plan other than to state that 
the Minister may approve a plan submitted in support of an application for a lease “if the plan sets 
out a description of the activities satisfactory to the Minister that the lessee will undertake to close 
down sequestration operations and facilities.”46 However, as with the MMV plans, the closure plan 
must be renewed every three years and on any renewal of the lease. The revised closure plan must 
address the following: 
(a) a summary of the activities that have been conducted by the lessee on the location of the carbon 
sequestration lease since it was issued;
(b) the quantity of captured CO2 that has been injected;
(c) an evaluation of whether the injected captured CO2 has behaved in a manner consistent with 
the geological interpretations and calculations the lessee submitted to the Board pursuant 
to Directive 65 in its application for approval of the injection scheme under the Oil and 
Gas Conservation Act;
(d) the most recent geological interpretations and calculations that may have been made by the 
lessee with respect to the injected CO2 and any associated pressure front;  
(e) a description of the location, condition, plugging procedures and integrity testing results for 
every well that has been used for the injection of captured CO2 under the lease;
46 CSTR, section 18 and titled “Initial closure plan”.
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(f) a description of any decommissioning, abandonment or reclamation activities undertaken by 
the lessee in the location of the lease;
(g) an inventory of the reports and documents that the lessee has submitted to the Board or a 
department or agency of the Crown in right of Alberta or the Crown in right of Canada since the 
approval of the first closure plan related to the carbon sequestration lease, whether or not those 
reports and documents were required to be submitted;
(h) advice and recommendations about the monitoring, measurement and verification activities 
that should be conducted after the issuance of a closure certificate is issued for the carbon 
sequestration lease under section 120 of the Act.
The closure certificate
The closure certificate is addressed in the Act. The regulations do not yet further elaborate on the 
procedure to be followed when a party is applying for a closure certificate.47 The issuance of a closure 
certificate is a precondition to the Crown’s assumption of liability. The Act provides that Minister may 
issue a closure certificate on the application of a lessee if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)  the lessee has complied with section 119, [i.e. it has monitored all wells and facilities and 
performed all the closure activities as prescribed by the regulations – the regulations have 
yet to be developed]
(b)  the lessee has abandoned all wells and facilities in accordance with the requirements under 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act and the regulations under this Part,
(c)  the lessee has complied with the reclamation requirements under the Environmental 
Protection and Enhancement Act,
(d)  the closure period specified in the regulations has passed, [no time yet prescribed]
(e)  the conditions specified in the regulations have been met [no regulations to this point], and
(f)  the captured carbon dioxide is behaving in a stable and predictable manner, with no 
significant risk of future leakage.
While this provides a framework and identifies one substantive condition for issuing a closure 
certificate (the idea that the CO2 plume is behaving in a stable and predictable manner with no 
significant risk of leakage) it is apparent (from the bracketed references in the above quotation) 
that much still remains to be elaborated by way of regulations.
5.4 The Regulatory Framework Assessment
The RFA identified 21 different issues that needed to be examined. These were as follows: (1) approvals, 
permits and regulatory process, (2) closure and transfer of liability, (3) CO2 classification, (4) CO2 
enhanced oil recovery and acid gas disposal, (5) CO2 transportation and composition, (6) competition 
with other resources, (7) environmental assessments, (8) environmental impacts, mitigation and 
remediation, (9) MMV, (10) pipeline open access, (11) pore space open access, (12) post-closure 
stewardship fund and financial security, (13) public engagement and stakeholder consultation, 
47 MMA, s. 124(h) empowers the Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations respecting applications for closure certificates, 
including regulations respecting the form and contents of applications and the closure period that must have passed before a 
lessee is eligible to apply.
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(14) public safety, (15) risk assessment, (16) site closure, (17) site selection, (18) surface access, 
(19) surface reclamation, (20) tenure process, and (21) well construction.
In what follows I shall focus on those issues that seem to have a bearing on the legal and regulatory 
framework rather than some of the more technical issues that were discussed. 
Third party access
The RFA expressed some concern that regulated emitters might not be able to negotiate access 
on market terms to CO2 pipeline infrastructure or an appropriate storage site.
48 Accordingly it 
recommended that Alberta should create a mechanism whereby in exceptional circumstances a 
party might apply for regulated access. The report also recommends that pipeline operators should 
be encouraged to conduct some form of “open season” as part of commissioning new pipeline 
capacity. The RFA also encouraged efforts to cooperate in the shared use of infrastructure and 
suggested that the Government should consider taking an active role in the regional planning of CO2 
pipeline infrastructure.
Site selection issues
The RFA recommended that the ERCB should review its requirements relating to CO2 sequestration 
to ensure that they adequately reflect issues related to sequestration volume capacity, injectivity 
and containment. An inventory of pore space should be established and updated and consideration 
should be given to identifying high priority areas where there is good quality pore space and little risk 
of conflict between CCS activities and other subsurface resource users.
The roles of the ERCB and the Department of Energy
The RFA suggested that government should clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of Energy 
and the ERCB in relation to the issuance of closure certificates and MMV issues. The RFA was of the 
view that MMV issues should be dealt with by the ERCB rather than the Department of Energy.
Transparency issues
The RFA made a number of recommendations relating to transparency including development of a guide 
for CCS proponents to guide them through the regulatory system; broad notification of stakeholders 
as part of project applications; development of a wide range of public information documents.
Tenure issues
Recommendations in relation to tenure include the following: the continued use of section 54 licences 
for CCS research activities; an enhanced list of matters to be addressed in a closure plan; and the 
revocation of unused sequestration leases.
48 These issues are also discussed in N Bankes and R Nilson, “Economic Regulation and the Design of a Carbon Infrastructure for 
Alberta” in Roggenkamp et al (eds), Energy Networks and the Law, (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 231 – 251.
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Environmental impact assessments
In addition to the review conducted by the ERCB under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act Alberta 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development may also require an environmental impact 
assessment under the terms of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act.49 The regulations 
under that Act create three categories of projects: (1) those for which an EIA is mandatory, (2) those 
activities that are exempt from an EIA, and, (3) (the default position) activities for which a Director 
may order an EIA. At the current time CCS projects fall in to this default category. The RFA recommends 
that CCS projects should be placed on the mandatory list – at least until further experience is gained 
with CCS projects.
Liability issues
The RFA recommended that the government needs to establish a contribution rate for the 
Post-closure Stewardship Fund. The rate should be based on a risk assessment. Lessees should be 
required to post security for anticipated suspension, abandonment and remediation costs so as 
to reduce the risk of drawing on the fund to cover “orphan” facilities. Government should assume 
liability for any emissions accounting liability that might occur after the closure certificate issues. 
Disbursements from the Fund for this purpose should be permitted. Liability issues are discussed in 
greater detail in part six of this report.
CCS and CO2-EOR Operations
The RFA recommended that government needed to identify and justify the different treatment of 
CO2-EOR projects, CCS projects and acid gas disposal projects. 
5.5 Conclusions on the regulatory issues
(1) The principal legislative authority for reviewing, assessment and approving CCS projects 
in Alberta is the scheme approval provision of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
(2) The detailed regulatory framework for CCS projects in Alberta is found in the key Directives of 
the ERCB and the terms and conditions of scheme approvals. In particular, the ERCB will treat 
CCS projects as a sub-set of acid gas injection projects.
(3) Shell’s Quest project provides an example of how the regulatory review process work and the 
types of issues that the Board will address in its detailed review of an application.
(4) In addition to the provisions of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, the Mines and Minerals Act 
prescribes additional obligations for CCS operators. In particular, the Mines and Minerals Act and 
regulations address the need for MMV Plans and Closure Plans and also discuss the circumstances 
in which a closure certificate may be issued. However, there are many issues here that still need 
to be elaborated in the regulations.
(5) The Regulatory Framework Assessment in Alberta has identified a number of improvements 
that might be made to the regulatory scheme for CCS projects in Alberta.
49 RSA 2000, c. E-12.
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6 Liability issues
The liability issues associated with CCS activities include: (1) potential tort liability in the event 
that the project causes harm to some person or persons, (2) statutory liability with respect to 
abandonment and re-abandonment obligations and any necessary remedial operations, (3) liability 
for ongoing monitoring of the site and the injected CO2, and (4) potential accounting liability for any 
emissions of CO2 from the project site. 
In discussing CCS liability issues it is conventional to distinguish between: (1) the liability for CCS 
activities during the operational phase and for at least some period after active injection has ceased, 
and (2) liability for the post-closure period. It is commonly accepted both in the literature and in 
practice that during the operational phase liability should always rest, and for all purposes, with the 
project operator or licensee. The principal issue discussed in the literature is whether, and if so under 
what circumstances, there should be a transfer of liability to the government. And if there is to be a 
transfer it will be important to identify: (1) the trigger for any transfer, (2) the liabilities that are being 
transferred, and (3) the legal means for effecting any transfer.
The Government of Alberta introduced a special liability regime for CCS operations in the 2010 
amendments that added Part 9 to the Mines and Minerals Act. In particular, the amendments provided 
for a transfer of liability to the Crown upon issuance of a closure certificate, and also provided for the 
creation of the Post-Closure Stewardship Fund.
6.1 Liability prior to the issuance of a closure certificate
Prior to the issuance of a closure certificate, the project licensee will be responsible for the first three 
categories of liability identified above. That liability extends to those parties who hold a working 
interest in the project.50 I will deal with accounting liability under the heading of crediting (Part 7) 
below. In the event that the project licensee and its working interest participants default on their 
statutory duties to pay for any abandonment and reclamation costs that accrue prior to issuance of 
the closure certificate,51 these costs may (notwithstanding the name of the Fund), be covered by the 
Post-closure Stewardship Fund.52
6.2 The Crown’s assumption of liability
Section 121 of the Mines and Minerals Act provides that the Crown assumes certain liabilities for the 
CCS project upon the issuance of closure certificate. More specifically, the Crown
(a)  becomes the owner of the captured carbon dioxide injected pursuant to the agreement,
(b)  assumes all obligations of the lessee
(i)  as owner and licensee under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act of the wells and facilities 
covered by that agreement,
50 OGCA, s. 29.
51 Such wells and facilities are then treated as “orphans”.
52 MMA, s.122(2)(c) and s.123. This is the only form of liability for which the Fund has any responsibility prior to the issuance of 
a closure certificate.
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(ii)  as the person responsible for the injected captured carbon dioxide under the 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, 
(iii)  as the operator under Part 6 of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act in 
respect of the land within the location of the agreement used by the lessee in relation to 
the injection of captured carbon dioxide, and
(iv)  under the Surface Rights Act,
 and
(c)  releases the lessee from any obligations under section 56(2)(a) with respect to the wells 
within the location of the agreement used by the lessee in relation to the injection of 
captured carbon dioxide.
I will discuss each of these paragraphs in turn. Paragraph (a) deals with ownership of the CO2. It is 
not itself concerned with liability but to the extent that liability turns on ownership (tort liability, 
the subject of the indemnity discussed below, ordinarily turns on control rather than ownership) any 
such liability will pass to the Crown. This provision appears to have been included out of an abundance 
of caution.
Item (i) of paragraph (b) deals with all of the obligations of a licensee under the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act. These include obligations for re-abandoning a well or for taking any other necessary remedial 
activities in relation to any wells or facilities. The 2010 amendments also amended the OGCA in order 
to give effect to this assumption of liability. The new section 23.1 of the OGCA effectively novates the 
Crown into the position of licensee in the Board’s records and relieves the lessee of any responsibility 
that it might have had. It seems reasonable to think that the obligations of the licensee that the Crown 
assumes would include any ongoing MMV obligations imposed on the licensee.53
Item (ii) and (iii) of paragraph (b) achieves the same result in relation to the statutory obligations 
that the lessee might have as “a person responsible” or as an “operator” under the Environmental 
Protection and Enhancement Act.54 The liabilities associated with item (ii) are any potential liabilities 
associated with a “release”, whereas the liabilities associated with item (iii) and Part 6 of EPEA are 
surface reclamation activities associated with wells and facilities.
Items (iii) of paragraph (b) deals with any liabilities that the lessee may have under the Surface Rights 
Act.55 Thus, to the extent that a right of entry order is still in place in order to accommodate ongoing MMV 
operations, then any obligations of the lessee under the right of entry order will be assumed by the Crown.
Paragraph (c) also seems to be included out of an abundance of caution since it deals with a 
situation in which a party is relying on section 56 of the Mines and Minerals Act rather than its lease.56 
In any event, the new paragraph effectively reverses the licensee’s indemnification obligation under 
section 56(2).
53 Note in this context that section 122(2)(a) of the MMA provides that the Post-closure Stewardship Fund may be used inter alia 
“for the purposes of monitoring the behaviour of captured carbon dioxide that has been injected pursuant to an agreement 
under this Part”.
54 RSA 2000, c.E-12.
55 RSA 2000, c.S-24. The 2010 amendments also amended the SRA to make it clear that the Surface Rights Board could issue 
a right of entry order to accommodate a CO2 injection well and any MMV activities required by Part 9 of the MMA. See now 
section 13.2 of the SRA.
56 It is possible that the Crown takes the view that section 56 applies even if there is no sequestration lease or permit. Certainly, 
the section is capable of that interpretation although the section was first included in the MMA before the MMA was amended 
to include the sequestration tenures provided by Part 9.
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In addition to the assumption of liability, the Crown also undertakes (section 121(2)) to indemnify the 
lessee against any liability for damages in an action in tort brought by a party if:
(a) the liability is attributable to an act done or omitted to be done by the lessee in the lessee’s 
exercise of rights under the agreement in relation to the injection of captured carbon dioxide, 
and
(b) any other conditions specified in the regulations are met [no relevant conditions prescribed 
as yet]
It will be observed that the assumption of liability and the indemnity arrangement effectively 
cover off the first three of the categories of liability identified in the introduction to this section. 
These sections do not provide that the Crown will assume any liability for project emissions 
that may trigger an accounting liability under federal or provincial greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction legislation.
6.3 The Post-closure Stewardship Fund
The Crown’s assumption of liability upon the issuance of a closure certificate and its liability for 
orphan facilities is not entirely unfunded since the 2010 amendments also provided for the creation 
of the Post-closure Stewardship Fund. The Fund may be used for the following purposes:
(a)  for the purposes of monitoring the behaviour of captured carbon dioxide that has been 
injected pursuant to an agreement under this Part;
(b)  for the purposes of fulfilling any obligations that are assumed by the Crown pursuant to 
section 121(1)(b);
(c)  for the purposes of paying for suspension costs, abandonment costs and related reclamation 
or remediation costs in respect of orphan facilities ….
(e)  for any other purpose prescribed in the regulations.
It is important emphasise what the Fund may not be used for. Note in particular that the scope 
of responsibilities of the Fund does not cover all of the matters for which the Crown has assumed 
responsibility. Specifically, the Fund may not be used to cover any liability that the Crown may have 
as a result of becoming the owner of any injected CO2 (section 121(1)), or any liability that the Crown 
may have under section 121(2) with respect to its statutory undertaking to indemnify the lessee. 
Furthermore, since the Crown’s assumption of liability under section 121 does not extend to any 
greenhouse gas accounting liability the Fund may not be used for that purpose either. As noted above 
however the Fund may be used, even pre-closure, to cover off any responsibilities for orphan wells 
and facilities (i.e. facilities for which the licensee and its working interest partners are in default).
Lessees are obliged to contribute to the Fund (section 122(3)) “in accordance with the regulations”. 
At present the regulations have simply deferred the matter since section 20 provides only that:
A lessee shall pay into the Postclosure Stewardship Fund a fee per tonne of captured carbon 
dioxide injected into the location of a carbon sequestration lease at the rate established by 
the Minister.
So far as I am aware the Minister has yet to establish the fee.
APPENDIx B 315
6.4 Conclusions on the liability issues
(1) Prior to the issuance of a closure certificate all liabilities (with the possible exception of 
emissions accounting liabilities) will rest with the lessee/operator/licensee and its working 
interest partners. In default of that liability the facilities may be declared to be orphaned and 
any abandonment and reclamation costs may be covered by the Fund.
(2) Upon the issuance of closure certificate the Crown assumes the statutory liabilities of the 
lessee/operator/licensee and also agrees to indemnify the lessee from relevant tort liabilities. In 
part this assumption of liability is effected by the Crown becoming the licensee of any wells and 
facilities under the terms of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act.
(3) Continuing MMV obligations will be assumed by the Crown either by the assumption of 
responsibilities under the OGCA licences or by the provision in section 122(2)(a) which allows 
disbursements from the Fund to cover ongoing MMV activities.
(4) The Fund is financed by lessees. The Fund may be used for MMV purposes and for reclamation, 
re-abandonment and any necessary remedial activities. It may not be used to cover any liability 
that the Crown may have under its general indemnity of the lessee and it may be not be used to 
pay for any emissions accounting liability.
7 Carbon crediting issues
CCS projects are designed to provide net carbon emission reductions over a business as usual 
operation. As such, the operator of a CCS project will expect to obtain credits in some way, shape 
or form which it can use either to meet its own emissions obligations (in the case of an integrated 
capture/transport/storage project) or to sell to others to allow them to meet their obligations whether 
in the form of emissions performance credits (i.e. an avoided emission) or in the form of offset credits.
7.1 The Specified Gas Emitters Regulation 
Alberta’s carbon crediting regime is based on the Climate Change and Emissions Management 
Act (CCEMA)57 first enacted in 2003 and amended in 2007.58 Key elements of that regime are the 
Specified Gas Reporting Regulation (SGRR),59 the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER)60 and the 
Specified Gas Reporting Standard.61 The SGERs were amended in 2011 to specifically address crediting 
issues associated with geological sequestration.62 
57 SA 2003, c. C-16.7.
58 SA 2007, c. 4.
59 Alta. Reg. 251/2004.
60 Alta. Reg. 139/2007. 
61 Alberta Environment, Specified Gas Reporting Standard, March 2007 <www3.gov.ab.ca/env/air/pubs/ghg_specified_gas_
reporting_standard.pdf>.
62 Alta. Reg. 127/2011.
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The SGERs require that covered facilities (or more specifically the “person(s) responsible” for a 
covered facility) must achieve (section 6) the emissions intensity targets specified by the regulations. 
A covered facility is a facility (section 2) that has “direct emissions” of 100,000 tonnes or more 
of specified gases (i.e. greenhouse gases or GHGs) in 2003 or any subsequent year. The SGERs 
contemplate that a person responsible may meet its obligations in a number of different ways. 
It may do so by actually achieving the reduction at the specific facility; it may do so by 
acquiring allowable emissions offsets; it may do so by payments into the Climate Change and 
Emissions Management Fund (the Fund) (currently set at $15 per tonne); or it may do so by applying 
to the facility any emissions performance credits that it has acquired or accumulated (section 4(3)).63 
An allowable emissions offset is a project-based reduction in GHG emissions (over a business as usual 
baseline) that is obtained in relation to an activity that does not have its own emission reduction 
commitment under the regulations (i.e it is not a covered facility). Emissions offsets are dealt with 
in detail in section 7 of the regulations. This section of the regulations was amended in 2011 to 
specifically address geological sequestration offsets. The amendment also changed the definition of 
offsets. The definition of “emissions offsets” now reads as follows:
(i)  a reduction in the release of specified gases, expressed in tonnes on a CO2e basis, that meets 
the requirements of section 7(1), but does not include an emission performance credit,
(ii) a geological sequestration of specified gases, expressed in tonnes on a CO2e basis, that meets 
the requirements of section 7(1.1), and
(iii)  a capture of specified gases that are geologically sequestered that meets the requirements of 
section 7(1.2); (emphasis added)
There are thus three categories of offsets: (1) reduction offsets, (2) geological sequestration offsets, 
and (3) upgrader capture + geological sequestration offsets.
Section 7(1) lays out the general requirements that must be met before a reduction in GHGs may 
count as an offset:
(a)  the specified gas emissions reduction must occur in Alberta;
(b) the specified gas emissions reduction must be from an action taken that is not otherwise 
required by law at the time the action is initiated;
(c)  the specified gas emissions reduction must
(i)  result from actions taken on or after January 1, 2002, and
(ii)  occur on or after January 1, 2002;
(d)  the specified gas emissions reduction must be real and demonstrable;
(e)  the specified gas emissions reduction must be quantifiable and measurable, directly or by 
accurate estimation using replicable techniques.
Section 7(2) imposes some fairly straightforward restrictions on the use of all three forms of 
emission offsets. Thus an offset can only be used once and its use must accord with any Ministerial 
Guidelines issued under the Act and the emissions offset must be “held” by the person responsible 
using it and where such an offset is jointly held each holder may only use “a portion of the offset on 
a pro rata basis”. 
63 An emissions performance credit (EPC) arises when a covered emitter beats its target.
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More detailed additional guidance is provided for offset projects. This takes the form of two general 
guidance documents the Technical Guidance for Offset Protocol Developers64 and the Technical 
Guidance for Offset Credit Project Developers,65 as well as detailed Quantification Protocols (QPs). 
Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development (AESRD, formerly Alberta Environment) 
has sanctioned more than 30 Quantification Protocols66 including two Quantification Protocols 
for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR),67 and a Quantification Protocol for Acid Gas Injection (AGI).68 
Both of the EOR QPs are “asterisked” indicating that they are under review to address “known risks”. 
Projects may still be accepted for offset purposes on a case-by-case basis with the approval of 
AESRD. The QP for AGI has now been withdrawn on the basis that acid gas injection is now the 
business as usual approach for dealing with acid gases recovered as part of natural gas processing. 
Accordingly AGI for these purposes fails the additionality test for generating offset credits. 
A QP for the Capture of CO2 and Storage in Deep Saline Aquifers is still under development.
69 
Offset credits cannot be generated for an activity that does not have a government approved 
quantification protocol.70 
Projects under the Alberta system have a credit duration period of 8 years with a possible extension 
for five years.71 Biosequestration activities may have a longer credit duration period.72 The offset 
scheme is said to be based on eleven key principles: (1) reduce provincial emissions, (real, quantifiable 
and verifiable) (2) produce net benefits that would not otherwise have occurred, (3) support 
incremental change technologies, (4) balance conservativeness and accuracy, (5) develop protocols 
to credit actions that can be implemented in Alberta, (6) verifiable, (7) transparent and accountable, 
(8) no leakage from any shift in emissions, (9) maximum scope, (10) “building and linking” (i.e. linking 
to existing programs and trading systems), and (11) reasonable program administration.73
The principal aim of the Technical Guidance documents and the Protocols is to ensure that credit 
is only claimed for reductions that would not otherwise occur (i.e. that go beyond business as 
usual or establish additionality) and that credit is only claimed for net emission reductions.74 
Protocols may be reviewed from time to time and withdrawn if it is concluded that an activity that 
previously qualified for offset credits now represents business as usual for the sector.75 An activity 
64 Version 1.0, January 2011. 
65 Technical Guidance for Offset Project Developers, v.4.0 (February 2013). Both guidance documents are available here: 
<www.carbonoffsetsolutions.climatechangecentral.com/offset-protocols/approved-alberta-protocols>. 
66 The Protocols are posted on AESRD’s website at http://environment.alberta.ca/02275.html and on the Alberta Offsets Registry 
website at <www.carbonoffsetsolutions.climatechangecentral.com/offset-protocols/approved-alberta-protocols>.
67 There is both a long version: <www.environment.alberta.ca/documents/EOR_Protocol_V1_Oct_07.pdf> (October 2007, version 1) 
and a “streamlined” version: <www.environment.alberta.ca/documents/EOR_Protocol_-_Streamlined_V1_Oct_07.pdf>.
68 Quantification Protocol for Acid Gas Injection, May 2008, <www.environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7961.pdf>.
69 See DRAFT, Quantification Protocol for the Capture of CO2 and Storage in Deep Saline Aquifers, December 2011, available at: 
<www.carbonoffsetsolutions.climatechangecentral.com/files/microsites/OffsetProtocols/DraftProtocolsDocs/col_Draft_
PUBLIC_COMMENT_Version__Dec9_2011__0.pdf>.
70 Technical Guidance for Offset Protocol Developers, at 12, note 1.
71 Technical Guidance for Offset Protocol Developers, at 17. An emissions performance credit can be earned at a regulated facility 
for so long as emissions are reduced and the facility beats its own emissions intensity target.
72 Id., at 17.
73 Technical Guidance for Offset Protocol Developers, at 10.
74 On the additionality tests for Alberta see Technical Guidance for Offset Protocol Developers at 22 – 23.
75 Technical Guidance for Offset Project Developers at 33. An example is the AGI Protocol.
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that is required by law (federal, provincial, municipal) is not additional.76 Once a Protocol has been 
approved then “all projects implemented under that protocol … will be considered additional until 
such time as the protocol is reviewed and/or the credit duration lapses.”77
The Alberta system is an “ex post” verification system.78 The project proponent creates the offsets 
by developing a project using an approved protocol which produces reduced net emissions over 
some business as usual baseline. This results in a Greenhouse Gas Assertion i.e. a statement of the 
total tonnes of GHG emission reductions or removals that are being claimed as offset credits.79 
The assertion is then verified by an independent third party according (effective 2012) to a reasonable 
level assurance standard.80 The Technical Guidance for Offset Project Developers provides further 
details as to the third party verification measures including the required qualifications for third party 
verifiers and the verification standards and materiality requirements (errors over 5% are considered 
material).81 The resulting Verification Report should follow a standard template.82 
Offsets once created must be registered with the Alberta Offsets Registry before they may be used for 
compliance purposes. Once registered, the Offset Credits will be serialized and a person responsible 
for a covered facility may use the Credit to meet its obligation by notifying the Register and requesting 
that the purchased offsets be retired.83 
The person responsible for a facility must file an annual compliance report which must be verified by 
a third party auditor (SGER, section 11). Compliance reports are subject to further government audit 
which will extend to the project developers and regulated facilities that submitted the offset credits 
for compliance.84
In order to qualify for geological sequestration offset credits (section 7(1.1) the following rules apply:
(a)  the specified gas that is geologically sequestered must be captured through a dedicated 
process from sources located at a facility in Alberta;
(b)  the specified gas must be stored in a geological formation that is located wholly or partly  
in Alberta;
(c)  the geological sequestration of the specified gas must not be required by law at the time 
geological sequestration of specified gas is initiated;
(d)  the construction of the infrastructure used to geologically sequester the specified gas must 
have been initiated on or after January 1, 2002;
(e)  the geological sequestration of the specified gas must occur after January 1, 2002;
(f)  the quantity of specified gas that is geologically sequestered must be quantifiable and 
measurable, directly or by accurate estimation using replicable techniques.
A geological sequestration of one tonne of specified gas constitutes one emission offset (section 7(1.5)).
76 See Technical Guidance for Offset Protocol Developers at 16.
77 Id at 24. As the document acknowledges “Alberta assesses additionality during protocol development.”
78 Technical Guidance for Offset Project Developers, at 45.
79 Id., at 37.
80 Id.
81 Id., at 46 – 52.
82 Id., at 55.
83 Id., at 66.
84 Id., at 60.
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In order to qualify for the upgrader capture + sequestration offset credits (ie section 7(1.2) the 
captured gas must be sequestered as provided for in section 7(1.1) above but must also meet some 
additional terms and conditions. In particular, the specified gas must be captured through a dedicated 
process from sources located at a facility upgrading or refining bitumen in Alberta; capture before 
December 31, 2017; the project must be capable of capturing and storing at least 1 000 000 tonnes of 
specified gas per year, and at least 51% of the captured gas must be stored under the terms of a pore 
space tenure agreement under the MMA. This latter condition means that these particular volumes 
could not be used for CO2-EOR purposes.
The formula for determining the quantity of emissions offsets constituted by upgrader capture 
+ sequestration activities is prescribed by section 7(1.6) of the Regulations. This provision 
contemplates that for so long as the Fund Credit amount is set at less than $40 per tonne 
(currently $15 per tonne) at the time that the gas is captured then the credits generated shall equal the 
emission offsets constituted by the geological sequestration of the specified gas under section 7(1.1). 
However, where the Fund Credit exceeds $40, the capture activity generates a declining portion of an 
emissions offset until the Fund Credit reaches $80 at which point the offset credit generated by the 
capture activity declines to zero. The sequestration activity will however continue to generate a full 
emissions offset.
The goal of these two new subsections 7.1 and 7.2 is therefore to credit both the capture activity 
and the sequestration activity (provided that capture does lead to sequestration) but only where the 
capture activity occurs at an upgrader. The amount of credit (offsets) accorded to the capture activity 
will decline as the Fund Credit prices rises. Where the capture activity occurs at another facility such 
as a coal-fired generating plant, then the overall activity (capture plus sequestration) will only earn 
geological sequestration offsets. 
As noted in the previous section, offset credits can now only be generated using an approved Protocol. 
There is no approved Protocol for CCS activities although there is DRAFT Quantification Protocol for 
the Capture of CO2 and Storage in Deep Saline Aquifers which was circulated for public comment in 
December 2011. The next section discusses some elements of that Draft Protocol.
7.2 The DRAFT Quantification Protocol for the Capture of CO2 
and Storage in Deep Saline Aquifers
Alberta Environment (now Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development (AESRD)) 
has published a Draft Quantification Protocol for the Capture of CO2 and Storage in Deep Saline 
Aquifers.85 This draft is current as of December 2011. AESRD expects the protocol to undergo a final 
public comment period in 2013, and to be released as a government-approved protocol shortly 
thereafter. This section of the report discusses some of the key elements of the Protocol under 
the following headings: (1) determination of project boundaries, (2) the concept of additionality, 
(3) description of calculation methods, (4) the energy penalty, (5) fugitive emissions, monitoring 
verification and accounting, and (6) duration of crediting.
85 Available here: <www.carbonoffsetsolutions.climatechangecentral.com/offset-protocols/draft-alberta-protocols-currently-
under-public-review> The material in this section was largely drafted by Elizabeth Brennan.
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Determination of project boundaries
The purpose of the Draft Quantification Protocol for the Capture of CO2 and Storage in Deep 
Saline Aquifers (hereafter referred to as “the Saline CCS Protocol”) is to quantify emissions associated 
with the “direct disposal of CO2 from a previous source of emissions into deep saline aquifers” 
(page 1). The protocol covers carbon capture activities, compression, transportation, injection, and 
storage. It distinguishes between the carbon capture facility or infrastructure, and the industrial 
facility that operates a primary process, to which the capture technology is attached. This distinction 
has an impact on the way in which the energy penalty is handled (see Energy Penalty section below). 
The methodology is not limited to particular technologies but it clearly has specific technologies in 
mind, in particular steam methane reforming for hydrogen production. The capture technology is 
comprised of a chemical solvent, typically an amine solvent and may include solvent regeneration 
units, including the stripping column, solvent filtration, solvent storage, and a CO2 vent stack; 
CO2 compression, possibly including a multi-stage compressor; and CO2 dehydration, possibly 
including a triethylene glycol absorber and regeneration unit. The explicit description of the technology 
in section 1.0, and in more detail in section 3.0, provides a very clear explanation of the intent of the 
protocol without being entirely prescriptive.
Determination of project baselines
The Saline CCS Protocol “uses a projection-based baseline condition” (page 7), indicating that 
emissions reduced are relative to the emissions that the primary industrial process would have 
produced without the carbon capture activities. “The baseline emissions are quantified from the 
metered quantity of CO2 that is injected and stored into the deep saline aquifer for the permanent 
storage in the project condition” (page 7). This means that emissions from the primary industrial 
process that are not sequestered permanently are considered to have been part of the baseline. 
This includes all venting events, fugitive emissions, or losses upstream of where the CO2 is metered 
and injected into the ground. 
The Saline CCS Protocol identifies sources and sinks of emissions, based on guidance from 
ISO 14064-2, Alberta Environment, and Environment Canada. The Protocol deems sources and sinks 
to be controlled (under the influence of the project developer), related (when material or energy 
flows are within the project boundaries but “not under the reasonable control of the developer”), 
or affected (influenced by the project activity). Sources and sinks are described in tabular form, and 
also categorized into upstream, on-site, and downstream, occurring before, during and after each the 
baseline and the project. As in the EOR protocol, the Saline CCS Protocol uses the terms “upstream” 
and “downstream” in a narrower sense than does the LCA literature; in the literature, upstream 
project emissions begin with materials used in CO2 Capture Process. The supporting tables explaining 
the sources and sinks justify the exclusions of particular emissions sources from the quantification 
methodology (Table 5, page 18). 
The Saline CCS Protocol describes all of the “baseline” and “project” sources and sinks within 
section 3.1 (Identification of Project Sources and Sinks), and provides a process flow diagram 
for the project conditions. Section 4.0 (Quantification) provides a table of identified sources 
and sinks and a justification for including or excluding them. Sources are excluded if they are a 
“one-time only source of greenhouse gas emission that is negligible compared to the expected size 
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and lifetime of the project”, or if the source is upstream of the point of metering. For example, fugitive 
emissions at the capture site are upstream of the meter recording the amount of injected CO2, therefore, 
those fugitive emissions are deemed “equivalent to emissions that would have occurred in the baseline 
and can be excluded from quantification” (page 22). This approach has been chosen over the indirect 
calculation of some small (fugitive and vented) sources of emissions, and does not compromise accuracy. 
The concept of additionality
The concept of additionality is not explicitly addressed within the CCS Protocol, but, as discussed 
above, is dealt with under project eligibility requirements for the Alberta Offset System. As a protocol 
is being developed, additionality requirements must be met. Therefore, once a government approved 
protocol is in place, the project is considered to be additional until the project seeks renewal.
Description of calculation methods
The quantification methodology presented in the Saline CCS Protocol takes the same general 
approach as the McCormick (2012) protocol. Emissions reductions are the difference between 
the Project Emissions and the Baseline Emissions, where the Project emissions are the sum of the 
emissions under the project condition, and the Baseline emissions are the sum of the emissions under 
the baseline condition (pp. 25). The un-captured emissions from the industrial facility are considered 
to be the emissions under the baseline condition; this is consistent with the projection-based baseline 
approach as described above. The sum of the emissions under the project condition considers 
multiple sources or sinks: the production and delivery of material inputs (for the carbon capture and 
storage facility); fuel extraction and processing of fuels used for heat or power generation; electricity 
consumption; off-site heat and power generation; on-site heat and power generation; carbon capture 
and storage facility operation; venting CO2 at injection well sites; fugitive emissions from injection at 
well sites; emissions from the subsurface to the atmosphere; and emissions from the loss, disposal, 
or recycling of material inputs. For each of the sources or sinks, the Saline CCS Protocol provides, 
 in tabular form, relevant parameters related to that source/sink, the units the parameter is expressed 
in, whether the parameter is measured or estimated, the frequency of measurement, methods, 
and explanatory notes (Table 7; pp. 27–45).
The project sources of emissions include emissions resulting from the combustion of fuels. 
Such emissions are considered to be comprised of CO2,t methane, and nitrous oxide and converted to 
CO2 equivalents (CO2e) by multiplying the quantity of that emission by its global warming potential 
(21 and 310, respectively). This is consistent with the methodology presented by McCormick (2012). 
Energy penalty incurred by CO2 capture
The saline CCS Protocol accounts for the energy penalty incurred by the primary process by 
including the additional materials and energy needed for the capture of waste gases from the 
primary process in the list of project condition sources and sinks. The project condition sources and 
sinks include “Construction of Carbon Capture and Storage Facilities, Production and Delivery of 
Material Inputs used in CO2 Capture Process, Generation of Electricity for use by Carbon Capture and 
Storage Facilities, and Carbon capture and Storage Facility Operation” (Table 5, pp. 18–19). This approach 
is consistent with the use of a projection-based baseline methodology. 
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Fugitive emissions from storage reservoir
The Saline CCS Protocol addresses the permanence of geologic storage in Section 3.0 
(Project Condition) noting that “with appropriate site selection, good operating practices and various 
monitoring activities, it is anticipated that there will be no CO2 emissions from the subsurface to the 
atmosphere” (pp. 13). In doing so the protocol assumes that site selection has been comprehensively 
examined by the provincial regulator, the Energy Resources Conservation Board. The Saline CCS 
protocol deals extensively with project monitoring, and monitoring, measurement and verification 
activities, which are addressed below.
Monitoring, verification, and accounting activities
The Saline CCS Protocol addresses all manner of monitoring activities in Section 5.0 (Data Management). 
Section 5 distinguishes between “project monitoring” activities that occur during the project to quantify 
greenhouse gas reductions, and “monitoring, measurement and verification” (MMV) plans that are 
intended to ensure the safe and permanent geologic storage of CO2 in accordance with operating license 
conditions. MMV plans are equivalent to the MVA plans discussed in the literature, or in other protocols, 
except that the Saline CCS Protocol includes “accounting” activities as “project monitoring” activities. 
The Saline CCS Protocol covers “Project Monitoring” Requirements in section 5.1.1. This section 
indicates that project monitoring activities should be consistent with “the ISO 14064-2 principles of 
transparency and accuracy such that the data capture is sufficient to ensure that the quantification 
and documentation of greenhouse gas reductions is verifiable and replicable” (pp. 46). This section 
describes the minimum monitoring requirements for the Saline CCS Protocol quantification 
methodology. These include four specific locations in the project flow diagram at which mass balance 
calculations must be undertaken. A further table provides additional guidance. The guidance contained 
within this section is sufficiently explicit to enable the development of robust MMV protocols for 
saline CCS projects.
Section 5.1.2 addresses “Measurement, Monitoring and Verification of Containment” plans and 
methodologies (pp. 50). A Saline CCS Project must obtain a Carbon Sequestration Lease pursuant to 
the Carbon Sequestration Tenure Regulation, under the Mines and Minerals Act, and those regulations 
require a Carbon Sequestration Lessee to prepare a MMV plan. “Each carbon capture and storage 
project would undertake various monitoring activities to ensure the safe and permanent storage of 
CO2 in accordance with its operating license requirements based on the characteristics of the deep 
saline aquifer” (pp. 50). This section of the Saline CCS Protocol explains requirements for MMV 
plans by reference to other regulations and ERCB directives;86 the project proponent must adhere 
to the most recent version of all regulations. The proponent must also show that the MMV plan 
demonstrates the permanence of geologic storage, and that the plan has been updated to comply 
with any regulatory changes that have been established since project commissioning. 
86 Including ERCB Directive 007, Directive 017, Directive 020, Directive 051, and Directive 065.
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MMV activities are described over four life cycle phases of the CCS project, including Pre-Injection, 
Injection, Closure, and Post-Closure. The MMV activities will result in the collection of some baseline 
monitoring data, as well as data collected through the injection and closure phases of the project. 
The MMV plan should be updated to reflect information gained in the Pre-Injection and Injection 
phases of the project and the site-specific experience gained during those phases. “The overall goal 
of the [MMV] program is to demonstrate the permanent containment of the CO2 in the subsurface, 
and that there is no release of CO2 to the atmosphere” (pp. 52). 
Duration of crediting
The Saline CCS Protocol does not specify the duration of the credits for CCS activities. The current 
rules allow offset projects to earn credits for up to eight years, with five-year extensions. AESRD 
may approve a longer crediting period on a project-by project basis. It is our understanding that the 
Government of Alberta has agreed to provide Shell’s Quest project with an initial crediting period 
of 25 years.
7.3 Conclusions with respect to crediting issues
(1) An operator of a CCS project may earn credits for carbon that is captured and sequestered. 
Captured CO2 is not treated as an avoided emission. Instead a CCS project creates credits to the 
extent that project qualifies under the applicable Protocol. A Quantification Protocol is available 
in draft and the government expects to finalize it in 2013. 
(2) A small subset of CCS projects (those involving upgraders) are eligible to earn double 
offset credits.
(3) Most offset projects can only earn credits for an eight year period after which they must be 
re-qualified. The principal reason for such a requirement is to ensure that the projects continue 
to meet the relevant additionality tests (i.e. to ensure that the application of the technology has 
not become “business as usual” in the sector.
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Appendix I Carbon Dioxide Disposal,  
Approval No. 11837 [Quest Project] 
The Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), pursuant to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 
chapter O-6 of the Revised Statutes of Alberta, 2000, orders as follows:
1) The Class III scheme of Shell Canada Limited (Approval Holder) in the Radway Field and 
surrounding areas (approval area) shown in Appendix A, for the disposal and sequestration of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) into the Basal Cambrian Sand Formation (BCS) as described in
a) Application No. 1670112, is approved, subject to the terms and conditions herein contained.
2) For the purposes of this approval, the injection fluid will contain a minimum of 95 per cent CO2 
by volume, at any time.
3) (1) The Approval Holder may commence or continue injection and disposal of CO2 for the wells 
listed in this clause 3)(1) a) when the commitments of the current Measurement, Monitoring, 
and Verification (MMV) Plan for these wells are met, substantially in accordance with the 
scheme.
a) 00/08-19-059-20W4/0
(2) The undrilled well(s), referred to in clause 3)(2) a), may be eligible for approval to commence 
injection once an application that includes at a minimum the Directive 065 requirements 
described in clause 4), and once the Directive 051 requirements have been submitted and 
approved.
a) 07-11-059-20W4
 15-01-059-21W4
 05-35-059-21W4
 10-06-060-20W4
 12-14-060-21W4
 15-16-060-21W4
 15-29-060-21W4
4) The minimum Directive 065 application requirements for undrilled wells listed in clause 3)(2) a) 
must include:
a) geological interpretation of the BCS CO2 disposal formation in the well(s), including:
i) updated BCS gross sand thickness isopach map over the approval area
ii)  updated BCS storage capacity map over the approval area
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iii)  updated interpreted and annotated log cross-section showing:
a. stratigraphic interpretation of the zone(s) of interest,
b. completions/treatments to the wellbore(s), with dates,
c. finished drilling date and Kelly bushing (KB) elevation and the scale of the 
log readings, and
d.  tabulation of the interpreted net reservoir thickness, permeability and porosity for 
the well(s),
b) geological interpretation of the bounding formations, extending from the Precambrian to 
top of the Upper Lotsberg Salt, based on all information from the new well(s) including:
i) continuity and thickness of base and caprock (include all seals and baffles in the 
bounding formations),
ii) updated thickness and extent map of the Middle Cambrian Shale (MCS) over the 
approval area,
iii) updated thickness and extent maps of the Upper and Lower Lotsberg Salts in the 
approval area,
iv) lithology,
v) integrity of the base and caprock, and
vi) if fracturing is evident, explanation of how containment can be assured
c) bottomhole injection pressure, maximum sandface pressure, fracture propagation pressure, 
and formation fracture pressure for each of the well(s) in clause 3)(2) a).
d) BCS stabilized shut-in reservoir pressures in accordance with Directive 040 requirements 
at the injection well(s) referred to in clause 3)(2) a), accompanied by pressure transient 
analyses (PTA), which may provide indication of fracture flow,
e) address the need to rerun the CO2 plume and pressure front models after each well is 
drilled, and
f) evidence that the current MMV Plan commitments have been met.
5) The Approval Holder must conduct the CO2 injection only through the well(s) referred to in 
clause 3)(1) a) in accordance with the following requirements and those of Table 1:
a) the BCS Formation stabilized shut-in reservoir pressure in each injection well listed in 
clause 3)(1) a) must not exceed 26 000 kilopascals (gauge),
b) the Approval Holder must obtain stabilized shut-in reservoir pressures in accordance with 
Directive 040 requirements after 2 years of injection at the well(s) referred to in clause 3)(1) a). 
Based on the results, additional tests may be required in order to better understand the 
plume movement,
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c) a hydraulic isolation log must be run on the injection well(s) and deep monitoring wells in 
accordance with Directive 051 after two years of injection. The need for further hydraulic 
isolation logging over the life of the injection well(s) will be determined through the annual 
reporting and presentation process,
d) the cumulative injection volume for all approved scheme wells must not exceed 14 500 million 
cubic metres of CO2 at standard conditions (15°C, 101.325 kPa), which is an equivalent mass of 
27 million tonnes.
e) no waste or other materials may be added to the injectant. The injectant must contain no 
less than 95 per cent of CO2 by volume. The composition of the injection stream must be 
monitored by taking a representative sample of the injectant on a monthly basis,
f) continuously monitor the pressures of the tubing/casing annulus for the injection well(s), 
conduct annual packer isolation tests, which must be submitted electronically to the ERCB 
in accordance with the current MMV Plan, implement appropriate corrosion protection, and 
install and test the wellhead emergency shutdown valves prior to commencement of the 
CO2 injection to ensure their proper operation. If a leak, or potential leak, is detected in the 
tubing/casing annulus or packer in the injection well(s), the Operator must immediately 
inform WellOperations@ercb.ca,
g) immediately suspend injection operations if the injection facilitates the movement of fluids 
into any zone above the base of groundwater protection or any zone other than the BCS, 
and immediately inform WellOperations@ercb.ca,
h) immediately suspend injection operations if any injection equipment, monitoring equipment, 
or safety devices fail that could compromise the safe operation of the scheme,
i) immediately report any loss of containment, anomalies that indicate fracturing out of zone, 
or anomalous pressure changes occurring anywhere within the CO2 disposal approval area 
to ResourceCompliance@ercb.ca and WellOperations@ercb.ca,
j) apply to remove the injection well from the list in clause 3)(1) a), before abandoning any 
well in the disposal project,
k) apply for and receive approval of its abandonment plan from the Well Operations Section, 
before abandoning any well in the disposal project, and
l) continue to monitor the injection and observation wells in accordance with the current 
MMV Plan, until the CO2 disposal scheme is transferred to the Government of Alberta or 
when the subject approval is rescinded.
6) The Approval Holder must provide a written incident report within 90 days to 
ResourceCompliance@ercb.ca and WellOperations@ercb.ca for an event that raises any 
immediate risk to public safety or environment including
a) any anomalies that indicate fracturing out of zone,
b) any indications of loss of containment,
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c) unexpected surface heave, and
d) appropriate mitigative measures taken.
 If monitoring shows loss of containment or unexpected surface heave the approval holder is 
required to conduct and submit results of more comprehensive project modeling using site 
specific parameters to re-evaluate the issue of deformations caused by pressure changes.
7) The Approval Holder is required to submit MMV plan updates as required by the ERCB; at a 
minimum updates are required at the critical milestones for commencement of injection, 
closure and post closure.
8) The Approval Holder must provide a complete pre baseline MMV plan by September 30, 2012, 
which includes a full set of baseline measurements to be taken during the pre-injection period 
and submitted to ResourceCompliance@ercb.ca.
9) The Approval Holder must provide a special report by September 30, 2012, which includes 
the following;
a) a phased assessment of natural variability of the geochemistry of the water in the domestic 
water wells included in its baseline study, including the need for more frequent sampling 
during both the baseline data collection and early operational monitoring periods,
b) explanation of method for determining statistical significance of number of landowner 
water wells included in baseline data collection and analysis,
c) potential need for downhole microseismic arrays in other deep monitoring wells, 
d) geomechanical testing of primary seal (MCS),
e) InSAR results to date and need for corner reflectors. If corner reflectors are deemed 
necessary the Approval Holder will be required to install the reflectors near each injection 
site at least 15 months prior to injection,
f) update on technologies to be used for monitoring changes in vegetation health due to 
surface leaks, and
g) evaluation and analysis of the need to add another deep monitoring well completed in the 
Winnipegosis formation at either the 15-16-060-21W4M or 15-29-060-21W4M locations.
 The report must be submitted to ResourceCompliance@ercb.ca.
10) The Approval Holder must provide annual status reports and presentations. The reports must be 
aligned to the most current MMV plan and submitted to ResourceCompliance@ercb.ca.
 The report must be in metric units and include:
a) a summary of scheme operations including, but not limited to,
i) any new project wells drilled in the reporting period,
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ii) any workovers/treatments done on the injection and monitoring wells including the  
reasons for and results of the workovers/treatments,
iii) changes in injection equipment and operations,
iv) identification of problems, remedial action taken, and impacts on scheme performance.
b) complete pressure analysis including but not limited to stabilized shut-in formation pressures 
and a discussion on how the pressure compares with the formation pressure expected for 
the cumulative volume of CO2 injection, along with an updated estimate of what the actual 
cumulative injection volume will be at the maximum shut-in formation pressure specified in 
clause 5) a),
c) discussion of the overall performance of the scheme, including: how the formation pressure 
is changing over time; updated geological maps; and updated CO2 plume extent and 
pressure distribution models, if needed. The updated models should be based on all new data 
obtained since the last model run including the cumulative CO2 injected to the end of the 
reporting period.
d) a summary of MMV Plan activities, performance and results in the reporting period, 
including, but not limited to:
i) a report on any event that exceeded the approved operating requirements or triggered 
MMV activities,
ii) comparison of measured performance to predictions,
iii) summary of operations and maintenance activities conducted,
iv) details of any performance or MMV Plan issues that require attention,
v) pressure surveys, corrosion protection, fluid analyses, logs and any other data collected 
that would help in determining the success of the scheme, and
vi) discussion of the need for changes to the MMV plan.
e) a table for all wells listed in clause 3)(1) a), showing the following injection data for each 
month of the reporting period:
i) mole fraction of the CO2 and impurities in the injection stream,
ii) volume of the CO2 injected at standard conditions,
iii) formation volume factor of the injected CO2 stream,
iv) cumulative volume of the injected CO2 at standard conditions following the   
commencement of the scheme,
v) volume of the CO2 injected at reservoir conditions,
vi) hours on injection,
vii) maximum daily injection rate at standard conditions,
viii) average daily injection rate at standard conditions,
ix) maximum wellhead injection pressure (MWHIP) and corresponding wellhead 
injection temperature,
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x) average wellhead injection pressure, corresponding average wellhead injection 
temperature,
xi) maximum bottom hole injection pressure (MBHIP) at the top of injection interval and 
the corresponding bottom hole injection temperature, and
xii) average bottom hole injection pressure at the top of injection interval and the 
corresponding average bottom hole injection temperature.
f) a table showing the volumes of injected CO2 on a monthly and cumulative basis, 
g) Hall Plots of constant average reservoir pressure where unexplained anomalous injection 
rate and pressure data could indicate fracturing.
h) a plot showing the following daily average data at standard conditions versus time since the 
commencement of CO2 injection:
i) daily CO2 injection rate,
ii) wellhead and bottom hole injection pressure, and
iii) estimated or measured average reservoir pressure in the target formation.
i) the potential need for installing additional monitoring wells in the Winnipegosis and BCS 
towards the periphery of the pressure build up zone in the BCS later in the project life,
j) evaluate the need for additional deep monitoring wells adjacent to the four legacy 
wells in the approval area. Based on the information provided the ERCB may require the 
Approval Holder to drill one or more such deep monitoring wells, and
k) discussion of stakeholder engagement activities in the reporting period.
11) The Approval Holder must provide its first annual status report by January 31, 2013. The report must 
include all the relevant requirements listed in clause 10). This report must also provide a summary of 
construction and implementation activities, as well as updates, conclusions, and reviews of
a)  the feasibility of using 07-11-059-20W4M and 05-35-059-21W4M injection wells as BCS 
monitoring wells prior to commencement of injection,
b) detailed feasibility of technical, operational, cost and public safety considerations of adding 
mercaptans,
c) the initial baseline fall-off test analyses of 00/08-19-059-20W4/0 and any other drilled 
injection wells, and
d) any testing results in relation to construction and implementation activities.
12) The Approval Holder must provide a special report by January 31, 2013, on the suitability of the 
InSAR baseline data for pressure front and geomechanical modeling and analysis.
13) The Approval Holder must provide a special report by January 31, 2014, on the feasibility of 
using an artificial tracer for CO2 injection, including conclusions and action plan, and provide a 
discussion of alternatives.
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14) The Approval Holder must provide its second annual status report by January 31, 2014. The report 
must include all the relevant requirements listed in clause 10). As well, this report must include 
updates, conclusions, and reviews of:
a) geology update from new injection wells,
b) initial injection well drilling and testing, and need for additional injection wells, and
c) any testing results in relation to construction and implementation activities.
15) The Approval Holder must provide its third annual status report by January 31, 2015. The report 
must include all the requirements listed in clause 10). Furthermore, this report must also include 
update, conclusions, and review of:
a) baseline data and analysis of biogenic flux of CO2 in different soil types throughout the 
approval area,
b) geology update from new injection wells,
c) initial injection well drilling and testing, and need for additional injection wells,
d) any testing results in relation to construction and implementation activities, and
e) the MMV Plan.
16) The Approval Holder must provide a special report by July 31, 2015. This report must include the 
efficacy of the InSAR program. Installation of GPS instruments may be required if the quality of 
InSAR data is too low for effective monitoring.
17) The Approval Holder must provide ongoing annual reports beginning March 31, 2016 through to 
March 31, 2040. The report must include all the requirements listed in clause 10). The Approval 
Holder must provide a report and presentation of general performance of prior calendar year, 
identification of operations problems, and discussion of the need for MMV changes. Include 
updates, conclusions and review of:
a)  need for additional deep monitoring wells adjacent to the four legacy wells in the approval 
area,
b)  results from well testing including data from annual hydraulic isolation logging,
c)  need for further hydraulic isolation logging beyond the first five years of injection,
d)  projected timing for additional 3D surface seismic surveys,
e)  required frequency of time-lapse seismic surveys,
f)  update of CO2 plume and pressure front models including the results of the prescribed 
reservoir pressure fall-off test two years after the start-up of each injection well,
g)  need for ongoing fall-off shut-in reservoir pressure tests in all injection wells,
h)  updated geology, and
i) potential need for additional monitoring wells in the Winnipegosis and BCS towards the 
periphery of the pressure build up zone.
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18) The Approval Holder must submit a closure report in 2040, which summarizes project total 
performance, updated surface and subsurface information, and detailed review of containment. 
It must also include a MMV plan update, with specific attention to any performance problems 
evident in the 25 years of operations.
19) The Approval Holder must submit a post closure report, which includes an update of its MMV plan. 
(Further details will be provided upon review of the closure report as specified in clause 18).
20) The Approval Holder must allow additional water well owners to participate in the landowner 
water well portion of its MMV program at any time. The Approval Holder is required to include 
such wells in the MMV plan and associated reports.
21) The Approval Holder must immediately advise the ERCB of any changes to its pore space rights 
within the approval area.
22) The Approval Holder must comply with all ERCB Acts and Regulations, including all applicable 
directives and approvals issued by the ERCB.
23) The ERCB may at any time vary these terms and conditions or may suspend or revoke this 
approval if, in its opinion, circumstances so warrant.
24) This approval, insofar as it pertains to matters of the environment, is subject to the approval 
of the Minister of Environment and Sustainable Resource Development, Ministerial Order 
No. 18/2012, hereto attached as Appendix B.
25)  The Approval Holder must submit the MMV plans and project reports referenced in conditions 
6, 7, 8, 15, 18, and 19 to Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development for 
review, who will provide comments and recommendations to the ERCB pertaining to matters of 
the environment, at:
Water Policy Branch 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development 
Oxbridge Place, 7 Floor 
9820 – 106 Street 
Edmonton, AB T5K 2J6 
Steve.Wallace@gov.ab.ca
26) The Approval Holder must immediately notify the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable 
Resource Development at 1-800-222-6514, regarding any loss of CO2 to the atmosphere, oils or 
shallow (non-saline) aquifers and must provide a copy of any incident report required pursuant to 
condition 6 of this approval to Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development at:
Water Policy Branch 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development 
Oxbridge Place, 7 Floor 
9820 – 106 Street 
Edmonton, AB T5K 2J6 
Steve.Wallace@gov.ab.ca
Appendix A (map), Table 1 and Appendix B are all omitted. 
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Appendix II Carbon Sequestration Lease  
to Shell Canada Ltd for the Quest Project
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1 Overview. The status of CCS and CCS 
regulation in Norway
Norway is widely supportive of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies as a climate change 
mitigation measure, both at the national and international level. The country benefits from a large 
offshore CO2 storage capacity in its North Sea continental shelf, both in saline aquifers and in depleted 
oil and gas fields, which could exceed by far its own storage needs and provide storage opportunities 
to neighbouring countries.
Since mid-1990s, Norway has developed CCS technologies linked to off shore petroleum production. 
Norway has been pioneer in developing the first ‘full’ CCS projects for storing CO2 offshore at the 
Sleipner (1996)1 and Snøhvit (2008) offshore natural gas fields.2 Currently, several technological 
development projects are undertaken linked to gas fired power plants on shore, with the participation 
of industry and the Norwegian government. 
As of today, there is no comprehensive, specialized legislation regarding CCS in Norway. Apart from 
some minor amendments to existing laws, no dedicated legislative work has been undertaken to 
regulate this technology. This may be partly due to the fact that the most relevant existing acts 
applicable to CCS seem to provide a sufficiently broad legal basis for more specific regulations, 
if necessary. The most important are: the 1963 Act on Research, Exploration and Exploitation of 
other Natural Resources than Petroleum on the Ocean Floor3 (hereafter the Continental Shelf Act); 
the 1981 Pollution and Waste Act,4 and the 1996 Petroleum Activities Act.5 
The EU directive 2009/31 on the geological storage of CO2 (“CCS directive”) made evident the need 
for more precise rules on CCS in Norwegian law. Norway is not a member of the European Union, 
but is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). The CCS directive qualifies as being ‘EEA 
relevant’, which means that, if it is incorporated within the EEA agreement, it must be implemented 
also by all EEA members, including Norway. As of March 2013, such incorporation has not yet been 
agreed and it seems unlikely that it will be formally incorporated in the EEA agreement. This has to do 
with the geographical scope of the agreement, which – according to the Norwegian view – does not 
cover Norway’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf outside the territorial waters, where 
the relevant geological formations and reservoirs are found.
despite the fact that Norway may choose not to implement the CCS directive for such formal reasons, 
the directive will most certainly serve as a model for Norwegian legislation on CCS. This intention 
was confirmed by the Norwegian government in the Royal decree of 13 March 2009 on delegation of 
authority in CCS matters under the 1963 Continental Shelf Act. The reason for this is that if Norway 
wants to offer CO2 storage opportunities to other European countries, it is likely that Norway must 
1 Sleipner was the first commercial-scale project in the world dedicated to the geological storage of CO2 in a saline formation.
2 in both cases, the gas in the field has a too high content of CO2, which consequently has to be removed on the platform. The high 
tax on CO2 emissions from off shore activities introduced by law in 1990 (Act of 1 december 1990 no. 72) works as a decisive 
incentive to store the CO2 instead of emitting it. Annually, 1 million tons and 700,000 tons of CO2, respectively, are stored in 
underground saline aquifers below the gas fields. 
3 Act of 21 June 1963 no. 12.
4 Act of 13 March 1981 no. 6.
5 Act of 29 November 1996 no. 72.
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itself follow the provisions of the CCS directive in order for it to be legal for any European country to 
use the Norwegian storage sites. 
it is foreseen that most of the new rules required will be in the form of regulations pursuant to existing 
legislation, in particular the Continental Shelf Act, the Pollution and Waste Act, and the Petroleum 
Activities Act. But it is not excluded that some amendments of and additions to the acts themselves 
will be necessary as well. 
At the time of writing, June 2013, this work has not yet been finalized. Apparently, the aim was to present 
a draft regulation by the end of 2012, but this has been postponed at least until the late autumn 2013. 
The reasons for this may be both the complexity of some issues, such as the transfer of liability to 
the state (see below point 7.3), and possible controversies between the respective ministries about 
the sharing of responsibilities (see below point 2), mainly the ministries of Petroleum and Energy and 
of the Environment. However, as a matter of fact, there does not seem to be any particular sense of 
urgency in this matter anyway. This is probably due to the fact that the technological development 
and progress is taking more time and has become much more expensive than was foreseen at an 
earlier stage. it is now unlikely that any carbon capture and storage of CO2 from Norwegian 
on-shore sources will take place before 2016 at the earliest. At the same time, the EU seems to have 
lost interest in CCS and apparently has put further progress in this area on hold for the time being.6
Until today, the only “pure” CCS project for installations that emit CO2 on shore in Norway is a 
research/development project with the purpose of developing CCS technology: Test Center Mongstad 
TCM. Apparently, TCM is the world’s largest facility for testing and improving CO2 capture and the 
only test center in the world to test two different types of technology applicable to emissions from 
both coal- and gas-fired power plants. The technologies to be tested during the first phase are based 
on chilled ammonia and amines. TCM has been constructed with a capture capacity of up to 100,000 
tonnes of CO2 per year. The center is owned by Gassnova (which manages the Norwegian state’s 
interests) (75.12%), Statoil (20%), Shell (2.44%) and the South African company Sasol (2.44%). 
it is thus mainly funded from the state budget, and the costs are huge.7 
Part of the background is the political decision of principle, made several years ago, that CCS should 
be required for all new gas fired power plants in Norway, with storage of CO2 off shore, in geological 
formation or emptied oil/gas fields on the continental shelf. Today, we have only one such plant 
running (Kaarstø), and it is not yet equipped for CCS. A second is under construction at Mongstad. 
As of today, however, it is most unclear when – or whether at all – these will be equipped for CCS, since 
the technology seems to be more complicated and the costs much higher than originally foreseen. 
it should be underlined that the decision to start the huge technological development project TCM 
was a political decision. it was an important element in shifting governments’ climate policy agenda, 
with broad political support in Parliament. There is no short term economic incentive at present to 
develop or apply CCS. The EU ETS CO2 price seems to stay much too low (see below point 8). 
6 Originally, the EU decided to use 60 % of the income from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for CCS pilot projects, in 
order to develop CCS technology, and 40 % on renewable energy. However, on 30 November 2012 the EU Commission proposed 
to spend only 18% on CCS projects, and 82 % for renewable energy. Only one (French) project has so far been approved for 
financial support.
7 For more information see <www.tcmda.com/en/>.
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Nevertheless, Norway has still ambitious goals with regard to CCS. CCS remains as one of the most 
important climate change mitigation strategies for Norway in the long term. Both the Norwegian 
state and private companies have been willing to invest in the development of necessary technology 
for a full-scale CCS solution in the future. However, as mentioned, the parties involved have been 
forced to extend their timeframe for completion, due to the uncertainties related to predicting 
when the technology will be available. in addition to this, the lack of commercial viability of CCS 
technologies under the present conditions has contributed to such postponement.8 
The focus of CCS research in Norway today is still on the capture of CO2 from gas-fired power 
plants and offshore storage of CO2 mainly from such plants There are two reasons for this. 
First, gas-fired power plants are expected to be the biggest single point emitters of CO2 in Norway 
and it is likely that the emissions from this industry will continue to rise, due to the possibility of 
construction of additional gas-fired power plants in Norway. Second, research indicates that there 
is a huge international potential for natural gas as a source for power production, not least in 
European countries, in the coming 50 to 100 years. if the international objectives related to climate 
change are to be reached, a significant expansion of gas power will require CCS on a large scale. 
However, quite recently, interest has also turned toward the possibility of CO2 capture in the cement 
industry. A Norwegian research project in this area is being prepared.
2 Main legal areas and division of authority
in the Royal decree of March 2009 the responsibility for the implementation was divided between 
three different ministries, based on three different main legal areas. 
The first legal area regards transport and storage of CO2, including exploration of possible sites, which 
the Government found as having many similarities with petroleum activities – i.e. requirements for 
permission to survey and use underground formations, requirements relating to environmental 
impact assessments on the continental shelf, etc. The power to design such regulations and to issue 
required licenses for transport and storage was therefore delegated to the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy.9 This ministry is responsible for the implementation of both the Continental Shelf Act and the 
Petroleum Activities Act.
in 2009 this ministry proposed an amendment to section 4-8 of the Petroleum Activities Act, which 
enabled the regulations regarding third party access to petroleum installations to apply also to CCS 
facilities, and this was approved by Parliament.10 
The second legal area regards environmental safety. The Ministry of the Environment was given the 
power to develop regulations to ensure that the storage of CO2 occurs in an environmentally safe 
way. This includes regulations which determine the composition of the CO2 stream, surveillance, the 
monitoring and reporting regime, and financial security. it is clear that CCS storage also will require a 
permit by the environmental authorities pursuant to the Pollution and Waste Act. 
8 One factor here is the extremely low price on carbon in the EU ETS at present which is not an incentive to develop new 
technology and use CCS.
9 The delegation was made in accordance with the Continental Shelf Act art 2 (2) and art 3. See Regulation FOR-2009-03-13-321.
10 Act of 19 June 2009 no. 104.
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The third legal area regards human safety in relation to CCS. The Ministry of Labour was made 
responsible for developing regulations on safety in connection with CO2 transport and storage; 
especially with regards to security measures for the construction and operation of facilities. This has 
to do with this ministry’s general responsibility for safety in the petroleum sector. 
The division of responsibility between the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) and the Ministry 
of the Environment (ME) clearly raise some problems. Both ministries may claim that CCS falls within 
their general responsibility. 
MPE is, as mentioned, responsible for the general management of the continental shelf pursuant to the 
1963 Continental Shelf Act. This implies to regulate all activities on the shelf (and the underground) 
– not only the petroleum activity. The ministry and its subordinate directorates and agencies have 
relevant knowledge of the geology, of ongoing activities and potential for future petroleum activities 
etc. it is essential to see CCS in relation to the petroleum industry, both as a possible combination – 
in particular through the reinjection of CO2 into the oil reservoir to obtain enhanced recovery of the 
hydrocarbons (EHR) – and as a possible conflict in the exploitation of the seabed and underground.
ME and its subordinate directorate – the Climate and Pollution Agency – are generally responsible for 
pollution permits pursuant to the Pollution and Waste Act. This applies to decisions on CO2 capture 
from gas fired power plants on shore as well as to regular emissions from the petroleum activity 
on the continental shelf – and thus for saying yes (or no) to CO2 capture at the installations. it also 
applies to the risk of leakage from CO2 storage and thus also the storage part. in addition, ME is also 
the ministry responsible for the 2004 Carbon Trading Act11 which apply to the petroleum activity and 
presumably will apply to leakage from CCS storage.
Therefore, it is at the outset very difficult to see how the regulation of CCS can be left to one of these 
ministries only. So it is likely that both systems will apply and several authorities will be responsible.
There may be various solutions to this. The situation corresponds to several other cases in Norwegian 
law, where a permit is required pursuant to several different laws, and where environmental concerns 
have to be taken into account, and may be in conflict with the sector development interests in question. 
in some cases, the sector ministry has the final say in balancing the environmental concern against 
the development needs. There may be a “one stop” system, whereby only the sector ministry receives 
the application and is sole responsible for coordinating the process. in that case the environmental 
authorities only give an advice or opinion, and it is the sector ministry that decides to what extent it 
shall be taken into account. in other cases several separate permits are required. This usually means 
that the environmental authorities treat the case independently on the basis of its legislation, and 
in reality can veto a development project which already has got a permit from a sector authority. 
There may be efforts to coordinate the procedures, but these do not necessarily succeed. 
There is thus no single model for this in the Norwegian legal and administrative system. The different 
solutions are more or less the result of political strengths and priorities at the time the legislation in 
question was issued. it also varies with the type of environmental interests that are threatened. As a 
matter of fact, both our pollution legislation and cultural heritage legislation are stronger in this regard 
vis-à-vis sector legislation than the legislation on biodiversity, ecosystem and landscape protection.
11 Act of 17 december 2004 no. 99. This act is the basis for Norway’s participation in the EU ETS, see point 8 below.
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The issue of delegation
The State has of course full decision-making power with regards to CO2 capture, and the construction, 
operation and closure of transport and storage facilities. The power may be delegated from the 
ministries to subordinate state bodies, to state-owned companies or other institutions. For example, 
with regards to transport of natural gas from the Norwegian continental shelf, the transport network 
is operated by a state-owned non-profit company; Gassco. And the government has established an 
important special agency, Gassnova SF, to manage the state’s interests in CCS-affairs. 
Gassnova SF is a somewhat particular institution.12 it is formally a state enterprise under the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy. it is both a business actor with the power to enter into commercial 
agreements with regards to CCS development, and the source of CCS information to the public. 
Gassnova provides advice to the government in matters relating to CCS. in addition, Gassnova 
contributes to the implementation of the CCS technology development programme, “CLiMiT”, 
in cooperation with the Research Council of Norway. One of the aims of Gassnova’s work is to develop 
ways to reduce the costs associated with CCS deployment. it participates in the three most important 
projects of CCS development in Norway: the CO2 Technology Centre Mongstad (TCM); the full-scale 
CO2 capture project at the (future) gas- fired power plant at Mongstad and a (future) large-scale CO2 
transport and storage project from Mongstad to a presumed storage site in the North Sea.
3 Property issues
As already mentioned, offshore storage of CO2 is the only relevant option for Norway in the 
foreseeable future. The Petroleum Activities Act applies to any offshore storage of CO2 that stems 
from petroleum activities on the continental shelf. Any storage of CO2 that does not stem from such 
activities falls outside the scope of the act. Non-petroleum related storage of CO2 falls within the 
1963 Continental Shelf Act. Both Acts must be interpreted to the effect that the Norwegian state is 
the owner/holder of rights of any pore space on the continental shelf.
despite the fact that onshore storage at present is not viewed as an option in Norway, the question 
of onshore sub-surface ownership may still be of at least theoretical interest. The possibility of 
future onshore storage can probably not be completely excluded in the long term. As of today, 
there are no acts of law regulating the ownership of onshore pore space, which would mean that the 
ownership must be determined in accordance with general Norwegian private property law. it has 
been established by case law that the owner of the property overground is the owner of the land, 
including property underground. The property right is however not infinite and it is established by 
the Supreme Court that the underground property right does not follow the overground property 
right beyond approximately 100 meters below the surface.13 Beyond this level the rule of occupation 
applies, meaning that the first one to possess underground resources claims the property right.
However, these general rules with regards to property rights do not apply to onshore exploration or 
recovery of petroleum underground. Onshore petroleum resources are state property by law, regardless 
12 See St.prp. Nr. 49 (2006-2007) and innst. S. nr. 205 (2006–2007).
13 See: Norsk Retstidende 1998 s. 251 (The Tellnes-case).
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of ownership overground or potential first-possession, according to a special Act on exploration and 
exploitation of onshore petroleum resources.14 This Act solely includes petroleum resources and thus 
not empty pore spaces suitable for storage of CO2. As of today, the rules of ownership overground and 
first-possession apply to such pore spaces. However, based on the fact that offshore storage spaces 
are state property, it is likely that it will be decided by law that onshore pore spaces are to be owned 
by the state as well, once the issue may become relevant. 
4 Permits for CCS
4.1 introduction
it is clear that any CO2 transport and storage activity will require permits pursuant to Norwegian 
law. So far, the two main examples of storage – at the Sleipner and Snøhvit fields – have been seen 
exclusively as part of the petroleum activity and regulated within the general system of permit for 
exploitation of petroleum resources pursuant to the Petroleum Activities Act. This will probably 
be the case also in the future for storage for the purpose of enhanced hydrocarbon recovery (EHR) 
or other purposes linked directly to the production of petroleum.
For “ordinary” CCS a broader spectrum of legislation comes into play. As mentioned, most likely a 
permit will be required pursuant to at least the Continental Shelf Act and the Pollution and Waste Act. 
The EU CCS directive foresees separate and subsequent permits for exploration and actual storage. 
This corresponds roughly to the system in our petroleum sector. But even before an exploration 
application can be treated, our system for petroleum activity requires an environmental impact 
assessment to be carried out for the whole sea and shelf area in question. The first issue is always 
whether an area shall be “opened” for exploitation and subsequent production in the first place. 
This requires an initial EiA. This is meant to bring forward the necessary information about the 
area, its general suitability for activity on the one hand, and on he other hand about what natural 
values and resources, and other interests, that may be affected by the exploration and possible 
exploitation/production. This will decide whether an area is suitable at all for this type of activity. 
if the conclusion is that storage in the area in question seems to be acceptable, it will formally be 
“opened” for exploration and the application for exploration permit is the next step, and subsequently 
for exploitation in case of a finding of petroleum.
it is likely that there will be a similar system of a “preliminary EiA” to decide in what parts of the 
Norwegian sea and shelf area CO2 storage is technically feasible and acceptable.
4.2 Exploration permit
As mentioned, Norway will most probably introduce a system of permits which fulfill the requirements 
of EU CCS directive. The directive holds in Article 4 that the state has the right to determine the 
storage areas. in order to identify where storage is possible, the state may demand that exploration is 
14 Act of 4 May 1973 nr. 21 (Lov om undersøkelser etter og utvinning av petroleum i grunnen under norsk landområde) art 1.
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carried out. Such exploration relies on a permit (Article 5 of the directive). An exploration phase will 
probably always be necessary because of the complexities in geological conditions, uncertainties and 
the risk of leakage. 
The CCS directive lists specific requirements that the state must impose on anyone applying for an 
exploration permit. The concept of an exploration permit is well known in Norwegian natural resources 
and environmental law in general, and in the Norwegian petroleum industry in particular. The existing 
petroleum regulations are not in conflict with the requirements in the CCS directive.15 However, the 
requirements following the directive appear at some points ambiguous and at other points they 
grant discretion on the implementation. Thus it remains to be seen how the exact requirements for 
obtaining an exploration permit for CO2-storage purposes will be designed in Norwegian law.
According to the CCS directive, the state decides whether exploration activities are needed. 
The permit must be limited in duration/time and location/area – where the duration may be extended. 
Furthermore there must not occur “conflicting uses of the complex” (see below) and the applicant 
must possess the “necessary capacities”.
details on the duration of the permit and location of the area subject to exploration are also 
included in the Norwegian regulations governing petroleum exploration permits. Both the duration 
of the permit and the extension of the area can be extended. The extension of the permitted area 
is not mentioned in the storage-directive. However, there is no difference in reality between the 
permit-holder applying for a new permit for an extended area and the permit-holder applying for an 
extended area under the current permit. Therefore, the possibility of extension of a permit in both 
duration and area can be adopted when implementing the CCS directive. This is the preferred solution 
for petroleum activities and is – based on the similarities between offshore petroleum activities and 
offshore CO2-storage – likely to become the preferred solution in regard to CCS.
The CCS directive does not provide any definition of “conflicting uses of the complex”. We shall get 
back to this issue under point 6. 
The CCS directive does not give a definition of the term “necessary capacities” either. The most 
likely interpretation of this term would be that the applicant meets the requirements and obligations 
following the CCS directive which can be considered relevant in the exploration phase. Such capacities 
will probably include the technical competence and financial capacity required for an environmentally 
sound fulfillment of the precise objective of the exploration. 
Since exploration activity of course does not include storage of CO2, this means that the requirements 
with regards to financial security and financial contribution required for storage, in general do not 
apply directly at this stage. However, it may well be that the authorities will consider such factors 
as well, to avoid that an exploration permit is given to an actor who has not the necessary economic 
basis for the subsequent storage.
Norwegian petroleum law contains some of these requirements concerning exploration permits. 
Petroleum regulations also require certain personal information and that the applicant pays a fee 
for the exploration activities. However, the storage-directive is more comprehensive than Norway’s 
petroleum legislation on other issues. The Norwegian legislative authorities can therefore not just 
15 See: Petroleum Activities Act Article 2-1 and the Regulations relating to the act chapter 2. 
APPENdix C 345
copy the existing system for petroleum exploration, but will to some extent have to establish an 
individual and more thorough system for CCS exploration permits in order to fulfill the requirements 
of the EU CCS directive.
4.3 Storage permit
The EU CCS directive decides in Article 6 that a storage permit shall be required for the storage 
of CO2. The requirements for a storage permit are very similar to the requirements for exploration. 
However, the requirement for the operator to possess the “necessary capacities” when storing CO2 
is, of course, more comprehensive than for the exploration phase, since proper storing requires more 
extensive and long term measures and obligations on the part of the operator than exploration. 
during the application for a storage permit “conflicting uses” of the complex will not be allowed. 
As stated, we shall get back to this issue below, under point 6. 
Article 6 further prescribes that the holder of an exploration permit shall be given priority for the 
granting of a storage permit. in the strict formal sense, this is not the case in Norwegian petroleum 
law with regard to the relationship between exploration permit and production permit of petroleum. 
However, in reality a successful exploration most often leads into a production permit for the 
company, although it often has to accept several partners in the production phase. 
Article 6 of the directive states that only one “operator” shall operate the storage site. The directive 
defines an operator as the natural or legal, private or public person who operates, controls or has 
decisive economic power over the technological functions of the storage site (Article 3 para 10). 
The same definition of operator is also used under Norwegian petroleum law, which as the main rule 
also accepts only one operator per oil or gas field. But of course, there may be several companies as 
economic partners in the production of a field.
4.4 Application requirements for storage permits
Article 7 of the EU CCS directive contains a list of the information required in the application for a 
storage permit. The list is a minimum requirement and the Norwegian legislative authorities may 
impose stricter requirements. The information that the applicant for storage permit is required to 
provide is more extensive than those required by Norwegian petroleum regulations. The application 
of the rule of the directive will however not raise any problem and will most probably be included in 
the Norwegian regulation. Whether the authorities want to impose even stricter requirements is an 
open question.
4.5 Public participation requirements
Future CCS regulations in Norway will certainly reflect and apply the general rules and principles 
for public participation in the procedure for storage permits. According to the applicable Norwegian 
environmental law (mainly the 1981 Pollution and Waste Act) applications for discharge and emission 
permits are subject to a transparent procedure; the application is public, and the public has the right 
to information and participation. 
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Furthermore, it is most likely that both the plants and installations where CO2 is captured, and the 
storage, will be subject to EiA-regulation in line with what we have today for other projects as well as 
for land use plans. This will also define the various steps in the procedure where the public are entitled 
to information and have the opportunity to have a say. it is also likely that both the environmental 
organisation and fishery people will be quite alert and active on these issues.
in the EU CCS directive, article 31 explicitly states that the EiA directive 85/337/EC is amended 
in order that the EiA requirement shall apply to installations for capture of CO2, pipelines “for the 
transport of carbon dioxide (CO2)streams for the purposes of geological storage, including associated 
booster stations” and to storage sites for geological storage of CO2. 
directive 85/337/EC, article 6, has detailed rules on the public’s right to information and participation, 
and these will thus apply to decisions on capture, pipelines and storage. in practice, this also means 
that the requirements of the Aarhus convention will apply.
4.6 Conditions for storage permits
The conditions for a storage permit are found in Article 8 of the CCS directive. There are three 
categories of conditions. 
The first category determines that all relevant requirements in the CCS directive must be 
fulfilled. This is a rather vague condition, but is more extensive than the conditions in the current 
Norwegian legislation. 
The second category of conditions relates to financial soundness and technical competence. 
Such provisions are also found in current Norwegian petroleum legislation. However, given 
the required financial contribution in relation to the transfer of responsibility (see below), 
the CCS directive has a wider set of conditions than existing petroleum legislation. 
The last category concerns pressure interactions where more than one storage site is in the same 
hydraulic unit. This is also a new condition. 
Seeing that each of the conditions for a storage permit are more comprehensive than current 
petroleum legislation, the impression is that the new Norwegian regulations have to be developed 
more or less from scratch on these issues in order to fulfill the directive. 
4.7 Contents of storage permits
Article 9 of the CCS directive provides that the storage permit itself shall contain a minimum set 
of information. This information is derived from the conditions set forth in the permit. in practice, 
this refers to specified information in relation to the operator and how the operator shall run the 
storage site in question. Norway, and the EU Member States, would have the discretionary power to 
require additional content of a storage permit. The rules with regards to the content of the permit are 
similar to the practice under Norwegian petroleum law.
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4.8 Changes, review, update and withdrawal of storage permits
in its Article 11, the CCS directive states that the authorities must be informed of any change in the 
operation and that substantial changes require a new or updated storage permit. in cases where the 
operator does not meet the permit conditions, the authorities have the discretion to withdraw the 
storage permit. An equivalent provision can be found in Norwegian law, where both the Pollution and 
Waste Act and the petroleum legislation require the operator to inform the competent authority of 
any change, and the competent authority has the power to change, review, update or withdraw the 
petroleum recovery permit.
The CCS directive prescribes that in the event of a withdrawal, the authorities shall temporarily take 
over all legal obligations, whereas any costs shall be recovered by the former operator. Such a scenario 
is not reflected into Norwegian petroleum law. However, it is clear that – following environmental 
law and legal principles of recourse – the mentioned regulation would be consistent with Norwegian 
legislation in general. 
5 Regulation of operations, monitoring, 
reporting, etc.
5.1 CO2 stream acceptance criteria and procedure
An important issue in the area of CO2 storage is the quality requirements – the “purity” as it were – 
as regards the gas being stored. The CCS directive sets forth concrete and discretionary requirements 
with regards to the quality of the CO2-stream (Article 12). This is also an important element in the 
international acceptance of CCS within the London dumping Convention/Protocol and OSPAR. Such 
requirements are important in Norwegian Petroleum law as well. Pipeline for the transport of natural 
gas can be used as an example, where the operator is subject to a detailed set of quality requirements in 
relation to the natural gas, by virtue of both the petroleum regulations and the standard agreement.16 
The specific standard of quality will depend on the state of the capture technology. The quality 
standards now included in the European Commission Guidance document 217 will of course be closely 
studied by the Norwegian authorities.
5.2 Monitoring
Article 13 of the CCS directive imposes on the state an obligation to ensure that the operator carries 
out the monitoring of the injection facilities, the storage complex and the surrounding environment. 
Monitoring requirements are well known in Norwegian law. The petroleum regulations sets forth 
stringent requirements in relation to safety zones and operators must at all times maintain effective 
emergency arrangements in order to face hazardous situations or accidents. Regulations and permits 
16 See: Terms & Conditions for transportation of Gas in Gassled, chapter 4.
17 <www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/lowcarbon/ccs/implementation/docs/gd2_en.pdf>.
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pursuant to the Pollution and Waste Act regularly require the permit holder to have proper monitoring 
systems in place. The directive contains a comprehensive list of requirements in this respect 
(Article 13 and Annex ii). These will most likely be considered as sufficient monitoring requirements 
by Norwegian legislative authorities.
5.3 Reporting by the operator
Article 14 of the CCS directive states that the operator – at least once a year – shall submit to the 
competent authority a report containing information on the results of monitoring, the quantity of 
CO2 stored, the properties of the CO2 streams, proof of financial security and other information that 
the competent authority might find relevant. in Norway, the current petroleum law also imposes on 
the operator an obligation to submit a report on an annual basis. This provision is therefore not new. 
According to the petroleum regulations, the report shall describe activities and measures performed 
which will give the authorities grounds to consider production strategy, environmental issues and so 
forth. The authorities can furthermore request additional information in the report. Regular reporting 
is also a normal condition in all pollution permits pursuant to the Pollution and Waste Act. 
The requirement in the directive regarding proof in relation to financial security is seemingly 
new to Norway, since it is not explicitly mentioned in the correlating petroleum regulations. 
However, it is clear that any petroleum operator’s financial soundness is an important aspect of 
the production strategy and is therefore likely to be a part of the report. The reporting process 
following Article 14 is thus not new in Norway and this requirement does not bring anything new 
to Norwegian legislation.
5.4 inspections
The CCS directive prescribes in Article 15 a duty and a right for the member states to organize a 
system of routine and non-routine inspections, which should include visits, assessments and checking 
of records. The inspections shall be carried out at least once a year, and shall be publicly available 
at least within two months after the inspection. inspections are a part of the Norwegian pollution 
prevention and petroleum legislation as well. in the petroleum sector a yearly inspection is the 
minimum. The inspectors shall have access to all data and material necessary and have the right to 
stay at installations as long as needed and also conduct relevant research. Costs shall be covered by 
the operator or licensee.
There are two minor material differences between the directive and Norwegian legislation. 
On the one hand, Norwegian legislation is more comprehensive when it explicitly states that the 
financial burden of inspections is to be borne by the operator, whereas the directive is silent on 
this issue. On the other hand, the directive seems more comprehensive when it sets a maximum 
period for the inspection report to be made publicly available, which is not explicitly stated in the 
Norwegian legislation.
Apart from the mentioned differences, the Norwegian legislation and the CCS directive are very similar. 
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5.5 Measures in case of leakage or significant irregularities
in case of leakages or significant irregularities, Article 16 of the directive requires the member state to 
ensure that the operator notifies the competent authority and takes necessary corrective measures. 
The competent authority may also take corrective measures itself and recover the costs from the 
operator, but it has a duty to do so if the operator fails to fulfill its obligations. Both the Norwegian 
petroleum legislation and pollution control legislation impose a duty of action on the operator in 
case of leakages or irregularities, whereas the authorities are provided with discretion to take such 
measures. if the authorities launch any measures, this may be a decision to delegate a third-party to 
take the necessary measures and thereafter recovering the costs from the operator. 
The existing petroleum regulations mirrors the CCS directive, and does also contain some 
specifications with regards to the right to appeal and cost recovery in practice.
6 Relationship of CCS with other  
subsurface activities 
6.1 The issue of “conflicting uses”
The EU directive decides in Article 6 that a storage permit shall be required for the storage of CO2. 
during the application for a storage permit “conflicting uses” of the complex will not be allowed. 
What constitutes a conflict is not defined. 
The directive applies to CCS, but also to Enhanced Hydrocarbon Recovery (EHR) activities, provided 
that they are combined with permanent storage of CO2. Other activities – such as EHR without 
permanent storage – are not under the scope of the directive and will thus probably qualify for a type 
of conflicting use. A question is however if CCS combined with EHR with permanent storage will fall 
under the definition of “conflicting use”. This is a relevant issue for Norway, since the combination of 
EHR and “pure” CO2 storage in an oil reservoir apparently is not excluded. if EHR with CO2-storage 
does not utilize the capacity of a storage site and there is room for additional storage of CO2 (in the 
form of CCS), this will contribute to a larger volume of CO2 being stored which is in line with the 
purpose of the CCS directive. Therefore, storage of CO2 with the purpose of EHR, and CCS without 
this purpose should not be regarded as conflicting use. (See more on this issue below in point 6.3).
in general it is foreseen that petroleum activities and CCS can be combined on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. The Norwegian oil company Statoil is itself heavily engaged in the technological 
development of CCS at Mongstad, and apparently sees this as a future business opportunity. 
The decision whether a particular storage area will be opened or not will of course be taken with 
due account of actual or potential petroleum activity in the area. What is striking, is that new oil 
and gas fields are still – to some surprise – discovered in the North Sea. There seem to be quite a lot 
of uncertainties and lack of precise knowledge with regard to geological conditions etc. There are 
also considerable uncertainties of the risk of leakage from CO2 storage in the relevant geological 
formations. Norwegian experts tend to warn against the thinking that finding safe storage sites will 
not be a problem on our continental shelf.
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6.2 Third party access
The CCS directive requires the state to ensure that potential users are able to obtain access to 
transport networks and storage sites (article 21). This means, for example, that a certain company 
can not, as the main rule, have exclusive right to use a certain storage site. The article imposes some 
criteria and objectives on the state in relation to third party access. in essence the state must take 
necessary measures in order to achieve a system where access to transport and storage facilities is 
granted in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, as long as the operator of such facilities 
does not refuse access on the basis of duly substantiated reasons. These criteria and objectives are 
somewhat ambiguous. The directive states that Member States are granted discretionary power in 
relation to the exact design of the third party access regulations – article 21 is thus only a framework.
Norwegian law has a well developed system for third party access in several of the energy sectors. 
As already mentioned, in 2009 it was decided that the system in the Petroleum Activities Act was to 
be applied also in relation to CCS-installations.18 The Norwegian regulations in relation to third party 
access are similar to the regulations in the CCS directive – but more detailed – and are derived from 
in the provisions of the recent EU electricity market directive19 and the natural gas market directive20. 
This fact should mean that the existing third party regulations will remain unchanged. However, the 
existing regulations in the Petroleum Activities Act do not apply to non-petroleum related activities 
such as CCS from gas-fired power plants. Given that the main focus for CCS in Norway today is in 
relation to such plants, the applicability of existing third-party access provisions must be considered. 
One of the most interesting issues in relation to the implementation of a complete third party access 
regime for CCS activities is how access will be granted. On one side access can be negotiated and on 
the other side regulated. As of today a combination between the two applies to petroleum-related 
CCS. Because there are no immediately striking arguments against a similar system for a complete 
access regime, the same system is likely to be continued.21
6.3 issues regarding the relationship between CCS and 
Enhanced Hydrocarbon Recovery (EHR)
The relationship between CCS and storage for the purpose of Enhanced Hydrocarbon Recovery 
or other purpose for the benefit of petroleum exploitation22 raises some special questions for the 
legislator. For Norway, this is partly a question of choice of/relationships between various national 
legislations and authorities, and partly formal issues in relation to the EU CCS directive.
CCS is technically very similar to EHR, but the CO2 is not intended for any purposeful means other 
than storage. An interesting question is whether or not different regulations will apply to the two 
activities after the implementation of the storage-directive, and if so which differences there will be.
18 See main rule in: Petroleum Activities Act art 4-8.
19 See directive 2009/72/EC.
20 See directive 2009/73/EC.
21 These issues are discussed in a master thesis from the Faculty of Law in Oslo: Tonje Eilertsen: “Tredjepartsadgang til transportnett og 
lagringsområder for CO2” (Third party access to transport networks and storage sites for CO2), published in Marius no. 392, Oslo 2010.
22 See footnote 3 above.
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The CCS directive only mentions Enhanced Hydrocarbon Recovery in its Preamble section 20, which 
states that EHR is “not in itself included in the scope of this directive”. However, if EHR is combined 
with (permanent) geological storage of CO2, “the provisions of this directive for the environmentally 
safe storage of CO2 should apply”. The question is which of the rules in the storage-directive can be 
said to fall under the wording “for the environmentally safe storage of CO2”. 
On the one hand it is clear that provisions with regards to safe monitoring and commitments that shall 
assure permanent storage must be included. On the other hand it is not as obvious that the regulations 
in relation to the financial mechanism and transfer of liability are needed for the “environmentally safe 
storage of CO2”. However, the CCS directive’s expressed purpose is “environmentally safe geological 
storage of carbon dioxide” (article 1 (1)), which – from the directive’s own point of view – spawns the 
need for all the listed requirements and obligations (including the financial mechanism and transfer 
of liability). Thus, the two wordings are almost identical and a system oriented interpretation leads to 
the conclusion that EHR-processes with permanent storage of CO2 must follow the same regulations 
as “pure” storage-projects.
Because EHR combined with permanent storage of CO2 “should” be governed by the same provisions 
as CCS, it is most likely that such EHR-processes will follow the upcoming CCS regulations in Norway. 
However, this is not clear at the present time.
The fact that the directive does not cover EHR processes where CO2 is not permanently stored, does 
not prevent the Member States adopting their own national regulations for this type of activity. 
This means that there is room for two forms of regulations in regard to EHR: one for “pure EHR 
projects”, and one for EHR projects in combination with permanent geological storage of CO2. 
in the case of Norway, EHR projects which are not combined with permanent storage of CO2 (as at Sleipner 
and Snøhvit) are regulated by the Petroleum Activities Act. The question is then whether the Petroleum 
Activities Act will be amended, as a result of the new CCS-legislation, to also cover EHR combined with 
permanent storage. Such amendments are not unlikely given the fact that Norway has proved to be an 
ardent advocate of CO2-storage where it is technologically possible. The required technology for EHR 
combined with permanent CO2 storage exists. However, there might be cases where permanent storage 
of CO2 in combination with EHR is not possible. This calls for separate regulations for this type of EHR. 
The provisions of the Petroleum Activities Act are to a large extent designed to leave discretion to the 
administrative organs with regards to the exact requirements for any activity. As such, it is likely that 
the existing provisions for EHR are maintained. At the same time it is possible that the authorities will 
impose the use of CCS-technology where it can. This means not only demanding EHR operators to 
actually store CO2 where it is possible, but also demanding that such operators try to implement other 
requirements and obligations derived from the CCS directive. An example of this would be to require 
that the EHR-operator – whether or not combined with permanent CO2 storage – seeks to achieve the 
same level of quality in the captured CO2-stream as the operators who actually store the CO2.
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7 Liability, transfer of liability,  
and financial security
7.1 The general liability picture in Norwegian  
environmental and petroleum law
The Pollution and Waste Act imposes a duty, irrespective of fault or negligence, to take reasonable 
measures to prevent, abate and repair pollution, including accidental emissions and discharges. it also 
lays down strict liability for the owner or operator of a property, installation or activity for damage 
and loss caused by pollution from such source, including costs of restoration measures.23 This Act will 
most probably apply if leakage from the storage site should occur. 
in addition, the Petroleum Activities Act imposes strict liability on operators for environmental 
damage caused by emission or discharge of petroleum from a petroleum installation. This also covers 
reasonable measures to prevent and limit such damage. Furthermore, this Act imposes strict liability 
for any type of damage to actors in the fishing industry, i.e. third parties.24 it is likely to assume that a 
similar scope of duty to take preventive and remedial actions, as well as strict liability for any damage 
caused by leakage, will be adopted for CCS transport and storage in Norwegian law.
Both the Pollution and Waste Act and the Petroleum Activities Act contain forms of limitation of 
liability. On one hand there is a discretionary upper limit – expressed by the word “reasonable” – 
as to the operators duty of action in case of a leakage accident.25 Furthermore, the liability may 
be restricted in case of force majeure pursuant to the Petroleum Act,26 but not explicitly pursuant 
to the Pollution Control Act. The CCS directive does not explicitly mention such limitations, and 
one can therefore ask if it would be in compliance with the directive to introduce the limitations 
when implementing the CCS directive. However, the directive refers to Articles 5 and 8 of the 
EU Environmental Liability directive.27 This directive has now been included in the EEA agreement 
and applies to Norway. Article 5 requires the “operator” to take “necessary” preventive measures 
when there is an imminent threat of environmental damage. Article 8 lays down as the main rule that 
the operator shall bear the costs for the preventive and remedial actions pursuant to the directive. 
The same article spells out some exceptions to this obligation and defines some (limited) possibilities 
for member States to allow other exceptions. 
Since Norway has implemented the Environment Liability directive there will be no problems in this area.
7.2 Long-term liability
The operational phase and the post-closure phase connected to the storage of CO2 pose different 
risks of damage. in relation to post-closure, Article 17 (2) of the CCS directive, in conjunction with 
23 Pollution and Waste Ac, chapter 8.
24 See the Petroleum Activities Act chapter 8.
25 See the Petroleum Activities Act art 7-1.
26 Article 7-3 para 3 of the Petroleum Act.
27 directive 2004/35/EC.
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article 18 (1) a, prescribes that the operator of a storage site is liable for the site until responsibility 
has been transferred to “the competent authority”. As the main rule, this can happen after 
a minimum period of 20 years, but also before if the authority “is convinced” that the stored CO2 
“will be completely and permanently contained”. 
The transfer of responsibility from the operator to the “competent authority” is a key point in the CCS 
directive. Given the fact that the Norwegian state owns the offshore pore space this means in reality 
that the state shall take over the responsibility. 
According to the directive the post-closure long-term liability consists of the duty to carry out 
monitoring, reporting, potential corrective measures, the surrender of GHG allowances if leakage 
occurs and preventive and remedial actions pursuant to articles 5 and 7 of the EU Environmental 
Liability directive. Thus, both a comprehensive duty of action and an economic liability is imposed 
on the operator. The economic liability does not explicitly impose on the operator to cover potential 
economic losses of third parties, but this follows in general from Norwegian law.
The implementation of the provisions concerning long-term liability will not entail any radically new 
to current Norwegian tort and environmental law. Post-closure long-term liability may be seen as an 
expression of the polluter pays principle, which is an important principle in Norwegian environmental 
law.28 With regards to the duties of action prescribed in the CCS directive, these are quite extensive 
and will probably be regarded as sufficient by Norwegian legislative authorities. However, it appears 
that the economic liability set out in the directive only imposes on the operator an obligation to give 
up ETS allowances in case of leakages (see below). The scope of such a liability is below the current 
legal standard of economic liability vis-à-vis third parties in Norway.
7.3 Transfer of liability
The CCS directive article 18 first para. states that:
Where a storage site has been closed pursuant to points (a)or (b) of Article 17(1), all legal 
obligations relating to monitoring and corrective measures pursuant to the requirements 
laid down in this directive, the surrender of allowances in the event of leakages pursuant to 
directive 2003/87/EC and preventive and remedial action pursuant to Articles 5(1) and 6(1)  
of directive 2004/35/EC, shall be transferred to the competent authority on its own initiative or 
upon request from the operator, if the following conditions are met[.]
This is a very important point: the operator’s post-closure liability shall be transferred to the competent 
authority – in reality the state – after a minimum period of 20 years, subject to the fulfillment of a 
number of important conditions laid down in article 18. 
Norwegian law does not contain any provision where the authorities are obliged to accept the transfer 
of environmental liability from private commercial actors.29 
28 See the Pollution and Waste Act art 2 (5).
29 Pursuant to the Petroleum Activity Act the state has the right – but no obligation – to take over petroleum installations when an 
exploitation permit expires and/or an activity comes to a close.
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Whether – and eventually how – the principle of liability transfer to the state will be implemented 
in Norwegian law remains to be seen, and this is probably one of the more difficult issues presently 
under discussion within the government. One might expect that such a new provision on the transfer 
of environmental liability will be met by skepticism by legislative authorities and the public in general, 
since it of course entails a risk for future costs for the state – costs that may be considerable in 
“a worst case scenario”. As of today there has however been no open debate on the subject. 
This silence may stem from a general acceptance of CCS or simply ignorance of the implications of 
such transfer. On the one hand, it is possible that the transfer of liability is regarded as a necessary 
condition for making CCS commercially attractive and that the process is viewed as safeguarded by 
the stringent transfer-requirements. On the other hand, it is also possible that the implication of a 
provision that allows the transfer of liability is still quite unknown among relevant interested parties. 
if the latter is the case, it cannot be excluded that the transfer of liability finally will be regulated even 
in a stricter way than what the CCS directive proposes in order to have it accepted. 
One way of making the transfer of liability stricter is by using the discretion given to the competent 
authority to extend the minimum period of 20 years. As of today, there are no statements from the 
authorities as to whether or not Norway wishes to do so. On the one hand Norway might want to 
extend the 20-year period in order to stress its strong commitment to environmentally safe storage 
of CO2. However, in this matter the government will also be under pressure from the industry that 
wants to engage in CCS and need acceptable conditions with regard to long term risk and obligations. 
A longer responsibility period will have the potential to inhibit commercial incentives and may 
have a distortive effect in favour of other EU countries which do not expand the minimum period. 
Those countries that keep the minimum period shorter would have a competitive advantage over those 
that make this condition stricter, in terms of investment and investor’s confidence. Seeing that CCS in 
general and the storage-directive in particular is new, my “best guess” is that Norway will start out with 
implementing the prescribed 20 year period. The state will not make it too difficult for operators when the 
petroleum industry sees the possibility of developing CO2 storage for other countries as a new industry.
in addition to the 20 year period, there are several other conditions that the operator has to fulfill 
in order for the authorities to accept transfer of liability: Permanent and complete containment 
of the injected CO2, sealing of the storage site, removal of the storage facilities and a provision of 
financial contribution (see below). There is no reason to believe that Norway will deviate from these 
proposed conditions. Furthermore, it is natural that the liability that is transferred to the state is of 
the same character as the liability that the operator has been responsible for before the transfer. 
 This means that the state will be subject to a comprehensive duty of action, and an economic liability 
encompassing both the obligation to surrender ETS allowances and third party liability. 
7.4 Financial security and financial contribution
Article 19 of the CCS directive imposes a requirement of financial security on potential operators in 
order to ensure that all obligations – following the directive – during the operation phase can be met. 
This includes closure and post-closure requirements as well as potential requirements arising from 
the EU ETS. 
The directive does not define “financial security” and neither does it provide any criteria in regards to 
what constitutes such security.
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The Norwegian Petroleum Activities Act also contains a provision which gives the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy the authority to impose on the operator a form of “security”.30 However, the 
Act does not give any definition of what is meant by such security.
Norway adopted a Financial Security Act in 2004.31 The act defines financial security as an agreement 
where the ownership of an asset is transferred for the purpose of securing the fulfillment of financial 
obligations. it applies to agreements between public authority, central banks, other financial institutions 
and legal persons. The act was introduced as a result of the EEA implementation of directive 2002/47/EC 
on financial collateral arrangements. Therefore it is likely that Norwegian authorities will regard the 
act as applicable in relation to the financial security provisions in the CCS directive.
The Financial Security Act leaves wide autonomy to the parties involved, with regards to the 
conditions relating to the financial security. The parties can make their own arrangements when it 
comes to what kind of financial security should be set up and their right to use the security. Autonomy 
is also granted with regards to how and on what terms the security provider can provoke the final 
settlement. The rules are clearly written with a high degree of flexibility, which is quite typical in 
Norway for legislation concerning commercial relationships between strong business actors. 
The parties involved in CO2 storage activities will be the Norwegian government on one side and, 
most likely, a strong commercial company on the other. As such, the legislative authorities are likely 
to grant the parties flexibility with regard to the financial security.
The Norwegian government, as a party in the financial security agreement for CCS, is likely to impose 
stringent requirements vis-à-vis the operator. With regards to the amount of financial security, this 
issue will also most likely depend on the parties’ autonomy and, thus, rely on what the government 
can consider acceptable. A natural starting point in relation to calculating the amount of financial 
security would be to determine how much it would cost to the government to fulfill the duties and 
obligations it is likely to incur, in a worst case scenario. This question is in itself rather subjective and 
will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis for each operator.
The duration of the financial security is specified in the CCS directive, which decides that it is to 
be valid and effective until the responsibility of the storage site is transferred to the competent 
authority. Furthermore, the directive also adds that the financial security is to be periodically adjusted. 
These two elements will most likely be implemented by Norway without any problems.
in addition to the financial security imposed on the operator during the operation of the storage 
site, the CCS directive in Article 20 requires the operator to make a financial contribution available 
to the authorities as a condition for the transfer of responsibility. Norwegian law has at least one 
rule along the same lines, in the case of the closing down of a polluting activity; in that case the 
authorities may require a financial guarantee as a contribution for possible future costs and liability.32 
Since the financial contribution is a way of balancing out the fact that the operator is relieved of 
his environmental liability, the Norwegian legislative authorities will probably not have a problem 
with the implementation of this rule. The fact that the transfer of responsibility will entail a financial 
commitment for the operator can make the transfer easier for the legislator to accept.
30 Petroleum Activities Act Article 10-7.
31 Lov 26 mars 2004 nr. 17 om finansiell sikkerhetsstillelse.
32 Pollution and Waste Act, section 20.
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The CCS directive states that the amount of financial contribution is supposed to cover the cost 
of the fulfillment of the anticipated post-transfer obligations and at least the costs of monitoring 
for a period of 30 years. Norway, as well as the other EU Member states, has the discretion to 
impose a longer period than 30 years. Whether this discretion will be used or not remains to be seen. 
However, the same kind of argument as the one in relation to minimum-period relating to the transfer 
of liability points towards implementing the 30 year period for the financial contribution and not a 
longer period. The actual post-transfer obligations will be dependent on the specific conditions for 
each individual storage facility and on how much CO2 is stored, which will determine the magnitude 
and cost of a potential leakage. it would thus be natural for Norway to give the competent authority, 
under the meaning of the directive, the discretion to set the financial contribution on a case-by-case 
basis, based on the two aforementioned elements.
Other than the indication of the amount of the financial contribution, the CCS directive does not give 
any further details with regards to the payment. An important question is how the payment is to be 
done (i.e. in cash or in another form; all at once or several installments, etc.). However, given the new 
character of the rule of financial contribution, there are at the moment no indications regarding how 
the remaining questions will be solved in Norwegian law.
8 Relationship with the Emission Trading Scheme
At some later stage it may be necessary to consider CCS in relation to the international climate 
regime. This is an issue which is under discussion for the time being. The Kyoto protocol establishes 
GHG emission reductions and sinks as the two groups of measures to combat global warming. 
Whether CCS should be regarded as emissions reduction or a sink was discussed during the 
negotiations of the Kyoto protocol as part of a more general debate on the role of sinks within the 
regime. These discussions were complex, and many issues, including this one, were left unsolved.33 
The concepts of ‘emissions’ and ‘sinks’ are defined in UNFCCC article 1(4) and (8), and these definitions 
apply equally to Kyoto. Only certain types of sink measures may provide a basis for addition to a 
state’s ‘assigned amount’ pursuant to the protocol: land use, land use change and forestation 
(LULUF-activities). Since CCS is not a sink, it must be treated as reduced emissions or non-emissions, 
and it follows that leakage from the CCS chain will be an ‘emission’ under the system.
CCS thus serves to fulfill the emissions reduction obligation of a state party, in that it eliminates 
or reduces an emission that would otherwise have counted in the state’s emissions quota. 
However, in order to have such an effect, the CO2 must come from a source that is covered by the 
emissions reduction obligation. in Kyoto these are listed in annex A34 as ‘sectors/source categories’. 
The main categories are ‘energy’, ‘industrial processes’, ‘solvent and other product use’, ‘agriculture’ 
and ‘waste’. in order to count towards a state’s commitment, the CCS chain must capture CO2 from 
a producer that is included in this list. These categories cover most of the producers where CCS is 
feasible and relevant, such as installations for petroleum exploitation, power production from fossil 
fuel burning power plants, and industrial processes.
33 intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (iPCC), Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) and 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, vol 2 Energy, p 55. 
34 See Kyoto Protocol, art 3(1)
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At present, the role of CCS in a future climate regime is unclear. So far, it has been formally discussed 
mainly in connection with the further development of the Clean development Mechanism (CdM). 
The UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún (2010) decided that CCS in geological formations 
is ‘eligible as project activities’ under the CdM, on strict conditions laid down in the decision. 
Further work is to be carried out by technical and legal experts to clarify the more detailed modalities, 
including ‘the appropriateness of the development of transboundary carbon capture and storage 
project activities ...’.35 This was further followed up at COP 17/CMP.7 in durban in 2011 by a special 
decision36 and further discussions have been going on during 2012.
CCS projects are included in the EU ETS.37 This means, on the one hand, that GHG emission sources 
do not need allowances to the extent that the CO2 is captured and stored. On the other hand, 
it means that emission from leakage from CO2 transport and storage must be covered by allowances. 
As mentioned, it even appears that the economic liability for the storage operator set out in the 
EU directive only imposes on the operator an obligation to give up ETS allowances in case of leakages. 
9 Regulation of Transportation of Carbon dioxide 
CO2 may be transported for storage both by ship and pipeline. There is not yet any special regulation 
on CO2 transport by pipeline. The regulation we have for transport of natural gas from Norway to the 
UK and the Continent will probably be applicable to a great extent and will most likely be the basis 
for the regulation of CO2 transport for storage. This raises both public and private law questions. 
in the public law area legislation is generally rather technical (safety rules on gas transport with ships 
and with pipe-lines, etc.). in the area of private law, there are complex but well developed systems of 
contracts for both gas transport with ships and with pipelines. 
Norwegian law is well developed in both fields, through standard contracts, etc. in particular, there 
is a well developed law with regard to gas transport by pipe-line, which is the main transport medium 
for natural gas from gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf to UK and the European continent. 
in CCS many of the same questions arise, although the gas stream in fact goes in the opposite direction, 
from emission on land to the storage deep into the continental shelf. in both situations the key issues are of 
course the respective rights and obligations of the owner of the gas and the owner of the transport facility. 
Here is the question of third party access to the transport facility also essential (see above point 6.2).
An important question is also when the “property right” to the gas – and the accompanying responsibility 
for leakage etc. – is transferred from the source (emitter) to the owner of the storage site. This may be 
decided by public law regulation, but may also be left to the parties to decide by contract.38
35 decision 7/CMP.6.
36 decision 10/CMP.7 Modalities and procedures for carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological formations as clean 
development mechanism project activities.
37 directive 2003/87/EC as amended by directive 2009/29/EC for the period 2013-2020.
38 Some aspects of this are treated in Hans Christian Bugge “Transboundary Chains for Carbon Capture and Storage: Allocation 
under the Climate Regime between the States Parties of Emissions due to Leakage”, in i Havercroft, R Macrory and R Stewart 
(eds.): Carbon Capture and Storage. Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues (Hart Publishing, 2011). There is a master thesis on the 
private law issues of CO2 transport by pipe-line from the Faculty of Law in Oslo: André Lamark Ueland: “Offshore rørtransport 
av CO2 fra kontinentet til lagringssted på norsk sokkel” (Offshore pipe-line transport of CO2 from the continent to storage on 
the Norwegian continental shelf), published in Marius no 404, Oslo 2011.
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This report considers issues arising under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) regarding the 
design of a legal and regulatory framework for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in new Zealand. 
It includes a review of the present law, some comparative analysis of overseas regulatory experience, 
and puts forward some tentative reform options.1
1 Resource Management Act 1991
The RMA was designed to reform and restate the law regarding the use of air, land and water; it repealed 
and replaced 59 statutes; and is the principal statute governing the new Zealand environment. 
But despite arguments about whether the RMA should become a “one stop shop”,2 new Zealand 
environmental law is currently contained in a suite of 36 statutes.3
The statutory purpose of the RMA is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources,4 which is the ultimate issue that determines the legality of policy statement and plan 
provisions or whether proposed activities are granted or refused resource consent.5 Key features of 
the RMA include the vertical integration of policy statements and plans into a hierarchy of statutory 
planning instruments,6 and the horizontal integration of resource consent decision-making to ensure 
that proposed activities are assessed in a holistic way.7
The RMA is permissive in relation to land use activities, which only require resource consent when 
a proposed activity will be carried out in a way that would be contrary to a rule in a plan.8 In contrast, 
the RMA prohibits all other activities (e.g. the discharge of contaminants into the environment) 
from being carried out, unless prior authorisation for the activity is obtained.9
The RMA is a framework statute that primarily provides procedural guidance by defining the 
functions, powers and duties of decision-makers; and sets out the procedure for preparing policy 
statements and plans,10 deciding resource consent applications,11 and civil and criminal enforcement.12 
Administration of the RMA is devolved at first instance to local authorities (regional councils and 
territorial authorities),13 and on appeal to the environment Court.14
1 The brief was to provide a report (3,500-5,000 words) covering: the effect of the RMA on CCS operations; prohibition of 
discharge a contaminant, discharge permits, and the term of discharge permits in relation to the likely duration of injection 
operations, stabilization periods, and liability periods; the possibility that the RMA can form the core of legal framework for CCS; 
measures to manage boundary issues such as overlapping statutes; the present law; comparative analysis; and reform options. 
2 K Tremaine, RMA – Is it still a one-stop shop? RMLA 4th Annual Conference (3–5 October 1996).
3 environment Act 1986, Sch.
4 Resource Management Act 1991, s 5.
5 Shirley Primary School v Telecom Mobile Communications Ltd [1999] nZRMA 66 at 99.
6 Resource Management Act 1991, part 5.
7 Resource Management Act 1991, s 102, and s 103.
8 Section 9.
9 Sections 11–15.
10 part 5.
11 part 6.
12 part 12.
13 Sections 30, 31.
14 Section 120; part 12; and Sch 1, cl 14.
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At national level, the preparation of statutory planning instruments is permissive, apart from the 
requirement to prepare the new Zealand Coastal policy Statement.15 national policy Statements (npS) 
and national environmental Standards (neS) have been slow to emerge,16 and the delay in preparing a 
complete suite of npS and neS has been the subject of continued criticism about policy failure under 
the RMA.17 npS have also been prepared in a way that requires implementation by further delegated 
regulation via the plan change process under Schedule 1 of the RMA, and therefore do not have direct 
applicability or effect on all persons exercising functions, powers or duties under the RMA.18
The preparation of policy statements and plans by local authorities is generally permissive, 
apart from the requirement to prepare regional policy statements,19 regional coastal plans,20 and 
district plans.21 As a result, there is no requirement for regional councils to prepare regional plans 
regarding a range of matters, including the discharge of contaminants into the environment.
2 The effect of the RMA on CCS operations
This section of report considers the effect of the RMA on CCS operations.
CCS involves the capture of carbon dioxide gas from large point sources (e.g. fossil fuel 
power stations), its transportation, and permanent storage under ground. The permanent storage of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) underground is accomplished by injecting it in supercritical form into porous rock 
(e.g. a depleted oil or gas reservoir or a saline aquifer) at depths of 800 m or more.22 CCS will include:
• The storage site: “A storage complex, overburden, the surface projection of the storage complex, 
and injection facilities.”23
• The storage complex: “A primary containment system and any secondary containment system.”24
It will also include any pipeline network required to transport CO2 from large point sources to the 
storage site for injection into the storage complex.
15 Section 57.
16 Sections 45–55; and sections 43AA-44A.
17 Ap Randerson, Environmental Law and Justice: A perspective on three decades of practice and some possibilities for the future, 
nZCeL national Forum: environmental Law for Sustainability, entering a new Millennium (17 April 1999); Ap Randerson, RMLA 
Seminar to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the enactment of the Resource Management Act (28 August 2001); S Westerlund, 
“Theory for Sustainable Development: Towards or Against”, in HC Bugge and C Voigt Sustainable Development in International 
and National Law (2003) europa Law publishing, at 49; S Dovers and R Connor, “Institutions and policy Change for Sustainability”, 
in B Richardson and S Wood, Environmental Law for Sustainability (2006) at 21.
18 For example, the npS on Freshwater Management 2011 contains 14 policies but only two policies are directed to be included in 
regional plans under section 55 of the RMA without using the Schedule 1 plan change process. The compliance period specified 
for implementation of the npS by regional councils is 31 December 2030. See: Milne & Severinsen, “The npS on Freshwater 
Management: What will it mean in practice?” April 2012 RMJ 13, for a critique of the npS.
19 Resource Management Act 1991, s 60.
20 Section 64.
21 Section 73.
22 Transfield Worley nZCCS partnership, CCS in new Zealand: Can carbon capture and storage deliver value to new Zealand as we 
head towards a low carbon future? (September 2011) at 3.
23 International energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010) at 127.
24 At 127.
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The activity will comprise distinct stages including site selection and establishment, operation, 
and aftercare. It will also include a range of component activities similar to the activities encountered 
in relation to geothermal and oil and gas wells, and landfills.
As a result, CCS activities will likely require a suite of land use consents, water permits and discharge 
permits from the relevant consent authorities.25 Depending on the location of both the storage site 
and the storage complex, resource consent could be required from a number of local authorities 
(regional councils and territorial authorities) as consent authority jurisdiction is confined by the 
boundaries of local authority administrative areas,26 and there may be no correlation between 
the physical extent of subterranean geological or hydrogeological structures or formations and 
administrative boundaries.
While horizontal integration is a key feature of the RMA, it is limited to joint hearings in the 
context of a particular region.27 For joint decision-making to occur in an inter-regional context, 
the resource consent applications would need to be called-in for decision by the Minister, and 
referred to a board of inquiry or directly to the environment Court under the RMA streamlining and 
simplifying procedures.28
Where multiple resource consent applications are nominally required, both the RMA and relevant 
regulations are drafted in a way that would allow a single resource consent application and assessment 
of environmental effects to be prepared in relation to the whole project and filed with the relevant 
consent authorities.29 However, in practice some consent authorities insist on “global” applications 
being unbundled and require a suite of separate applications to be filed.30
3 The prohibition on the discharge  
of contaminants, discharge permits,  
and the term of discharge permits
This section of report considers the prohibition on the discharge of contaminants into the environment 
under the RMA; discharge permits; and the term of discharge permits in relation to the likely duration 
of injection operations, stabilisation periods, and liability periods.
25 Scottish experience is that more than 50 separate consents may be required for a CCS project: The Scottish Government, 
Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage Regulatory Test Exercise (11 & 12 August 2010), at 3.
26 Currently, there are 11 regional councils, 61 territorial authorities, and 6 unitary councils in new Zealand: source, Local 
Government new Zealand, <www.lgnz.co.nz>.
27 Resource Management Act 1991, s 102.
28 part 6AA.
29 Section 88 and Sch 4, and Resource Management (Forms, Fees and procedure) Regulations 2003.
30 For example, 5 separate resource consent applications (including 3 discharge permit applications) were required to establish the 
composting activity carried on by Living earth Ltd on puketutu Island, Manukau: Living Earth Ltd v Auckland Regional Council, 
A126/06 (unreported).
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prohibition on the discharge of contaminants
As noted above, the discharge of contaminants into the environment requires prior approval 
under section 15 of the RMA, which prohibits the discharge unless expressly allowed by an neS, or 
by a rule in the relevant regional plan, or by resource consent. Section 15(1) of the RMA regulates 
(inter alia) the discharge of contaminants into land in circumstances which may result in that 
contaminant entering water, and the discharge of contaminants from any industrial or trade premises 
into land. Relevant statutory definitions include:
• “Contaminants” are defined as any substance or energy or heat, or any combination of them that 
when discharged into water or onto land “changes or is likely to change the physical, chemical, 
or biological condition” of the water or land. Contaminative substances include “gases, odorous 
compounds, liquids, solids, and micro-organisms”.31
• Water is defined as including “surface water and groundwater”; and “fresh water, coastal water, 
and geothermal water”.32
• Industrial or trade premises are defined to include “any premises used for the storage, transfer, 
treatment, or disposal of waste materials or for other waste-management purposes, or used for 
composting organic materials”.33
Significantly, there is no comprehensive statutory definition of “discharge” in the RMA.34 The meaning 
of “discharge” was considered by the Court of Appeal in McKnight v NZ Biogas Industries Ltd.35 
The case involved the discharge of potato and vegetable waste into a tributary of the Otara Stream in 
Manukau, when a storage bladder at a waste treatment plant burst and the contents were disgorged 
over land and into the creek. The plant operator was charged with criminal offences under s 338 
of the RMA, and the issue for the Court was whether the discharge was “due to an event beyond 
the control of the defendant that could not reasonably have been foreseen or provided against”.36 
If so, a statutory defence was available under s 341(1) of the RMA. The Court noted that:37
In the ordinary and natural use of language, a person discharges something when he causes it to 
be discharged. In the context of an environmental protection statute there is everything to be 
said for adopting that meaning … the extension of the meaning in the definition to include emit 
points in the same direction. Similarly the extension of the defined meaning to allow to escape 
appears to encompass passive lack of interference.
The Court also had regard to comparative authorities from other jurisdictions and concluded that 
the situation in McKnight was “indistinguishable” from Alphacell Ltd v Woodward,38 where the 
House of Lords held:
31 Resource Management Act 1991, s 2(1).
32 Section 2(1).
33 Section 2(1).
34 Section 2(1) simply provides that “discharge” includes “emit, deposit, and allow to escape”.
35 McKnight v NZ Biogas Industries Ltd [1994] nZRMA 258.
36 McKnight v NZ Biogas Industries Ltd [1994] nZRMA 258 at 264.
37 At 265.
38 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] 2 All eR 475 at 479 per Lord Wilberforce.
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In my opinion, “causing” here must be given a common sense meaning and I deprecate the 
introduction of refinements, such as causa causans, effective cause or novus actus. There may 
be difficulties where acts of third persons or natural forces are concerned but I find the present 
case comparatively simple. The appellants extract water, pass it through their works where it 
becomes polluted, conduct it to a settling tank communicating directly with the stream, into 
which the polluted water will inevitably overflow if the level rises over the overflow point.  
They plan, however, to recycle the water by pumping it back from the settling tank into their 
works; if the pumps work properly this will happen and the level in the tank will remain below 
the overflow point. It did not happen on the relevant occasion due to some failure in the pumps.
In my opinion, this is a clear case of causing the polluted water to enter the stream. The whole 
complex operation which might lead to this result was an operation deliberately conducted by 
the appellants and I fail to see how a defect in one stage of it, even if we must assume that this 
happened without their negligence, can enable them to say they did not cause the pollution.  
In my opinion, complication of this case by infusion of mens rea, and its exceptions, is unnecessary 
and undesirable.
As a result the Court found no difficulty in holding that the defendant had caused the discharge due 
to the manner in which the pit that contained the bladder had been constructed. Failure to take 
reasonable precautions, such as obtaining engineering advice, had made the discharge “inevitable”.
When these definitions are applied to CCS, it is reasonably clear that injecting CO2 in supercritical 
form into depleted oil or gas reservoirs or saline aquifers deep below the land surface will be deemed 
to include the discharge of contaminants into the environment, that the precautionary approach to 
landfills that requires discharge permits due to the potential that contaminants may enter ground 
water will also be applied to CCS,39 and that storage sites for CCS will be deemed to be industrial or 
trade premises. As a result, resource consent will be required unless the activity is permitted by an 
neS, or by a rule in the relevant plan. It is also reasonably clear that enforcement under the RMA 
could result in the event of any CO2 leakage from a pipeline or storage complex.
Discharge permits
As noted above, unless CCS is expressly allowed by an neS or by a permitted activity rule in the 
relevant regional plan, resource consent will be required.40 Section 87A of the RMA provides for plan 
rules to classify activities as permitted activities, controlled activities, restricted discretionary activities, 
discretionary activities, non-complying activities, and prohibited activities.41 Absent a rule in a plan 
classifying the consent status of the activity, all activities are deemed to be discretionary activities.42
The RMA imposes few substantive requirements on regional councils. For example, when preparing 
regional plans they must ensure that the plan will promote sustainable management as required 
39 See: Centre for Advanced engineering (CAe), Landfill Guidelines (2000); Ministry for the environment, Guide to Landfill Consent 
Conditions (May 2001); Ministry for the environment, A Guide to the Management of Closing and Closed Landfills in New Zealand 
(May 2001); Ministry for the environment, A Guide to the Management of Cleanfills (January 2002).
40 Various types of resource consents are defined by section 87 of the RMA, including “discharge permits”, which are defined 
as “a consent to do something (other than in a coastal marine area) that otherwise would contravene section 15”: Resource 
Management Act 1991, s 87(e).
41 Resource Management Act 1991, s 87A(6) provides that no resource consent application can be made for a prohibited activity, 
and that consent authorities must not grant resource consent for prohibited activities.
42 Resource Management Act 1991, s 87B(1)(a).
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under part 2 of the RMA,43 when including permitted activity rules about discharges in regional plans 
they must ensure (inter alia) that the discharge does not give rise to adverse effects in relation to 
drinking water for farm animals or aquatic life,44 and they are precluded from having regard to the 
effects of greenhouse gas discharges on climate change.45 Similar substantive requirements apply to 
regional councils when deciding discharge permit applications.46
Absent any substantive guidance in the RMA, or npS, or neS, regional councils will be left in a policy 
vacuum, and will be free to determine what requirements or conditions should apply to CCS activities.47 
It is clear that a range of matters will be relevant when deciding whether to allow CCS activities 
to be carrier out, either generally or in relation to specific proposals. They will include: definitions, 
site exploration, site selection, activity classification, inspections, monitoring, remediation measures, 
site closure, and financial contributions for aftercare.48 An examination of regional plan rules 
regarding landfill activities indicates that although similar matters will also be relevant in the context 
of waste-management activities, plans typically do not provide detailed guidance on these matters.49 
Instead, regional councils rely on non-statutory guidelines from the Centre for Advanced engineering 
(CAe) and from the Ministry for the environment (Mfe),50 and their power to include consent 
conditions when granting discharge permits.51 In particular, site selection does not appear to be 
expressly considered, apart from those cases where the question of alternative sites is relevant under 
part 2 of the RMA.52 Reliance on non-statutory guidelines, however, appears to be endemic under the 
RMA. For example, Williams noted that “new Zealand appears to have become seduced into thinking 
that much of the needed action can be initiated and sustained by voluntary programmes”.53
Duration of discharge permits
Discharge permits may be granted for a period not exceeding 35 years from the date of grant, or where 
no period is specified the duration of the consent is 5 years from the date of commencement of the 
consent.54 Regardless of the maximum 35 year consent period available under the RMA, some consent 
authorities have adopted policies (either formally or informally) designed to keep consent holders on 
a “short leash” by normally granting permits for periods of 10–15 years.55 The duration of discharge 
43 Section 63(1).
44 Section 70(1)(f) and (g).
45 Section 70A.
46 Sections 107(1)(f) and (g); and 104e.
47 Section 30(1)(f): The functions of regional councils are defined as including “the control of discharges of contaminants into or 
onto land, air, or water and discharges of water into water”.
48 International energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010) at 55-104.
49 See, for example: Waikato Regional plan, 5 Land and Soil Module, 5.2 Discharges onto or into land, 5.2.3 policies, policy 2 Other 
discharges onto land, and 5.2.7.1 Discretionary activity rule – new and currently operating landfills.
50 See: Centre for Advanced engineering, Landfill Guidelines (2000); Ministry for the environment, Guide to Landfill Consent Conditions 
(May 2001); Ministry for the environment, A Guide to the Management of Closing and Closed Landfills in New Zealand (May 2001); 
Ministry for the environment, A Guide to the Management of Cleanfills (January 2002).
51 Resource Management Act 1991, s 108 regarding conditions of resource consents; and s 108A regarding bonds.
52 TV3 Network Services Ltd v Waikato District Council [1997] nZRMA 557.
53 JM Williams, “Sustainability: the “language” for the 21st century” in T Daya-Winterbottom (ed) The Salmon Lectures – Justice and 
the Environment (2nd ed) (2012) at19.
54 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 123(d), and 116.
55 PVL Proteins v Auckland Regional Council, A61/2001 (unreported).
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permits is therefore problematic for infrastructure and capital intensive activities,56 and is also likely to 
be problematic for CCS projects where the injection phase could be some years or decades long, but 
where measuring, monitoring and verification would need to go on for decades longer afterwards,57 
unless resource consents are renewed. The relatively short consent period available under the RMA will 
also create specific issues in relation to injection operations and stabilization periods.58 Overall, the need 
to renew consents will have an effect on compliance costs and investment certainty.
Under the RMA liability during the consent period, and liability post closure, will rest with consent 
holders, site owners, and occupiers.59 The RMA imposes strict liability,60 with limited statutory 
defences,61 and provides a “deep pockets” regime with no express preference regarding who should be 
primarily responsible for any statutory breach: i.e. the consent authority could choose to commence 
enforcement action against all persons that have been involved in the CCS activity, including any 
passive land owner, or it could focus on the person with the greatest financial resources at their 
disposal to pay mitigation costs and criminal fines.62 However, there are practical difficulties that may 
limit retrospective RMA liability (e.g. availability of legal site access for former owners).63
4 Can the RMA form the core of a legal 
framework for CCS?
This section of report considers the possibility that the RMA could form the core of a legal framework 
for CCS. However, the legal framework provided by the RMA would require careful analysis before 
any policy decisions are taken about RMA reform to retrofit the statute and make it fit for purpose as 
the core legal framework for CCS in new Zealand, including the following matters:
• While the RMA could form the core legal framework for CCS, a critical issue would be preparing 
or changing plans to regulate these activities via the Schedule 1 process. This could take time,64 
and absent any relevant npS or neS there would be no guarantee that a nationally consistent 
56 For example, current policy questions in the RMA reform process include “whether permits for large-scale long-term 
infrastructure should be given for more than 35 years and whether there should be a minimum term for water permits – for 
example, 20 years”. Source: Ministry for the environment, Freshwater reform 2013 and beyond (March 2013) at 43.
57 B Barton, “Carbon Capture and Storage Law for new Zealand: A Comparative Study” (2009) 13 nZJeL 1, at 2.
58 For example, stabilisation periods of 15-20 years after site closure are typically required under Australian and european Union 
legislation: Offshore petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006, s 399; and eU CCS Directive 2009/31, Article 18. 
See: n Durrant, Legal Responses to Climate Change (2010), at 190-193.
59 Resource Management Act 1991, s 314.
60 Section 341.
61 Section 341.
62 See: T Daya-Winterbottom, “Contaminants in paradise” (1998) 2 nZJeL 93.
63 Voullaire v Jones (1998) 4 eLRnZ 75.
64 There has been lobbying from local government for RMA reform of the Schedule 1 plan preparation process by substituting 
merits appeals with appeals on questions of law only, but these proposals have not (to date) been supported by informed 
analysis and commentary. See: T Daya-Winterbottom, “Blue horizons” August 2011 RMJ, at 21; D nolan et al “A better approach 
to improving the RMA plan process” [2012] RM Theory & practice, at 63; L newhook “Current and recent past practice of the 
environment Court concerning appeals on proposed plans and policy statements” [2013] RM Theory & practice, at 241; and 
D nolan et al “Faster, higher, stronger – or just wrong? Flaws in the framework recommended by the Land and Water Forum’s 
Second Report” [2013] RM Theory & practice, at 252.
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and horizontally integrated rule framework would emerge. Additionally, based on experience with 
existing plans (e.g. landfills) it is unlikely that detailed guidance would be provided regarding CCS 
activities of the kind envisaged by the IeA Model Regulatory Framework.65
• The permissive approach to land use activities under section 9 of the RMA is not replicated in other 
jurisdictions where CCS activities require prior authorisation in order to be lawfully carried on.66
• procedurally, the RMA does not impose any obligations for applicants to consult with affected 
persons.67 In contrast, legislation in other jurisdictions places considerable emphasis on public 
consultation both as part of the application process and on a continuing “stakeholder” basis 
throughout the lifetime of the CCS project.68 This could present a real tension between current 
RMA practice and international best practice by raising “public sensitivities” similar to those 
encountered in the GMO debate,69 and the simplifying and streamlining objectives of current RMA 
reforms.70
• Absent any express rules about priority to resources in the context of competing applications, 
the first in first served rule applies as a default mechanism under the RMA;71 whereas in other 
jurisdictions other methods of allocation are used (e.g. tenders) and express provision is made for 
comparative consideration of competing applications.72
• Apart from the general monitoring duties in section 35 of the RMA, there are no specific ongoing 
obligations imposed on the consent authority. This contrasts markedly with the situation in the 
european Union where annual inspection is required in relation to CCS activities, reducing to 
inspection every 5 years post closure until responsibility for the site is transferred to a competent 
authority.73 Likewise in Australia detailed monitoring requirements are specified in legislation, 
including requirements for injection and monitoring plans;74 and specific provision is made in the 
european Union for CCS operators to notify the competent authority of any leakages or significant 
irregularities and carry out any required remediation action.75
65 International energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010) at 55-104.
66 energy Act 2008 (UK), s 17.
67 Resource Management Act 1991, Sch 4, cl 1AA.
68 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 152-156.
69 See: M Grant, “Letting the Genie out of the Bottle?”, in T Daya-Winterbottom (ed) The Salmon Lectures – Justice and the 
Environment (1st ed) (2007) at 30; and Havercroft, Macrory & Stewart (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and 
Regulatory Issues (2011) at 3, 251-264.
70 See: S nolan, “Facilitating infrastructure development”, [2012] RM Theory & practice, at 97; and Havercroft, Macrory & Stewart 
(eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues (2011), at 3, 277-296.
71 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 nZLR 257.
72 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 22 and 24.
73 eU Directive 2009/31 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide, art 15.
74 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), s 94.
75 eU Directive 2009/31 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide, art 16.
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• express provisions are also made in overseas legislation for site closure and liability, 
e.g. for the terms on which the surrender and cancellation of licenses will be accepted by the 
relevant competent authority,76 for indemnities and the assumption of long-term post closure 
liability by the relevant competent authority,77 and for the payment of financial contributions to 
meet long-term monitoring and verification costs.78 These approaches contrast starkly with the 
“deep pockets” approach under the RMA noted above, and long-term liability has been identified 
as an issue that “may prove a real hindrance to investment in the technology”.79
Internationally, a range of approaches have been adopted to provide for CCS including amendments 
to existing legislation pertaining to “resource extraction” or the assessment of environmental effects, 
and “dedicated” CCS legislation.80 When considering the alternative approaches of revising existing 
legislation or enacting “dedicated” legislation to provide the legal framework for CCS, “gap and barrier 
analysis” will be an important component of the deliberation process.81 Comparison with some of the 
detailed provisions noted above indicates that the RMA may not be suitable to “handle the specific 
risks involved in CCS operations”.82
5 Measures to manage boundary issues such as 
overlapping statutes
This section of report considers measures to manage boundary issues such as overlapping statutes.
Boundary issues will arise where proposed CCS activities require approval under multiple statutory 
or administrative jurisdictions. Currently, new Zealand environmental law adopts a “silo” approach 
where approval is required under more than one statute, and applicants are left to navigate their 
way through the statutory thicket and prioritise the order in which consents are applied for. 
Where boundary issues are dealt with by the RMA, this is addressed by excluding jurisdiction so that 
matters are dealt with entirely under another statute.83 While this approach may simplify matters 
by clarifying the statutory jurisdiction under which particular matters will be processed and decided, 
it does not streamline process in the way envisaged by Tremaine when he questioned whether the 
RMA should become a “one stop shop”.84
76 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 168 and 170.
77 Offshore petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), ss 399-401.
78 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic), ss 112 and 174.
79 Havercroft, Macrory & Stewart (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues (2011) at 3, 159-178.
80 International energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage Model Regulatory Framework (2010) at 14.
81 At 22.
82 At 23.
83 See, for example: Resource Management Act 1991, s 5(2)(a) regarding minerals: Winter and Clark v Taranaki Regional Council 
and Fletcher Challenge Energy Taranaki Ltd (1998) 4 eLRnZ 506, [1999] nZRMA 1; RMA, s 30(3) regarding fisheries; and RMA, 
s 70A and 104e regarding the discharge of greenhouse gases: Genesis Power Ltd v Greenpeace New Zealand Inc [2007] nZCA 469 
and [2008] nZSC 112, and Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Buller Coal Ltd [2012] nZHC 2156.
84 K Tremaine, RMA – Is it still a one-stop shop? RMLA 4th Annual Conference (3–5 October 1996).
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In contrast, under the Integrated Development Act 1997 and the Sustainable planning Act 2009 in 
Queensland, local authorities have been required to follow the integrated development assessment 
system (IDAS), designed (inter alia) to address cases where approvals are required under multiple 
statutory jurisdictions administered by different state or local authority functionaries, where 
the responsibility for processing and deciding applications is “referred” or allocated to a specific 
functionary. From June 2013, this system will be further streamlined by introducing a single state 
assessment and referral agency (SARA) that will be responsible for receiving all applications and 
coordinating the processing and determination of them via a single process. put simply, SARA will 
establish a “one stop shop” for processing and deciding applications. This will avoid the need for the 
“mediation” process under IDAS that allocates the processing and determination of applications after 
they have been filed with a local authority or state department.85
In other jurisdictions there has been greater use of national statutory planning instruments 
(e.g. npS) to coordinate, streamline and simplify decision-making by local authorities under particular 
statutes, for example, in the United Kingdom under the Town and Country planning Acts where a full 
suite of 25 planning policy guidance notes (ppG’s) was used to ensure uniformity in decision-making 
by local authorities regarding plan preparation and deciding planning applications. Most recently, 
the suite of ppG’s has been streamlined and replaced by a single, 59 page, national planning policy 
framework (nppF). Where local authority plans are not up to date, the policies in the nppF prevail.86 
Additionally, statutory regulations (similar to neS) are used in the United Kingdom to classify 
activities as permitted and controlled activities, and the requirements and conditions that apply to 
these activities.87
6 Reform options
This section of report provides concluding comments on the present law, comparative analysis, and 
possible reform options.
The present law under the RMA is fractured. Decision-making is devolved to 78 local authorities, 
and horizontal integration between local authority policy statements and plans is not 
coordinated as a result of the slow progress made with preparing a full suite of directly applicable 
npS and neS. environmental decision-making, generally, also remains split across 36 separate 
statutory jurisdictions.
Comparative analysis illustrates that greater use of npS and neS is urgently required to 
coordinate decision-making by local authorities regarding particular activities, such as CCS. 
Analysis also demonstrates that a more direct approach is required when npS are drafted and 
gazetted, and that npS should have direct effect without the need to prepare plan changes via the 
RMA Schedule 1 process.
85 Queensland planning reform: <www.dsdip.qld.gov.au>.
86 national planning policy Framework (2012), para 4, at 4.
87 Town and Country planning (General permitted Development) Order 1995 (amended 2008).
AppenDIx D 369
While npS and neS could be used to coordinate uniform decision-making in relation to 
proposed CCS activities, this would not resolve issues regarding consent duration or post-closure 
and aftercare liability. Specific RMA amendments would be required to address these issues. 
Likewise, boundary issues between different statutory jurisdictions that may apply to proposed CCS 
activities (e.g. Crown Minerals Act 1991 or Gas Act 1992) could not be fully addressed by preparing 
npS or neS or by further RMA amendments, and a more sophisticated approach to environmental 
decision-making (e.g. IDAS or SARA) may be required.
The complexity of providing for proposed CCS activities across multiple local authority and 
statutory jurisdictions, however, indicates that specific legislation may be required to govern these 
activities. notwithstanding the more sophisticated approach to horizontal and vertical integration of 
environmental decision-making in Queensland, the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 was enacted 
to provide expressly for CCS activities. The Australian experience provides a basis for legislative 
reform in new Zealand,88 while the complexity of regulating proposed CCS activities across multiple 
jurisdictional silos is amply illustrated by the United Kingdom experience.89
Finally, stepping back from specific RMA issues to consider the purpose of CCS as a mechanism 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it is for note that the environment Court held in the 
Environmental Defence Society cases that a national approach was required to address climate 
change,90 and the RMA was subsequently amended to reflect the preferred policy choice of the 
new Zealand government for addressing climate change via the emissions Trading Scheme by 
precluding consideration of the climate change effects of greenhouse gas emissions under the RMA.91 
notwithstanding the result of any “gaps and barriers analysis” of the RMA, these authorities may 
indicate that dedicated CCS legislation is likely to be the preferred new Zealand policy choice for 
regulating CCS activities.92
88 Offshore petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth); Barrow Island Act 2003 (WA); Greenhouse Gas Geological 
Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic); and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld).
89 Department of energy and Climate Change, UK Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Commercial Scale Demonstration 
programme, Delivering projects 2-4 (Further Information) (December 2010), at 23-26.
90 Environmental Defence Society v Taranaki Regional Council (A184/2002) unreported, and Environmental Defence Society v 
Auckland Regional Council [2002] nZRMA 492.
91 Resource Management (energy and Climate Change) Amendment Act 2004.
92 However, legal analysis of CCS in new Zealand environmental legal writing is rudimentary. There is no discussion of the 
topic in the leading text, A Cameron (ed) Climate Change Law and Policy in New Zealand (2011), outside the context of 
carbon sequestration in relation to biofuels and forestry activities; and the only in-depth legal study to date appears to be: 
B Barton, “Carbon Capture and Storage Law for new Zealand: A Comparative Study” (2009) 13 nZJeL 1. In contrast, Australian 
environmental legal writing on CSS is prolific, including: Bonyhady & Christoff, Climate Law in Australia (2007) at 142-160, 
W Gumley and T Daya-Winterbottom, Climate Change Law: Comparative, Contractual & Regulatory Considerations (2009) 
at 111-122, and n Durrant, Legal Responses to Climate Change (2010) at 175-200.
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1 Introduction
The capture and underground storage of carbon dioxide (CO2) is an approach employed to reduce 
emissions and alleviate concerns associated with global climate change. In light of the effect this 
operation may have on Māori, the purpose of this Appendix is to consider the possibility of a claim to 
the Waitangi Tribunal for a breach of the rights contained in the Treaty of Waitangi/te Tiriti o Waitangi 
(the Treaty). In ascertaining this possibility this Appendix will first provide a general background of 
the rights articulated in the Treaty and any legal effect, second the claim process and the jurisdiction 
of the Waitangi Tribunal, and third identify some issues with some concluding comments. In light 
of the concluding comments the final part will hypothesise on the likely areas where a Treaty claim 
may result. It should be noted that the limitations, or potential effect, of additional legislation 
e.g. Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) and the Crown Minerals Act 1991, upon such a claim will 
not be considered.
2 The Treaty of Waitangi
In 1840, the Crown and Māori signed the Treaty. This action subsumed the existing social, political, 
legal and economic rights for Māori into a non-Māori paradigm. 
2.1 Text
There were several different texts of the Treaty both in english and in Māori, te Tiriti o Waitangi. 
Signed in 1840, Article 1 of the english text, commonly referred to, stated:1
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of new Zealand … cede to Her Majesty the 
Queen of england absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty 
which the said Confederation … respectively exercise or possess[.]
In Article 2 the Crown, in exchange, confirmed and guaranteed: 
Her Majesty the Queen of england confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of  
new Zealand … the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and estates Forests 
Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess[.]
In Article 3, the Crown also extended:
Her Majesty the Queen of england extends to the natives of new Zealand Her royal protection 
and imparts to them all the Rights and privileges of British Subjects.
1 I H Kawharu, “The Treaty of Waitangi (the text in english) by I H Kawharu” in M Belgrave, M Kawharu and d Williams (eds) 
Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University press, Australia, 2005) at 389–390.
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The Māori text of Te Tiriti stated:2
Ko Wikitoria te Kuini o Ingarani i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu o nu Tirani 
i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga me to ratou wenua, a kia mau 
tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hoki kua wakaro ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi 
Rangatira - hei kai wakarite ki nga Tangata maori o nuTirani - kia wakaaetia e nga Rangatira maori 
te Kawanatanga o te Kuini ki nga wahikatoa o te Wenua nei me nga Motu - na te mea hoki he 
tokomaha ke nga tangata o tona Iwi Kua noho ki tenei wenua, a e haere mai nei.
na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e puta mai ki te 
tangata maori ki te pakeha e noho ture kore ana. na kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu 
Hopihona he Kapitana i te Roiara nawi hei Kawana mo nga wahi katoa o nu Tirani e tukua aianei, 
amua atu ki te Kuini, e mea atu ana ia ki nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga o nga hapu o nu Tirani 
me era Rangatira atua enei ture ka korerotia nei.
Ko te tuatahi
Ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoke ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga 
ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu - te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.
Ko te tuarua
Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu - ki nga tangata katoa 
o nu Tirani te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa. Otiia 
ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o 
era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te wenua - ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko 
te kai hoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei kai hoko mona.
Ko te tuatoru
Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaeetanga ki te Kawanatanga o te Kuini - Ka tiakina e te 
Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata maori katoa o nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou nga tikanga katoa rite tahi 
ki ana mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani.
[signed] W. Hobson Consul & Lieutenant Governor
na ko matou ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o nga hapu o nu Tirani ka huihui nei ki Waitangi 
ko matou hoki ko nga Rangatira o nu Tirani ka kite nei i te ritenga o enei kupu, ka tangohia ka 
wakaaetia katoatia e matou, koia ka tohungia ai o matou ingoa o matou tohu.
Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i te ono o nga ra o pepueri i te tau kotahi mano, e waru raue wa te 
kau o to tatou Ariki.
There are several different translations of the Māori text into english. The reconstruction of the Māori 
text by I.H. Kawharu is widely recognised and accepted. The reconstruction states:3
In Article 1:
The Chiefs of the Confederation … give absolutely to the Queen of england for ever the complete 
government over their land.
In Article 2:
The Queen of england agrees to protect the chiefs … in the unqualified exercise of their 
chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures [taonga] [.]
2 distinguished professor dame Anne Salmond’s Brief of evidence for the Waitangi Tribunal Wai 1040 dated 17 April 2010, at 4.
3 I H Kawharu “A reconstruction of Maori text” in M Belgrave, M Kawharu and d Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on 
the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University press, Australia, 2005) at 389-390.
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In Article 3:
[T]he Queen of england will protect all the ordinary people of new Zealand and will give them 
the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of england.
It is clear that the Māori text enables continuing rangatiratanga of Māori tribes over their possessions 
and taonga and that the Crown would protect that rangatiratanga. This includes the right of self-
determination and the right of development. The Crown receiving the right to govern, a delegated 
power, subject to continuing Māori authority.4 However, in the english text Māori cede sovereignty 
to the Crown.
The meaning of the Treaty is often debated.5 The discrepancies between the english and Māori texts 
and translations of the Treaty/te Tiriti have caused much debate and misunderstanding and are to 
be noted.6 According to professor Anne Salmond, this due to the fact that the Treaty of Waitangi and 
Te Tiriti are:7
[T]wo very different documents, with divergent textual histories and political implications; and 
for that reason, it is a mistake to bracket them together. I have observed that this error has led to 
a confused and confusing historiography of the Treaty, which should not be perpetuated.
From a legal perspective, the most important discrepancy lies within the translation of “kawanatanga” 
to mean, governorship, and not, sovereignty. Kawharu noted that Māori signatories had no 
understanding of ‘government’ in the sense of ‘sovereignty’ when signing the Treaty. There was no 
equivalent translation of “kawanatanga”.
According to professor Anne Salmond “I do not believe, however, that in signing Te Tiriti, the rangatira 
ceded sovereignty to the British Crown”.8
The issue of whether or not Māori ceded their sovereignty to the Crown is the subject of a current 
Treaty claim that, although it has no direct impact on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), should be 
noted.9 If Māori did not in fact cede sovereignty then the Crown’s subsequent sovereign actions can 
be perceived as illegitimate. 
notwithstanding these discrepancies, the Treaty is the main vehicle through which Māori continue to 
express their desire to survive as a distinct people. The Treaty stands on its own10 as a source of rights 
and obligations between Māori and the Crown.11 
4 See Brief of evidence given by distinguished professor dame Anne Salmond to the Waitangi Tribunal Wai 1040 17 April 2010, at 25.
5 See, for example, discussion in Maui Solomon “The Wai 262 Claim” in in M Belgrave, M Kawharu and d Williams (eds) Waitangi 
Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University press, Australia, 2005) at 216-217.
6 For discussion, see C Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1997) at 32–59 and also He Tirohanga o Kawa ki 
te Tiriti o Waitangi (Te puni Kokiri, Wellington, 2001) at 37 <www.tpk.govt.nz>.
7 To fully understand the extent of misunderstanding see distinguished professor dame Anne Salmond’s Brief of evidence for the 
Waitangi Tribunal Wai 1040 dated 17 April 2010, at 84.
8 Salmond, ibid, at 26.
9 Wai 1040 Te paparahi o te Raki claim.
10 But see further discussion in point “Legal Status of the Treaty” and Te Heu Heu Tu Kino v Aotea District Māori Land Board [1941] 
nZLR 590.
11 Alison Quentin-Baxter “The International and Constitutional Law Contexts” in Alison Quentin-Baxter (ed) Recognising the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Institute of policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, new Zealand 1998) at 32.
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Further, it is commonly accepted that Article 2 confirms and guarantees to Māori the full, exclusive, 
and undisturbed possession of their lands, estates, forests, fisheries, and other treasures. The use 
of taonga, or treasures, implies a connection between the Treaty and Māori social and economic 
development. Although Article 2 may seem to be restricted to forests and fisheries, the 1988 Royal 
Commission on Social policy broadened the application of Article 2 to include social and economic 
policies.12 In stating that the “Queen of england will protect all Māori of new Zealand and will give 
them the same rights as those of the people of england” article 3 includes protection and equality. 
There is change in the understanding of what taonga captures, and there is complexity in the status 
of carbon dioxide. In climate change terms, CO2 is usually thought of as greenhouse gas, a waste 
with harmful effects; but that is not the whole story. The substance has long been useful and valued 
in firefighting, in the food industry, and in greenhouse horticulture. It is important in enhanced oil 
recovery (eOR, or enhanced hydrocarbon recovery). More generally CO2 is part of the web of life 
in photosynthesis and respiration. It is necessary for plant life. There is some reason therefore to 
consider that the CO2 aspect of a CCS operation could be classified as a taonga under Article 2, and 
be subject to a potential Treaty claim by Māori.
It would be reasonable to assume that a CCS operation may impact on Māori economic and social 
development and thus be subject to a potential Treaty claim by Māori.
It would also be reasonable to assume that if the storage, separation and capture operation was on, 
or near, traditional land, or waahi tapu, this activity could be subject to a potential Treaty claim by 
Māori. Although the title of the land may have passed from Māori the obligation, as kaitiaki with 
manawhenua, on Māori, continues.13 This becomes manifest in the ongoing role, for Māori, to caretake 
the land to ensure it is available for future generations. The feasibility of such claims will be further 
considered in the final part of this Appendix.
2.2 Legal effect
Initially viewed as a simple nullity,14 the orthodox view, on the legal effect of the Treaty, is that 
unless it has been adopted or implemented by statute, it is not part of our domestic law and 
creates no rights enforceable in Court. In Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board (1941) 
Viscount Simon LC, privy Council ruled that:15
[I]t is well settled that any rights purported to be conferred by such a Treaty of cession cannot be 
enforced by the Courts, except so far as they have been incorporated in municipal law.
Viscount Simon LC also noted that:16 
[T]he Treaty is a valid treaty of cession and the Treaty was unenforceable of itself in new Zealand 
Courts except to the extent that it had been given by statute.
12 Royal Commission on Social policy, The April Report (1988) Vol 11: Future directions 27, 80.
13 See for example The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry v Waikato Regional Council environment Court, 
Hamilton, decision no A 133/2006, 17 October 2006, Judge Sheppard.
14 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 nZJur (nS) 72 at 78 per prendergast CJ.
15 Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] 2 All e.R. 93 at p 98; also [1941] nZLR 590.
16 Te Heu Heu Tu Kino ibid.
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The noble Viscount then quoted the passage from Lord dunedin’s judgment17 and continued with:
So far as the appellant invokes the assistance of the court, it is clear that he cannot rest his claim 
on the Treaty of Waitangi, and that he must refer the court to some statutory recognition of the 
right claimed by him.
This is consistent with the constitutional principle in new Zealand that in general treaties are not 
part of the law in new Zealand, and if rights and duties, under that law, are to be altered legislation 
is required.18 This is also the view in Ashby v Minister of Immigration and Cooke comments “a treaty 
that parliament had not incorporated into new Zealand law could not possibly override the broad 
discretion conferred by parliament on the Minister”.19
Irrespectively, it is generally accepted that the Treaty has constitutional importance and is part of 
new Zealand’s constitutional arrangements,20 there is, however, major disagreement on its precise role 
and the nature and extent of its importance.21 To address this, the Government is currently conducting 
a wide-ranging review of our Constitutional arrangements. Included in these terms of reference is the 
role of the Treaty. This review has no immediate bearing on this Report, however it is important to note.
Although the Treaty is seen as “the founding document of new Zealand”,22 “a constitutional 
document”,23 “simply the most important document in new Zealand’s history”,24 “essential to the 
foundation of new Zealand” and “part of the fabric of new Zealand society”,25 and “of the greatest 
constitutional importance to new Zealand”26 the text of the Treaty is not referred to in domestic 
legislation rather it is the “principles of the Treaty”. 
2.3 principles of the Treaty
The term the “principles of the Treaty” first appeared in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. This Act 
also provided the Waitangi Tribunal with the jurisdiction to determine whether an ordinance or Act, 
or regulation, order, proclamation, notice, or other statutory instrument, or the policy or practice, 
or the act or omission, was inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty and to also determine the 
meaning and effect of these principles.
17 See Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for lndia (1924), L.R. 51, Ind. App. 357, Lord dunedin’s comments at pp. 360 - 361 
on treaties of cession.
18 M Mcdowell and d Webb, The New Zealand Legal System, (4th ed, Lexis nexis, Wellington, 2006) at 181.
19 Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 nZLR 222, 224. The other Judges agreed with Cooke’s comments. However see comments 
by Taggart M, “Rugby, the Anti-apartheid Movement and Administrative Law in R Bigwood (ed) Public Interest Litigation 
(Lexis nexis new Zealand, 2006) at 81 where the conferral of a broad discretionary power does not of itself exclude or 
displace the interpretive principle.
20 See comments by G W R palmer Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand Wellington, (Victoria University press, 2002) 
at 22 and comments by Lord Woolfe in New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General [1994] 1 nZLR 513, 516 (Lord Woolf) (pC). 
21 Sir Geoffrey palmer presentation to the Te papa Treaty of Waitangi debate Series 2 February 2006 “The Treaty of Waitangi 
– Where to from here? Looking back to move forward” point 25, available <http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/Speechpaper.aspx> 
(21 november 2007).
22 Mcdowell and Webb, above n 18, at 194.
23 G W R palmer, Constitutional Conversations (Victoria University press, Wellington, 2002) at 22.
24 Sir Robin Cooke “Introduction” (1990) 14 nZULR 1, at 1-8.
25 See Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 nZLR 188 especially at 206, 210. But see also the obiter 
reservations of Casey and Hardie Boys JJ in Attorney General v New Zealand Māori Council (No 2) [1991] 2 nZLR 147 at 149. 
26 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General [1994] 1 nZLR 513, 516 (Lord Woolf) (pC).
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It is generally accepted that the principles of the Treaty include the acquisition of sovereignty in 
exchange for the protection of rangatiratanga; partnership and the imposition on the partners of the 
duty to act reasonably and in good faith; the freedom of the Crown to govern; the Crown’s duty of 
active protection; the duty of the Crown to remedy past breaches; Māori to retain rangatiratanga 
over their resources and taonga and to have all the privileges of citizenship; and the duty to consult.27 
Since the 1987 Court of Appeal judgement28, the Treaty principles have been developed and 
reconsidered in a raft of cases.29 If any legislation or policy, of the Crown, is inconsistent with the 
principles of the Treaty a claim can be brought before the Waitangi Tribunal.30 
It is reasonable to assume if a CCS operation breaches or impinges on the ability of Māori to use their 
lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable31 this could be subject to a claim by Māori.
It is reasonable to assume if adequate consultation is not undertaken, in terms of a CCS operation, 
this could be subject to a claim by Māori.
It is also reasonable to assume that if any impending legislative framework, for this CCS operation, 
was not consistent with the principles of the Treaty this would be subject to a claim by Māori.
It is acknowledged that the term “principles of the Treaty” occur in many other pieces of legislation 
including section 8 of the RMA and section 9 of the State Owned enterprises Act 1986.32 The effect of 
this term however is subject to the context of the statute. For instance section 8 of the RMA requests 
the decision maker to take into account the principles of the Treaty. This is only one consideration 
for the decision maker when determining whether the activity satisfies the purpose of the Act. 
Whereas the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 bestows upon the Waitangi Tribunal the jurisdiction to 
consider whether a CCS operation would be inconsistent or a breach of the principles. 
3 process
Treaty Settlement process
The Waitangi Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) was established in 1975 to receive claims on, report on, and 
make recommendations on alleged Crown breaches of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
These powers were extended to include retrospective claims back to 1840 and more recently limited 
to hearing historical claims that were submitted prior to 1 September 2008.33
All clams must satisfy the provision that the claimants have been prejudicially affected by legislation, 
Crown policy or practice, or Crown action, or omission, on or after the 6 February 1840 and that 
27 NZMC & Ors v Attorney General & Ors [1987] 1 nZLR 641.
28 Ibid.
29 For example Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation [1995] 3 nZLR 534, 535, where the right to 
development although not unlimited was confirmed, together with the principle of active protection and consultation.
30 See Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6.
31 See NZMC above n 27 at 664, per Cooke.
32 There are, at least, an additional 40 statutes that refer to the principles of the Treaty.
33 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6AA (1).
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that policy or legislation was inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty.34 The Tribunal must then 
consider this claim unless it is deemed frivolous or vexatious not made in good faith or there is another 
avenue of appeal.35
The Tribunal has the power to examine and report on any legislation to ensure its consistency with the 
principles of the Treaty.36 The Tribunal also has exclusive authority to determine the meaning of the 
Treaty and to decide issues relating to the two texts. 
The Crown in settling Treaty claims will generally acknowledge historical injustices and that any 
Treaty settlements should not create further injustices. The Crown also has a duty to act in the best 
interests of all new Zealanders. As settlements are to be durable they must be fair, achievable and 
remove the sense of grievance. The Crown must deal fairly and equitably with all claimant groups. 
Settlements do not affect ongoing rights arising out of the Treaty.
The Tribunal has been described as a “cultural safety valve” which allows Māori to be heard. 
The Tribunal is a not a court but a permanent Commission of Inquiry. It provides recommendations to 
the Crown that for instance ‘action be taken to compensate for, or remove, the prejudice or to prevent 
other persons from being similarly affected in the future’37. This could include, for instance, the return 
of Crown and State Owned enterprise land.
However, the recommendations by the Tribunal are, generally, not binding on the Crown38 and there 
has been a tendency not to accept the recommendations.39 notwithstanding the lack of certainty 
that recommendations hold40 this avenue of redress is available to Māori.41 The Treaty of Waitangi Act 
provides a legislative avenue of redress for Māori. 
Again, it is reasonable to assume that if any impending legislative framework for CCS was not 
consistent with the principles of the Treaty this would be subject to a claim by Māori.
4 Additional Concerns
In April, 2010, the Government offered support for the United nations declaration on the Rights of 
indigenous people (“the declaration”). The orthodox view is that the declaration is soft law and will 
not be legally binding upon the state unless it is incorporated into domestic legislation. The doctrine 
34 Section 6 (1).
35 Section 7 (1).
36 Section 8 (1).
37 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6 (3).
38 Although often requested by iwi (e.g. ngati Kahu) the Tribunal has only exercised its binding powers once. See the preamble 
to the Treaty of Waitangi (State enterprises) Act 1988; Turangi Township Remedial Report Wai 84; Turangi Township Remedies 
Report 1995. 
39 See Report of the Minister of Māori Affairs on the progress made in the implementation of recommendations made to the 
Crown by the Waitangi Tribunal for the period January 1995 – June 2007. Tabled in the House July 2007. 
40 See Everton v Attorney General (High Court, Wellington, Cp 121/00, Cp 68/99 5 July 2000 doogue J) where the Crown had 
rejected a Tribunal recommendation regarding the radio frequency spectrum. The claimants unsuccessfully argued that a failure 
to recognise the recommendations was a breach of fiduciary duty. 
41 It is acknowledged that a Remedies Hearing is required prior to any redress and even then there is no guarantee a suitable 
redress is attained by the Claimants.
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of state sovereignty provides a restriction on international instruments, such as the declaration, 
to regulate matters within the realm of the state. notwithstanding this perspective there is 
developing case law in common law jurisdictions42, offering a persuasive application, that rely on the 
articles of the declaration. Further the doctrine of customary international law and administrative 
law principles43 can assist the realisation of the rights articulated in the declaration. 
Although the use of the declaration may not be the substantive submission it can provide additional 
support for a potential claim. For instance the use of Article 26 e.g. article right to resources.
Article 26
(1) Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
(2) Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or 
use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
(3) States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. 
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure 
systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
5 Issues
The following issues below identify potential areas for a claim by Māori to the Waitangi Tribunal:
(1) The subject: If CO2 can be classified as a taonga under Article 2 this could result in a pan 
tribal claim.
(2) The place: If the areas identified for a CCS operation, e.g. the capture, the separation and the 
storage, are near, or on, traditionally owned land or coincide with waahi tapu sites this could also 
result in a claim by Māori.
(3) The effect: If CCS activities impact on Māori economic and social development this could result 
in a pan tribal claim. 
(4) The legislation: If the resulting legislation is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty then a 
potential claim is possible. 
It is noted that the activity is inconsistent with tikanga Māori in that it, for instance, seeks to alter 
the tapu nature of the whenua. This inconsistency becomes heightened when that area of whenua is 
a scared site or a waahi tapu. 
42 Cal v Attorney-General SC Belize Claim 171/2007, 18 October 2007.
43 For instance mandatory relevant consideration and the presumption of consistency.
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For Māori, the natural environment is a taonga to be administered in accordance with tikanga Māori, 
a Māori worldview. The aim of tikanga Māori is balance. The infusing of papatuanuku with CO2 is an 
unnatural alteration of the land and will result in an imbalance requiring rectification. 
6 Conclusion
It is acknowledged that the success, or not, of the possible claims identified above will turn on the 
situation and also any prior engagement with iwi. 
To this end, in view of a potential Treaty claim, it is recommended that full and meaningful consultation 
occur between Māori and the Crown prior to any CCS operation, particularly in areas where the 
capture, separation and storage component is likely to take place. 
7 Hypothetical Claim
This final section will consider each of the three parts to a CCS operation and highlight, within these 
three parts, any issues that may trigger a potential Treaty claim. 
Capture
Carbon dioxide can be collected at various stages during the capture process. Absent any issue with 
the physical nature of the building or structure that captures the CO2 nor any associated consent 
process to establish the building or structure, the major concern, from the perspective of a potential 
Treaty claim, would, in my opinion, be a claim to the subject i.e. whether the CO2 could be classified 
as a taonga under Article 2. 
Broadly a taonga is an object, tangible or intangible, that is treasured. The interpretation of taonga 
has varied over time. Initially viewed as relating only to forests, fisheries and resources this definition 
now encompasses te reo (language) flora and fauna, radio frequencies and water. 
The orthodox view of CO2 is that of waste and contributing to climate change thus attracting no 
value. It would be difficult under this view to perceive CO2 as a taonga. 
However, in light of the changing interpretation of taonga it is not unreasonable that such a claim 
may be brought. The success of such of claim would ultimately be determined by its context. 
Such a claim may indeed be viewed now as fanciful however similar “fanciful” claims, having no 
monetary value, to items classified as a taonga have been successful.44 
Although the recent claim by Māori to water was unsuccessful the Supreme Court found that the 
courts do have jurisdiction to consider similar cases.45 It is not unreasonable then that if the context 
was favourable a claim could be considered.
44 See for example Wai 11 Te Reo claim, also the Broadcasting Claim Wai 150.
45 NZMC v The Attorney General [2013] nZSC 6.
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Carbon Transport
The transport component is more contentious. If the transport vehicle e.g. pipeline traverses waahi 
tapu or Māori owned land this would impinge on the ability for Māori to use their lands to the fullest 
extent practicable46 resulting in grounds for a Treaty claim.
For Māori, even if title of land has passed, the obligation on Māori still remains.47 However, if a pipeline 
traversed Māori owned land would, in my opinion, provide stronger grounds for a Treaty claim. 
It is noted that similar issues arise when expressways are proposed that traverse waahi tapu or 
Māori land. Currently ngati Te Roro o Te Rangi and ngati Hurunga Te Rangi are objecting to the 
eastern arterial to proceed partly because it will cut access to traditional land in ngapuna, an area 
used to harvest sulphur for medicine. One solution proposed by the Transport Agency Bay of plenty 
State Highway department is to redirect the eastern arterial route. This is a positive example of 
meaningful consultation resulting in potential solutions and possible co-management solutions. 
Carbon Storage
during this component, when the CO2 is injected or stored, the activity provides grounds for not only 
a possible Treaty claim but is incompatible with tikanga Māori. For Māori, just as there is no distinction 
between land above the water and land below so too is there no “cut off” in terms of obligation, 
responsibility or ownership of the area below the surface. The area is known as papatuanuku, 
earth Mother.
The accessing or penetration of the land is inconsistent with tikanga Māori as the action metaphorically 
destroys the whenua (land) or earth Mother. The current mining issue on ancestral Māori land 
highlights similar concerns.
The activity of storing any CO2 on or below ancestral lands would be inconsistent with the principles 
of the Treaty in particular that of active protection. 
In light of a potential claim by Māori, as a result of the effect a CCS operation, it is recommended that 
full and meaningful consultation occur between Māori and the Crown prior to the activity. This may 
not only circumvent future claims but ensures transparency in the process. 
46 See NZMC above n 27 at 664, per Cooke.
47 See for example The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry v Waikato Regional Council environment Court, 
Hamilton, decision no A 133/2006, 17 October 2006, Judge Sheppard.
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This Appendix provides additional detail and argument to support the discussion in Chapter 9, 
in relation to the regulation of CCS offshore. each part of this Appendix is self-contained, and should 
be read in the context of the point in Chapter 9 where reference is made to that part. The Appendix as 
a whole is not designed to be read as a standalone document.
As in other parts of the Report, the law is stated as at 13 September 2013. Since then, as already 
noted, the Marine Legislation Bill was split into two bills via supplementary order paper and enacted, 
on 22 October 2013, as the exclusive economic Zone and Continental Shelf (environmental effects) 
Amendment Act 2013 and the Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2013. different provisions will 
come into force on different dates. The text of the legislation remains, in substance, largely the same 
as in the version of the Bill reported from Select Committee (on which this Report relies). 
1 new Zealand’s Jurisdiction to Regulate CCS  
in its exclusive economic Zone
Article 56 of UnCLOS sets out the rights, jurisdiction and duties of a coastal state in its exclusive 
economic zone (eeZ). Such jurisdiction is more limited than in the territorial sea, and does not amount 
to full sovereignty. The Article provides (with emphases added):
Article 56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone
1. in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has
(a)  sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the 
sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy 
from the water, currents and winds
(b)  jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c)  other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
Materially co-extensive sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources exist in relation to 
the continental shelf under Article 77.1 The stipulation that sovereign rights relate only to natural 
resources means that domestic CCS regulation in the eeZ cannot be based on rights to manage 
injected CO2, which is unlikely to be a natural resource (in much the same way that no exclusive 
jurisdiction exists to regulate shipwrecks).2 However, for now it is sufficient to conclude that pore 
space in the continental shelf underlying the eeZ appears to amount to a “natural resource”, and 
injection could probably be managed on this jurisdictional basis.3 Furthermore, exclusive jurisdiction 
1 in Article 81, the right to regulate drilling on the continental shelf is wider, as it is for any purpose.
2 This is reflected in the jurisdiction provided for in the eeZ Act, where the purpose of sustainable management relates only to the 
natural and not “physical” resources of the zone.
3 R purdy and R Macrory Geological Carbon Sequestration: Critical Legal Issues (Tyndall Centre, London, 2004), at 12.
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exists in the eeZ4 in relation to installations used for the exploitation of natural resources or other 
economic purposes, which clearly encompass installations that will be used for the injection of gas. 
Jurisdiction also exists in relation to the protection of the marine environment from any effects 
of CCS.5 The same jurisdiction exists over the extended continental shelf by virtue of the fact that 
CCS installations and any marine pollution from CCS would be connected to the exploitation of 
subsurface formations.6 This extends to full civil and criminal jurisdiction over such installations 
in the eeZ.7 
A coastal state also has the right under UnCLOS to establish reasonable safety zones around 
installations, which cannot exceed a distance of 500 metres from the installation (measured from 
each point of its outer edges).8 Within such zones a coastal state can take measures to ensure the 
safety of navigation and the safety of the installation. Such zones are only able to be imposed around 
“artificial islands, installations and structures”, and do not seem to be able to be imposed over a 
storage complex to the extent it is further than 500 metres from an injection installation. Finally, 
Article 60(7) prohibits installations or safety zones to be established where they could interfere with 
the use of recognised sea lanes essential to international navigation. domestic regulation would need 
to be careful to import this consideration as mandatory in the decision making process for permits to 
inject CO2 streams.
Although no jurisdictional issues are presented by Article 56 for CCS regulation in the eeZ in a broad 
sense, such sovereign rights and jurisdiction are subject to the rights of other states in the eeZ, as 
specified in Article 58. domestic regulation would need to be in accordance with such rights, which 
include the freedoms of navigation (wider than innocent passage), overflight, and the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines. in particular, Article 79 elaborates on the freedom to lay pipelines 
and cables, and stipulates that a coastal state cannot impede the laying of pipelines or cables (subject 
to reasonable measures for exploiting natural resources and control of pollution from pipelines), 
but can control their specific delineation. However, this would not prevent full coastal jurisdiction 
over pipelines for the purposes of CCS injection in its eeZ. This is because Article 79(4) affirms such 
jurisdiction where pipelines are used in connection with the exploitation of the continental shelf. 
However, in allowing CCS pipelines to be constructed and used, a coastal state has to have regard 
to cables or pipelines already in position. As discussed in Chapter 9, there is a protection mechanism 
under existing domestic legislation for this purpose.9
One further obligation to which the rights of exploitation are subject warrants further attention. 
Article 82 provides that the exploitation of the natural resources of the extended continental 
shelf is subject to payment to the international Seabed Authority (iSBA) set up under UnCLOS. 
This payment is based on the value or volume of production, which appears to be a problematic 
concept in a CCS context. Article 82 applies to all exploitation of the extended continental shelf. 
However, the calculation of contribution based on “production” envisages only activities that are 
4 Under the United nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 58 and 60.
5 United nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art 56.
6 This relies on the jurisdiction over the continental shelf rather than over the eeZ, as the eeZ only includes the seabed below the 
water column within 200 nautical miles of the baseline.
7 United nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts 80 and 60(2).
8 Under arts 60(4)-(5). This is reflected in new Zealand’s Continental Shelf Act as discussed in Chapter 9.
9 Submarine Cables and pipelines protection Act 1966.
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extractive. CCS is regarded as “dumping” under international law, as well as the “exploitation” 
of the natural resources of the subsurface. Other forms of dumping on the extended continental 
shelf do not appear to require any payment. Whether payments are payable for CCS activities 
(and if so, how these are to be calculated) would require clarification at an international level. 
Like other forms of dumping, CCS has no “production” as such (unless this amounts to profit made 
through the acquisition of emission units) but it also clearly amounts to a use of natural resources. 
This may be significant in the future if CCS were to occur on the extended continental shelf. 
no literature has been able to be located on this issue,10 and at present it remains theoretical because 
globally CCS is not occurring on any extended continental shelf.11 in particular, it is not likely to be 
a significant issue in new Zealand given the cost and technical difficulties of engaging in CCS on the 
extended continental shelf. Other than the issue of payment to the iSBA, the regime for the extended 
continental shelf under UnCLOS is the same as that for the continental shelf proper.12
problems also exist regarding the ability of states to engage in CCS in the international seabed area. 
Under UnCLOS, states are not permitted to appropriate areas of the international seabed area, and 
thus CCS injection here is currently prohibited under international law.13 proposals for CCS would 
require the approval of the iSBA, yet it is doubtful whether this organisation has jurisdiction to consider 
or permit such applications. However, to conduct CCS in the international seabed area would require 
substantial economic incentives, resources and improvements in technology and there appears to be 
no global appetite to make the necessary amendments to the UnCLOS regime at present.
2 The impact of part 12 of the United nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea
The United nations Convention on the Law of the Sea addresses not only the jurisdiction of coastal 
states in their maritime zones, but also (in part 12 of the Convention) the protection of the marine 
environment. Although CCS was not envisaged when the Convention was done in 1982, and as such 
it is not referred to specifically in part 12, the provisions of UnCLOS are broad and impose obligations 
that are of general relevance to CCS. 
Under Article 192, states have a general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment. 
This is an absolute, or bottom line, requirement. Under Article 193, states have the sovereign right 
to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with 
their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment. This statement holds true for both the 
territorial sea and the eeZ, where sovereign rights for these purposes are provided by the jurisdictional 
provisions of UnCLOS.
10 Although passing reference has been made to the fact that it might be an issue, as in Mark de Figueiredo “The Liability of Carbon 
dioxide Storage” (phd Thesis, Massachusetts institute of Technology, 2007).
11 Global CCS institute, The Global Status of CCS 2012 (Global CCS institute, 2012).
12 Although the regime governing the overlying water column (being high seas) is different.
13 Baker and McKenzie Strategic Analysis of the Global Status of Carbon Capture and Storage Report 3: policies and Legislation 
Framing Carbon Capture and Storage Globally (Global CCS institute, 2009) at 85.
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potentially relevant to CCS is Article 195, which provides that in taking measures to prevent, reduce 
and control pollution of the marine environment, states shall act so as not to transfer, directly or 
indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into 
another. if CO2 amounts to “pollution” under the Convention, then injecting it into the seabed 
arguably infringes the obligation not to transfer one type of pollution (emissions to the air) into 
another (injection to the ground). However, this obligation has not been treated in this way by 
states in practice. The Convention has not been seen internationally as a barrier to CCS deployment, 
because injection arguably does not meet the definition of pollution in Article 1.4:
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as 
harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, 
including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water 
and reduction of amenities.
Although this appears to be a wide definition, it is constrained in a number of ways. 
First, the definition is anthropocentric, and does not recognise any effects that CO2 might have on 
the deep subsurface or the formation itself.14 Thus it is unlikely in most cases that injection could 
be treated as pollution. The injection of CO2 may also not be “likely” to result in the kinds of effects 
contemplated, as this presents a high threshold. Although CCS has been treated as “dumping”, 
it has not in practice been treated as being “pollution from dumping” under Article 210. This general 
assumption by the international community may not be beyond legal challenge, particularly 
if gas were both likely to escape from the formation and be likely to cause the kinds of effects 
contemplated in the definition of pollution. Carbon dioxide discharged into the water column could 
dissolve completely or escape to the surface, and potentially could cause environmental effects.15 
in most cases any effects would likely be minor. There may be questions over whether effects on 
sub-surface benthic life would come within the scope of pollution to the “marine environment” if this 
relates only to the water column.16 However, whether injection were likely to result in an escape of 
gas, and whether an escape would be likely to cause harm, would need to be assessed on a proposal 
specific basis. Thus there can be no definitive conclusion in the abstract on whether escapes of gas 
from a formation would amount to pollution under international law.
Article 197 provides that states shall cooperate on a global and regional basis. in the context of 
marine CCS, which internationally has been treated as a form of dumping,17 global cooperation has 
been achieved through the London dumping Convention and protocol (to which new Zealand is a 
contracting party). On a regional basis, the provisions of the Ldp are largely (although not completely) 
reproduced in a dumping protocol to the noumea Convention.18 For the reasons above, Article 207 of 
the Convention (which provides that states shall adopt laws to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment from land based sources), has not been considered to be the applicable 
regime for most CCS activities, even where gas streams produced on land are transported by pipeline 
to an offshore installation. 
14 For example, effects that the injected CO2 could have on petroleum, minerals, or future uses of the formation.
15 intergovernmental panel on Climate Change Special Report on Carbon Capture and Storage (Cambridge, 2005), at 243.
16 intergovernmental panel on Climate Change, above n 15, at 249.
17 Rather than pollution from seabed activities or (where pipelines are used) as pollution from land based sources.
18 protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South pacific Region by dumping [1986] piTSe 16 (signed 24 november 1986, 
entered into force 22 August 2005).
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One issue remains in relation to CCS where injection occurs from remotely controlled devices on 
the seafloor. Most academic opinion is of the view that this does not amount to “dumping” under 
UnCLOS or the London protocol, and is therefore not subject to the dumping provisions of the 
protocol.19 The reason given for this view is that the protocol applies only to dumping “at sea”, and 
the definition of “sea” expressly excludes subsea repositories accessed only by land. it would at least 
seem arguable that this interpretation has the potential to undermine the strict CCS requirements 
of the London protocol, and encourage the use of seafloor devices to avoid internationally accepted 
standards on CCS. Given the absence of a global binding regime on land based sources of pollution, 
such CCS would not be subject to any international standards. Furthermore, injection is unlikely to 
amount to pollution and therefore unlikely to trigger even the general obligations of states in relation 
to the control of pollution. An alternative argument could be that the use of a remote injection device 
on the seabed performs a similar role to an offshore installation, and arguably means that access 
is not “only” via a land-based pipeline. On this reading, this form of CCS would remain subject to 
the dumping provisions of UnCLOS and the London protocol. However, the significant point to note 
is that there is uncertainty over which international regime applies to CCS via pipeline and seabed 
injection devices.
Similarly, CCS injection from offshore installations or ships has been treated as dumping rather 
than pollution from “seabed activities” or “offshore installations” envisaged in Article 208.20 
in any event, Article 8 simply provides a very general obligation that states shall adopt laws to 
“prevent, reduce and control” pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with 
sea bed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures 
under their jurisdiction. There is no obligation in this Article to prohibit specific forms of pollution.
A broad obligation also applies to states, under Article 209, to control pollution of the marine 
environment in the international seabed area (the area beyond the continental shelf or extended 
continental shelf). it provides that international rules shall be established in accordance with 
part xi to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from activities in the Area, 
and states must impose laws on their own ships that are no less effective than these rules for activities 
in the Area. new Zealand has implemented this requirement by referring directly to UnCLOS in the 
United nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Act 1996. it is unlikely, however, that CCS in the 
Area is lawful under international law for jurisdictional reasons (as discussed in Appendix F, part 1), 
and it is recommended that this not be authorised in domestic law.
A general monitoring provision in Article 204(2) requires that new Zealand keep under surveillance 
the effects of any activities that it allows, in order to determine whether these are likely to pollute the 
marine environment. even if CCS injection were viewed as a form of “pollution” by dumping (which is 
unlikely), this Article does not itself prohibit pollution. it would apply more to the potential discharge 
of CCS from a storage formation into the water column, and require that permits for CCS be subject 
to monitoring to identify and respond to any leakage that is likely to cause harm. This is potentially 
19 J Friedrich “Carbon Capture and Storage: A new Challenge for international environmental Law” [2007] 67 Zeitschrift fur 
auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 211 at 219; Mark de Figueiredo “The Liability of Carbon dioxide Storage” 
(phd Thesis, Massachusetts institute of Technology, 2007) at 137; R purdy and R Macrory Geological Carbon Sequestration: 
Critical Legal Issues (Tyndall Centre, London, 2004) at 20; international energy Agency Legal Aspects of Storing CO2 : Update and 
Recommendations (2007) at 64.
20 Which is targeted at operational pollution from activities and installations (such as garbage) as opposed to situations where the 
primary purpose of an operation is to dispose of matter.
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significant in the domestic context, given that there are questions as to what extent limited duration 
consents under the eeZ Act and RMA are capable of imposing such monitoring in the long term.21
Most relevant to CCS, given international treatment of CCS as a form of dumping, is Article 210. 
This relates primarily to “pollution” by dumping, but contains provisions relevant to dumping in 
general. This provides that:
1.  States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment by dumping.
2.  States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control such 
pollution.
3.  Such laws, regulations and measures shall ensure that dumping is not carried out without the 
permission of the competent authorities of States.
4. States, acting especially through competent international organisations or diplomatic 
conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. Such rules, standards 
and recommended practices and procedures shall be re-examined from time to time  
as necessary.
5.  dumping within the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone or onto the continental 
shelf shall not be carried out without the express prior approval of the coastal State, which 
has the right to permit, regulate and control such dumping after due consideration of the 
matter with other States which by reason of their geographical situation may be adversely 
affected thereby.
6.  national laws, regulations and measures shall be no less effective in preventing, reducing 
and controlling such pollution than the global rules and standards.
Article 210(5) imposes an obligation on states not to treat dumping, including CCS, as a permitted 
activity, given that express approval is required. Given the wider context of the Article, the right to 
“permit” dumping more likely amounts to the right to grant a “permit” for a specific application, 
rather than the right to treat dumping as a “permitted activity” in the RMA sense. This interpretation 
is in line with the presumption against dumping contained in the Ldp. 
Finally, Article 210(6) imposes an obligation on new Zealand to regulate dumping in a manner no 
less effective than the relevant “global rules and standards”. it is arguable that this could refer to 
the London dumping Convention rather than its protocol.22 However, this question is academic 
because new Zealand will be bound by the higher standards in the protocol, by virtue of being 
party to the protocol directly. This would include implementing, in new Zealand legislation, 
an approach presuming that dumping of any matter is prohibited unless expressly listed, and such 
listed substances could not fall outside of those in Annex 1 of the protocol. UnCLOS, in addition to 
requiring legislative recognition of the Ldp, requires in Article 216 that such international rules and 
standards be enforced by the coastal State in relation to dumping not only in its eeZ and continental 
shelf, but also in its territorial sea. Also, Article 235 requires that States provide legal recourse for 
relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment within their jurisdiction. 
Liability for pollution damage is provided for in part 25 (and the proposed part 26A) of the Maritime 
Transport Act 1994, although in the context of CCS this has potential issues.23
21 For more on this, refer to the discussion in Chapter 2.
22 Ratification levels for the LdC remain significantly higher than for the Ldp.
23 discussed in Chapter 9.
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3 The impact of the Substantive provisions  
of the London dumping protocol
The London dumping Convention (LdC) addresses the problem of marine pollution specifically 
by dumping. The London dumping protocol (Ldp) effectively replaces its parent convention for 
new Zealand.24 The Ldp implements a precautionary approach to dumping, by requiring parties to 
prohibit the dumping of wastes or other matter into the sea or seabed, unless it is contained within 
an exhaustive list of substances in Annex 1 (described as a “reverse list”). parties are obliged to 
require a permit for the dumping of Annex 1 substances.25
Under Article 2, contracting parties are required to “individually and collectively protect and preserve 
the marine environment from all sources of pollution and take effective measures, according to their 
scientific, technical and economic capabilities, to prevent, reduce and where practicable eliminate 
pollution caused by dumping or incineration at sea of wastes or other matter.” As under UnCLOS, 
the primary focus of the objective of the protocol is therefore on dumping that causes pollution, 
rather than dumping itself. “pollution” is defined in a similar way as in UnCLOS:26 
[T]he introduction, directly or indirectly, by human activity, of wastes or other matter into the sea 
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine 
ecosystems, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities. 
As discussed earlier, CCS injection is unlikely to amount to pollution, although it is arguable whether 
any given escape of gas would meet the definition. The general obligation to “prevent, reduce and 
where practicable eliminate” pollution has therefore not been treated by the international community 
as requiring that efforts be made to prevent, reduce or eliminate CCS.
However, the protocol’s restriction on dumping in Article 4(4) does not require that dumping amount 
to “pollution”, nor does the definition of dumping require an activity to cause pollution. Article 4 
provides simply that “contracting parties shall prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter 
with the exception of those listed in Annex 1” and that “the dumping of wastes or other matter listed 
in Annex 1 shall require a permit”. Furthermore, “contracting parties shall adopt administrative or 
legislative measures to ensure that issuance of permits and permit conditions comply with provisions 
of Annex 2. particular attention shall be paid to opportunities to avoid dumping in favour of 
environmentally preferable alternatives.” 
The requirements of the Ldp apply to all dumping at “sea”, which includes all marine waters 
(and underlying seabed and subsoil) other than internal waters.27 in other words, the Ldp applies 
to the territorial sea, eeZ, the extended continental shelf and high seas,28 but not to waters on the 
landward side of the baseline. The Ldp also applies to ships where they are loaded in the territory of 
a state party and the matter loaded is intended for dumping at “sea”.29
24 London dumping protocol, Article 23.
25 Article 4.
26 Article 1.
27 Article 1.
28 Although a coastal state only has international legal jurisdiction on the high seas in relation to its own ships and installations.
29 Article 9(2).
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dumping is defined in Article 1 as including: 
1.  any deliberate disposal into the sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms 
or other man-made structures at sea; and
2.  any storage of wastes or other matter in the seabed and the subsoil thereof from vessels, 
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; but excluding 
3.  the “placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that 
such placement is not contrary to the aims of this protocol”.
Furthermore, the disposal or storage of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to 
the exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources is not 
covered by the provisions of the protocol. Carbon dioxide itself is not a mineral. However, CCS that 
doubles as eOR or eGR would not be subject to the protocol, nor arguably would a situation where 
injection is of CO2 that has been stripped from offshore natural gas, such as at the Sleipner CCS 
project off the norwegian coast.30 
despite the protocol’s exclusion of the placement of matter for a purpose other than mere disposal,31 
the international community has interpreted CCS injection as falling within the definition of 
“dumping” under the protocol. in 2006, in response, the contracting parties adopted amendments 
to Annex 1 of the protocol to include (and therefore no longer prohibit) the dumping of CO2 streams, 
subject to the following restrictions:
4 Carbon dioxide streams referred to in paragraph 1.8 may only be considered for dumping, if:
1. disposal is into a sub-seabed geological formation; and
2. they consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide. They may contain incidental associated 
substances derived from the source material and the capture and sequestration 
processes used; and
3. no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes or 
other matter.
This amendment came into force on 10 February 2007. The Ldp therefore no longer prohibits 
CCS, but it does now place restrictions on it, in light of its inclusion within Annex 1. in particular, 
Annex 2 to the protocol covers a list of obligations now applicable to CCS injection, including 
dump-site selection, assessment of effects, monitoring, and permitting issues and conditions that are 
to be met. Annex 2 is reproduced in full in part 4 of this Appendix.
Under Annex 2(9) and (10), parties must set up a national action list and upper and lower levels for 
dumping, and categorise waste into one of three categories according to such levels. 
30 Mark de Figueiredo “The Liability of Carbon dioxide Storage” (phd Thesis, Massachusetts institute of Technology, 2007) at 130.
31 Although unlikely, it is theoretically arguable that the purpose of CO2 injection is not “mere disposal”, but rather the 
sequestration of CO2 only until the issue of climate change has been resolved: see J Friedrich “Carbon Capture and Storage: 
A new Challenge for international environmental Law” [2007] 67 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 
211 at 219; R purdy and R Macrory Geological Carbon Sequestration: Critical Legal Issues (Tyndall Centre, London, 2004) at 23.
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Annex 2(11) provides also that:
information required to select a dump-site shall include: 
1. physical, chemical and biological characteristics of the water-column and the seabed; 
2. location of amenities, values and other uses of the sea in the area under consideration; 
3. assessment of the constituent fluxes associated with dumping in relation to existing 
fluxes of substances in the marine environment; and 
4. economic and operational feasibility.
Such criteria concerning site selection for marine CCS would be required in domestic legislation or 
regulation. More detailed domestic regulation on site selection will be needed, given that the primary 
risks of leakage are likely to arise from a poorly characterised storage formation.32
Clauses 12 to 15 of Annex 2 address the requirements for assessments of environmental 
effects for dumping, which could usefully be replicated in domestic regulation on marine CCS. 
Similarly, Annex 2(16) concerns monitoring requirements that must be met or exceeded in domestic 
regulation. The requirements should not be difficult to meet in the approval process.
Marine CCS under the Ldp is also subject to the permitting and reporting requirements in Article 9. 
in short, contracting parties are obliged to:
(1)  issue permits in accordance with the Ldp (including permits for dumping and for the loading, 
in its territory or on its ships, of matter to be dumped);
(2)  keep records of the nature and quantities of all matter for which dumping permits have been 
issued and where practicable the quantities actually dumped and the location, time and method 
of dumping;
(3)  monitor individually, or in collaboration with other Contracting parties and competent 
international organizations, the condition of the sea for the purposes of the Ldp; and
(4)  report certain information annually, and other information regularly, to the iMO (and to other 
parties where appropriate).
even if CCS is not characterised as “dumping” under domestic law, the requirements of the Ldp must 
still be met, because international law characterises CCS as dumping.
Article 3 of the Ldp provides that “in implementing the provisions of this protocol, Contracting 
parties shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or likelihood of damage from one 
part of the environment to another or transform one type of pollution into another”. This mirrors the 
provision in UnCLOS discussed earlier, and is also mirrored in Article 3 of the protocol on dumping 
under the noumea Convention.33 As discussed earlier, it is most likely that the injection of CO2 into 
the subsurface does not amount to “pollution” under the Ldp, unless an escape of gas is likely and the 
escape is likely to cause harm. 
32 A ingleson, A Kleffner, and n nielson “Long-Term Liability for Carbon Capture and Storage in depleted north American Oil and 
Gas Reservoirs – A Comparative Analysis” 31 energy Law Journal 431, at 437; S Benson, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in 
Underground Storage Formations (2004) Centre for Climate and energy Solutions 10-50 Workshop proceedings <www.c2es.org> 
at 9.
33 The noumea Convention and protocols are discussed in a moment.
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it is also questionable whether CCS injection amounts to “damage”. if it did, injecting CO2 into the 
seabed arguably infringes the obligation not to transfer one type of damage (effects on climate 
change from emissions to the air) into another (disturbance to the seabed by injection to a storage 
formation). As with the term “pollution”, this obligation not to transfer damage is likely not, and has 
not been treated internationally as, a barrier to CCS deployment. However, CCS that is likely to result 
in leakages of CO2 to the water column may infringe the obligation in Article 3.
Article 4(2) of the Ldp provides that: 
[n]o provision of this protocol shall be interpreted as preventing a Contracting party from 
prohibiting, insofar as that Contracting party is concerned, the dumping of wastes or other matter 
mentioned in Annex 1. That Contracting party shall notify the Organization of such measures. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, if the definition of an offshore installation in the Maritime Transport Act 
were extended to include CCS injection installations, CCS in new Zealand’s territorial sea would be 
prohibited under regulations made under the RMA, and new Zealand would be obliged to notify 
the iMO of this fact.34 However, at present, the Regulations under the RMA (and therefore their 
prohibition) do not apply to CCS installations, and we do not recommend that CCS be prohibited, 
except those forms required to be prohibited under the Ldp. 
The extent to which the eeZ Act aligns with the requirements of the Ldp is presently uncertain. 
Clause 96 of the Marine Legislation Bill (as reported from Select Committee) proposes the introduction 
of a new part 2, including a new section 24F, into the eeZ Act. The new part 2 prohibits the dumping of 
toxic or hazardous waste. The definition of toxic and hazardous waste is left for regulations to define. 
Section 24F provides, effectively, that no person can dump other matter in the eeZ or continental shelf 
unless regulations allow a marine dumping consent to authorise the dumping, and a marine dumping 
consent duly does so. in accordance with Article 4 of the Ldp, section 24F requires a permit to be granted 
for any dumping to occur, and does not allow dumping of any kind to be a permitted activity. 
However, dumping regulations have not yet been made. To fulfil new Zealand’s obligations under 
the Ldp, regulations would have to refer to or mirror the Ldp by prohibiting the dumping of all 
matter apart from that listed in Annex 1.35 The stringent requirements in Annex 1 relating to CCS 
would also have to be mirrored in regulations, given that CCS is still a prohibited dumping under the 
Ldp unless the requirements of Annex 1 are met. For the specific purposes of CCS, this uncertainty 
would be removed if injection were removed from the scope of the eeZ Act (as recommended in 
Chapter 9) and the requirements of the Ldp were introduced into a new CCS Act. However, before 
a CCS Act were enacted, it would be important for regulations under the eeZ Act to be consistent 
with the Ldp.
A significant provision in the Ldp for CCS deployment in new Zealand is contained in Annex 2, 
where it is stated that “the acceptance of dumping under certain circumstances shall not remove 
the obligations under this Annex to make further attempts to reduce the necessity for dumping.”36 
Because CCS is not excluded from the Ldp’s definition of dumping, new Zealand remains under 
34 Resource Management (Marine pollution) Regulations 1998.
35 Although dumping of those substances in Annex 1 would also be able to be prohibited.
36 London dumping protocol, Annex 2(1). The preamble to Resolution Lp.1(1) explicitly provides that the enabling of the 
technology does not remove the need to address the root cause of CO2 production (Resolution on the Amendment to Include 
CO2 Sequestration in Sub-Seabed Geological Formations in Annex 1 to the London Protocol Res Lp.1(1) (2006)).
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an obligation to reduce the need for CCS by focusing on factors such as emissions reductions, the 
promotion of renewable energy, demand side management and energy efficiency. This may have 
implications for new Zealand’s policy direction in balancing CCS and renewable energy in particular. 
For completeness, Annex 2(5) of the Ldp provides that: 
[A]pplications to dump wastes or other matter shall demonstrate that appropriate consideration 
has been given to the following hierarchy of waste management options, which implies an order 
of increasing environmental impact: 
1.  re-use; 
2.  off-site recycling; 
3.  destruction of hazardous constituents; 
4.  treatment to reduce or remove the hazardous constituents; and 
5.  disposal on land, into air and in water.
There is clearly a hierarchy within the numbers listed, but it is uncertain whether an internal hierarchy 
is intended within the phrase “on land, into air and into water”. This may not in practice be an issue, 
as marine CCS is arguably on “land” (the seabed) as opposed to “in water” (the water column). 
This has not in practice been treated internationally as a constraint on marine CCS, or a direction that 
land based CCS injection is to be preferred over marine injection.
There are also issues in the Ldp concerning the cross border transportation of CO2, which currently 
appears to be prohibited. The parties are working on a solution to this issue, although it is not likely to 
be significant in the new Zealand context, due to this country’ geography. it is therefore not discussed 
further here.
4 extracts from the London dumping protocol
4.1 Article 9, issuance of permits and Reporting 
1. each Contracting party shall designate an appropriate authority or authorities to: 
1. issue permits in accordance with this protocol; 
2. keep records of the nature and quantities of all wastes or other matter for which dumping 
permits have been issued and where practicable the quantities actually dumped and the 
location, time and method of dumping; and 
3. monitor individually, or in collaboration with other Contracting parties and competent 
international organizations, the condition of the sea for the purposes of this protocol.
2. The appropriate authority or authorities of a Contracting party shall issue permits in accordance 
with this protocol in respect of wastes or other matter intended for dumping or, as provided for 
in Article 8.2, incineration at sea: 
1. loaded in its territory; and 
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2. loaded onto a vessel or aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag, when the loading 
occurs in the territory of a State not a Contracting party to this protocol. 
3. in issuing permits, the appropriate authority or authorities shall comply with the requirements 
of Article 4, together with such additional criteria, measures and requirements as they may 
consider relevant. 
4. each Contracting party, directly or through a secretariat established under a regional agreement, 
shall report to the Organization and where appropriate to other Contracting parties: 
1.  the information specified in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3; 
2. the administrative and legislative measures taken to implement the provisions of this 
protocol, including a summary of enforcement measures; and 
3. the effectiveness of the measures referred to in paragraph 4.2 and any problems encountered 
in their application. 
 The information referred to in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 shall be submitted on an annual basis. 
The information referred to in paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 shall be submitted on a regular basis. 
5. Reports submitted under paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 shall be evaluated by an appropriate subsidiary 
body as determined by the Meeting of Contracting parties. This body will report its conclusions to 
an appropriate Meeting or Special Meeting of Contracting parties.
4.2 Annex 1, Wastes or Other Matter That May Be Considered 
For dumping 
1. The following wastes or other matter are those that may be considered for dumping being mindful 
of the Objectives and General Obligations of this protocol set out in articles 2 and 3: 
1. dredged material; 
2. sewage sludge; 
3. fish waste, or material resulting from industrial fish processing operations; 
4. vessels and platforms or other man-made structures at sea; 
5. inert, inorganic geological material; 
6. organic material of natural origin; 
7. bulky items primarily comprising iron, steel, concrete and similarly unharmful materials 
for which the concern is physical impact, and limited to those circumstances where such 
wastes are generated at locations, such as small islands with isolated communities, having 
no practicable access to disposal options other than dumping; and 
8. Carbon dioxide streams from carbon dioxide capture processes for sequestration. 
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2. The wastes or other matter listed in paragraphs 1.4 and 1.7 may be considered for dumping, 
provided that material capable of creating floating debris or otherwise contributing to pollution 
of the marine environment has been removed to the maximum extent and provided that the 
material dumped poses no serious obstacle to fishing or navigation. 
3. notwithstanding the above, materials listed in paragraphs 1.1 to 1.8 containing levels of 
radioactivity greater than de minimis (exempt) concentrations as defined by the iAeA and adopted 
by Contracting parties, shall not be considered eligible for dumping; provided further that within 
25 years of 20 February 1994, and at each 25 year interval thereafter, Contracting parties shall 
complete a scientific study relating to all radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter 
other than high level wastes or matter, taking into account such other factors as Contracting 
parties consider appropriate and shall review the prohibition on dumping of such substances in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in article 22. 
4. Carbon dioxide streams referred to in paragraph 1.8 may only be considered for dumping, if: 
1. disposal is into a sub-seabed geological formation; and
2. they consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide. They may contain incidental associated 
substances derived from the source material and the capture and sequestration processes 
used; and 
3. no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes 
or other matter.
4.3 Annex 2, Assessment of Wastes or Other Matter That May 
Be Considered For dumping 
GeneRAL 
1. The acceptance of dumping under certain circumstances shall not remove the obligations under 
this Annex to make further attempts to reduce the necessity for dumping. 
WASTe pReVenTiOn AUdiT 
2. The initial stages in assessing alternatives to dumping should, as appropriate, include an evaluation of: 
1. types, amounts and relative hazard of wastes generated; 
2. details of the production process and the sources of wastes within that process; and 
3. feasibility of the following waste reduction/prevention techniques: 
1. product reformulation; 
2. clean production technologies; 
3. process modification; 
4. input substitution; and 
5. on-site, closed-loop recycling. 
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3. in general terms, if the required audit reveals that opportunities exist for waste prevention 
at source, an applicant is expected to formulate and implement a waste prevention strategy, 
in collaboration with relevant local and national agencies, which includes specific waste reduction 
targets and provision for further waste prevention audits to ensure that these targets are being 
met. permit issuance or renewal decisions shall assure compliance with any resulting waste 
reduction and prevention requirements. 
4. For dredged material and sewage sludge, the goal of waste management should be to identify 
and control the sources of contamination. This should be achieved through implementation of 
waste prevention strategies and requires collaboration between the relevant local and national 
agencies involved with the control of point and non-point sources of pollution. Until this objective 
is met, the problems of contaminated dredged material may be addressed by using disposal 
management techniques at sea or on land.
COnSideRATiOn OF WASTe MAnAGeMenT OpTiOnS 
5. Applications to dump wastes or other matter shall demonstrate that appropriate consideration 
has been given to the following hierarchy of waste management options, which implies an order 
of increasing environmental impact: 
1. re-use; 
2. off-site recycling; 
3. destruction of hazardous constituents; 
4. treatment to reduce or remove the hazardous constituents; and 
5. disposal on land, into air and in water. 
6.  A permit to dump wastes or other matter shall be refused if the permitting authority determines 
that appropriate opportunities exist to re-use, recycle or treat the waste without undue risks to 
human health or the environment or disproportionate costs. The practical availability of other 
means of disposal should be considered in the light of a comparative risk assessment involving 
both dumping and the alternatives. 
CHeMiCAL, pHYSiCAL And BiOLOGiCAL pROpeRTieS 
7. A detailed description and characterization of the waste is an essential precondition for the 
consideration of alternatives and the basis for a decision as to whether a waste may be dumped. 
if a waste is so poorly characterized that proper assessment cannot be made of its potential 
impacts on human health and the environment, that waste shall not be dumped. 
8. Characterization of the wastes and their constituents shall take into account: 
1. origin, total amount, form and average composition; 
2. properties: physical, chemical, biochemical and biological; 
3. toxicity; 
4. persistence: physical, chemical and biological; and 
5. accumulation and biotransformation in biological materials or sediments. 
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ACTiOn LiST 
9. each Contracting party shall develop a national Action List to provide a mechanism for screening 
candidate wastes and their constituents on the basis of their potential effects on human health 
and the marine environment. in selecting substances for consideration in an Action List, priority 
shall be given to toxic, persistent and bioaccumulative substances from anthropogenic sources 
(e.g., cadmium, mercury, organohalogens, petroleum hydrocarbons, and, whenever relevant, 
arsenic, lead, copper, zinc, beryllium, chromium, nickel and vanadium, organosilicon compounds, 
cyanides, fluorides and pesticides or their by-products other than organohalogens). An Action 
List can also be used as a trigger mechanism for further waste prevention considerations. 
10. An Action List shall specify an upper level and may also specify a lower level. The upper level 
should be set so as to avoid acute or chronic effects on human health or on sensitive marine 
organisms representative of the marine ecosystem. Application of an Action List will result in 
three possible categories of waste: 
1. wastes which contain specified substances, or which cause biological responses, exceeding 
the relevant upper level shall not be dumped, unless made acceptable for dumping through 
the use of management techniques or processes; 
2. wastes which contain specified substances, or which cause biological responses, below the 
relevant lower levels should be considered to be of little environmental concern in relation 
to dumping; and 
3. wastes which contain specified substances, or which cause biological responses, below 
the upper level but above the lower level require more detailed assessment before their 
suitability for dumping can be determined. 
dUMp-SiTe SeLeCTiOn 
11. information required to select a dump-site shall include: 
1. physical, chemical and biological characteristics of the water-column and the seabed; 
2. location of amenities, values and other uses of the sea in the area under consideration; 
3. assessment of the constituent fluxes associated with dumping in relation to existing fluxes 
of substances in the marine environment; and 
4. economic and operational feasibility. 
ASSeSSMenT OF pOTenTiAL eFFeCTS 
12. Assessment of potential effects should lead to a concise statement of the expected consequences 
of the sea or land disposal options, i.e., the “impact Hypothesis”. it provides a basis for deciding 
whether to approve or reject the proposed disposal option and for defining environmental 
monitoring requirements.
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13. The assessment for dumping should integrate information on waste characteristics, conditions 
at the proposed dump-site(s), fluxes, and proposed disposal techniques and specify the potential 
effects on human health, living resources, amenities and other legitimate uses of the sea. 
it should define the nature, temporal and spatial scales and duration of expected impacts based 
on reasonably conservative assumptions. 
14. An analysis of each disposal option should be considered in the light of a comparative 
assessment of the following concerns: human health risks, environmental costs, hazards, 
(including accidents), economics and exclusion of future uses. if this assessment reveals that 
adequate information is not available to determine the likely effects of the proposed disposal 
option then this option should not be considered further. in addition, if the interpretation of 
the comparative assessment shows the dumping option to be less preferable, a permit for 
dumping should not be given. 
15. each assessment should conclude with a statement supporting a decision to issue or refuse 
a permit for dumping. 
MOniTORinG 
16. Monitoring is used to verify that permit conditions are met – compliance monitoring – and that 
the assumptions made during the permit review and site selection process were correct and 
sufficient to protect the environment and human health – field monitoring. it is essential that 
such monitoring programmes have clearly defined objectives. 
peRMiT And peRMiT COndiTiOnS 
17. A decision to issue a permit should only be made if all impact evaluations are completed and 
the monitoring requirements are determined. The provisions of the permit shall ensure, as far 
as practicable, that environmental disturbance and detriment are minimized and the benefits 
maximized. Any permit issued shall contain data and information specifying: 
1. the types and sources of materials to be dumped; 
2. the location of the dump-site(s); 
3. the method of dumping; and 
4. monitoring and reporting requirements. 
18. permits should be reviewed at regular intervals, taking into account the results of monitoring 
and the objectives of monitoring programmes. Review of monitoring results will indicate 
whether field programmes need to be continued, revised or terminated and will contribute 
to informed decisions regarding the continuance, modification or revocation of permits. 
This provides an important feedback mechanism for the protection of human health and 
the marine environment.
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5 The impact of the noumea Convention  
and protocols
new Zealand ratified the original noumea dumping protocol in 1990, and signed an amended 
protocol on 10 September 2006. As at July 2012 the amended protocol has not entered into force.
The original protocol, which entered into force on 22 August 1990 and remains in force in that 
form, does not prohibit CCS, because it takes the London dumping Convention’s approach that all 
dumping may be permitted by a party State as long as it does not fall within those substances listed in 
Annex 1. Annex 1 does not include CO2. 
The amended version of the protocol as at 2006 takes the opposite approach, and reflects the 
“reverse list” approach of the Ldp. Under Article 4 it prohibits the dumping at sea37 of all matter38 
other than those substances in Annex 1. Annex 1 of this version of the protocol does not include CO2 
for CCS injection. 
Further amendments to Annex 1 of the amended noumea protocol on dumping, adopted at the 11th 
ordinary meeting of the parties to the noumea Convention in 2012,39 also do not appear to have 
entered into force. Such further amendments would reflect the 2006 changes to Annex 1 of the Ldp, 
thereby enabling CCS to the same extent as the Ldp currently in force. 
At present, therefore, it appears that CCS injection into the continental shelves of parties to the 
noumea Convention is not prohibited. not all parties to the noumea protocol are parties to the Ldp, 
therefore at present there are potentially a variety of approaches in the region that could be taken 
to marine CCS. parties to the noumea protocol that are not parties to the Ldp may lawfully engage 
in forms of CCS not allowed under the Ldp, although the likelihood of these states engaging in CCS 
appears low. 
Under Article 3(1) of both the in force and amended protocols, parties are also required to take 
all appropriate measures to effectively prevent, reduce and where practicable eliminate pollution 
by the dumping matter at sea. Article 10 of the noumea Convention imposes an equivalent 
obligation. “pollution” is defined in the noumea Convention in an identical manner to the Ldp. 
As discussed earlier, injection would not likely amount to pollution. However, pollution would 
more likely include the escape of sequestered gas from the seabed into the water column, and thus 
States may be obliged to take appropriate measures to prevent such escapes (including, for example, 
through effective monitoring and maintenance requirements).
Another potentially relevant protocol to the noumea Convention is the protocol on Hazardous 
and noxious Substances pollution, preparedness, Response and Cooperation in the pacific Region. 
This protocol is not yet in force in any form. Under the protocol, “hazardous and noxious substance” 
is defined widely as including any substance other than oil which, if introduced to the marine 
environment, “is likely to …. harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere 
37 Sea is defined to include seabed and subsoil.
38 defined widely in the Convention to include material and substances or any kind, form or description.
39 Agenda item 8.4, 11th Ordinary Meeting of noumea Convention, 30 August 2012, at 1.
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with other legitimate uses of the sea”.40 Broadly, parties are required to set up national systems for 
responding to pollution incidents. pollution incident is defined as an occurrence which “may result in 
a discharge, release or emission of hazardous and noxious substances and which poses or may pose a 
threat to the marine environment… and which requires emergency action or immediate response”.41 
As with the comments above regarding the definition of “pollution”, it is likely that neither of the 
above definitions would apply to CCS injection, but may more likely apply to escape of CO2 from 
storage formation – depending on the particular threat posed in any given case. if CO2 amounted to a 
hazardous and noxious substance under the protocol, it would impose an obligation to prepare for an 
escape of CO2, and to engage in measures to respond to such an escape.
42 it would be good practice 
for such measures to feature in new CCS legislation regardless of the requirements of the protocol.
6 The impact of the Maritime Transport Act  
and the eeZ Act as Currently in Force
6.1 The Current impact of the eeZ Act 2012
The impact and relevance of the eeZ Act as it will exist after amendment from the MLB has been 
discussed in Chapter 9. This part of this Appendix outlines the impact of the eeZ Act and MTA as they 
apply to CCS prior to amendments under the MLB. This is because the amendments in the MLB do not 
represent the current law. However, given that an application for CCS is not likely to be made in the 
near future, the law as it currently stands may not be of particular significance.
Currently, section 20 of the eeZ Act does not restrict discharges other than those that amount to the 
deposit of any “thing” in under or on the seabed or subsoil. Therefore the Act in its present form would 
not restrict the escape of gas from a CCS storage formation after injection. Section 20, and therefore 
the main restrictions in the Act, also do not apply to certain activities currently regulated under the 
MTA.43 These include the “storing of toxic or hazardous waste” and the “dumping of waste or other 
matter”. Both of these are potentially applicable to CCS injection. Therefore to determine the extent 
to which the eeZ Act currently applies to injection, it is useful here to provide an analysis of these 
relevant provisions in the MTA. discussion will then return to the impact of the eeZ Act.
6.2 The Current impact of the Maritime Transport Act 1994
The purpose of the MTA is not expressed in a dedicated purpose section. However, section 5 lists 
the objectives of the Minister under the Act, which are relatively diverse: to undertake his or her 
functions in a way that contributes to an integrated, safe, responsive, and sustainable transport 
system, and to ensure that new Zealand’s obligations under the relevant international conventions 
40 protocol on Hazardous and noxious Substances pollution, preparedness, Response and Cooperation in the pacific Region, Article 1.
41 Article 1.
42 Article 6.
43 exclusive economic Zone and Continental Shelf (environmental effects) Act 2012, s 20(5).
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are implemented. The Act reflects a number of new Zealand’s international obligations.44 As such, 
it addresses a diverse range of subjects, from salvage and the carriage of goods, to safety requirements. 
parts of the Act are concerned with environmental protection, but have limited scope. As suggested 
by the exclusions in section 20 of the eeZ Act, the focus of the environmental provisions of the MTA 
is the regulation of dumping and hazardous or harmful substances. A general purpose of protecting 
the marine environment, as evidenced by parts 19 to 27 of the Act, can clearly be read into the MTA. 
However, in contrast to the eeZ Act, the MTA is not designed as a comprehensive, effects-based 
statute regulating all aspects of environmental harm from a wide variety of activities. 
For CCS to be regulated by the MTA, it must be triggered by the machinery of the Act, or by the 
Marine protection Rules made under it. The parts of the MTA that are prima facie triggered by CCS 
injection are:45 
(1)  part 19, relating to the protection of the marine environment from harmful substances; 
(2)  part 20, relating to the protection of the marine environment from (among other things) 
hazardous offshore operations; and 
(3)  part 21, relating to the protection of the marine environment from dumping, incineration and the 
storing of wastes. 
part 25, concerning civil liability for pollution, may also have an impact on the post-injection phase. 
parts 19 and 21 generally apply only to activities in the eeZ and underlying and extended continental 
shelf. in the territorial sea, these matters are regulated under the RMA and HSnOA. Section 20 
of the eeZ Act states that the restrictions in the section do not apply to “the dumping or storing 
of radioactive waste or other radioactive matter,” “the storing of toxic or hazardous waste” or 
“the dumping of waste or other matter” regulated under the MTA. 
dumping under part 21 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994  
First, it needs to be considered whether CCS injection amounts to dumping under the MTA. “dumping” 
is not defined in the eeZ Act, but it is reasonable to assume that it has the same meaning as that 
given in the MTA. Section 257 of the MTA defines dumping in line with the wording used in the Ldp, 
which includes not only the deliberate “disposal” of matter into the sea, but also any “storage” of 
matter in the seabed (even though storage of hazardous waste is dealt with separately). As such, 
“storing” is effectively treated as the specific subset of “dumping” applicable to the seabed, with 
a separate prohibition on storing hazardous/toxic matter. 
A potential uncertainty in the definition of dumping in the MTA is that it expressly includes “any storage 
of wastes or other matter in the seabed and the subsoil” and yet goes on expressly to exclude from 
dumping the “placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal of them, provided 
that such placement is not contrary to the aims of the 1996 protocol to the London Convention”. 
This reflects the wording in the Ldp itself, and the international approach to this issue has been 
discussed earlier. CCS injection arguably amounts to the placement of matter for a purpose other than 
44 For example, the MARpOL and SOLAS Conventions, and the Ldp.
45 part 18 also has a bearing on parts 19 to 21, but not in a substantive sense. Other parts may also apply to the transportation 
phase of CCS if done by ship.
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mere disposal, since the gas is not being abandoned but rather “stored”. Since the 2006 amendments 
to the Ldp, it is also not contrary to the aims of the Ldp. However, the international community has 
interpreted this phrase in the Ldp as classifying CCS injection as “dumping”, and given a purpose of 
the MTA is to implement the Ldp, the same interpretation would likely be made by the new Zealand 
Courts. The placement of matter for purposes “other than mere disposal” is more likely intended to 
refer to objects that remain useful in the short term, such as measuring instruments, navigational aids 
or artificial reefs. The term CO2 “storage” is a misnomer, given that the purpose of CCS is disposal.
Section 257 of the MTA also excludes from the definition of dumping “the disposal or storage of wastes 
or other matter directly arising from, or related to, the exploration, exploitation, and associated 
offshore processing of seabed mineral resources”. This provision probably allows oil and gas mining 
activities to reinject natural gas (for temporary storage) or production water, use CO2 eOR and eGR 
techniques, or to inject CO2 that has been stripped (in an offshore location) from offshore natural gas 
and injected back into the seabed.46 
The applicability of this exception is less clear in the case of “pure” marine CCS, where the injection of 
CO2 is not necessarily related to or arising from the offshore processing of minerals. Carbon dioxide 
itself is not a mineral. The gas being injected may originally have been produced as a result of the 
processing of mineral resources (such as petroleum or natural gas), but it would not necessarily 
be the case. Similarly, any mineral resources that produced the CO2 would not necessarily have 
come from an offshore source. it is even less likely that the CO2 would be produced by the offshore 
processing of seabed mineral resources, as processing (and capture) is more likely to occur onshore 
at industrial sites. injection streams may also be mixed from more than one capture source; which 
may be only partly produced in connection with the offshore processing of seabed mineral resources. 
The exception to dumping in section 257 therefore provides an arbitrary distinction between different 
kinds of CCS streams, which would not have been intended by the Act. Most CCS is likely to be 
excluded from this exception and therefore amount to dumping under the MTA. As a consequence, 
currently CCS injection in the eeZ would not be governed under the eeZ Act.47 
The prohibition on dumping under Section 260 of the Maritime Transport Act 
if CCS amounts to the storing of “toxic” or “hazardous” waste (and does not come within the exception 
to the definition of “dumping” discussed above) it will fall under the specific subcategory of dumping 
in section 260 of the MTA, and be prohibited. However, CO2 (if it conforms to the purity requirements 
of the Ldp) is unlikely to amount to a “toxic” or “hazardous” substance. The MTA defines toxic or 
hazardous waste with reference to the definition contained in the Marine protection Rules. 
Curiously, the Marine protection Rules do not appear to define a toxic or hazardous substance in 
part 180 (relating to dumping), or in any other part of these Rules. “Harmful substance” is defined in 
part 200 of the Rules for the purposes of part 19 of the MTA (protection of the marine environment 
46 As occurs at the Sleipner Field off the norwegian coast.
47 To the extent that CCS injection involves dumping. injection may involve other activities that are not excluded from section 
20 of the exclusive economic and Continental Shelf (environmental effects) Act 2012, in which case marine consent would be 
required for these in addition to a dumping permit under the Maritime Transport Act. An example would be the disturbance of 
the seabed.
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from harmful substances) with reference to hazardous substances under HSnOA regulations.48 
it may be reasonable to conclude that the definition of “hazardous” for the purposes of part 21 is the 
same as that provided under the same HSnOA regulations. Carbon dioxide does not amount to a 
hazardous substance under these regulations. 
Given the above conclusions, CCS would not be prohibited by section 260 of the MTA. instead, it 
would fall within the more general dumping regime of section 261. Curiously, for the limited purpose 
of transport by ship under international law (and, by incorporation, some parts of the Maritime 
Rules), CO2 is treated as a dangerous substance.
49 However, this classification is a result of the 
safety requirements of the SOLAS Convention, and not for the purposes of protecting the marine 
environment. Therefore the classification as a “hazardous substance” for the purposes of transport 
by ship can be distinguished from the classification as a “hazardous substance” for the purposes of 
dumping under section 260 of the MTA.
dumping permits under section 261 of the Maritime Transport Act  
Although CCS likely amounts to dumping under the MTA, it would have to trigger section 261 for the 
Act to have practical effect. To trigger this section, injected gas would have to be a “waste or other 
matter”. Although questions could arise over whether CO2 is a “waste” (which is not defined) CO2 
is clearly at least “other matter”. 
However, section 261 only requires permits for the dumping of matter “from a ship, aircraft, or 
controlled offshore installation”. A “controlled offshore installation” is defined with reference to an 
“offshore installation”, which in turn requires an artificial structure to have a purpose of exploring for, 
exploiting or processing any “mineral”. installations used for CCS (and not concurrently used for eOR/
eGR or extraction) do not have this purpose, because CO2 is not a mineral. due to this unintended 
oversight, CCS injection in the eeZ is not technically restricted. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that CCS installations were treated as “offshore installations” 
under the MTA, the matters that the director would have to consider in deciding whether to grant 
a dumping permit under section 262 are contained in Rule 180.8 of the Marine protection Rules. 
The decision must be in accordance with:
(1) section 270 of the MTA (a general requirement that the director must be satisfied the application 
meets all prescribed requirements);
(2) the criteria, measures and requirements for the granting of dumping permits set out in the Ldp50 
(this amounts to a direct incorporation of international law into domestic law); and
(3) the Guidelines for the implementation and uniform interpretation of the Ldp adopted from time 
to time by resolution of the contracting parties and published by the iMO.
48 Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 225; Marine protection Rules, rule 200.2; Hazardous Substances (Minimum degrees of Hazard) 
Regulations 2001.
49 Under the international Gas Carrier Code, which is incorporated into Chapter Vii of the SOLAS Convention.
50 The section technically refers to the LdC, but the LdC is defined in section 257 as including amendments and protocols. 
For practical purposes in new Zealand, the Ldp is the relevant instrument.
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Rule 180.3 clarifies that the director cannot grant an application that permits the dumping of matter 
in breach of the Ldp. The director is also required to have regard to the New Zealand Guidelines for Sea 
Disposal of Waste. However, these Guidelines are silent on CCS activities. Although the director may 
have regard to other international, domestic or foreign guidelines on dumping, this would not allow 
the consideration of guidelines that were more lenient than the Ldp, such as the noumea protocol on 
dumping (as currently in force). As recommended in Chapter 9, domestic law on marine CCS should 
reflect the standards in the Ldp.
part 19 of the Maritime Transport Act  
part 19 of the MTA concerns the protection of the marine environment from harmful substances, 
and was largely introduced to ensure new Zealand’s compliance with the MARpOL Convention.51 
For the purposes of CCS, the relevant provisions of part 19 concern the discharge or escape of harmful 
substances into the sea. The significance here is that it may apply to unintended escapes of CO2 
from a formation. Such escapes would not amount to dumping, and therefore the regime governing 
discharges would not be prevented from applying.
The key question is whether an escape would trigger section 226 of the MTA, the relevant parts of 
which provide: 
[H]armful substances shall not be discharged or escape, otherwise than in accordance with the 
marine protection rules,- 
(a)  from any ship, offshore installation,52 or pipeline-
(i)  into the sea within the eeZ of new Zealand; or 
(ii)  onto or into the seabed below that sea”.
A “harmful substance” is defined in section 225 of the MTA as “any substance specified as a harmful 
substance for the purposes of this definition by the marine protection rules”. The Marine protection 
Rules part 200.2 (definitions) refers to regulations made under the HSnOA.53 This requires that 
substances other than oil be ecotoxic to aquatic organisms and considered hazardous for the purposes 
of the Hazardous Substances (Minimum Degrees of Hazard) Regulations 2001. These regulations define 
different kinds of substances differently, via schedules. A sensible way of reading part 200.2 of the 
Marine protection Rules is that the requirement that a substance is both “ecotoxic” and “hazardous” 
for the purposes of the Regulations in fact refers to the requirement that the substance amount to 
a hazardous substance under Schedule 6 of the Regulations (which addresses the definition of a 
hazardous substance that has ecotoxic properties). 
it is reasonably clear that CO2 is not ecotoxic to aquatic organisms under any of the criteria in 
Clause 2(1)(a) of Schedule 6. The criteria focus only on the characteristics of the substance, rather 
than the potentially (albeit unlikely) harmful way in which it could escape (in high concentrations or 
at high pressure). 
51 international Convention for the prevention of pollution from Ships 1340 UNTS 184 (adopted 2 november 1973, entered into 
force 2 October 1983) (MARpOL). part 19 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994 is wider than MARpOL, because it applies both to 
ships and offshore installations.
52 For the purposes of the present discussion, it is assumed that a CCS installation is included within the definition of an “offshore 
installation” although, as discussed earlier, it currently is not.
53 part 24A of the Marine protection Rules also provides a (different) definition of harmful substance, but it is fairly clear that the 
Maritime Transport Act in this context is referring to part 200 (offshore installations – discharges) rather than part 24A (carriage 
of cargoes – dangerous goods).
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that a discharge from a storage formation would be “from any ship, 
offshore installation, or pipeline” as required by the MTA. Although originally the CO2 would have 
been injected from an offshore installation (assuming again that a CO2 injection installation is treated 
as falling within this definition), the seabed itself does not amount to an “installation”. The escape of 
CO2 from a formation is therefore not currently regulated under the MTA (or, for that matter under 
the eeZ Act). 
in relation to injection, one curious feature of the Marine protection Rules is that part 200.2 provides 
a wider definition of “discharge” than the MTA, adding that “reinjection into geological formations” 
does not amount to a discharge even if the substance in question is harmful. Section 226 clearly 
provides that harmful substances can be discharged “in accordance with” the Marine protection Rules, 
but it is by no means clear that the Rules can do so by redefining a term already defined in the MTA.
The altered definition of “discharge” only excludes “reinjection”, a term that was most likely 
envisaged to apply in cases of re-injection of production water, or potentially also temporary 
natural gas storage. it is unclear the extent to which CO2, which is produced elsewhere and would 
be injected in large amounts for permanent or long-term storage, could amount to re-injection. 
it may require a substance to have been extracted from a geological formation and then returned to it. 
Furthermore, the schema of the Act as a whole is clearly that an activity amounting to dumping will 
not amount to a discharge, even if that discharge is characterised under the Marine protection Rules 
as “injection”. 
The provisions in the MTA and part 200 of the Marine protection Rules regarding the preparation 
and approval of detailed discharge management plans, however, apply to offshore installations 
generally54 and (if an offshore installation were treated as applying to injection installations) would 
include a CCS platform. The plan would not have to address the actual injection of CO2, because this 
would not be a “discharge”, but would have to address incidental discharges of harmful substances. 
in particular, the following rules would apply:
(1) Rule 200.4, under which a discharge management plan is required to be approved for the 
installation (every 3 years);
(2) Rule 200.6, which requires consultation with persons whose interests in the vicinity of the 
installation are likely to be affected by a spill of the harmful substance;
(3) Rule 200.20, which requires notification of any modification to discharge management plan; and
(4) Rules 200.11 and 200.12, which require emergency spill response procedures to be set up.
The matters required to be included in a discharge management plan, under Schedule 1 to part 200 
of the Rules, are more comprehensive for installations beyond the coastal marine area than for 
those inside it.55 in short, all operators of offshore installations are required to provide general risk 
assessment information in an application for approval of a discharge management plan, but operators 
outside the coastal marine area have to provide information on harmful substances as well.
54 Marine protection Rules, rule 200.3.
55 presumably because the RMA plays a role in relation to installations within the coastal marine area.
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part 25 of the Maritime Transport Act 
part 25 of the MTA imposes civil liability on persons in charge of offshore structures for pollution 
damage caused by the discharge of harmful substances or dumping. This part is to be partially 
replaced by a new part 26A under the MLB, although the bulk of the part will not be subject to change. 
For this reason, both the existing part 25 and the proposed part 26A are discussed in Chapter 9 and 
Appendix F, part 9.
6.3 Summary of the Current Legislative Regime Applicable  
to CCS beyond the Coastal Marine Area
Currently, the regimes for dumping and discharges under the MTA and eeZ Act are in flux. As these Acts 
currently stand CCS injection is most likely classed as dumping and thus excluded from consideration 
under the eeZ Act.56 However, given the definition of “offshore installation” under the MTA, no permit 
is technically required for CCS injection under that Act. For completeness, the applicability of part 19 
of the MTA has also been discussed above, although currently it is unlikely to apply to CCS injection 
because a “discharge” expressly excludes “dumping”. 
The escape of gas from an injection platform or a storage formation is also unlikely to infringe the 
MTA as it stands. Such an escape most likely amounts neither to “dumping” nor the discharge of a 
“harmful substance” as currently defined in the MTA. Section 20(5) of the eeZ Act therefore does 
not exclude these escapes from the scope of the eeZ Act. However, section 20 of the eeZ Act also 
does not restrict or regulate the discharge of CO2 to the water column. The only restriction appears 
to be section 25 of the Act, imposing a general duty to avoid, remedy and mitigate adverse effects 
of activities on the environment. it is by no means clear that all (or potentially any) escapes of CO2 
to the water column would cause “adverse effects” in an environmental sense and be caught by the 
section. in any case, the reactive nature of section 25 is clearly not an adequate basis for the active 
regulation of CCS storage formation integrity. 
However, the Marine Legislation Bill is set to make sweeping changes to this regime. The effect of 
the Bill is discussed in Chapter 9. Given the likelihood of the Bill passing into law, we have based our 
recommendations in Chapter 9 on the legal regime in the eeZ as it would stand after the coming into 
force of the Bill.
56 exclusive economic Zone and Continental Shelf (environmental effects) Act 2012, s 20(5). CCS is excluded from the eeZ Act 
regime only to the extent that an activity amounts to dumping or the discharge of harmful substances. The requirement to 
obtain consent for the disturbance or drilling of the seabed, the laying of pipelines or the construction of an injection installation 
would still currently require marine consent under the eeZ Act.
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7 Consents Required for CCS Operations 
Straddling the Boundary between eeZ  
and Coastal Marine Area
The eeZ Act expressly provides for the consenting of cross boundary activities,57 where (generally) 
applications are processed together, but are required to address both regional and eeZ matters. 
These matters are decided by the body with competent jurisdiction.58 A cross boundary activity 
is defined as “an activity that is carried out partly in the exclusive economic zone or in or on the 
continental shelf and partly in new Zealand”.59 The reference to new Zealand refers to the coastal 
marine area. it is unclear whether CCS would amount to a “cross boundary activity” if injection 
occurred in one jurisdiction but injected CO2 migrated to the other. An “activity” is defined as any 
activity restricted by section 20.60 Although it is clear that the injection of CO2 into the seabed will 
be an activity restricted by the Act, it is arguable that the natural migration of gas does not amount 
to a separate activity, and therefore would be considered only in accordance with the policy guidance 
applicable to the injection site. However, given that the eeZ Act is a broadly effects-based statute 
like the RMA, it is more likely that CCS involving straddling pore space will require consent as a 
cross boundary activity, or at least that regulations or regional plans could provide for this as a cross 
boundary activity.61 
The eeZ Act provides for an efficient administrative process for deciding cross boundary activities 
(including information sharing, non-duplication of administrative functions, and referral to a board 
of inquiry for decision on matters of national significance). However, the Act makes no provision for 
how policy discrepancies are to be resolved. The approach taken in the eeZ under regulations could 
foreseeably be different to the policy direction adopted at a regional level in the coastal marine area, 
with the potentially frustrating result that a single activity with consistent effects in each zone could 
receive consent in one zone but be declined in another. if decided by a board of inquiry as an activity 
of national significance, there is a risk that an application could be declined in its totality due to the 
existence of strong regional policies against the activity. no provision is currently made for national 
regulations in the eeZ to override regional policies in the territorial sea, or for how a board of inquiry 
is expected to reconcile potentially opposed policy guidance for a single activity. 
Some mitigation of this issue is already provided for in section 176 of the eeZ Act, where the RMA has 
been consequentially amended to require regional councils, when preparing or changing any regional 
policy statements and regional plans, to have regard to the extent to which the document needs to 
be consistent with regulations made under the eeZ Act. This reflects a similar provision already in 
sections 61(2) and 66(2) of the RMA whereby regard must be had to the extent to which a plan needs 
to be consistent with the RpSs and plans of adjacent regional councils. The risk with this approach 
57 exclusive economic Zone and Continental Shelf (environmental effects) Act 2012, ss 88 to 100.
58 except if referred to a board of inquiry in the case of a nationally significant activity under section 99 of the exclusive economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf (environmental effects) Act 2012.
59 exclusive economic Zone and Continental Shelf (environmental effects) Act 2012, s 88.
60 Which will also, under clause 90 of the Marine Legislation Bill, include dumping and discharges of harmful substances.
61 The Resource Management Act 1991 deals with this issue in section 67(2)(f), where regional plans are empowered to state how 
issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries will be dealt with.
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for regulations under the eeZ Act is that it may not be sufficiently directive in the absence of an npS 
or neS. First, regional councils only need to consider the extent to which their documents need to 
be consistent with regulations, which leaves open the possibility that councils may consider there is 
no such need. Secondly, it is possible that regional councils could consider the need for consistency, 
but for other reasons decline to take action based on it. Third, the requirement only applies when 
preparing or changing regional policy statements or plans. if a cross boundary activity application 
were lodged between the point at which regulations were promulgated and the time that a council 
reviewed its RpS or plan, the outcome of an application could still be uncertain. 
An option could be for neSs and npSs under the RMA to ensure that regional level policy is 
consistent with regulations developed under the eeZ Act. The npS and neS process is a transparent, 
established and reasonably well accepted process by which national level resource management 
policy can guide (or, if necessary, direct) regional approaches, while providing engagement with 
concerned parties to explain the nature of likely effects in advance of any specific consent application. 
Alternatively, injection could simply be removed from the scope of the RMA and eeZ Act regimes and 
provided for in a new CCS Act. As recommended in Chapters 2 and 9, we consider that this option 
is preferable. it would resolve not only the issue in relation to CCS where formations straddled the 
eeZ-territorial sea boundary, and would also avoid a number of other problematic aspects of these Acts. 
8 The Continuing Relevance of the MTA  
for Marine dumping Activities
The Marine Legislation Bill62 provides that the MTA will continue to regulate the dumping of matter in 
emergencies. The definition of “emergency” requires that there be an unacceptable risk to the marine 
environment or human health or safety. it is unlikely that CO2 would need to be intentionally injected 
into the seabed or dumped into the water column in an emergency, given that it could simply be 
emitted to the air with no regulatory restrictions. An unintended leak into the water column would 
not constitute dumping or be subject to a requirement for an emergency dumping permit, because it 
would not be deliberate. 
The Marine Legislation Bill also provides that the MTA will continue to regulate the dumping of matter 
beyond the extended continental shelf by new Zealand structures or ships.63 Section 261 of the MTA 
is amended accordingly. Although section 257A(2)(a) only refers to the dumping of matter into the 
water column, section 261(1) in fact requires a permit for any dumping from a new Zealand ship or 
structure into or onto the seabed. Section 262 of the MTA64 provides that the director may issue 
permits authorising the dumping of matter (including ships, aircraft or offshore installations) from a 
new Zealand ship or aircraft beyond new Zealand’s continental waters. The Marine protection Rules 
(part 180 on dumping) are expressly imported into this section, and applications must be determined 
in accordance with these Rules. 
62 Maritime Transport Act, s 262A, as in the Marine Legislation Bill, Sched 3.
63 Maritime Transport Act, 257A(2)(a), as in the Marine Legislation Bill, Sched 3.
64 Marine Legislation Bill, Sched 3.
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The injection of CO2 amounts to dumping into the seabed. in the international seabed area, it is likely 
that CCS injection is currently prohibited under international law. This is because the international 
Seabed Authority may lack the practical jurisdiction to process such applications, and because the 
ongoing presence of injected CO2 may amount to a state’s appropriation of an area of the deep 
seabed for its own benefit (as discussed in part 1 of this Appendix). Therefore we recommend that CCS 
injection be removed from the MTA regime on dumping beyond the extended continental shelf, and 
that a prohibition be included in a new CCS Act on any injection by new Zealand ships or structures 
in the international seabed area.
9 Liability for Marine pollution under the MTA 
for CCS injectors
Currently, part 25 of the MTA imposes civil liability on the owner of a marine structure or person in 
charge of any marine operation for all pollution damage in continental waters caused by the escape 
or discharge of a harmful substance, or caused by matter that is dumped.65 This is potentially relevant 
to any escape of CO2 into the water column from an injection installation or a storage formation. 
“pollution damage” is defined widely as including “damage or loss of any kind”, and includes loss of 
profit from the impairment of the environment.66 A marine “operation” requires that an operation be 
connected with the exploitation of mineral resources.67 Therefore liability for CCS operators under 
part 25 would be limited to where pollution damage is caused by the release of a harmful substance 
from a structure, or where pollution damage is caused as a result of matter that has been dumped 
from a structure. However, as discussed earlier, CO2 is unlikely to amount to a “harmful substance” 
as defined in the Marine protection Rules. A “structure” is defined in section 247 of the MTA as 
“an offshore installation or a pipeline”. An “offshore installation” includes only those installations 
connected with minerals exploitation and would not include a CCS injection installation.
The proposed part 26A of the MTA, introduced by clause 62 of the MLB, makes changes to the 
regime for civil liability in relation to pollution damage from marine structures and operations. 
Sections 355 to 360 of the existing part 25, relating to marine structures and operations, are to be 
repealed. instead, a new part 26A will provide for civil liability for these discharges.
Under proposed s385C of the MTA, the owner of a marine structure is to remain liable for all pollution 
damage in new Zealand or its continental waters or the seabed below them caused by any matter 
that is dumped from that structure. Liability also extends to any clean-up costs by the Crown, 
or preventative measures taken by the Crown where there is a grave and imminent threat of such 
a discharge.68 The definition of pollution damage remains the same as under the existing part 25.69 
However, the Marine Legislation Bill does not propose any amendment to the definition of “offshore 
65 Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 356.
66 Section 342.
67 Thus where CCS amounts to eOR or eGR, this will be caught by the definition of a marine operation.
68 Maritime Transport Act 1994, ss 385B and 385C(b).
69 Maritime Transport Act, s 385A in the Marine Legislation Bill, cl 62.
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installation” or “structure”, and an escape of CO2 from an injection installation would not be caught 
by the section. 
equally significant is whether a leak from a storage formation, which caused damage, would be 
subject to the liability regime under part 26A. A natural geological formation would not fit within 
the definition of an “offshore installation”, which requires there to be an “artificial structure”.70 
However, liability extends to all pollution damage caused by “any waste or other matter that is 
dumped from that… structure”.71 Thus the pollution damage need not be from the structure itself, and 
it is sufficient that it is caused by the matter that has, at some point, been dumped from a structure. 
damage from a discharge from a storage formation would have been caused by the CO2 that had been 
dumped from an injection installation. However, this installation would not be a marine “structure” 
under the Act,72 Furthermore, such an escape could not amount to pollution damage if injection were 
removed from the dumping regime of the eeZ Act or RMA (as recommended in Chapters 2 and 9), 
because the source of the damage would not be matter that had been “dumped”.
it would involve relatively simple amendments to the MTA to bring escapes of CO2 within the regime 
for liability for pollution damage. if this were done, there would be no cap on the quantum of damages 
payable for an escape of gas from an installation or formation. The provision of some form of legal 
recourse for pollution damage is required under Article 235 of UnCLOS. However, escapes of CO2 
that are not likely to cause harm (which is the most likely scenario) would not amount to “pollution” 
under UnCLOS or require redress. Recourse for escapes that did cause harm could equally be provided 
under a new CCS Act, or perhaps through existing common law actions. The most significant point, 
however, is that liability under the MTA is not well suited to the detailed regulation of CCS operations 
that is required, and should not be used in isolation as a way to regulate the integrity of marine 
storage formations. preventing leakage is essential irrespective of whether it causes private damage. 
detailed and proactive regulation for leakage needs to be provided for in a new CCS Act. 
For completeness, section 356 of the MTA provides that civil liability for pollution damage from 
matter dumped from a structure is attributed to the owner of that structure. escapes of CO2 from 
an underground formation could foreseeably occur long after the structure that injected it was 
removed, and it may be possible to transfer ownership of the structure after injection. in the case 
of CCS, liability might be better imposed on the holder of an injection permit rather than an owner 
of a structure.
We consider that amendments should still be made to the definition of “structure” in the MTA to 
include CCS injection installations. This would ensure that any discharges of harmful substances from 
the installation (such as incidental discharges of oil) are properly subject to parts 25 or 26A.
70 Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 222.
71 Maritime Transport Act, s 385C, in the Marine Legislation Bill, cl 62.
72 Marine Legislation Bill, cl 62.
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10 The impact of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 
on Marine CCS injection
Section 4 of the CSA imports the permitting regime of section 25 of the CMA73 for petroleum mining. 
Recent amendments74 have also brought the CMA regime into force for the mining of other minerals 
under the CSA.75 The impact of the CMA regime on CCS is discussed in Chapter 2, and the conclusions 
reached there will apply equally under the CSA.
The eeZ Act also consequentially amends the CSA. These changes are relatively minor, and leave the 
core elements of the CSA regime intact. Section 171 of the eeZ Act repealed six subsections of section 
8 of the CSA, concerning the matters for which regulations can be made under the CSA. This is a result 
of these matters now being governed by regulations under the eeZ Act. The matters include:
(1)  the regulation of installations related to the exploitation of resources;76 
(2)  measures that can be taken in safety zones for the protection of the natural environment from 
harmful agents;77 and
(3)  restricting exploration where it could cause unjustifiable interference with other uses.78 
Although prima facie the CSA may appear relevant to CCS,79 the Act does not provide an adequate 
basis for regulatory jurisdiction over the activity. The broad limitations of the Act are the same as 
under the CMA: it relates almost exclusively to minerals and to extractive activities, and has a    limited 
purpose.
However, the CSA does provide a basis for the extraterritorial application of general new Zealand civil 
and criminal law to CCS installation in/on the eeZ/continental shelf. Under section 7 an installation 
must be constructed in connection with the exploitation of the natural resources of the continental 
shelf for jurisdiction to apply. This seems to be adequate to include the exploitation of geological 
storage capacity/pore space as “natural resources”.
Aspects of the CSA are also wider than its restrictive provisions. Section 3 of the Act vests all rights 
of exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf in the Crown.80 
Furthermore, regulations can still be made under section 8 of the CSA for the establishment of safety 
zones around installations and devices associated with the exploitation of any natural resources of 
the continental shelf (including under the territorial sea), and for restricting the entry of ships into 
these zones. An injection platform for CCS likely falls within the terms “installation” or “device” under 
73 except for references to section 10 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991, because the Crown does not “own” minerals in the 
continental shelf.
74 Continental Shelf Amendment Act 2013.
75 Continental Shelf Act 1964, s 5AA. This is subject to certain transitional arrangements.
76 Continental Shelf Act 1964, ss 8(a), (b), (g) and (i) (repealed).
77 Section 8(f) (repealed).
78 Section 8(j) (repealed).
79 Since the petroleum industry uses similar infrastructure, and similar exploration activities are needed.
80 The Crown does not “own” resources in the continental shelf beyond territorial waters (in contrast to the CMA), because it only 
has sovereign rights to them under UnCLOS.
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the Act, although a storage formation would not. Thus safety zones could not be created to exclude 
ships from navigating above formations.81 For completeness, regulations made under section 8(h) 
of the CSA, concerning the placement of warning markers to show the location of installations and 
devices, could also apply to CCS operations.
Section 5A of the CSA provides for payments to be made for the exploitation of the extended 
continental shelf, which implements new Zealand’s obligations under Article 82 UnCLOS to make 
payments to the iSBA. Although the section itself applies to the exploitation of the non-living resources 
of the extended continental shelf,82 in effect it only applies to licenses granted under section 483 for 
petroleum, and section 5AA for other minerals. However, the obligation for payment to the iSBA 
under UnCLOS is wider, requiring that payment be made for the exploitation of all natural resources 
of the extended continental shelf. The calculation of such a payment or whether it is in fact required 
appears uncertain at an international law level. However, in practice this is not likely to be an issue, 
because CCS on the extended continental shelf appears unlikely in the foreseeable future.
11 Resource Consents Required under the 
Resource Management Act 1991
A coastal permit under section 12 of the Act is required for any disturbance of the seabed likely to 
have an adverse effect, the erection of structures, the deposit of any substance into the seabed likely 
to have an adverse effect, or an occupation of any part of the area, unless expressly allowed by a 
national environmental standard (neS), or rule in both a regional coastal plan and proposed regional 
coastal plan. Under section 12(3), no person may carry out any activity in the coastal marine area 
or in relation to any of its natural and physical resources that contravenes an neS or rule in coastal 
plan, unless consent is first obtained.84 The above restrictions would apply to the construction of CCS 
injection platforms, the occupation of the area required for injection or storage, and the drilling of 
wells. However, section 12(6) states that section 12 restrictions do not apply to anything to which 
section 15A or section 15B apply. Similarly, the restriction in section 15, on discharges generally, does 
not apply to anything to which sections 15A or 15B apply. 
Section 15A is reflective of the dumping provisions in the eeZ Act, and provides that no person may 
dump any matter in the coastal marine area from an offshore installation unless allowed by a resource 
consent (a coastal permit). in line with the approach in the Ldp, such dumping must not be classified 
as a permitted activity.85 
An “offshore installation” is defined in the Act with reference to the definition in section 222(1) of the 
MTA, which requires that an installation be for the purposes of exploring for, exploiting or processing 
81 To the extent this was not within the safety zone around an installation.
82 Continental Shelf Act 1964, 5A(1).
83 Which is, effectively, section 25 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991.
84 Or the activity meets the requirements of an existing lawful activity.
85 Section 15A expressly requires a grant of resource consent.
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minerals.86 This would have the effect of excluding CCS from the restrictions on dumping in the RMA 
and, inconsistent with the Ldp, would give regional councils the ability to list CCS as a permitted 
activity in a regional coastal plan.87 Similarly, under section 15B, a CCS project would not currently 
require a consent (for discharge of contaminants from installations), nor would it require consent 
under section 15C (dumping or storage of hazardous and noxious substances from installations). 
The result of this is that CCS injection in the coastal marine area would instead require consent under 
section 15 of the RMA (discharges generally).
We consider that it is artificial and against the intent of the Act for the RMA to distinguish between 
CCS installations and mineral installations for the purposes of its general regimes on discharges and 
dumping. in particular, the fact that an installation is used for a non-mineral purpose should not 
serve to allow the dumping of matter or the storage of radioactive or hazardous waste, which would 
otherwise be restricted or prohibited (as required by international law, and as provided for in section 
15C and in regulations relating to dumping under section 15A). Section 15 alone would not impose the 
restrictions on CCS required by the Ldp. As such, we recommend in Chapter 9 that the definition of an 
“offshore installation” in section 222(1) of the MTA be amended to include all man-made structures 
in the coastal marine area. The revised definition would automatically be imported into the RMA, and 
no amendment would be required to the definition in section 2 of the Act.
“dumping” is defined broadly in section 2 of the Act as the “deliberate disposal” of waste or other 
matter. Assuming that an offshore installation is amended to include an injection platform, a coastal 
permit under section 15A will be required for CCS injection. One complicating factor is that section 
15A(3) effectively provides that section 15B is the applicable section where dumping amounts to 
a “discharge” governed by that section. it is uncertain whether the intention in section 15A(3) is 
to refer to all discharges under section 15B, or only the discharge of harmful substances (and not 
contaminants in general).
Section 15B provides that no person may discharge a contaminant from an offshore installation into 
water, land or air in the coastal marine area unless it is a permitted activity in the relevant region, 
authorised by regulations or a resource consent, or meets certain criteria when discharged to air or 
water (unless prohibited by regulations or a rule). Although the heading of section 15B refers only to 
the discharge of harmful substances, the section itself applies to the discharge of all contaminants.88 
The result is that the exception to dumping in section 15A (relating to discharges) may be wider 
than the general rule on dumping, if section 15A(3) were read as referring to the discharge of any 
contaminant that would contravene section 15B. This issue arises equally in the context of the 
Resource Management (Marine pollution) Regulations 1998, where its broad prohibition on dumping 
(with only limited specific exceptions) does not apply to any discharge governed by section 15B.
in practice, given that CCS injection meets the definition of dumping, section 15B would not likely be 
read as imposing further restrictions. The prohibition under section 15A on classifying CCS injection 
in a regional plan as a permitted activity reflects new Zealand’s international obligations under the 
86 Resource Management Act 1991, s 2.
87 The effect of this would be that, technically, none of sections 15A, B or C would apply to CCS, since all apply to “offshore 
installations”. Section 15 would be triggered instead. 
88 in this sense section 15B of the RMA is more restrictive than its equivalent provisions in the eeZ Act, the latter of which applies 
only to the discharge of “harmful” substances.
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Ldp, whereas the less restrictive approach in section 15B would not. in the case of ambiguity the 
Courts would favour an interpretation consistent with international law.89 nevertheless, the potential 
breadth of the exception to dumping in section 15A(3) may mean that the appropriate permit for CCS 
would not be immediately apparent to a prospective applicant. 
Section 15C of the RMA also imposes a narrow prohibition on the storage of hazardous and toxic waste 
in or on land or in water. Toxic and hazardous waste is defined in section 15C(2) through reference to 
the definition in regulations. Such regulations are most likely the Hazardous Substances (Minimum 
degrees of Hazard) Regulations 2001. To be classed as a hazardous substance, a substance must have 
the minimum degree of hazard in one of Schedules 1 to 6. Given that section 15C refers to hazardous 
and toxic substances, the relevant schedules are likely either Schedule 4 (hazardous substances with 
toxic properties) or Schedule 6 (hazardous substances with ecotoxic properties). Carbon dioxide 
would not meet the minimum degrees of hazard in these schedules.
A related issue is the extent to which the RMA regulates the leakage of CO2 from an offshore storage 
formation out of the seabed into the water column, during or after injection.90 Here, section 15 might 
apply and require consent to be obtained, because the discharge would not be from an offshore 
installation or ship, and therefore sections 15A and 15B would not apply.
For completeness, the general duty in section 17 of the RMA to avoid, remedy or mitigate 
any adverse effects on the environment from an activity would also apply to CCS operations. 
Furthermore, ancillary discharges from CCS installations will require consent under section 15B. 
Certain kinds of ancillary discharges, which are dealt with in the Marine pollution Regulations, will 
be subject only to the regulations rather than the provisions of the relevant regional plan (unless 
provided otherwise in the Regulations).91 These include oil (more specifically, those substances listed 
in Schedule 1 of the Regulations), noxious liquid substances (those substances listed in Schedule 2 
of the Regulations), grade A and B treated sewage, garbage, and ballast water, along with discharges 
“made as part of normal operations of ship or offshore installation” (as described in Schedule 4 of the 
Regulations).
12 The effect of the Resource Management 
(Marine pollution) Regulations 1998
The effect of clause 4 of the Resource Management (Marine pollution) Regulations is that “dumping” 
of CO2 from a ship or offshore installation in the coastal marine area cannot be classed as a 
discretionary activity in a regional coastal plan, or proposed regional coastal plan.92 Section 360(ha) 
of the RMA empowers these regulations to deem any activities to which section 15A of the Act applies 
(dumping) to be prohibited activities. This prohibition is then deemed to be included in all regional 
coastal plans, with the result that a person cannot apply for resource consent for that activity. 
89 Police v Teddy [2013] nZHC 432, [2013] nZAR 299.
90 This is discussed in full in Appendix F, part 15.
91 Marine pollution Regulations, reg 16; Resource Management Act 1991, s 15B(3); Wood v West Coast RC [2000] nZRMA 193 (envC).
92 Because it takes the approach (as in the Ldp) that only the listed substances can be authorised for dumping.
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CCS therefore appears to be prohibited in the coastal marine area, assuming that the definition of 
an offshore installation were expanded to include an injection installation (as discussed in part 11 
of this Appendix).
However, there are exceptions to this prohibition. if the matter to be dumped is directly from or 
related to the exploration, exploitation, or offshore processing of seabed mineral resources then the 
prohibition does not apply.93 As discussed earlier in part 11 of this Appendix, this exception is unlikely 
to apply to CCS unless it amounted to eOR/eGR or the injection of CO2 stripped from offshore natural 
gas resources and processed offshore. 
Confusingly, the prohibition on dumping in the Regulations also expressly does not apply to a 
discharge made in accordance with section 15B of the RMA.94 This is the opposite approach to that 
taken in the eeZ Act (in which anything that amounts to the more specific concept of “dumping” 
is excluded from the wider concept of a “discharge”). in relation to discharges, the Marine pollution 
Regulations only impose specific restrictions on certain discharges (which do not include CO2), 
and no blanket prohibitions. The characterisation of CCS as either “dumping” or a “discharge of a 
contaminant” is thus practically very important under the Regulations. if it is treated as dumping, it is 
prohibited in all regions (again, assuming that the definition of an offshore installation is extended). 
Under section 104(3)(c)(iii), resource consent cannot be granted to an activity contrary to regulations. 
in contrast, if injection is treated as a discharge, it will not be prohibited unless an neS or rule in a 
regional plan deems it to be prohibited. Under the Ldp, new Zealand is required to prohibit CCS to 
the extent that it does not meet the requirements set out in Annex 1. if treated as a discharge, CCS 
injection would also be able to be classed as a permitted activity, which would be inconsistent with 
new Zealand’s international obligations under the Ldp.95
Ultimately, CCS is more likely to fall within the definition of “dumping” under the RMA, a conclusion 
which would be in line with the approach in the eeZ Act and the Ldp. it is therefore hard to escape 
the conclusion that marine CCS injection would be prohibited under the Marine pollution Regulations 
where it occurred within the coastal marine area if the definition of an offshore installation 
were expanded to include CCS installations. However, this does not detract from our ultimate 
conclusion that, although CCS would currently amount to “dumping”, this is still not an appropriate 
characterisation of the activity for new Zealand’s domestic law.
13 policy Guidance for Marine CCS under the 
new Zealand Coastal policy Statement 2010
The new Zealand Coastal policy Statement 2010 (nZCpS) is a national level document that provides 
policy guidance relevant to consent decisions on marine CCS injection. Regional policy statements 
93 Resource Management (Marine protection) Regulations 1998, reg 4 (3). 
94 Resource Management (Marine protection) Regulations 1998, reg 4 (3).
95 new Zealand is not under an international obligation to treat CCS injection as “dumping” under domestic law, but it is under an 
obligation to impose the requirements of the Ldp irrespective of whether CCS is deemed to be “dumping”. For example, new 
Zealand could legitimately treat CCS as a “discharge” under the RMA, but would still be obliged to prohibit such a discharge to 
the extent it did not meet the requirements of Annex 1. 
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and plans are required to give effect to the nZCpS.96 Therefore the provisions of the nZCpS impact 
on consent decisions in two ways: they can determine the policy direction of lower level policy 
documents, and itself be a matter to which regard must be had directly under section 104. in addition, 
if an activity is specified as a restricted coastal activity in a regional plan, the application is decided by 
the Minister of Conservation rather than a regional council.97 
importantly, and consistent with section 3(b) of the Resource Management (energy and Climate 
Change) Amendment Act 2004, the objectives and policies in the nZCpS do not include a focus 
on mitigating the causes of climate change. Objective 5 provides only for adaptation to effects of 
climate change. The remainder of the objectives in the nZCpS focus on the protection of the coastal 
environment and its ecosystems, natural character, the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, the 
importance of public space and access, and the importance of the use and development of the coastal 
environment to enable people to provide for their wellbeing. Most of these objectives appear to tend 
against the granting of consent for CCS injection into the coastal marine area. 
Although arguments are inevitable over the extent of the adverse effects of CCS on the environment, 
it clearly represents a potential threat, rather than a benefit, to the local natural environment, 
ecosystems, and natural seascapes around an injection site or pipeline route. Similarly, the visible 
presence of injection platforms could be considered to affect adversely the natural character of the 
coast, and Māori may view the injection of gas as pollution or poison. CCS injection would also limit 
the space available to the public to access and enjoy the coastal marine area,98 especially if safety 
zones were set up around installations under the CSA.99 even Objective 6 of the nZCpS, concerning 
the value of use and development, contains strong protective elements. Furthermore, this Objective 
and policy 6 contain a focus on the value of renewable energy resources in the coastal marine area. 
in the future, CCS injection may facilitate the development of non-renewable, emissions intensive 
energy resources that would otherwise not be financially viable under the eTS, and adversely affect 
the relative viability of renewable energy sources. 
Objective 6 does recognise that appropriate development has value, that some uses are important 
for the wellbeing of people and communities, and that some uses can only be located in the coastal 
marine area. However, policy 6 only specifically recognises the importance of mineral extraction, 
the supply and transport of energy and the provision of infrastructure. On balance, the nZCpS seems 
to lead to a more protection focused approach in the coastal marine area than in a terrestrial context 
and (depending on the specific context) seems more likely to discourage the granting of consent for 
CCS injection. 
policy 6(2)(d) of the nZCpS provides that where there is no functional need for an activity to be 
located in the coastal marine area, it should not generally be located there. CCS injection is capable 
of occurring under land, and arguably under the nZCpS there is no functional need for marine CCS 
injection if land based formations are available. We recommend that injection be removed from the 
RMA regime, and that an npS be developed on CCS (and/or the nZCpS amended) to provide positive 
96 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 62 and 67.
97 policy 29 of the nZCpS states that no activities are currently required to be specified as a restricted coastal activity in regional 
coastal plans, and that any activity specified as such is deemed to be a discretionary or non-complying activity.
98 policy 6(2)(b) of the nZCpS also focuses on the value of this.
99 The power to impose such zones under the CSA does not appear to be limited to the eeZ.
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policy direction on those aspects of CCS remaining under the RMA (such as coastal occupation, 
the erection of structures, the disturbance of the seabed, and incidental activities).
For completeness, Objective 7 of the nZCpS provides that new Zealand should recognise and comply 
with its international obligations. This obviously includes compliance with the Ldp. However, this 
objective is at best neutral in the context of marine CCS, because the Ldp does not actually require 
new Zealand to enable CCS. in fact, the Ldp expressly states that its provisions do not prevent States 
prohibiting the dumping of matter contained in Annex 1.100
14 Coastal Occupation under the RMA
part 7A of the RMA provides that regional councils can manage the occupation of the coastal marine 
area on a proactive basis by including rules in a regional coastal plan. Such rules can provide for the 
staged release of areas for development, that applications to occupy the same space or proximate 
spaces can be heard together,101 and for the allocation of space based on competitive tender.102 
The Act provides for tenders for authorisations, being exclusive rights to apply for a coastal permit to 
occupy. Offers for authorisations (including via tender) can provide that an annual rental is to be paid 
under a coastal permit to occupy. Although this method of allocation was designed for aquaculture 
purposes and is not in widespread use (the default rule remaining the “first in, first served” rule), 
it poses potential problems for CCS if it were to become more widespread. Tendering for authorisations 
to occupy for CCS projects would be inappropriate. due to the competitive nature of a purely financial 
tendering process, early applicants for CCS in the marine and coastal area could be disadvantaged,103 
given that the most efficient or profitable use of the seabed where suitable formations were located 
may be the mining of petroleum or other activities.104 
However, we consider that (as on land), the RMA is the appropriate place for CCS coastal occupation 
rights (of the surface of the seabed) to be regulated. We recommend that RMA requirements for a 
coastal permit for occupation of coastal space on the surface of the seabed apply to CCS operations 
(including exploration), subject to restrictions in an neS to prevent a CCS application from being 
classified in a regional plan as non-complying or prohibited; and to ensure that they are evaluated on 
a first-in-first-served basis rather than any other allocation method. Call in procedures should also be 
used to enable this aspect of a CCS project to be considered by a board of inquiry at the same time 
as others.
existing coastal permits granting rights to occupy the surface of the seabed should not be allowed 
to present absolute obstacles to CCS projects, in much the same way as powers of compulsory 
acquisition on land provide network utility operators with a means to overcome landowner 
100 London dumping protocol, Art 4(2).
101 Resource Management Act 1991, s 165F.
102 Resource Management Act 1991, s 165G. Other allocation methods are possible, subject to the approval of the Minister of 
Conservation. 
103 depending on the costs involved in deploying CCS technology and the price of emissions at the time.
104 Although part 7A would allow for the development of a weighted attributes tendering process, where non-financial 
characteristics could be taken into account. Whether the concept of the “public interest” could defensibly be included in such a 
process is uncertain, and could be subject to legal challenge. 
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opposition. A ministerial power to compel the surrender of occupation rights could be inserted into 
the CCS Act, along with provision for appropriate procedures and compensation modelled on the 
RMA’s compulsory acquisition provisions.
There may also be some uncertainty as to whether authorisations to occupy can relate to the 
subsurface only. if the ongoing presence of stored CO2 in the subsurface could be considered to 
amount to “occupation”, an injector would require a permit in perpetuity This could be potentially 
significant, as the area required for storage of injected gas is much larger than the surface area required 
for injection, and a storage formation could extend below an area over which a separate exclusive 
occupation right had been granted. depending on the nature of the neighbouring activity, allowing 
the “occupation” of the subsurface could amount to a derogation from an existing grant to occupy 
the surface above a formation. An addition, Councils would need to take care to issue subsequent 
seabed occupation permits, where they involved an activity above a storage formation, subject to 
conditions enabling adequate access to the sub seabed-formation for monitoring and remedial works. 
To resolve these issues, we recommend that the use or occupation of the subsurface of the coastal 
marine area for CCS purposes, including storage formations and pore space, be removed from control 
under the RMA, chiefly section 12(2), in the same manner as it is removed from control by land 
owners on shore. A coastal permit under section 12 should not be required for the initial or ongoing 
occupation of the subsurface by injected CO2, but should still be required for the occupation of the 
surface of the coastal marine area (for example, for the footprint of the injection site and for the 
pipeline route). We recommend an amendment to section 12 of the RMA, to clarify that the presence 
of injected CO2 under the seabed for the purposes of CCS does not amount to a coastal occupation 
for the purposes of the Act or require consent by virtue of section 12.
15 The Regulation of a post-injection discharge 
under the RMA
Because an escape of gas from a sub-seabed storage formation would not be deliberate, it would not 
be classed as dumping or be in breach of section 15A of the RMA. Given that section 15B requires a 
discharge of a contaminant to be from a ship or an offshore installation, this section would also not be 
infringed by the escape of CO2 from the seabed, unless the definition of an offshore installation were 
artificially extended by amendment to include a storage formation. The escape of gas from a storage 
formation would, however, constitute a discharge of a contaminant to water and thus be caught by 
section 15 of the Act.105 An injector would likely have the requisite awareness and control over the 
stored gas to establish causation under the Act for leakage.106 
105 Resource Management Act 1991, s 15(1)(a).
106 McKnight v NZ Biogas Industries Ltd [1994] 2 nZLR 664, at p 14. This case held that it is sufficient, in order to establish a causal 
connection between the person and the discharge, for the person to have awareness of facts from which a reasonable person 
would recognise that escape could occur. The Court of Appeal stated at page 8 of its judgment that the section encompasses 
the consequence of activities carried out by a person.
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The restriction in section 15 does not apply if a discharge is expressly allowed by an neS, regulation, 
rule, or resource consent. no current neS applies to the discharge of a contaminant to the water 
column, nor do the Marine pollution Regulations restrict the discharge of CO2 from the seabed. 
There is the potential for the leakage of CO2 from the seabed to be deemed a permitted activity 
under a rule in a regional coastal plan, given that the effects of such a leak may not give rise to any 
of the effects in the receiving water listed in section 70 subsections (c) to (g). Given that regional 
councils, when making rules, cannot consider the effects on climate change of the discharge to air of 
greenhouse gases,107 there may be little environmental justification for regional councils imposing an 
activity status other than permitted.
in light of the purpose of CCS, it would also seem unlikely that a resource consent for injection would 
ever expressly allow leakage from a storage formation. However, if a consent authority could not 
consider the effects of such an escape on climate change, and the leakage had no other adverse 
environmental effects, it is questionable whether a condition could be imposed requiring that no 
escape occur. Conditions must reasonably relate to the effects of the activity consented.108 it would 
appear to be consistent with the purpose of the 2004 amendments to the RMA that conditions must 
also reasonably relate only to effects that are able to be lawfully considered by a consent authority. 
it is clearly desirable to provide for regulatory control over escapes of CO2 from a formation. 
There are a number of justifications for this: the substantial interest the public would have in 
retaining the gas underground, regulators’ responsibility to ensure that suitable formations are used 
as efficiently and effectively as possible, and the Crown’s interest in the proper maintenance of 
formations given (potentially) its eventual assumption of responsibilities and liabilities.109
The above issues could be resolved through the use of an neS, which would be able to provide that the 
effects on climate change of a discharge from a sub-seabed storage formation to the water column is 
able to be considered in making regional rules.110 However, we consider that a more targeted approach 
would be a better option. We recommend that post-injection leakages from a formation be subject to 
detailed regulation under a new CCS Act, and removed from the scope of the RMA.
16 The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) 
Act 2011
The effect of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (MCAA) was to repeal the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (FSA), which had vested the foreshore and seabed in the Crown. 
The MCAA reclassifies the legal status of the foreshore and seabed as a “common coastal and marine 
area”,111 thereby removing property rights and guaranteeing public access.112 it also revives Māori 
107 discussed in Chapter 2.
108 Sampson v Waikato Regional Council envC A178/02, 2 September 2002.
109 See Chapter 10 for a discussion of liability.
110 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 70B and s104F.
111 The common coastal and marine area is identical to the coastal marine area under the RMA, except for the exclusion of privately 
owned and certain Crown owned land (Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, s 9).
112 including navigation under section 27 and recreational access under section 26.
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customary interests that had been extinguished by the FSA, although these are now recognised and 
regulated according to statutory criteria.113 
Māori can apply for recognition of customary marine title (CMT) and protected customary rights (pCR). 
These are interests granted under the statute and not proprietary title.114 The recognition of a CMT 
requires there to have been exclusive use and occupation from 1840 without substantial interruption.115 
A recognised pCR removes the need to obtain resource consent under RMA for the recognised activity. 
Because a pCR is not subject to the restrictions in sections 12 to 17 of the RMA,116 an neS would also 
have no effect on it. 
A CMT does not remove the need to obtain a resource consent under the RMA to undertake an activity 
that is not permitted. Subject to the sustainable management purpose of the RMA, a regional council 
must recognise and provide for the matters contained in a planning document prepared by a CMT 
group for the CMT area. However, the primary significance of a CMT is that an applicant for a coastal 
permit to conduct an activity within a CMT area will generally require an RMA permission right 
from the holder of the CMT. This permission right is discretionary, subject to no statutory guidance 
(including any neS or npS), and not subject to appeal or objection.117 
Section 26(1) of the MCAA prevents a CMT group from charging for access or for recreational 
activities within a CMT, but does not appear to prevent a CMT group from charging for the exercise of 
a permission right in relation to an activity for which resource consent is required. Given that Māori 
may see CCS as pollution, there is a risk that such permission may be refused irrespective of any 
neS or npS that is developed on CCS. Such broad discretion has the potential to provide investment 
uncertainty to CCS proponents if suitable formations were located beneath an area subject to a CMT, 
especially if permission rights were subject to discretionary fees. 
An important exception is that an activity can occur without an RMA permission right if it amounts 
to an accommodated activity under section 64. However, at present CCS does not amount to such 
an activity. 
Given that an RMA permission right applies only to activities carried out under a resource consent,118 
deeming CCS to be a permitted activity in a regional coastal plan would avoid the need for such 
permission. However, such a rule would be unlikely to be possible given the weight that has to be 
given to a planning document prepared by the CMT group. Furthermore, this option would mean 
detailed conditions would not be able to be imposed on a particular CCS project under a resource 
consent, and it would breach the requirement in the 
RMA and the Ldp that dumping not be classified as a permitted activity. 
113 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, ss 6, 11.
114 Section 54.
115 Section 58.
116 Section 52.
117 Section 68.
118 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, s 66.
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An alternative option would be the inclusion of CCS activities in the list of accommodated activities, 
by inclusion in the list of “deemed accommodated activities”.119 This could be achieved by enabling 
CCS operators to apply to become network utility operators, by expanding the list in section 166 
of the RMA.120 The construction of CCS infrastructure would still be required to be either approved 
by the relevant CMT group or classified by the Minister in accordance with the requirements in 
part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Act.121 The CMT order would also remain a relevant consideration under an 
application for resource consent for CCS.122 
Furthermore, to qualify as a deemed accommodated activity, CCS infrastructure would have to be 
unable to operate in any other location, and be essential for the social or economic well-being of the 
nation or region in question. These requirements may still provide a barrier to CCS in a CMT area. 
no reference is made in the Act to infrastructure being “essential” for environmental reasons, let 
alone global environmental reasons. even if there were such a reference, it would be difficult to 
establish that any given CCS operation would be “essential” in mitigating or even have a significant 
effect on global climate change. 
The recommended option is that injection and the management of storage formations be removed 
from the scope of the RMA. This would remove the need to obtain an RMA permission right for 
injection, because such permission is required only in relation to those activities requiring consent 
under the RMA. For clarity, storage formations could also be expressly vested in the Crown, 
or removed from the CMT regime, by an express statutory provision.123 We recommend that the use 
of the subsurface of land for CCS injection and storage purposes under either a protected customary 
right area or a customary title area be vested in the Crown, as are such rights elsewhere. Options are 
available, however. Such a vesting could apply to protected customary right areas only, if the size and 
number of customary title areas is unlikely to interfere with foreseeable CCS operations, with the 
possibility of obtaining accommodated activity rights instead. 
The need for CMT holder permission would remain for CCS activities that remained under the RMA 
regime (for example, the construction of installations). To address this issue, CCS operators should 
be classed as network utility operators under the RMA, which would be one step to these activities 
being “deemed accommodated activities”. However, providing for these activities as deemed 
accommodated activities may not in practice be necessary unless CMT areas expanded into areas 
where CCS could realistically occur, or it was seen that RMA permission rights were being exercised in 
a manner that unduly hampered the development of the technology. 
119 Section 64(2)(h) provides that deemed accommodated activities under section 65 amount to accommodated activities.
120 Which would also enable, in a terrestrial context, the compulsory acquisition of land for injection.
121 This involves the provision of certain information in an application to the Minister, and a discretionary decision by the Minister 
as to whether RMA permission rights should be waived. it also requires, among other requirements, that the activity become 
a deemed accommodated activity before consent is applied for under the RMA.
122 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, Sched 2, part 1, cl 10(d).
123 Similar to the manner in which certain Crown owned minerals are excluded from CMT management under section 83(2).
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For completeness, status as an accommodated activity only negates the need to obtain an RMA 
permission right, and does not affect the exercise of the right to protect wahi tapu under a CMT.124 if a 
wahi tapu protection right is recognised in a CMT, this may restrict access to a formation to the extent 
recognised in that right, with only limited exceptions for fisheries.125 
17 Legislation Applicable to the eeZ  
and Coastal Marine Area
The Building Act 2004 requires approval for the construction, alteration, demolition and removal of 
buildings, under section 40 of the Act. it is unlikely that the Act will apply to any activity involved in 
marine CCS injection. “Building” is defined as expressly excluding any vessel or boat, and construction 
standards applicable to ships are governed under the MTA. Similarly, any “offshore installation” 
used for petroleum mining, as defined in the MTA, is excluded from the definition of a building.126 
As has been discussed earlier in this Appendix, an injection platform for CCS does not at present 
amount to an offshore installation under the MTA, nor will it generally be used for petroleum mining 
(although in some cases it might). Thus, technically, CCS injection platforms would amount to 
“buildings”. However, the Building Act does not appear to apply outside the coastal marine area. There 
is a general presumption against the extraterritorial application of legislation unless the purpose of 
a statute suggests this interpretation is intended,127 and the bodies responsible for granting building 
consent under the Building Act are territorial authorities and regional councils (which possess no 
jurisdiction in the eeZ).128
The broad intent of section 9 of the Building Act suggests that such structures should not be regulated 
under that Act, given the similarities between CCS platforms and offshore petroleum installations. 
The construction of offshore installations for petroleum are currently regulated under the Health and 
Safety in employment (petroleum exploration and extraction) Regulations 2013, which provide for 
certificates of fitness and inspections in part 5. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Regulations do not currently apply to CCS, given that CCS does not relate 
to petroleum operations. However, the Regulations appear to be broadly appropriate for regulating 
the construction and operation of offshore CCS injection installations in both the coastal marine area 
and eeZ,129 although express reference to CCS specific standards could be usefully incorporated in 
the certificate of fitness process. We recommend that these regulations be amended to govern CCS 
installations, and provide for CCS specific design and construction requirements. The HSeA should 
also be amended to clarify that the Act and regulations apply to CCS installations in the eeZ and over 
the extended continental shelf. At present this jurisdiction is unclear.
124 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, s 64(1)(c).
125 Sections 78, 79.
126 Building Act 2004, s 9(f).
127 Police v Teddy [2013] nZHC 432, [2013] nZAR 299 at [5], [15].
128 Building Act 2004, ss 12 and 13.
129 Under regulation 3, an “offshore” installation means an installation “anywhere that is the seaward side of the mean high-water mark”.
Carbon Capture and Storage: Designing the Legal and Regulatory Framework for New Zealand422
18 Civil Liability for Marine pollution resulting 
from the escape of CO2 from a Submarine 
CCS pipeline
Currently, part 25 of the MTA imposes civil liability on the owner of a marine structure or person in 
charge of any marine operation for pollution damage in continental waters caused by the escape or 
discharge of a harmful substance, or caused by matter that is dumped. Given that the escape of gas from 
a pipeline does not amount to dumping (or damage from matter that has been dumped), and a marine 
“operation” requires that an operation be connected with the exploitation of mineral resources,130 
liability for pipelines under part 25 is currently limited to where damage is caused by the release of 
a harmful substance from a structure. A “structure” is defined as expressly including a pipeline.131 
“pollution damage” is defined widely as including “damage or loss of any kind”, and including losses of 
profit from the impairment of the environment.132 However, CO2 is unlikely to amount to a “harmful 
substance” as defined in the Marine protection Rules. if CO2 did amount to a harmful substance and a 
leak occurred from a pipeline into the water column, the liability of a person in charge of the operation 
would not currently be capped (as it would in the case of marine pollution from ships).133 
proposed part 26A, introduced by clause 62 of the MLB, is set to make changes to the regime for 
civil liability in relation to pollution damage from marine structures and operations, but no changes 
in relation to ships. Sections 355 to 360 of the existing part 25, relating to marine structures and 
operations, are repealed. instead, a new part 26A will provide for liability in relation to pollution 
damage from marine structures and operations.
Under proposed section 385C of the MTA, the owner of a marine structure (which would continue 
to be defined broadly enough to include a pipeline) or the person in charge of a marine operation 
(which would not include any operation in connection with CCS except to the extent this also 
amounted to eOR/eGR),134 would be liable in damages for pollution damage caused by a harmful 
substance discharged from that structure or operation, or by any matter dumped from that structure 
or operation. Liability would also extend to any cleanup costs by the Crown, or preventative measures 
taken by the Crown where there were a grave and imminent threat of such a discharge.135 The wide 
definition of pollution damage would remain the same as under the existing part 25.136
Therefore, as under part 25, a CCS pipeline under part 26A would amount to a “structure”, and a leak 
that caused damage to the marine environment could amount to “pollution damage”. However, as in 
part 25, a release of CO2 would not amount to the release of a “harmful substance” as defined in the 
Marine protection Rules, and thus proposed section 385C would not impose civil liability in relation 
to a discharge from a pipeline. 
130 Thus where CCS amounts to eOR or eGR, this will be caught by the definition of a marine operation.
131 Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 247.
132 Section 342.
133 There is no equivalent of section 347 (regarding limitation of liability for ships) in part 25 of the MTA for marine pollution caused 
by structures.
134 Because “marine operation” as defined in section 222 of the MTA requires an operation to be “for, or connected with, the 
exploration for, or the exploitation or associated processing of, any mineral in the sea or the seabed”.
135 Maritime Transport Act 1994, ss 385B and 385C(b).
136 Maritime Transport Act, s 385A, in the Marine Legislation Bill, cl 62.
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As discussed in the context of installations and formations, an option would be to classify CO2 as a 
harmful substance for the purposes of parts 25 and 26A of the MTA, and thus make a pipeline owner 
subject to liability for any escape of CO2 that caused pollution damage. We consider that there is 
not a strong case for doing so, given that more than minor adverse effects on the environment seem 
unlikely and due to the risk of disincentivising CCS. A lack of liability under section 385C would not 
restrict the ability of a person to take other forms of civil action for any private loss that did occur 
from an escape of CO2,
137 thus not infringing the requirement in Article 235 of UnCLOS that states 
provide some form of legal recourse for pollution damage. if CO2 is classified as a harmful substance 
under the MTA, it should be done for the purposes of parts 25 and 26A only, and not for the wider 
purposes of the Act; that would cause an overlap of jurisdiction by enabling MnZ to take action in 
relation to hazardous pipelines under part 20 of the MTA. 
We consider that liability for damage is an inadequate basis on which to regulate marine CCS pipelines. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, regulation would better achieved under health and safety regulation, the 
RMA, and CCS specific legislation.
19 The impact of part 20 of the MTA 
part 20 of the MTA outlines the powers of the director of Maritime new Zealand in relation to 
hazardous structures, offshore operations and ships. part 20 therefore potentially impacts on CCS 
injection and pipeline transport in terms of hazardous structures.
in the context of the injection phase of CCS, part 20 of the MTA has twofold significance: in relation 
to injection installations, and in relation to the discharge of CO2 from a storage formation. part 20 
has no general restrictive sections, but rather provides broad powers to the director under section 
249 to take measures to address hazardous structures and operations. effectively, part 19 establishes 
duties and liabilities for those conducting activities involving discharges of harmful substances, 
whereas part 20 allows wide measures to be taken to pre-empt, prevent and address such discharges. 
These part 20 powers are not proposed to be transferred to the eeZ Act regime under the MLB, even 
though they involve discharges.138
A hazardous structure includes a hazardous installation and a hazardous pipeline. A hazardous 
installation is defined as “an offshore installation in new Zealand continental waters that is 
discharging, or is likely to discharge a harmful substance into new Zealand continental waters or the 
seabed below them”, and a hazardous marine operation has an equivalent definition.139 part 20 will 
not apply to injection if CCS is classed as “dumping” rather than a discharge.140 nor will it apply if CO2 
is not a “harmful substance”. it will also not apply to escapes of gas from an injection installation or 
storage formation, because neither is an “offshore installation” (an offshore installation is defined 
only as those relating to petroleum operations). 
137 A restriction on taking other forms of civil action applies only to ships (Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 352). 
138 Maritime Transport Act, s 467A, in the Marine Legislation Bill, Sched 3.
139 Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 247.
140 Because the definition of “discharge” excludes anything that amounts to “dumping”.
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The definition of a pipeline in the MTA would include a CCS pipeline, but a “hazardous” pipeline 
requires that a pipeline be likely to discharge a harmful substance, which CO2 is not. 
The director’s powers to take action under section 249 are not limited to where discharges are likely 
to occur from an offshore installation, but apply to all “operations”. However, a “marine operation” 
is defined in section 222 as being connected with the exploitation only of minerals.
it is also unlikely that the director would currently have the legal power to take measures in relation 
to CCS injection or CCS pipelines under section 250 of the MTA. This section imposes additional 
matters required for action to be taken under section 249, and provides (emphases added):
The director shall not issue any instructions, or take any measures, under section 248 or section 249 
unless the issue of such instructions, or the taking of such measures, appears necessary to the 
director to avoid, reduce, or remedy pollution, or a significant risk of pollution, by a harmful 
substance that is causing, will cause, or will be likely to cause serious harmful consequences to 
the marine environment or marine interests.
injection is unlikely to amount to “pollution”, or meet the high threshold of being likely to cause 
“serious harmful consequences to the marine environment”. 
An escape of CO2 from a formation to the water column may have consequences for the marine 
environment and marine interests and be classed as “pollution”, although “serious harmful” 
consequences is a high threshold and seems unlikely to be met in most cases. 
Thus the director currently has no powers to issue instructions or take measures in relation to leaking 
CCS injection installations or storage formations. in the context of section 250, it is worth noting here 
that changes are to be made by the MLB in relation to the kinds of substances subject to the section.141 
However, the changes in the MLB do not include changes to section 249, and therefore action could 
still only be taken under part 20 in relation to “structures” and “operations” that would be likely to 
discharge a “harmful substance”. 
An option would be for amendments to be made to the MTA to classify CO2 as a harmful substance, 
and an injection platform and storage formation to be deemed to be offshore installations. 
However, we consider that there is not a strong case for including CO2 as a harmful substance for the 
purposes of part 20, given that this would produce an undesirable overlap in jurisdiction relating to 
pipelines (which are, in Chapter 9, recommended to be governed under health and safety regulations, 
the RMA and CCS legislation), storage formations (which are recommended to be governed under 
targeted CCS legislation) and injection installations (which are recommended to be governed under 
the RMA, eeZ Act and health and safety regulations, along with CCS legislation for discharges of 
CO2 to the atmosphere). For the same reason, storage formations should not be included within the 
definition of a “structure” or “offshore installation”. However, we consider that injection installations 
should be included within the definition of an “offshore installation”, to ensure that the powers in 
part 20 apply when there is a risk of a discharge of a other substances already classified as hazardous. 
The purpose of a CCS installation should not exempt it from the requirements of the Act in relation 
to all hazardous substances.
141 Clause 47 of the Marine Legislation Bill replaces section 250 of the MTA. This has greater significance in relation to discharges 
from ships.
